Towards an anatomy of protracted scientific controversy: perpetuated negotiation in the 'directed mutation' debate. by Jarvis, L.H.M.
Towards an anatomy of protracted scientific
controversy: perpetuated negotiation in the 
‘directed mutation’ debate
Miss Louise Hannah Mary Jarvis
PhD Thesis 
University College London 
Department of Science and Technology Studies
1
UMI Number: U591505
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U591505
Published by ProQuest LLC 2013. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
Abstract
In 1988 an article from the Harvard School of Public Health sparked the 
‘directed mutation’ debate. Its authors claimed that bacteria starved of their 
accustomed food were able to specifically control their genetic mutations and so 
adapt directly to use alternative food sources. Apparently, they were not at the 
mercy o f random mutation to achieve adaptation as Neo-Darwinian theory 
demands. Rather, the authors claimed the bacteria chose their mutations and 
participated in their evolution as Lamarckian theorists had previously supposed.
The controversy that followed was comprised o f two sub-debates. The first 
concerned negotiation of this molecular genetic anomaly in bacteria. The second 
concerned the broader debate between Lamarckians and Darwinians, and 
contributed a new episode to a considerable historical legacy of similar dissent.
The directed mutation debate has been protracted. I argue that it has been 
prolonged by active factors, which I refer to as ‘perpetuating forces’. These 
include: the historical and cultural context o f the controversy, the influence of 
scientific dogma on the evaluation of the anomalies, the role of defamation by 
association in Lamarckian resurrections, the interdisciplinary contest for 
authority and participants’ styles of advocacy. I also analyse the role of the 
Internet in the protraction of this debate and provide quantitative analysis of the 
scale change caused by uptake o f the debate in what I term ‘the Internet forum’.
To enable this analysis I apply boundary theory and the cartographic 
metaphor. I extend that theory in line with its’ architects recommendations; 
addressing the concept of ‘old maps’, and identifying boundary work at the 
interdisciplinary boundaries within the territory ‘science’.
I, Louise Hannah Mary Jarvis, confirm that the work presented in this 
thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I 
confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.
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Figure 1: Information panel on ‘the walk of life’ at Chester Zoo in 2002
Reads: ‘Earlier, a scientist called Lamarck suggested that living things inherited features / 
characteristics developed during the lifetime of their parents. Lamarck believed that giraffes 
inherited long necks from ancestors who physically stretched them while browsing on trees.
Darwin thought that this was untrue. He argued that giraffes evolved long necks from ancestors 
who happened to have slightly longer necks. Those acquired more food, survived better, and 
passed on ‘long neck’ genes to their offspring.’
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‘.. .what becomes of he who deals the king a non-lethal blow?’
Franklin Stahl, 1990
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Introduction
In this thesis I examine a range of hypotheses in relation to one primary and 
several ancillary case studies of scientific controversy. The primary case study is 
the directed mutation debate. That debate began in 1988, when a team of 
molecular biologists from the Harvard School of Public Health reported an 
anomaly in the mutational processes and evolution of Escherichia coli bacteria 
subjected to starvation conditions.1 The team, led by eminent scientist John 
Cairns, claimed that the bacteria they had observed were able to control, or 
determine, the kinds of mutation they experienced in these conditions. It 
appeared that the bacteria were able to direct their genetic changes specifically 
towards the achievement of adaptation to use alternative available food sources. 
The team labelled this process ‘directed mutation’.
Neo-Darwinian theory demands that mutation be understood as a random 
process, not guided in any way by the demands of the environment; the 
mutations that arise within organisms do so with no regard for utility. In 
Darwinian theory, organisms that face an environmental challenge are at the 
mercy of random mutation for the achievement of an adaptation that allows 
them to survive. Thus, the Harvard claim was not compatible with orthodox 
Darwinian evolutionary theory. Furthermore, Cairns’ team framed their 
observations in Lamarckian language, adding still greater unorthodoxy to their 
claims. The advocates of directed mutation claimed that the cells they had 
observed participated in their evolution, even going as far as to suggest that the 
cells ‘chose’ their mutations. The negotiation of the validity of the teams’ 
observations, and of the validity of their non-Darwinian and possibly 
Lamarckian claims, formed a debate that has continued for almost two decades.
The project has six key objectives:
i) To provide the first complete historical narrative describing the directed 
mutation debate.
1 Cairns, J., Overbaugh, J. & Miller, S. (1988) The origin o f mutants. Nature, 335: 142-145.
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ii) To identify protracted scientific controversies as having particular 
characteristics, structure and dynamics which differentiate them from other 
kinds of conflicts.
iii) To demonstrate that some active factors, which may be common to many 
controversies, can contribute to the perpetuation of the negotiation phase. And to 
show that it is these factors which confer a special/common quality upon 
protracted controversies.
iv) To assess the usefulness of some existing methodological tools to the 
specific study of protracted controversies. To suggest modifications to some of 
those methodological tools, with the goal of enhancing their usefulness in the 
study of perpetuated negotiation. In particular, to explore potential modifications 
of Boundary Theory and cultural cartography.
v) To recommend a methodology suited to the specific study of protracted 
scientific controversies and perpetuated negotiation.
vi) To examine the role of the Internet in contemporary scientific 
controversies, particularly regarding its role as an agent of controversy 
perpetuation.
1.1 Project theses
In this project I make four central claims, that are discussed throughout and 
unite the chapters:
1. I argue that protracted scientific controversies have a particular 
character that distinguishes them from other kinds of conflict. I suggest that 
certain features of their structure, dynamics and participation contribute to and 
determine their protraction, and that as a consequence a wide range of protracted 
controversies might share certain common qualities. I suggest it might be 
possible to identify a ‘general anatomy’ of protracted controversy, but argue that 
existing methodologies are often poorly suited to describe that anatomy since 
they prioritise resolution events over negotiation processes.
2. I argue that the protraction of the directed mutation debate, and 
possibly also that of other scientific debates, is determined by a number of
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active factors. In this project I identify a range of these and refer to them as 
‘perpetuating forces’. The perpetuating forces named and discussed here are 
those that appear to have had the most significant role in the protraction of the 
directed mutation debate. However, I have aimed to classify these forces in 
groups broad enough that they might be transferable as categories for identifying 
perpetuating factors in other case study conflicts. Therefore, the perpetuating 
forces I consider are:
a) Historical legacies (Chapter 3.1)
b) The use of ‘old maps’ of cultural authority (Chapter 3.2)
c) Scientific dogma (Chapter 3.3)
d) The clash of sub-disciplines (Chapter 4.1)
e) Advocacy of one or more key individuals (Chapter 4.2)
f) The uptake of debate in the Internet forum (Chapter 5)
I describe how each of these factors has determined the protraction of the 
directed mutation debate and, using supporting case studies, I indicate how each 
might act more broadly in protracted controversies. I suggest that a useful 
methodology for analysing controversy perpetuation would necessarily focus on 
these factors.
3. I argue that the directed mutation debate cannot be successfully 
analysed if viewed as either local or episodic. Rather than being a defined 
incidence of conflict in science, it is instead one conflict event in a series of 
similar and/or related contests. I argue that extrinsic factors of cultural and 
social context have been at least as important in this debate as intrinsic factors. I 
demonstrate links between this contest and those that provide its historical 
legacy, showing that they are bound together. I argue that existing methodology 
is often unsuited to explore this complexity, and that as a result the symmetry of 
controversy accounts suffers. I suggest that building a study of every aspect of a 
controversy, including its history and broader context is essential to reaching an 
understanding of its structure and dynamics.
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4. I argue that scientific conflicts that develop a strong Internet presence
take on a character that distinguishes them from debates that are conducted only 
in the already clearly defined ‘constitutive’ and ‘contingent’ forums of scientific 
debate. I suggest that the Internet represents a new forum for debate; that has its 
own qualities and must be recognised as an additional context for negotiation if 
we are to understand the structure and dynamics of contemporary scientific 
conflicts. I suggest that, in order to analyse the activity in this forum we require 
a new methodology. I demonstrate that many of the structures and 
visual/language tools in the existing methodology fail to translate to the 
conditions in that forum. I suggest that a new methodology would need to 
account for the large community involved in Internet-based debate, the complex 
groupings within that larger community, the interaction between specialist and 
non-specialist groups, and the classification of the various ‘qualities’ of 
contribution that those groups make.
1.2_____Introducing terminology
To enable this discussion I introduce the following terms:
a) Perpetuating force -  to describe any of the active factors that I identify 
as the agents of protraction in this controversy.
b) Loud vs. Quiet advocacy -  to describe individuals’ different styles of 
advocacy during controversies.
c) The Internet Forum -  to describe the space for debate that is
represented by Internet publication. I add this to the categories ‘contingent 
forum’ and ‘constitutive forum’ that have already been identified as spaces for 
debate by Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch. I suggest that it combines several of 
their features, along with some that are particular to it, in a novel way that
makes it a new forum in its own right.
L3 Project methodology
Chapter 1 identifies the key methodological tools available for the study of
controversy, and describes the combined methodology that I have used in this
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project. In this chapter I describe the transition between essentialist and 
constructivist accounts of science that has taken place in science studies and 
suggest that a methodology created from a combination of the existing 
approaches is best suited to enable the analysis undertaken here. I argue that 
even the essentialist accounts, which have been criticised regarding their 
demarcation criteria, can remain useful to the study of controversy if  their visual 
or language tools are put to work in abstraction from their essentialist premise.
I identify boundary work as the most broadly useful methodology for this 
project. In particular, I suggest that it is ideal for the analysis of the legacy of 
conflict between Lamarckians and Darwinians that underlies the directed 
mutation debate. Thomas Gieryn has suggested that boundary theory might be 
developed through attention to the concepts of ‘old maps’ and ‘interdisciplinary 
boundary work’. In this thesis I explore and develop those two extensions to 
boundary theory.
>  ‘Old maps’: In Chapter 1 ,1 describe how boundary theory assumes that 
the delineation and associated authority of any cultural space is constantly being 
drawn and redrawn during every episode of conflict. The local and episodic 
identity of cultural spaces and authority relations is fundamental to the theory. 
However, in the case of the history of Darwinian theory we see that its cultural 
authority has experienced a degree of persistence between conflict episodes. 
Gieryn acknowledges that certain cultural spaces can become ‘stabilized’, as 
unquestioned tacit assumptions are replicated between authority contests. Both 
Darwinism and Lamarckism seem to be ideal examples of the kind of 
‘uncontested old maps’ that Gieryn considers this process might produce. In 
Chapter 3 I explore the idea of ‘old maps’ as a way of penetrating the complex 
status o f Darwinism and Lamarckism throughout the 20th century and into the 
21st.
> ‘Interdisciplinary boundaries’ In Chapter 1, I acknowledge Gieryn’s 
statement that boundary theory has chiefly addressed the delineation of science 
‘from something else altogether’, rather than examining the delineations that 
determine the boundaries between the various sub-disciplines within the cultural 
territory ‘science’. In Chapter 4, I argue that the concepts and categories of
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boundary work that have already been developed in the study of the delineation 
of science from other cultural territories can equally be transferred to describe 
the conflicts that occur within science and determine the delineations of the sub­
disciplines. I describe the conflict between evolutionary biologists and 
molecular biologists, which is at the heart of the directed mutation debate, using 
the terms that have already been developed and put to work in boundary studies 
of the delineation of the territory ‘science’. I suggest that the same activities are 
apparent at the interdisciplinary boundary as at the disciplinary boundary. I 
argue that the same tools of cartography are useful to understanding these 
delineations, but that a larger scale map is needed to depict the internal world of 
the cultural territories in more detail.
Various other methodological tools are applied in specific areas of the project. 
O f particular importance are:
>  Collins’ core-set terminology and Empirical Programme of Relativism 
(EPOR). In Chapter 2 these are used together to describe the structure of the 
early part of the directed mutation debate (1980-1990) and to order the 
participants in the journal-based phase of the negotiation.
>  Patricia Fara’s classification of the qualities of ‘genius’. This is 
employed in Chapter 3 as a tool to identify the tactics used to raise Charles 
Darwin as an icon during the 1959 centennial celebrations.
>  Betty Smocovitis’ analysis of the functions of celebration. This is 
discussed in Chapter 3 in relation to boundary work function o f the centennial 
celebrations.
>  Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions and Lakatos’ theory of research 
schools. These are discussed to reveal the different activity and approaches in 
molecular biology and evolutionary biology in Chapter 4.1.
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> Irving Langmuir’s theory of pathological science. This is employed in 
Chapter 4.2 to evaluate whether Cairns’ style of advocacy qualifies as 
‘pathological’.
>  The various cartographies of cyberspace that visualize the Internet. In 
Chapter 5. I compare the depiction of adjacency in those cartographies with the 
representations of adjacency, and thus authority, that are recorded in Gieryn’s 
cartography.
L4 Project structure
Chapter 1 has two principal aims; first, to provide an overview of the many 
existing approaches to scientific controversy and the methodologies that they 
rely upon, and second, to outline this project’s methodology, which I have 
synthesised from elements of several of those existing approaches. The chapter 
describes the trend away from essentialist and philosophical explanations of 
science and scientific activity towards more constructivist and sociological 
accounts. It describes how, for some authors, questions about the nature of 
science have shifted their focus from the ‘demarcation’ problem to the 
‘boundary’ problem. In this chapter I identify the ‘end-directedness’ common to 
many accounts of scientific controversy, and highlight this as an impediment to 
the study of protracted controversy.
Chapter 2 is a detailed case study of the structure and dynamics of the directed 
mutation debate, from its inception in the 1980s, through to the present day. The 
historical narrative is constructed from the primary materials of the journal- 
based debate, the Internet-based debate, and oral history accounts. This case 
study has two functions in relation to my analysis: First, to provide the basis for 
a discussion o f the structure and dynamics of the debate. Second, in association 
with other supporting case studies, to launch a discussion of some more general 
issues relating to the nature of scientific controversy. The use of a specific case 
study as the basis for a more general analysis of scientific controversy follows a 
good deal of precedent.
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Chapter 3 addresses three of the six perpetuating forces that I describe in this 
project: historical legacies, old maps and scientific dogma. I argue that these 
aspects of the broader context of the debate influenced the participants, and 
affected their interactions and response to the challenge that directed mutation 
presented. In this chapter, I describe how the directed mutation debate arose 
within the context of significant established attachment to Darwinism coupled 
with significant established antagonism to Lamarckism. I describe how that 
broad context for the debate shaped its character, influenced its participants, and 
ultimately protracted the negotiation phase and impeded closure.
Chapter 4 deals with a further two of the six perpetuating forces: the clash of 
sub-disciplines and the role of advocacy. I argue that one of the principal forces 
of protraction of the directed mutation debate has been that it engaged two 
disciplinary groups: molecular biologists and evolutionary biologists. (4.1) I also 
argue, that the debate has been actively protracted by individuals, on account of 
their chosen styles of advocacy. (4.2)
In Chapter 5 I argue that the Internet represents a new, important and poorly 
understood forum for scientific debate, and that understanding the conditions of 
that forum will be essential to understanding the quality of contemporary 
scientific debates. This chapter describes the many contributions that comprise 
the directed mutation debate on line. I argue that at the point of uptake the scale 
of the debate increased dramatically, and the meanings of the debate diversified. 
The new audiences and participants changed the terms and meanings of the 
debate, so that many closures were needed rather than just one. In this chapter I 
ask whether closure is even possible in the kinds of diversified debates that the 
Internet encourages.
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Chapter 1: Methodology and Literature Review
This chapter seeks to locate this project’s content and methodological approach as a 
contribution to the ongoing endeavour to understand scientific controversy. A wealth 
of literature describes the structure and dynamics of that aspect of science. This 
chapter categorizes and evaluates that literature, focussing chiefly on the technical 
resources that I have selected and combined to create the methodology of this 
project. I suggest that a methodology synthesised from aspects of a wide variety of 
the existing approaches is the most appropriate to this study of protracted 
controversy.2
Many analyses of scientific controversy have emerged from attention to the 
‘demarcation’ problem.3 That is to say, they have been generated as part of 
investigations of the means by which: i) science has achieved and maintained its 
special status in relation to society throughout history, ii) science has been perceived 
as a more likely and/or abundant source of ‘truth’ and knowledge than other forms 
of intellectual or creative work, and iii) scientists and the public determine the 
distinction between science and non-science, and between scientific orthodoxy and 
unorthodoxy. There is a long history of attention to these issues from philosophers, 
sociologists and historians, in which the changing perceptions of and approaches to 
scientific controversy are embedded.
Section 1.1 provides an overview of the various approaches that have 
constituted that history, focussing on how the ‘demarcation problem’ came to be 
reinterpreted as the ‘boundary problem’ in more recent sociological treatments.
Section 1.2 describes a selection of models and analyses that are usually 
classified as philosophical, or perhaps ‘essentialist’. I argue that despite the 
essentialist critique, which has rendered such theories less popular, elements of their 
language and visual tools remain useful in the context of a synthetic methodology
2 An account o f the research method used in this project appears in Appendix 1, alongside a 
description o f the conception and design of this thesis.
3 See Gieryn , T. (1983) Boundary work and the demarcation o f science from non-science: strains and 
interests in professional ideologies of scientists. American Sociological Review, 48, 781-795 and 
Gieryn, T. (1995) Boundaries of science. In: S. Jasanoff, G. E. Markle, J. C. Petersen and T. Pinch 
(Eds) Handbook of Science and Technology Studies. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA.
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that employs them in abstraction from their essentialist premise. I describe those 
elements that I have selected to contribute to the combined methodology of this 
project.
Section 1.3 explores a selection of approaches that are sociological, or 
perhaps ‘constructivist’. I focus particularly on the concepts of ‘boundary work’ and 
the ‘cartographic metaphor’ as outlined and explored by sociologists Thomas 
Gieryn4, Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch5, and historians Steven Shapin and Simon 
Schaffer6. In this thesis I argue that boundary work methodology provides an 
excellent tool for the study of the historical conflict between Lamarckism and 
Darwinism, but that it requires modification to be equally useful in the more specific 
study of the directed mutation debate. Thus, in section 1.3 I outline some 
modifications that might extend the methodology to describe contests within science 
as well as contests between science and other domains. I also discuss the notion of 
‘old maps’ (which Gieryn has identified as a topic for further research7), and their 
relevance to the history of Darwinism and Lamarckism.
In section 1.4 I describe some treatments of scientific controversy that have 
emerged from contexts other than those associated with explicit attention to the 
demarcation and boundary problems. These include controversy analyses generated 
from policy, politics and economics studies, as well as those emerging from popular 
accounts of scientific controversy. I identify some methodological contributions that 
these treatments might make to the analysis I undertake in this project.
Section 1.5 explores the use of history and the role of narrative in 
controversy analyses. This section highlights precedent for, and merits of, the ‘case 
study-based’ approach that this project adopts.
4 Gieryn, T. (1995)
5 See for examples o f Collins’ and Pinch’s treatment of the ‘boundary problem’: Collins, H. & Pinch, 
T. (1979) The construction o f the paranormal: nothing unscientific is happening. In: R. Wallis (Ed.) 
On the margins o f science. Sociological Review Monographs 27, University o f Keele Press, Keele; 
Collins, H. & Pinch, T. (1993) The Golem: what you should know about science. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge.
6 Shapin, S. & Schaffer, S. (1985) Leviathan and the air pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the experimental 
life. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
7 Gieryn, T. (1999a) Cultural boundaries o f science: credibility on the line. University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago.
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In section 1.6 I identify the ‘end directed’ trend manifest in many of the 
controversy treatments described in this chapter. I describe the context for the 
emergence of that trend and highlight the disadvantages of its pervasive influence. 
The problems of end-directed identities of scientific controversy are discussed, in 
particular the problem of ‘asymmetry’. I identify ‘boundary work’ methodology as 
one approach that might potentially avoid these problems and thus enable a more 
revealing and symmetrical discussion of protracted or perpetuated controversies.
Finally, in section 1.7 I show that adopting the notion or language of 
‘perpetuating forces’ relieves the problem of end-direction. Perpetuating forces 
allow controversy to be reframed with ‘activity’ emphasised over ‘outcome’. This 
section describes how my project analyses the directed mutation debate in relation to 
possible examples of perpetuating forces in action. I argue that the concept of 
perpetuating forces enables a particularly rich and clear interpretation of the 
circumstances of that debate.
Throughout this chapter I explore the argument that reliance on the newer 
sociological tools, in the absence of comparison and contrast with the older 
philosophical tools and the less explicit tools of historians, results in analyses of 
controversy that lack some of the clarity and richness that might be achieved through 
a more integrated methodological approach.
1.1 Modelling conflict: from ‘demarcation’ to the ‘boundary problem’.
The ‘demarcation problem’, or the ‘boundary problem’ as we might term it 
in line with more recent treatments8, asks: ‘Where does science leave off, and 
society — or technology — begin? Where is the border between science and non­
science?’.9 There is a long tradition of attention to these questions. In asking how 
science has come to achieve and retain its special status in relation to other
8 See Barnes, B. (1974) Scientific knowledge and sociological theory. Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
London for the ‘setting up’ of the ‘boundary problem’ and Gieryn, T. (1995) for discussion of the 
boundary problem and various approaches to it.
9 Gieryn, T. (1995) p.393
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knowledge-producing or creative activities, theorists have inevitably faced the 
problem of trying to define science and its demarcation from other kinds of activity. 
The search for that definition has driven theorists to identify the ‘boundaries of 
science’, and to consider how those boundaries are policed and redrawn, and 
therefore, how the scientific community demarcates orthodoxy from unorthodoxy.
The models and analytical materials produced often address conflict in 
science, since episodes of controversy seem to provide clear and abundant examples 
of demarcation or boundary work activities. As a result, the literature is dominated 
by descriptions of how the ‘mainstream’ or ‘establishment’ responds to unorthodox 
researchers or anomalous findings as it seeks to protect its authority. The processes 
of marginalization and discredit are common themes. Some analyses focus on the 
ways in which knowledge is affected when orthodoxy and unorthodoxy or even 
science and non-science clash. Others focus on the behaviour and motivation of the 
participants in these conflicts.
Many of these analyses are fraught with problems of asymmetry. They 
assume a predetermined or predefined identity of orthodoxy and unorthodoxy, and 
assume a dynamic between the two that privileges orthodoxy over the unorthodox. 
To promote symmetry, analyses of conflict must abandon the a priori assumptions 
embodied in those categories. There is a tendency or temptation to look at 
controversies teleologically, and make analyses of them based upon which parties it 
seems turned out to be ‘right’ at the end of the conflict (see section 1.6). A 
symmetrical approach instead focuses attention on the reasons that certain parties 
had for assuming their position, and attempts to show the force of those reasons 
other than in relation to the outcome of the conflict. As philosopher and sociologist 
Sergio Sismondo explains, the symmetrical approach ‘attempts to recover rationality 
in controversies, where the rationality of one or another side is apt to be dismissed or 
forgotten.’ A symmetrical approach would view each episode of demarcation or 
boundary work as part of an ongoing negotiation of veiy moveable boundaries. In 
symmetrical terms the categories ‘orthodox’ and ‘unorthodox’ are re-determined 
during each episodic or local event that comprises that ongoing negotiation. Theories 
and analyses borne out of constructivist attention to the boundary problem promote a
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stronger degree of symmetry than the studies of demarcation based on an essentialist 
perspective. The newer sociological approaches abandon the a priori assumptions of 
the essentialist view of science, and therefore are better positioned to achieve a 
symmetrical approach to controversy studies. Of the approaches to controversy 
discussed here, Thomas Gieryn’s boundary work methodology provides perhaps the 
best opportunity for symmetrical analysis (as described in section 1.3). The 
symmetry principle is discussed further below.
Before discussing and categorising various treatments of controversy, it is 
useful to appreciate the context of their generation. In particular, it is important in 
terms of this thesis to recognise the degree to which constructivist sociological 
models of science and scientific controversy have challenged the older philosophical 
approaches to the demarcation of science.10 This project advocates the use of a 
methodology synthesised from elements of both the essentialist and constructivist 
accounts, and so it is useful to understand their relationship to each other.
A significant attempt to resolve the demarcation problem was mounted 
during the 1930s by the group of philosophers that constituted the Vienna Circle. 
Those philosophers developed the ‘logical positivist’ approach to define the 
character of science in relation to other activities.11 Logical positivism maintains that 
scientific theories are established through an inductive process that transforms 
accumulated data points into general statements. A scientific theory therefore is ‘a 
mere summary of possible observations, in a logically structured language’.12 The 
methodology of science appears to ensure the success of this inductive process since 
it provides frameworks ‘in which it is possible to unequivocally generalize from 
data’.13 Logical positivism, like the philosophical theories that were to follow, was 
essentialist. It identified the special character of science as an intrinsic quality, in 
this case conferred by the methodology of science itself.
10 Gieryn, T. (1995)
11 Sismondo, S. (2004) An introduction to science and technology studies. Blackwell Publishing, 
Malden, MA.
12 Sismondo, S. (2004) p.2
13 Sismondo, S. (2004) p.2
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During the 1960s the philosopher Karl Popper proposed alternative 
demarcation criteria.14 Popper had been on the margins of the Vienna Circle and 
retained their essentialist perspective. However, he criticised their inductivist 
approach, stating that no amount of observations could ever allow extension from a 
finite number of cases to a generalised rule ‘true’ of all cases. Instead of identifying 
the special nature of science as based upon the accumulation of observations, Popper 
suggested that a true scientific theory was ‘ falsifiable’. A falsifiable theory only 
makes predictions that are open to question, or for which a potential disproof can be 
imagined. Science is, in that view, not an inductive process, but rather a creative 
process of theoretical conjecture combined with scepticism.
Other theorists attempted to move beyond the formulation of demarcation 
criteria focused on the relations of data, observation, evidence and truth and the 
intrinsic qualities of science manifest in its methodology. Some developed 
approaches to account for the social structure and social function of science, while 
retaining the essentialist view that ultimately an intrinsic quality demarcates science. 
For example, during the 1940s, Robert Merton began to offer contributions to the 
demarcation problem from the perspective of sociology.15 For Merton, an 
institutionalized ethos replaced falsifiability as the keystone of scientific work.16 In 
his view, society is composed of a series of interacting institutions, each of which 
fulfils a particular function and contributes to ‘the stability and flourishing of the 
society’.17 Merton perceived science as having the institutional goal of extending 
certified knowledge.18 His was a functionalist view that saw science as a social and 
cultural structure that relied upon certain behavioural norms to make the fulfilment 
of its goal a more likely outcome. Merton identifies four norms: Communism, 
Universalism, Disinterestedness and Organised scepticism.19 Sociologist Thomas 
Gieiyn has said that if Merton’s norms are read as demarcation criteria ‘then 
knowledge-producing activities not ensconced in that institutionalized moral frame
14 See Popper, K. (1963) Conjectures and refutations. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.
15 Merton, R. (1942) The normative structure of science. In: N. Storer (Ed.) (1973) The sociology of 
science: theoretical and empirical investigations. University o f Chicago Press, Chicago.
16 Gieryn, T. (1995)
17 Sismondo, S. (2004) p.20
18 Merton, R. (1942) p.270
19 Merton, R. (1942); and for discussion of the four ‘norms’ see Gieryn, T. (1995)
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must be non-scientific’.20 So, Merton’s science is still essentialist in that an 
unalienable character defines it, although, the criteria for distinction are social rather 
than epistemic.
In 1962, historian Thomas Kuhn published his much celebrated work, The 
Structure o f  Scientific Revolutions21, in which he described his impression of the 
process of scientific change and ‘progress’. The impact of his contribution has in 
turn been referred to as ‘the Kuhnian revolution’.22 Kuhn’s analysis, while following 
Merton in taking account of social factors, was still roughly essentialist. Like his 
predecessors, Kuhn still sought the intrinsic features of science that defined its 
nature. However, as Gieryn points out, Kuhn did this with a degree of self- 
awareness, stating: ‘we must not, I think, seek a sharp or decisive ‘demarcation 
criterion” .23 Gieryn qualifies Kuhn’s attention to the value of demarcation stating 
that:
‘Still, looking back on Kuhn from a perspective shaped by 10 years 
of constructivist empirical studies of boundary-work, a case can be 
made that he set that line of inquiry in motion more as a foil than as a 
pioneer’.24
Kuhn’s analysis assumed that Popper’s concept of a constant process of 
conjecture and falsification was not a true reflection of scientific activity, at least not 
during the phase that Kuhn termed ‘normal science’25.26 In place of Merton’s ‘social 
norms’ Kuhn introduced ‘the moral force of cognitive norms’27, with science based 
upon consensus. He thought that consensus allowed ‘paradigms’ to be formed, 
representing the agreed theoretical framework for investigations. In his theory, when
20 Gieryn, T.(1995) p. 399
21 Kuhn, T. (1962) The structure o f scientific revolutions. Chicago University Press, Chiacgo.
22 Sismondo, S. (2004) p. 12
23 Kuhn, T. (1970) (Rev.2nd Ed.), The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago University Press, 
Chicago p.6, cf. in Gieryn, T. (1995)
24 Gieryn, T.(1995) p.401
25 Kuhn, T. (1962)
26 Gieryn, T. (1995)
27 Gieryn, T. (1995) p.401
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facts or observations arise that conflict with the paradigm they must be examined 
and, if the paradigm can be protected in light of them, they must be dismissed. If an 
anomaly arises that cannot be managed in the context of the paradigm, then Kuhn
perceived that a ‘scientific revolution’ would result, as the old paradigm was
28abandoned and replaced with a new framework of consensus.
Popper, Merton and Kuhn provide the key essentialist approaches relevant to 
this project. Numerous criticisms have been levelled at each of these approaches to 
science and the view of scientific conflicts that they expound.
For example, Popper’s conflicts (falsification attempts) are criticised for 
being too ubiquitous, too built-in to the scientific process and too incessant.29 His 
process of falsification relies upon the reproducibility of falsifying empirical 
evidence and assumes that the moment of falsification is apparent and un-negotiable 
to those involved. Sociologist Harry Collins has pointed out that cultural and 
rhetorical factors contribute significantly to scientists’ choices between theories, and 
that, therefore, falsification is contingent and social rather than natural or purely 
logical.
For Collins, Popper’s scheme is too idealistic, and does not allow for the 
social elements of science. In particular, Collins argues that there is no unambiguous 
way of knowing when an experiment has been reproduced effectively; the decision 
concerning the authenticity of a replication being open for scientists to decide. This 
leads to what Collins calls ‘experimenter’s regress’, in which decisions about the 
success of an experimental replication are inextricably tied to negotiation of the 
reality of the phenomenon being tested. As a case study illustration of this point, 
Collins describes the 1970s controversy surrounding physicists’ attempts to measure 
gravitational waves. In that case, one researcher’s initial claim to have detected such 
waves was followed by a rush of attempts at replication by other scientists at other 
locations. Some replications produced positive results and supported the initial
28 Kuhn, T. (1962)
29 See for example: Kuhn, T. (1977) The essentialist tension: selected studies in scientific tradition 
and change. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
30 Collins, H. (1985) Changing Order: replication and induction in scientific practice. Sage 
Publications, London.
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claim, while others detected no gravitational waves and so appeared to falsify the 
original reports. However, the negative results could be designated by the supporters 
of gravitational wave theory as the result of the use of non-functional equipment. 
The central problem is that it is only clear that an experimental system is working 
when it generates the desired results, and so cannot be used to obtain a negative 
result. This issue presents a serious problem for Popper, whose theory relies upon 
replication to test falsification.
Critics have argued that Merton’s norms are also too idealistic and thus ill- 
suited to describe conflicts undertaken in the inevitable context of widespread 
‘interests’. Harriet Zuckerman has argued that, in all likelihood, the norms are not 
constant, but rather are interpreted differently by different individuals at different 
times and in different places; that is norms of behaviour in science are contingent 
rather than ideal. Zuckerman argues that in reality Merton’s four norms are possibly 
not even common.31 Similarly, sociologist and cognitive scientist Aaron Cicourel 
has argued that behavioural norms in science are interpretive and are negotiated 
collectively by actors as they approach science as part of their everyday practice. 
Cicourel argues against essentialism and for a more social scheme involving the 
negotiation and deployment of norms that have been constructed by the actors 
involved.32
Sociologist Michael Mulkay suggests that Mertonian type norms might exist 
as a kind of point of reference for the scientific community, but that the way the 
community interacts with and relates to the norms at any given time is socially 
determined and contingent on a combination of factors. Mulkay considers that, at 
any time, interests will have an impact upon the way the norms are interpreted and 
acted upon. In Mulkay’s view, the norms are idealistic and can only provide a 
general point of reference when in the context of the social situations that constitute 
science as work.33 Furthermore, Mulkay has argued that there is little evidence of
31 Zuckerman, H. (1977) Deviant behaviour and social control in science. In: E. Sagarin (Ed.) 
Deviance and social change. Sage Publications, London; Zuckerman, H. (1984) Norms and deviant 
behaviour in science. Science, technology and human values, 9: 7-13.
32 Cicourel, A. (1974) Cognitive Sociology. Free Press, New York.
33 Mulkay, M. (1969) Some aspects of cultural growth in the sciences. Social Research, 36:22-52; 
Mulkay, M. (1980) Interpretation and the use of rules: the case of norms in science. In: T. Gieryn
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any rewards imperative of the Mertonian kind in science, or that conforming to the 
norms is linked, or perceived to be linked, to any system of rewards.34
Ian Mitroff has gone further, and identified a series of counter-norms that he 
claims exist in science in tension with the Mertonian norms. He argues that, the 
flexible combination and interpretation of these norms and counter-norms 
determines social behaviour in science. Mitroff based his counter-norms theory on 
interviews with 42 scientists involved in the Apollo moon project. He discovered 
that as well as valuing the four Mertonian norms, the scientists also thought that 
behaviours such as secrecy and emotional commitment were important in scientific 
activity. Mitroff lists six anti-norms: non-rationality, emotional commitment, 
particularism, solitariness, interestedness and organized dogmatism.
Finally, Kuhn’s conflict episodes have been criticised as too uniform and 
violent, and as assuming that too high a level of unpartisan objectivity determines 
the scientific community’s approach to unorthodox assaults on paradigmatic theory. 
Nigel Gilbert and Michael Mulkay have highlighted a fundamental problem with 
Kuhn’s paradigm and revolution scheme. They argue that the kind of widespread 
consensus that is vital to the operation of a paradigm is not apparent in the scientific 
community, suggesting that the reality of widespread discrepancies in the beliefs of 
individuals and sub-communities renders Kuhn’s ‘normal’ science untenable and 
unrealistic. Rarely is the scientific community so agreed on any issue as to be in a 
state of absolute consensus.36 Also, Kuhn’s notion of incommensurability between 
different paradigms seems to be similarly idealistic. Kuhn suggested that scientists 
working with different paradigms effectively inhabit ‘different worlds’.37 Several 
critics have pointed out that the history of science betrays a much greater continuity
(Ed.) Science and social structure: a festschrift for Robert Merton. Transactions of the New York 
Academy of Sciences, Series II, Vol.39. New York Academy of Sciences, New York.
34 Mulkay, M. (1975) Norms and ideology in science. Social Sciencelinformation, 15(4/5): 637-656.
35 Mitroff, I. (1974) Norms and counter-norms in a select group of Apollo moon scientists: a case 
study o f the ambivalence o f scientists. American Sociological Review, 39: 579-595.
36 Gilbert, N. & Mulkay, M. (1984) Opening Pandora’s box: a sociological analysis o f scientists ’ 
discourse. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
37 Kuhn, T. (1962)
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between periods of science history, and that the extent of change rarely seems 
sufficient to satisfy the criteria for Kuhn’s revolutions.38
These and other criticisms contributed to the essentialist critique that arose in 
the late twentieth century. Various authors encouraged an alternative view of science 
that took better account of the behaviours of its participants and the social settings in 
which it has been conducted. Rather than seeking the intrinsic quality that 
determined why science was attributed such status, theorists began to encourage us 
to consider how science had achieved that status; that is, what activities and 
processes of articulation have enabled science to achieve authority: they encouraged 
a constructivist approach. For example, in Gieryn’s view, the problem with the 
essentialist approach is that it seeks explanations for the superiority of science, 
without being reflexive about the fact that science has attained such status.39 Gieryn 
explains that the constructivist approach relieves this problem. He states:
‘Constructivists argue that no demarcation principles work 
universally and that the separation of science from other 
knowledge-producing activities is instead a contextually contingent 
and interests-driven pragmatic accomplishment drawing selectively 
on inconsistent and ambiguous attributes.’40
Gieryn adds that the constructivist approach, especially when drawn away from the 
quest for ‘demarcation criteria’ to the more open analysis of the ‘boundary problem’, 
asks more about the achievement of cultural authority, than about any intrinsic 
quality of science. He explains that:
38 See for examples: Bird, A. (2000) Thomas Kuhn. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ; 
Barnes, B. (1982) T.S. Kuhn and social science. Columbia University Press, New York; Davidson, D. 
(1974) On the very idea o f a conceptual scheme. Proceedings o f the American Philosophical 
Association, 47:5-20.
39 Gieryn, T. (1995)
40 Gieryn, T. (1995) p.393
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‘...attention shifts to representations of scientific practice and 
knowledge in situations where answers to the question, ‘what is 
science?’ move from tacit assumption to explicit articulation. The 
task of demarcating science is reassigned from analysts to people in 
society...’.41
During the 1970s the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) arose in an 
attempt to consolidate the social approach. The advocates of SSK suggested that the 
very material of scientific knowledge was itself socially contingent and constitutive. 
Scientific knowledge was not immune to analysis by virtue of any special quality, 
but could instead be analysed in the same way as other knowledge products. 
Traditionally, it had been suggested that science produced immutable asocial truths 
that were not available for analysis, with scientists involved in an ongoing dialogue 
with Nature through which they gained access to those truths. Scientists themselves 
may have been subject to sociological forces, but the knowledge they produced was 
immune from that activity. SSK arose as a criticism of that positivist approach to 
demarcation. It promoted a relativist approach to science study, in which both sides 
in any controversy are examined symmetrically using the same tools, and in which 
knowledge is a social construct rather than an immutable asocial truth.
While Merton and Kuhn42 had made moves towards the social, they had 
done so in a way that reflected the internalist/externalist debate. They saw social 
factors as impinging upon the scientific process - a kind of perturbation, often 
stemming from an external source. In particular, it seemed to them that 
pseudoscience or errors in science could be explained with reference to the influence 
of external social factors. As Steve Shapin suggests, during the 1960s heyday of 
Mertonian sociology the ‘social’ was a kind of contaminant of the scientific process.
41 Gieryn, T. (1995) p.405
42 Merton’s relation to SSK is apparent in as much as he was a founder of the sociology of science 
and so merged the social and scientific in such a way that the path was laid for the social study of 
scientific knowledge to emerge from the social study of scientific practice. Sociologist Barry Barnes 
argues that Kuhn’s contribution can also be traced in later developments in SSK. He considers that 
Kuhn merged science, sociology and history in his paradigm theory; the same convergence of 
subjects as was later promoted at Edinburgh where the strong programme of SSK arose. See: Barnes, 
B. (1982)
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The control of the ‘social’ was a concern, and Merton’s norms, for example, 
represented a means that scientists had created by which to control this influence. 
During this period, the sociology of science was marked by considerations of the 
external and internal, the rational versus the social, and the dualism of social and 
intellectual factors. With the birth of SSK, attention shifted to analysis of the extent 
to which society, rather than being a pollutant, was instead a necessary condition for 
the making, holding, extending and changing of knowledge products themselves.43
Early SSK was largely developed in Britain.44 During the 1970s a group of 
philosophers, sociologists and historians in Edinburgh set out to describe the content 
of scientific knowledge in sociological terms. They developed the ‘strong 
programme’ as a kind of mission statement for that enterprise.45 In 1976 David 
Bloor laid out the tenets of that programme.46 He suggested that SSK should:
i) offer causal explanations for the state of knowledge and the beliefs that 
develop around it.
ii) be impartial in relation to truth or falsity, success or failure; realising that 
both kinds of knowledge claims require explanation.
iii) be symmetrical i.e. assert that both true and false beliefs have the same kinds 
of explanation.
iv) be reflexive i.e. recognise that the patterns of explanation they apply to 
science should also be applicable to sociology and its knowledge 
products/beliefs.
43 Shapin, S. (1995b) Here and everywhere: sociology of scientific knowledge. Annual Review of 
Sociology, 21: 289-321.
44 The sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) was distinct from the existing sociology o f knowledge 
that had arisen slightly earlier. The sociology of knowledge had been pioneered by Karl Mannheim 
who, although rendering knowledge generally socially contingent, had stated that the ‘rational 
methodology o f the natural sciences precluded them from social explanation’. The founders of SSK 
wanted to extend the sociology of knowledge to cover scientific knowledge also; they wanted to be 
‘symmetrical’ in their analyses by treating science in the same ways as other activities. They called 
their programme ‘the strong programme’ to help distinguish its methodological goals from those of 
Mannheim. See Fuller, S. (1992) Being there with Thomas Kuhn: A parable for postmodern times. 
History and Theory, 31(3):241-275.
45 Sismondo, S. (2004)
46 Bloor, D. (1976) Knowledge and social imagery. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
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Investigations of the nature of scientific knowledge took several forms during the 
1970s and 1980s. SSK encouraged empirical studies, and a huge amount of 
historical work was done in line with the strong programme. Attention was turned 
to the role of ‘interests’ and objectives in the construction of scientific knowledge. 
The interests model showed that scientists choose which knowledge claims to 
support, or which knowledge to ‘believe’ in, in the context of various motivations 
that shape their choices, the representations that they offer and eventually the 
knowledge constructions that they produce.
For example, historian John Dean has shown that the morphological and 
genetic theories of plant species distinction were accepted simultaneously in the 20th 
century on account of the differing interests of the scientists in herbaria and 
museums versus scientists in laboratories and experimental settings.47 Steven 
Shapin has shown that the nineteenth century Edinburgh anatomy debate over the 
correct depiction of the human brain was fuelled by the social and political uses that 
were planned for those representations. Shapin links the growth of phrenology in 
the 1820s to contemporary heightened class struggles and the reform movement48 
Also Shapin, along with Simon Schaffer, has shown that the political and cultural 
causes underlay the choices between knowledge claims in the debate between 
Robert Boyle and Hobbes concerning Boyle’s air pump experiments 49
In line with the strong programme, interest analyses of this kind prioritise 
symmetry. Mertonian sociology was interested in social forces as external 
phenomena, rather than as an intrinsic part of knowledge production. Barry Barnes 
has pointed out that the newer interest analyses are not explicitly external or 
internal. For example, Dean’s analysis considers the ‘narrow esoteric’ objectives of 
scientists associated with their professional objectives and so is more like an 
internal history of science. Shapin and Schaffer on the other hand are concerned
47 Dean, J. (1979) Controversy over classification: a case study from the history of botany. In: B. 
Barnes & S. Shapin (Eds.) Natural Order. Sage Publications, London.
48 Shapin, S. (1979) The politics of observation. In: R. Wallis (Ed.) On the margins o f science: the 
social construction o f rejected knowledge. Sociological Review Monograph, 27: 139-178.
49 Shapin, S. & Schaffer, S. (1985)
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with the interests and objectives arising from the broader social and cultural context
and so provide a more external history.50
The interest models pursued as part of SSK have also been criticised. For
example, Cantor has criticised Shapin’s analysis of phrenology, saying that class
membership is not as clear as Shapin suggests and so cannot be linked with such
clarity as a cause of knowledge choices.51 Steve Woolgar argues that SSK advocates
invoke interests as causes without being able to draw a clear casual relationship
•  •  •between the interest they identify and the knowledge outcome they link it with. 
Yearley has added that this situation is exacerbated by the fact that interests are 
rarely straightforward or easy to identify.53 In spite of this, interests remain 
important to the sociological analysis of science, and the interest model is 
particularly useful for identifying motivations during periods of controversy.
Ethnomethodology arid discourse analysis have also been popular in SSK. In 
these analyses authors focus on specific accounts of knowledge that scientists give, 
for example in journal articles or in interviews. Materials are studied to show not 
the actions of scientists, but rather the accounts of action that scientists construct to 
achieve certain interpretations. In these studies, rhetoric and argument are identified 
as influencing decisions concerning knowledge and belief. Symmetrical analyses of 
discovery, that do not take account of the truth or falsity of a discovery, have been a 
common goal of ethnomethodological study and discourse analysis. Garfinkel, 
Lynch and Livingston have used tape recordings from the laboratory to analyse the 
discovery of the optical pulsar by Cocke and Disney.54 Collins has used interviews 
to study scientists’ attempts to build TEA lasers during the 1970s.55 Through these
50 Bames, B. (1990) Sociological theories of scientific knowledge. In: R. Olby, G. Cantor, J. Christie 
& M. Hodge (Eds.) Companion to the history of modern science. Routledge, London.
51 Cantor, G. (1975) A critique of Shapin’s social interpretation o f the Edinburgh phrenology debate. 
Annals o f Science, 32: 196-219.
52 Woolgar, S. (1981) Interests and explanation in the social study of science. Social Studies of 
Science, 11: 365-394.
53 Yearley, S. (1982) The relationship between epistemological and sociological cognitive interests: 
some ambiguities underlying the use of the interest theory in the study o f scientific knowledge. 
Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 13: 353-388.
54 Garfinkel, H., Lynch, M., Livingston, E. (1981) The work of discovering science construed with 
materials from the optically discovered pulsar. Philosophy of the social sciences, 11: 131-158.
55 Collins, H. (1974) The TEA set: tacit knowledge and scientific networks. Science Studies, 4: 165- 
186.
33
kinds of studies the processes of attribution and credit in science have come to be 
better understood as a social process. Also, Collins’ study enabled him to identify 
the craftwork elements of knowledge sharing and acquisition, and the role of tacit 
knowledge in science practice. However, these studies have also received criticism. 
Gilbert and Mulkay have criticised the interview technique in general, suggesting 
that the statements scientists make cannot be viewed as a source of valid 
information, other than that concerning scientists’ patterns of discourse.56 Mulkay 
has gone as far as to say that sociologists cannot use discourse to define or explain 
science because it is dependent on the very nature of scientists discourse.57
Trevor Pinch has identified the distinction between the various approaches to 
SSK as a difference in where they ‘locate the constraining features of the social 
world’. For interest theorists, the social content is in communities or in the wider 
cultural context. For ethnomethodologists, the constructed accounts of science 
themselves manifest the social legacy.58 Pinch points out, however, that the various 
approaches in SSK are not mutually exclusive, but rather can be used in combination 
to illuminate a particular situation from a variety of perspectives.
A key outcome of the constructivist, anti-essentialist and SSK approaches 
has been the redefinition of the ‘demarcation’ problem as the ‘boundary’ problem. 
Sociologist Thomas Gieryn has been a key force in that redefinition, and has been 
developing his ‘boundary theory’ since the early 1980s.59 For Gieryn, the 
redefinition allows a different interpretation of science. Rather than being an 
enterprise with ‘essential’ character, science can be thought of as a cultural territory, 
the perimeters of which are contingent and open to review. The territory ‘science’ 
confers cultural authority, and exists adjacent to other kinds of cultural domain. 
Scientists negotiate and assert the location of the territorial boundaries, but they do 
so in unison with many other individuals, from other cultural territories, who are
56 Gilbert, G & Mulkay, M. (1984)
57 Mulkay, M., Potter, J. & Yearley, S. (1983) Why an analysis of scientific discourse is needed. In: 
Knorr-Cetina & M. Mulkay (Eds.) Science Observed: Perspectives on the social study of science.
Sage Publications, London.
58 Pinch, T. (1990) The sociology of the scientific community. In: R. Olby, G. Cantor, J. Christie &
M. Hodge (Eds.) Companion to the history of modern science. Routledge, London, p.95-96.
59 Gieryn, T. (1983)
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also interested in establishing the boundaries of science. The boundaries are located 
and maintained as various individuals carry out the active task of ‘boundary work’. 
Boundaries are in general drawn and redrawn continuously, and the distribution of 
authority changes as this occurs. Gieryn states that:
‘ Boundary work occurs as people contend for, legitimate, or challenge the cognitive 
authority of science -  and the credibility, prestige, power, and the material resources 
that attend such a privileged position. Pragmatic demarcations of science from non­
science are driven by a social interest in claiming, expanding, protecting, 
monopolizing, usurping, denying or restricting the cognitive authority of science.’60
Gieryn suggests that when issues of epistemic authority arise, for example 
during controversies, people attempt to draw boundaries that allocate authority such 
that the debate is resolved one way or another. However, the activity of boundary 
work is interest driven. The groups or individuals that are in conflict attempt to draw 
boundaries such that they allocate themselves the required cultural authority to 
decide the resolution of any debate. As Sismondo has put it: ‘When issues of 
epistemic authority arise, people attempt to draw boundaries: to have authority on a 
contentious issue requires that at least some other people do not have it.’61 A group 
might attempt to extend the boundaries of their territory in order to gain extra 
authority to succeed in conflict, or a group might attempt to decrease or control the 
territory of another group to protect cultural authority already held. The boundaries 
are fluid, and are constantly being negotiated and redrawn through local and 
episodic contests. Authority is lost and gained by various groups during each 
contest, and with these changes in delineation of territory come changes in the 
cultural authority of the groups concerned.
60 Gieryn, T. (1995) p.405
61 Sismondo, S. (2004) p.30
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A popular tool for exploring the boundary work process is Thomas Gieryn’s 
‘cartographic metaphor’.62 Gieryn states that:
‘The layered interpretations that surround scientists and scientific facts with a 
special believability often come in a rhetorical form best described as 
cartographic.’63
The metaphor allows that we understand society to be built up from 
numerous adjacent cultural territories, which fit together to form a cultural map. The 
‘inhabitants’ of each territory are engaged in the maintenance of its perimeter, and in 
negotiation with the inhabitants of adjacent cultural spaces as to where exactly the 
boundaries that define the territories should be located. Individuals outside a 
particular territory can be as interested in the location of territorial boundaries as 
those ‘inside’. Gieryn says that in light of the cartographic metaphor:
...“science’ becomes a space on maps of culture, bounded off from other 
territories, labelled with landmarks showing travellers how and why it is different 
from regions of common sense, politics and mysticism.’64
He adds that, for scientists, the role of the cartographies is to:
...‘provide interpretive grounds for accepting scientific accounts of reality 
as the most truthful or reliable among the promiscuously unscientific varieties 
always avai lable. ’65
Rhetoric is an important tool for the construction of these boundaries, and it 
is supported and reinforced by other signposts/landmarks that delineate territories. 
For example, in the case of the territory ‘science’, Gieryn says that the ‘landmarks’
62 Gieryn, T. (1995)
63 Gieryn, T. (1999a) p.x
64 Gieryn, T. (1999a) p.x
65 Gieryn, T. (1999a) p.x
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include: ‘white lab coats, laboratories, technical journals, norms of scientific 
practice, linear accelerators, statistical data, and expertise’.66
Gieryn suggests that four kinds of ‘boundary work’ activity contribute to the 
negotiation of cartographies: monopolization, expansion, expulsion and rejection. 
These activities are conducted as part of a constant revision of the extent of the 
authority of the territory ‘science’. They concern the ever-changeable delineation of 
the ‘inside’ from the ‘outside’; that is, the delineation of those with the authority 
conferred by being inside science from those who have failed to secure that status 
and authority. This delineation results in the familiar process of marginalisation of 
some unorthodox individuals as they are removed from the inside and redefined as 
outsiders by drawing new boundaries. Boundary work is also the principle force 
behind the processes often termed professionalisation, in which a group attempts to 
redraw boundaries such as to allocate themselves cultural authority. From this point 
of view some conflicts might be expressed as boundary disputes between the 
occupants of adjacent territories.
Sociologists Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch have suggested that negotiation 
occurs in two key forums: the constitutive and the contingent.68 It is useful to 
consider these forums as the arenas for boundary work. The constitutive is 
comprised of what might be considered the ‘formal’ spaces for scientific discourse 
and debate; the professional journals and professional conferences. The contingent 
forum is made up of all the other kinds of communication/interaction that seem to 
contribute to scientific debate; publication in popular media, personal 
communications, and e-mails. In each of these forums boundary work can be explicit 
or implicit.69 Collins and Pinch argue that, in the case of implicit rejection, rival 
claims are simply ignored by orthodoxy, whereas, in the case of explicit rejection
66 Gieryn, T. (1999a) p.x
67 Gieryn, T. (1995) p.424
68 Collins, H. M. & Pinch, T. (1979)
69 Collins & Pinch (1979)
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there is usually a controversy in which the ‘objects of dispute are articulated by
70individual scientists or opposed groups of scientists’.
Some authors have explored more specific aspects of boundary work and 
boundary activity, in line with the general frameworks structured by authors such as 
Gieryn, Collins and Pinch. For example, Thomas Gieryn and Anne Figert have 
examined the role of fraud accusations in boundary work, with reference to the case 
of psychologist Sir Cyril Burt.71 Also, Bruce Lewenstein has described the role of 
‘informal’ publications and communications in the negotiation of unorthodox 
scientific claims through a study of the cold fusion debate. Lewenstein’s study 
provides an example of boundary work in the ‘contingent’ forum. In addition, 
French scientist Michel Schiff has presented a case study of ‘rejection’ in the 
constitutive and contingent forums in his study of the reception of Jacques 
Benveniste’s ‘water memory’ theory.73 Also, Collins and Pinch74, and separately 
Gieryn75, have studied experiment replication during the cold fusion controversy as a 
way of showing how a scientific conflict might be resolved without recourse to the 
kinds of proof or refutation that are commonly recognised as the mainstay of the 
scientific process. Policy researcher and sociologist Sheila Jasanoff has looked more 
broadly across the cultural cartography, and used the theory of boundary work to 
focus attention on the shifting associations between the adjacent territories ‘science’, 
‘politics’ and ‘policy’.76,77
70 Collins & Pinch (1979) p.239
71 Gieryn, T. & Figert, A. E. (1986) Scientists protect their cognitive authority: The status degradation 
ceremony of Sir Cyril Burt. In: G. Bohme & N. Stehr (Eds.) The knowledge society: The growing 
impact o f scientific knowledge on social relations. D. Reidel, Dordrecht.
72 Lewenstein, B. (1995) From fax to facts: communication in the cold fusion saga. Social Studies of 
Science, 25: 403-436.
73 Davenas, E., Benveniste, J. et al. (1988) Human basophil degranulation triggered by very dilute 
antiserum against IgE. Nature, 333: 816-818; Schiff, M. (1994) The memory o f water. Thorsons 
(Harper Collins), London.
74 Collins, H. & Pinch, T. (1993)
75 Gieryn, T. (1992) The balled of Pons and Fleischmann: Experiment and narrativity in the 
(un)making o f cold fusion. In: E. McMullin (Ed.) The social dimensions o f science. University of 
Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, IN
76 Jasanoff, S. (1987) Contested boundaries in policy relevant science. Social studies o f science,
17(2): 195-230; Jasanoff, S. (1990) The fifth branch: science advisors as policymakers. Harvard 
University Press, London; Jasanoff, S. (1992) Science, politics and the renegotiation of expertise at
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Gieryn’s boundary work methodology has been a particularly important 
contribution to the sociology of scientific knowledge. As discussed above, Bloor 
identified symmetry as a key tenet of his ‘strong programme’, and boundary work 
methodology allows symmetry to be prioritised. Sociologists Brian Martin and 
Evelleen Richards have explained that, the symmetrical approach demands that ‘the 
sociologist or historian must attempt to explain adherence to all beliefs about the 
natural world, whether they are perceived to be true or false, rational or irrational, 
successful or failed, in an equivalent or symmetrical way’. The analyst must also 
achieve this by examining ‘both sides in the controversy using the same repertoire of
TfO
conceptual tools’.
Boundary work provides an excellent scheme by which to achieve this 
balance. It seeks boundary work activity on both sides of a conflict and describes the 
motivations of both advocates and adversaries using the same language, i.e. 
monopolization, expansion etc. It also refers to the ongoing process of boundary 
delineation, and so offers a scheme in which the categories right versus wrong and 
successful versus unsuccessful have less meaning or relevance, and instead the 
process of negotiation is prioritised above outcomes. Scott, Richards and Martin add 
that another demand of the symmetrical approach is that analysts should ‘not grind 
an evaluative axe’, and that ‘if researchers are ‘captured’ by either side and become 
part of the debate, then they are deemed to have failed to maintain a symmetrical
EPA. Osiris, 7: 1-23; Jasnaoff, S. (1995) Science at the bar: law, science and technology in America. 
Harvard University Press, London.
77 In addition to these explicit discussions of the boundary problem in science, Gieryn also suggests 
that further ‘theoretical nourishment’ might come form the studies of cultural boundary domains and 
delineations that occur in other areas of the cultural map than the scientific.(Gieryn, 1995:407) Gieryn 
shows that cultural boundaries have been explored in other contexts than the sociology of science. He 
cites four examples o f other contributions to the boundary problem: i) the ‘sociology of professions’ 
in which the process of active professionalisation of trades and practices has been studied, ii) ‘social 
worlds theory’ which provides a descriptive tool analogous to cultural cartography for studying the 
boundaries between different ‘subject sites’ and jobs, iii) the ‘history of cultural classifications’ 
which uses the cartographic metaphor in detail to describe the means by which various cultural spaces 
have attained their classifications and boundaries, iv) ‘feminist studies o f science’ in which 
boundaries have been studied in relation to their power to marginalize. (Gieryn, 1995)
78 Martin, B. & Richards, E. (1995) Scientific knowledge, controversy, and public decision-making. 
In: S. Jasanoff, G. Markle, J. Petereson and T.Pinch (Eds.) Handbook of science and technology 
studies. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA. p.5
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approach’.79 Again, boundary work methodology allows analysts to avoid such 
asymmetry.
It is worth noting that these are potential benefits of using boundary 
methodology, but that, at the point of application of the methodology to case study 
analyses it is often difficult to make this potential count to its full extent. For 
example, section 1.6 describes how boundary methodology often ends up being used 
in the study of completed episodes of boundary activity, i.e. to examine the 
expulsion of a particular scientist from the cultural territory science. The result is 
that the potential of the methodology to eclipse the ‘successful versus unsuccessful’ 
and ‘right versus wrong’ considerations is not realised in full. In section 1.6 I argue 
that, at its point of use, boundary methodology often exhibits end-directedness 
despite its potential to avoid that asymmetry.
Some critics suggest that boundary studies have failed in the second part of 
the symmetry obligation; to avoid grinding an ‘evaluative axe.’ For example, as 
Scott, Richards and Martin describe, Collins and Pinch’s classic boundary work- 
study of the dispute over the existence of psychic phenomena has been criticised as 
an example of analysts being ‘captured’ by the debate.80 Collins’ and Pinch’s 
analysis was taken up by the parapsychologists that they had studied, and used to 
support their case. Meanwhile, critics of parapsychology accused the sociologists of 
selective reporting. Mulkay, Potter and Yearley attribute this problematic outcome to 
Collins’ and Pinch’s uncritical adoption of the perspectives and terminology of the
O  I
parapsychologists ; forcing a divide between researcher and researched is 
paramount in ongoing or contemporary conflict studies. So, while Gieryn’s 
methodology is potentially an excellent approach to the demand for symmetry, it 
often fails to achieve its full potential at the point of use. Sections 1.6 and 1.7 
describe how this project aims to apply boundary work methodology in such a way 
as to promote the symmetry that it offers. In particular, in section 1.7, I argue that
79 Scott, P., Richards, E. & Martin, B. (1990) Captives of controversy: the myth of the neutral social 
researcher in contemporary scientific controversies. Science, Technology and Human Values, 15(4): 
4 7 4 - 4 9 4 .
80 Scott, P., Richards, E. & Martin, B. (1990)
81 Mulkay, M., Potter, J. & Yearley, S. (1983)
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my concept of ‘perpetuating forces’ promotes symmetry when combined with 
boundary work analysis.
This is by no means an exhaustive review of attention to the ‘demarcation’ or 
‘boundary’ problems. I have dealt with some key positivist and relativist approaches, 
since these are the most relevant to the combined methodology used in this project. 
There have of course been many other contributions, of equal merit to those laid out 
here, from both the essentialist and constructivist schools of thought. For example, 
C. P. Snow famously tackled the issue of the demarcation of science in his 
description of the ‘two cultures’.82 Controversy has also been studied from the 
perspective of both ‘group politics’ and ‘social structuralism’. Martin and Richards 
state that, from the group politics perspective, ‘controversy is dealt with as any other 
form of politics in the pluralisitic interpretation of liberal democracy: a process of 
conflict and compromise involving various groups contending in a political 
marketplace’.84 They suggest that the group politics approach is best suited to 
controversies in which there are obvious contending groups, for example, the public 
versus government. This approach expresses the behaviours of participants in 
relation to the motivations of the interested group to which they belong. For 
example, Dorothy Nelkin has considered the nuclear power debate from this 
perspective, examining the interaction of government, public and science.85 
Furthermore, the social structuralist approach uses ‘concepts of social structure, such 
as class, the state, and patriarchy, to analyse society and to provide insights into 
controversial issues’.86 For example, that approach underlies treatments that would 
be classified as feminist or Marxist, i.e. sociologist Gena Corea has offered feminist 
analysis of the reproductive technologies controversy.87
82 Snow, C. P. (1959) The two cultures and the scientific revolution. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge
83 Martin, B. & Richards, E. (1995)
84 Martin, B. & Richards, E. (1995) p.4
85 Nelkin, D. (1971) Nuclear power and its critics: The Cayuga Lake controversy. Cornell University 
Press, New York.
86 Martin, B. & Richards, E. (1995) p.5
87 Corea, G. (1985) The mother machine: reproductive technologies from artificial insemination to 
artificial wombs. Harper and Row, New York; Corea, G. et al (Eds.) (1985) Man made women: How 
new reproductive technologies affect women. Hutchinson, London.
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In summary, this review seeks to achieve two goals. Firstly, it introduces 
some of the approaches and methodologies that will be applied in this analysis. 
Secondly, it illustrates that there has been some transition from essentialist to 
constructivist approaches to the study of science. I argue below that, although some 
of the essentialist tools have been heavily criticised, certain of their elements might 
be applied alongside the newer constructivist approaches to achieve a richer 
analysis. Like the internalist/externalist division, the essentialist/constructivist 
division is an artificial one. To reject tools from one tradition, in favour of those 
from the other, is thus potentially wasteful and short sighted. I propose a synthetic 
methodology for the study of controversy in this project, using language and 
analytical tools drawn from both of these traditions. Sections 1.2 and 1.3 examine in 
more detail the particular tools and theories, both essentialist and constructivist, that 
are applied in combination to enable my particular analytical approach.
1.2 A synthetic methodology 1: How philosophical approaches to the 
‘demarcation problem’ might illuminate the directed mutation debate 
and the anatomy of protracted controversy.
As described above, the philosophical tools that address the structure and 
dynamics of scientific conflict are generally essentialist in their approach; that is 
they seek to describe scientific activity in terms of the intrinsic qualities that 
delineate it from other kinds of knowledge-producing or creative work. Some more 
recent sociological approaches shift attention from the ‘demarcation problem’ to the 
‘boundary problem’, and shift emphasis from essentialist to constructivist 
treatments. In this section, I argue that some tools from the philosophical essentialist 
tradition might remain useful to the constructivist study of scientific conflict, if used 
in abstraction from their essentialist view of science; allowing essentialist tools to be 
put to use without invoking the essentialist critique. In particular, some essentialist 
philosophical models provide valuable language for exploring the structure and
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dynamics of scientific conflict. This section considers those models and their utility 
in this project.
i) The Kuhnian Paradigm
In general, boundary theory assumes that contests are local and episodic, and that 
during them authority is open to review. It does not deal expressly with the defence 
of orthodoxy that underlies negotiation in some debates; that is, it does not allow for 
contests in which authority is less clearly open to review. Thomas Gieryn notes the 
possible existence of stable territories that persist between episodes of mapping. He 
suggests that in some cases ‘cartographies get stabilized as unquestioned tacit 
assumptions or as uncontested old maps’88, and that these ‘old maps’ should be 
studied in greater detail as a contribution to the development of boundary theory. In 
this project I explore how stabilized authority can be created through a series of 
contests; examining the genesis and perpetuation of ‘old maps’ in relation to the 
principal case study. I argue that where old maps exist subsequent debates are not 
local and episodic, and that authority is not always open to review. Rather, a 
consensus regarding authority emerges as orthodoxy and is defended against review.
89
In this project I use the language of Kuhn’s paradigm theory to explore the 
emergence of consensus regarding authority, and the defence of orthodoxy that 
protects it. I suggest that Kuhn’s notion of paradigm and paradigm defence can 
provide the language for exploring these issues, showing how some groups come to 
monopolize authority and seek to protect that monopoly between contests. Applied 
as a rhetorical tool, Kuhn’s theory can be put to work without invoking the problems
88 Gieryn (1999a) p.34-35.
89 Boundary work theory suggests that during each conflict territories are redrawn afresh, locally and 
contingently. Therefore there is no real sense in speaking of a mainstream or establishment, or of the 
defence o f ‘existing’ territory. The theory does not accept a priori categories, which is one aspect that 
contributes significantly to its high degree of symmetry. However, it is important to note that Gieryn 
does allow in some circumstances for the pervasive influence of what he calls ‘a cartographic legacy’. 
This refers to the persistence between mapping episodes of certain territories that become more stable 
and easily redrawn as the result o f ‘accumulated residues of previous instances of boundary work’. 
These cartographic legacies result in certain territories becoming ‘sedimented as an ordinary tacit 
space on most everybody’s mental map of culture’ such that in some instances ‘creased and dog­
eared maps’ are unfolded and re-used rather than drawn afresh. (Gieryn, 1999 p. 19-20) In that light it 
becomes more reasonable to speak of a mainstream and their orthodoxy.
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conferred by the theory’s essentialism. In chapter 3 ,1 argue that Gieryn’s ‘old map’ 
is roughly analogous to Kuhn’s ‘paradigm’. I suggest that it might be useful to 
invoke the familiar concepts of the ‘paradigm’ and ‘paradigm defence’ to describe 
the community dynamics that enable the kind of stability between mapping episodes 
that Gieryn has highlighted for investigation.
In addition, in Chapter 4, I contrast Kuhn’s paradigm theory and Lakatos’ 
research programmes model to illustrate the different approaches of the groups 
involved in the case study debate. I suggest that, depending on the group’s interests, 
they adopt either a more Kuhnian defence of consensus90 or a more Lakatosian 
approach to anomaly91.1 argue that the Kuhnian approach promotes the preservation 
of old maps, whereas the Lakatosian promotes the local and episodic nature of 
contests. Contrasting participants’ approaches in this way helps reveal goals and 
motivations, and illustrates groups’ differing perceptions of appropriate closure.
ii) The Mertonian ‘norms’
The language of Merton’s normative scheme92 is put to work in this project to 
further reveal the role of ‘old maps’, and illuminate the defence of orthodoxy that 
allows their operation. Merton’s norms imply responsibilities, which if adhered to 
would both protect the local and episodic nature of contests, and the openness of 
authority to review. For example, Merton’s scheme requires ‘organized scepticism’, 
meaning a withholding of judgements on new findings until such time as they have 
been evaluated scientifically. In that light, each anomaly is dealt with on the basis of 
its own merit, and the outcome of any contest is self contained and not determined 
by existing assumptions.
However, in cases where old maps persist and orthodoxy is defended the 
obligations of Merton’s norms are not met. Disinterestedness and scepticism are 
quickly abandoned in service to defence of an old map. In this project, participants’ 
actions are reviewed in relation to their adherence to the norms. Where the norms
90 As expressed in: Kuhn, T. (1962)
91 As expressed in: Lakatos, I. (1970) Falsification and the methodology o f research programmes. In : 
I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (Eds.) Criticism and the growth o f knowledge. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge; Lakatos, I (1976) Proofs and refutations. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
92 As expressed in: Merton, R. K. (1942)
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are subverted, the goals and interests of participants are made clearer. For example, 
where organized scepticism is abandoned the interests of a group in preserving an 
existing authority allocation are revealed. In this project the action of groups and 
individuals is evaluated in relation to the imperative of the norms, and abandonment 
of one or more of the norms is identified as an outcome of the creation and 
perpetuation of an old map.
In addition, I use the language of Merton’s normative scheme to evaluate the 
contributions of some key authors in the case study debate. During conflicts 
contestants often use the rhetorical device of accusing their opponents of 
unorthdoxy, or even ‘pathological’ science. Without using Mertonian language, they 
are nevertheless often appealing to the responsibilities of disinterestedness and 
communism in their accusations. In Chapter 4 I explore the relationship between 
subversion of the norms, and the branding ‘unorthodox’, and consider whether there 
has been ‘pathological’ scientific activity in the case study debate.
iin Popper’s falsification concept
In cases where old maps are being used to validate persistent authority allocations 
there is a degree to which the authority allocation is adopted as an object of faith; the 
usual processes of proof and refutation are eclipsed by the defence of the faith 
object. Recourse to scientific detail in resolution of conflicts is diluted by reference 
to the details of the old map and the authority allocation it recommends. Where 
aspects of scientific knowledge begin to be defended using old maps, falsifiability is 
lost.
In this project I use Popper’s falsification concept to assess the degree to 
which old maps recommend the adoption of unfalsifiable faith objects. I argue that, 
in order to preserve an old map, falsifiability must be sacrificed by some interested 
parties. In Chapter 5 ,1 describe the tacit popular view of falsification as one mark of 
objectivity in science, and illustrate how adherence to old maps defies the public 
identity of science.
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So, essentialist theories are used here to contribute useful visual aids and language 
for the analysis of particular elements of the case study, and as such, these models 
can bolster the constructivist tools in attempts to uncover motivation and goals in 
particular groups of controversy participants. They provide a clear, and often 
familiar, language by which to express some of the participants’ behaviours. The 
theories’ essentialism need not figure explicitly, but rather they can be put to work in 
the service of a largely constructivist analysis.
Essentialist philosophical approaches are also often useful for discussion of 
popular engagement with scientific conflicts, since essentialism remains dominant in 
popular perceptions of science, in spite of academics’ enthusiasm for constructivist 
approaches. In addition, the scientific community has often taken an essentialist 
approach to its own self-definition93; scientists often subscribe to the idea that they 
are engaged in an activity that merits special status on account of intrinsic features of 
its methodology and practice. In line with this self-styling, the scientific response to 
unorthodoxy is often convened in line with the terms of the essentialist approach. 
That is, unorthodox individuals or groups are often portrayed as being in some way 
‘unscientific’ or ‘pathological’, and that alone appears as evidence by which to 
disregard their work. So, in spite of the criticism of essentialism within science 
studies, that perspective remains embedded in scientific practice and the engagement 
of the public with that practice. Thus, as this project illustrates, the essentialist tools 
retain the capacity to illuminate some of the action of scientific conflicts.
1.3 Synthetic methodology 2: How sociological and constructivist
approaches to the ‘boundary problem’ might illuminate the directed
mutation debate and the anatomy of protracted controversy.
Thomas Gieryn’s ‘boundary’ theory94 examines the negotiation and 
allocation of epistemic authority during episodes of conflict, and describes how 
participants’ contribute to and influence that process through ‘boundary work’
93 Gregory, J. (1998) Fred Hoyle and the popularisation o f cosmology. PhD thesis, Imperial College 
of science, technology and medicine.
94 Gieryn, T.(1983)
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activities. His concepts provide perhaps the most broadly useful methodological tool 
for exploring the circumstances of the directed mutation debate and revealing the 
interests of the participants.
The boundary work concept facilitates three analytical tasks in this project. 
Firstly, it reveals the activity of advocates and adversaries as they compete for 
authority. Boundary theory allows that contest to be framed as a struggle for 
epistemic authority between two principal groups: one which wishes to retain its 
epistemic authority and the other which wishes to challenge that authority and win a 
share of it. Boundary work theory makes apparent the goals and motivations 
underlying each group’s activities and rhetorical devices. It frames their activity as 
boundaiy work for expansion (the advocates) versus protection and expulsion (their 
adversaries), and illuminates the struggle for authority across the inter-disciplinary 
boundary.
Secondly, the concept of boundary work is invaluable in the discussion of the 
broader intellectual and social context of the directed mutation debate. It allows the 
directed mutation debate to be viewed as an episodic contest within the greater and 
longer-term authority struggle between competing programmes. This reveals 
elements of the participants’ boundary work as serving their broader, though less 
explicit, interests: the acceptance versus rejection of their wider agendas.
Thirdly, boundary theory and the cartographic metaphor provide a useful, 
and much needed tool for the analysis of the somewhat murky structure and 
dynamics of the Internet based component of the debate. In relation to this aspect of 
the debate, boundary theory allows us to ask some useful questions regarding this 
context for conflict, for example: ‘how are boundaries identified in the virtual 
world?’; ‘does conflict negotiation online contribute to the negotiation of cultural 
cartographies?’; ‘does boundary work still function in the Internet forum?’ and ‘do 
authority allocations break down without explicit cartography and authority 
signifiers?’.
Three of Gieryn’s boundary work categories - monopolization, expansion 
and expulsion - are particularly useful:
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i) Monopolization: Gieryn describes this kind of boundary work as ‘a cartographic 
contest for cultural authority’95, whereby, a particular group asserts the dominance 
of their programme, and drives the exclusion of other groups such that they gain sole 
control over epistemic territory and gamer authority for themselves alone. The 
boundaries of that territory are then policed heavily against the assaults of other 
groups who wish to take or share the authority. Gieryn96 suggests that this kind of 
boundary work is exemplified by the case of the seventeenth century epistemic 
conflict between Hobbes and Boyle that historians Steven Shapin and Simon 
Schaffer97 have analysed. In that conflict both Hobbes and Boyle engaged in 
boundary work designed to take control of all the cognitive authority attached to the 
territory currently defined as ‘science’; both stated that their particular 
epistemological approach best ensured the success and progress of science. There 
was no potential for heterogeneity or for the territory to be shared; monopolization 
was the goal of each of their activities.
In Chapter 3 I describe the rise of Darwinian evolutionary biology as a 
process of progressive authority monopolization. I illustrate how the monopoly was 
created, recorded as an old map, and later deployed in subsequent debates to 
influence authority allocations.
ii) Expansion: In this category Gieryn groups all those boundary work activities that 
occur when ‘insiders seek to push out the frontiers of their cultural authority into 
spaces already claimed by others’ ,98 As an example of this kind of activity he cites 
the work of the eighteenth century philosophes, who sought to extend their ‘mixture 
of rationalism and empiricism into a domain of questions and problems owned by 
religion and embodied in the institution and dogma of the church’.
The principal case study examined in this project involves an 
interdisciplinary contest for authority. The concept of expansion enables a clearer 
understanding of that aspect of the contest; revealing how the participants struggled
95 Gieryn, T. (1995) p.424
96 Gieryn, T. (1995)
97 Shapin, S. & Schaffer, S. (1985)
98 Gieryn, T. (1995) p.429
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either to expand their authority into a territory held by another discipline, or defend 
the territory held from that expansion.
iii) Expulsion: Gieryn suggests that expulsion is a common goal of boundary work." 
He defines expulsion as the act o f ‘insiders’ removing ‘not-real’ members from their 
midst; this is achieved by labelling the rejected individuals as; ‘deviant, 
pseudoscientist, amateur, fake’.100 Those who are expelled are accused of exploiting 
the authority that should only be due to those who are accepted into the consensus, 
and thus ‘inside’, of the scientific territory. Such individuals may appear as real 
scientists, but they have not earned the cognitive authority they claim. Gieryn 
suggests that the 1970s fraud accusations against Sir Cyril Burt provide an example 
of boundary work to affect expulsion.101 Thomas Gieryn and Anne Figert have 
studied Burt’s case, and have analysed the process by which his expulsion from the 
‘inside’ was achieved through accusations of fraud.102
In this project I consider the role of expulsion in the perpetuation of old 
maps. I argue that expelling opponents of a stable authority allocation prevents 
review of epistemic authority and that, therefore, expulsion is a goal of individuals 
who are interested in preserving the status quo. I describe how expulsion is a 
necessary part of the process of progressive authority monopolization. I illustrate 
that there are local examples of expulsion within the case study, as well as a 
significant legacy of expulsion underlying the old map that influenced this 
apparently local debate. I argue that the old map that influenced the case study 
debate was formed in part through accumulated instances of expulsion.
Overall, boundary theory is useful in this project as a tool or revealing 
interests and motivations. Understanding the ongoing nature of the struggle for 
epistemic authority reveals both the local conditions of the case study, the stakes of 
the interdisciplinary aspect of the debate, the means by which old maps are drawn,
"Gieryn, T. (1995)
100 Gieryn, T. (1995) p.432
101 Gieryn, T. (1995)
102 Gieryn, T. & Figert, A. (1986)
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and the legacies of the old maps as they are unfurled in new contests. Additionally, 
boundary theory provides a revealing tool for discourse analysis (important in the 
construction of the narrative case study from the primary journal articles), allowing 
rhetoric to be understood as boundary work for the achievement of expansion or 
protection, and allowing expulsion to be seen as a tool for defending authority.
Some additions/extensions to boundary work theory
Thomas Gieryn has noted two areas of deficiency in existing boundary 
theory and highlighted these for further work.
i) Boundary work gives ‘greater attention to boundaries between science and 
something else altogether than those dividing the various sciences and 
scholarly disciplines’.103
ii) ‘...too little is said about when and how some cartographies get stabilized 
as unquestioned tacit assumptions or as uncontested old maps...’
In this project I address these issues, pursuing Gieryn’s recommendations for further 
work, and seeking to increase the utility of boundary theory for this analysis.
i) I explore the possibility of extending the language of boundary work to describe 
the shifting interdisciplinary boundaries that delineate the space within the cultural 
territory ‘science’. In Chapter 4, I use Gieryn’s categories of boundary work 
(expulsion, expansion and monopolization) to describe the motivations and activities 
that determine the debate between the sub-disciplines. I aim to demonstrate that the 
same tools used by scientists to define their cultural domain are also used within that 
domain to manage the sharing of territory by the disciplinary groups. In Chapter 4 ,1 
describe the extent to which the authority (or amount of territory) allotted to the 
groups within the overall cultural territory ‘science’ is equally as local, episodic and
103 Gieryn, T. (1999) p.34
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changeable as the boundary of the territory ‘science’ itself. I suggest that a larger- 
scale map is required to understand the detailed activity of scientific conflict. 
Contests concerning the boundaries of the cultural space ‘science’ explain some of 
the rhetoric and activity of its practitioners, but there is also a great deal of activity 
aimed at drawing and shifting the internal boundaries.
ii) In Chapter 3, I explore the persistence of certain cultural territories between 
mapping episodes. I use a historical account to exemplify how a territory can 
become stabilized. I describe how boundary work tactics, which usually help 
construct local and transient boundaries, can be used to create a more durable 
delineation. I argue that cultural authority can be allocated not just as the outcome of 
one boundary contest, but rather as the cumulative legacy of many contests. I use 
Gieryn’s language of ‘old maps’ to show how authority can be transferred more or 
less intact between conflict episodes, illustrating how a territory can be created and 
then deployed so as to retain its authority in a variety of different cartographies. I 
show that authority accumulated across many contests leads to the development of 
‘tacit assumptions’ regarding that authority within the cultural cartography. Through 
the circumstances of the principal case study I explore the ‘accumulated residues’ 
that Gieryn suggests contribute to these kinds of persistent cultural territories.
1.4 Looking at scientific controversy from different perspectives.
Of course, not all discussions of scientific conflict are so explicitly motivated 
by attention to the ‘demarcation’ or ‘boundary’ problems. For example, there are 
also controversy studies and theories focussed more specifically on policy-making, 
legislation, politics and economics. In this project, these kinds of treatments are less 
broadly useful in methodological terms. They are less concerned with the internal 
structure and dynamics of scientific conflicts and the behaviour of advocates and 
adversaries, and largely focus on the specifics of the interaction of science with 
external forces such as government and funding, often emphasising issues of ethics
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or finance, which are largely beyond the scope of this analysis. However, despite 
that quite different emphasis some elements can be drawn from that literature to add 
value to this analysis.
A case in point is the Closure Project carried out from 1978 to 1982. The 
project was funded by the U.S National Endowment for the Humanities to address 
the character of ‘scientific disputes with a heavy ethical or political overlay’.104 The 
outcome of the project was an edited collection of case studies exploring the 
influence of ethical or political factors on the structure and dynamics of scientific 
conflicts. Although the project’s conclusions concerning the interplay of politics, 
ethics and science do not help illuminate the directed mutation debate (or the 
analogous cases examined here), the Closure Project does provide precedent for one 
of the key approaches in this project. In section 1.7,1 argue that a useful perspective 
for achieving a clear picture of negotiation in protracted scientific controversies is to 
think in terms of the active ‘perpetuating forces’ that have contributed to the 
extension of negotiation. In the Closure Project a similar approach is evident. In that 
project certain aspects of the debates studied are considered as ‘impediments’ to 
closure of the conflict.
The authors of the Closure Project collectively establish that the existence of 
moral or ethical elements in a debate will serve to impede the standard processes of 
closure (i.e. appeal to further evidence, argument, abandonment, circumscription).105 
They achieved this by using examples drawn from four principal case studies; the 
use of Laetrile in cancer treatment, the classification of homosexuality as a disease, 
the assessment of risks in the workplace, and the safety of nuclear power. The 
authors show that the negotiation of these debates has by no means been confined to 
matters of empirical fact or epistemology. Rather, the path to resolution has been 
shaped by financial and political interest and by moral and ethical imperatives; 
reason and objectivity have been overlaid by interests, feelings and money.
104 Engelhardt, T. (Jr) & Caplan, A. (Eds.)(1987) Scientific controversies: Case studies in the 
resolution and closure o f disputes in science and technology. Cambridge University Press, New 
York.
105 Engelhardt, T. (Jr.) & Caplan, A. (Eds.) (1987)
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Without using the language of controversy ‘perpetuation’ that I adopt here, 
the authors are nevertheless identifying moral and ethical ingredients as forces of 
conflict protraction. The Closure Project therefore offers a precedent for the study of 
the active elements of protracted controversy in apparently unresolved or un- 
resolvable conflicts. It is such an approach to controversy closure that this project 
aims to elaborate upon. In this analysis I seek further examples of how particular 
aspects of a debate might contribute actively to its protraction and might determine 
the quality of the negotiation phase. The identification of a selection of these forces 
is the unifying theme of Chapters 3 ,4  and 5.
Treatments of scientific controversy also exist in the form of the numerous, and 
often familiar, popular accounts of scientific conflict. These largely take the form of 
historical accounts of particular episodes of conflict and aim only to present that 
history as a narrative or ‘story’, rather than as an analysis. In some cases, 
introductory or concluding passages may offer statements concerning scientific 
controversy more generally, but these statements have a secondary role in relation to 
main function of these texts, which is most often entertainment. Even the general 
statements that these texts include are often useless to an analysis such as this one, 
since they betray, incorporate or pander to various simplistic views of the nature of 
scientific controversy. These treatments of controversy are often sensationalist, a 
tendency that is fostered by their entertainment role. They also often rely upon 
certain unarticulated interpretations of conflict as their premise, for example, that 
conflict represents ‘pathological science’, that controversy is a perversion of the 
scientific process and that scientists who engage in controversy are invariably 
motivated by self-interest. The materials in this category are therefore omitted from 
this analysis.
1.5 Scientific controversies, historical narrative, and the role of case studies 
in the development of analytical tools. Justifying the case study-based 
approach.
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The study of scientific controversy is often linked with case study-based 
methodology. In the categories of literature described above case studies are 
deployed in a variety of ways. In some of the sociological and philosophical 
treatments case studies are referred to with minimal detail; they are invoked to 
illustrate theoretical points. For example, Gieryn106 outlines his categories of 
boundary work and illustrates each of them with reference to a case study that has 
been developed by another author. For example, he argues that the boundary work 
process of ‘expansion’ is illustrated in Robert Damton’s study of D’Alembert’s
enlightenment project107 and that ‘monopolization’ is demonstrated in Shapin and
108Schaffer’s study of the seventeenth century conflict between Hobbes and Boyle.
In other sociological and philosophical treatments single case studies are 
developed in detail by the authors as a means of illustrating several theoretical points 
using a single example. This methodology underlies Gieryn and Figert’s study of 
fraud and ‘expulsion’ in relation to the case of Sir Cyril Burt.109 That case study is 
constructed in such detail that the authors have essentially written a paper ‘about 
Burt’ as much as they have written a paper ‘about controversy ’. This same trend is 
also reflected in; Michel Schiffs analysis of exclusion with close reference to 
Jacques Benveniste’s ‘water memory’110, Harry Collins’ study of the replication of 
controversial research findings with reference to the detection of gravitational 
waves111, Trevor Pinch’s study of conflict sociology with reference the neutrino 
detection debate112, Martin Rudwick’s study of the shaping of scientific knowledge 
with reference to ‘the great Devonian controversy113 and Bruce Lewenstein’s study 
of publication during conflicts with reference to the Cold Fusion controversy.114
106 Gieryn, T. (1995)
107 Damton, R. (1984) The great cat massacre. Basic Books, New York .
108 Shapin, S. & Schaffer, S. (1985)
109 Gieryn, T. F. & Figert, A. (1986)
110 Schiff, M. (1994)
111 Collins, H. M. (1985)
112 Pinch, T. (1986) Confronting nature: the sociology of neutrino detection. Reidel, Dordrecht, the 
Netherlands.
113 Rudwick, M. (1985) The great Devonian controversy: The shaping of scientific knowledge among 
the gentlemanly specialists. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
114 Lewenstein, B. (1995)
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In some other analytical controversy studies a series of cases are presented to 
illustrate a particular theoretical point. This methodology is exemplified in the 
Closure Project in which four cases studies are developed to illustrate the thesis that 
moral and ethical elements in controversies impede the processes of closure.115
In popular accounts of scientific controversy the development of case studies 
becomes the priority and analysis is eclipsed by this shift of attention towards self- 
contained narratives that constitute ‘stories’ of scientific controversy. Some of these 
accounts retain a degree of analytical voice, while others abandon theory or 
generality altogether in the pursuit of ‘entertainment’. Examples of this kind of 
treatment include Hal Heilman’s Great Feuds in Science116, Michael White’s Rivals: 
conflict as the fuel o f science117 and Arthur Koestler’s The Case o f  the Midwife 
Toadm
Therefore, the case study based approach of this project follows precedent 
for the study of controversy. A detailed narrative describing the directed mutation 
debate is developed in this project as a means by which to illustrate the theoretical 
issues that are addressed and analysed. That principle case study is presented in 
Chapter 2, and in Chapters 3-5 various technical or theoretical issues are explored in 
relation to that material. Supporting case studies are included throughout to 
demonstrate the generality of many of the theses that I explore.
Further justification for the use of the case study-based approach can be 
drawn from Martin Rudwick’s explicit statements concerning the role of narrative in 
methodologies for the study of conflict. Rudwick states that:
‘It is high time for a genuine revival of narrative to be set in train, but 
it must be narrative with a purpose, and no mere chronicle. In the 
fine-grained study of scientific research practice, narrative is not so 
much a literary convenience as a methodological necessity. If
115 Engelhardt, T. (Jr.) & Caplan, A. (Eds.X1987)
116 Heilman, H. (1998)
117 White, M. (2001) Rivals: conflict as the fuel of science. Secher & Warburg, London.
118 Koestler, A. (1971) The case of the midwife toad. Random House, London.
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scientific knowledge is to be studied in the making, the closest 
attention must be paid to strict chronology, not only in description but 
also in analysis.’ 119
Rudwick contends that, to understand the activities and motivations of individuals 
involved in establishing new scientific knowledge claims, the process that they 
experience must be re-created. The intricate aspects of the pursuit of knowledge and 
the interactions of individuals must be discovered if a realistic portrayal of the 
scientific enterprise is to be achieved. Rudwick advocates the use of detailed 
narrative as a tool by which to accomplish this closeness to the object of science 
studies. He adds that:
‘A narrative that does justice to the twists and turns of research does 
indeed need to be long and detailed.’120
To follow the spirit of Rudwick’s recommendation of narrative as a central 
methodology for science studies, and in line with his advice as to the proper length 
of such a narrative reconstruction, this project is case study-based and that case 
study is developed in detail (Chapter 2). Chapter 2 provides the ‘story’ of the 
directed mutation debate (which is one desired outcome of controversy studies ie. in 
popular treatments or at the foundation of discourse analysis) but also goes beyond 
being ‘mere chronicle’ by acting as the basis for a general exploration of scientific 
controversy themes (as is the desired outcome of the more technical treatments of 
controversy).
1.6 Enthusiasm for the ‘ends’ of conflicts and the neglect of protracted 
negotiation
1,9 Rudwick, M. (1985) p. 11
120 Rudwick, M. (1985) p. 12
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As discussed above, descriptive and analytical tools concerning the structure 
and dynamics of scientific conflict are abundant. These tools, and the approaches 
that they embody, appear diverse and varied. One might loosely categorize them in 
terms of their focus as philosophical, sociological or historical, as I have done here 
for evaluative clarity. Despite their variety, the majority of these approaches are 
united by their similar assumptions regarding the anatomy of scientific conflict. In 
this section I describe the limitations of those assumptions and their influence on the 
utility of technical resources for the study of protracted controversy.
There is a common structure inherent in the majority of theoretical models of 
scientific conflict; the vast majority of descriptive and analytical tools assume that a 
three-part process underlies controversy activity. In spite of their specific 
terminology or depth of focus, what each model effectively describes is the process 
by which an anomaly arises, is negotiated and is resolved. In general, these 
descriptions and analyses, whether they are predominantly philosophical, 
sociological or historical, are invariably focussed upon the achievement of resolution 
and closure. Even where description of the means of anomaly resolution is not the 
primary aim, still theoretical tools assume closure as the ultimate goal or end point 
of scientific conflict; they focus on the processes by which anomalies are rendered 
unproblematic. Even those sociological models concerned with the activity of 
controversy participants are directed to describe how participants resolve their 
differences. The sociological theories, particularly the constructivist approaches, 
take better account of interest and motivation than the philosophical and historical, 
but they are still structured around the notion that disputes have an ultimate end. The 
effect of this common approach is similar to the problem of present- 
centrededness.121 There is a temptation to analyse controversy teleologically.
Even in the case of boundary work study, where the process of anomaly 
identification, negotiation and closure is most blurred, and there is explicit attention
121 Ashplant & Wilson see the problem of present-centredness arising when ‘...the historian, in 
seeking to study, reconstruct and write about the past, is constrained by necessarily starting from the 
perceptual and conceptual categories of the present. [Ashplant, T & Wilson, A. (1988a) Present- 
centred history and the problem of historical knowledge. The Historical Journal, 31:253-274. p.253] 
See also: Ashplant, T & Wilson, A. (1988b) Whig history and present-centred history. The Historical 
Journal, 31: 1-16.
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focussed on the motivation of boundary workers and the ongoing nature of contests, 
still the aims and outcomes of the actors’ tactics reflect some kind of closure. Any 
one of the cartographies that are constantly being locally and episodically generated 
represents the end of a particular contest. As the territories expand and contract some 
groups might be excluded or assimilated - but the goal/outcome is still a community 
cohered by a common consensus. Where the boundary work concept is applied to 
real cases it is often to elucidate historically completed acts of ‘exclusion’ or 
‘monopolization’.122 So, while boundary work theory is in no way expressly or 
necessarily teleological or present-centred, it is often applied as a methodology to 
situations that imply end-directed outcomes of boundary activities.
It is unsurprising that the closure of controversy is all-important in 
theoretical frameworks; closure appears to be the goal of scientific activity -  it is 
portrayed and often acknowledged as the motivation for those involved in a 
controversial episode. This clear enthusiasm for the ‘ends’ of conflicts can be 
attributed as a function of two legacies: (i) the self-image and public image of the 
scientific endeavour, and (ii) the predominance of analyses of scientific knowledge 
over analyses of scientific activity:
i) Controversy is an undesirable activity in science, often perceived as failure 
of the scientific process. Philosophers of science Peter Machamer, Marcello Pera 
and Aristides Baltas describe aversion to conflict, stating that: ‘...the absence or 
resolution of disputes has been taken as the hallmark of scientific knowledge as 
compared to other disciplines or fields of experience’123, and that, the ‘view that 
science should be ultimately uncontroversial flourished at the time of the founders of 
modem science’ and has been perpetuated by scientists and philosophers ever
122 For example Gieryn (1999a) acknowledges that the five examples of boundary work that he 
explores are ‘.. .all historical rather than contemporary, more or less resolved rather than ongoing 
contests for credibility.’ p.34. Also, Gieryn (1995) describes the complete act of Sir Cyril Burt’s 
‘status degradation’, as do Gieryn and Figert (1986) and Gieryn (1992) describes the ‘unmaking’ of 
Cold Fusion.
123 Machamer, P., Pera, M. & Baltas, A. (2000) Scientific Controversies: Philosophical and 
Historical Perspectives. Oxford University Press, New York. p.4.
124 Machamer, P., Pera, M. & Baltas, A. (2000)
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Karl Popper stated that: ‘Science is one of the very few human activities, 
perhaps, the only one, in which errors are systematically criticised and often 
eventually corrected’.125 Machamer, Pera and Baltas add that it is that conception of 
the process of science that leads to the state in which: ‘...it is typical of scientists 
and others to believe that any dispute or controversy is resolvable given further 
information or data, which, in their turn, necessarily will be forthcoming given 
enough time and money.’126 Therefore, the very nature of the scientific enterprise 
pre-supposes closure.
As Dorothy Nelkin suggests: ‘The authority of scientific expertise rests on 
assumptions about scientific rationality’.127 Effectively, ‘science is judged rational 
because it is based on data collected through rational procedures.’128 Controversy 
appears to undermine or challenge that rationality. Controversy analysts Tristram 
Engelhardt and Arthur Caplan state that: ‘Contemporary societies take science 
seriously. They presume that science can resolve factual issues...’.129 They add that: 
‘Also, much of Western public policy has presupposed that scientific controversies 
are resolvable by rational analysis and the investigation of the facts. Science has 
been presumed to be objective.’130 Machamer, Pera and Baltas suggest that there is a 
‘paradoxical dissociation between science as actually practiced and science as 
perceived or depicted by both scientists and philosophers’, and that, ‘while nobody 
would deny that science in the making has been replete with controversies, the same 
people often depict its essence or end product as free from disputes, as the 
uncontroversial rational human endeavour par excellence.’131
These commentaries illustrate the extent to which the widespread identity of 
science incorporates, and indeed relies upon, an element of trust. Trust relates to the 
expectation that science will operate an objective system by which appropriate
125 Popper, K. (1963) p.216
126 Machamer, P., Pera, M. & Baltas, A. (2000) p.4
127 Nelkin, D. (1982) Controversy as a political challenge. In: B.Bames & D. Edge (Eds.) Science in 
context: Readings in the sociology of science. Open University Press, Milton Keynes.
128 Barnes, B. & Edge, D. (Eds.) (1982) Science in context: readings in the sociology of science. Open 
University Press, Milton Keynes.
129 Engelhardt, T. (Jr.) & Caplan, A. (Eds.)(1987) p.vii
130 Engelhardt, T. (Jr.) & Caplan, A. (Eds.)(1987) p.3
131 Machamer, P., Pera, M. & Baltas, A. (2000) p.3
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resolution of problems might certainly be achieved. The ability of science to achieve 
such resolutions earns it regard as a special kind of activity. It appears that the 
resolutions achieved in science can be trusted on account of the method that has 
been applied in their achievement. Where resolution seems problematic or 
unachievable, then trust in the method is effectively betrayed. What should be a 
failsafe methodology begins to appear imperfect. Any indication of such failure is 
inevitably problematic in ‘a culture that looks to scientific investigations, panels, and 
commissions for the determination of facts and the resolution of scientific 
disputes.’132
It seems that protracted debates in science undermine the ‘special’ or 
dignified nature that has been attributed to the scientific enterprise and the 
knowledge that it generates. They disappoint the view of science that assumes a 
perfect methodology is in action that cannot result in anything other than the 
progressive and inevitable generation of ‘facts’ or more secure knowledge claims. 
Protracted debates undermine the image of science perpetuated from within the 
profession itself, and clash with the perception of science that has been adopted by 
non-scientists. The ends of conflicts thus become a focus; resolution reaffirms the 
image of science upon which trust and authority is based.
ii) Engelhardt and Caplan contend that: ‘For some time the analysis of science 
by philosophers, sociologists, historians and others has been dominated by 
discussions about theory change and development. Metascientific studies have not 
progressed far beyond bitter wrangles as to the adequacy of such concepts as 
‘paradigms’, ‘research traditions’, ‘themata’ and ‘theories’ for adequately describing 
developments over time in various fields of scientific inquiry.’133 This statement 
highlights the traditional tendency for analytical work to be focussed on scientific 
knowledge, and its generation, rather than on the activity of science and its 
participants. That common approach has also promoted a kind of end-directedness. 
The emphasis in many of the well-known philosophical models such as Kuhn’s
132 Machamer, P., Pera, M. & Baltas, A. (2000) p.vii
133 Machamer, P., Pera, M. & Baltas, A. (2000) p.l
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‘structure of scientific revolutions’134 and Lakatos’ ‘research programmes’135 has 
been on theory and the means by which it is amended and replaced. Machamer, Pera 
and Baltas state that: ‘Of course, neither scientists nor philosophers have been 
unaware of controversies. Nevertheless, they have been reluctant to recognise when 
and how controversy plays a constitutive role in the development of scientific 
knowledge.’136 The focus on scientific knowledge has in some cases been divorced 
from attention to the activity that generates knowledge.
Placing emphasis on scientific knowledge over scientific activity forces 
attention on the achievement of closure and its outcomes. A knowledge product is 
only generated at the point of closure, when consensus forms regarding the validity 
of a knowledge claim. Knowledge is not produced during protracted negotiations. 
Models of knowledge production thus have no particular interest in the structure and 
dynamics of individual episodes of anomaly negotiation in science. Rather, they 
concern themselves with the influence of the knowledge outcomes of conflicts on 
the overall theoretical body of ‘science’. Since the generation of knowledge appears 
to occur with the termination of conflict it is that event that attracts attention. So, 
although we might think of these models as addressing conflict in science, they do 
not in fact deal with the details of negotiation, only its outcomes and how those 
relate to the body of knowledge that constitutes science. Since, as Englehardt and 
Caplan point out, attention to ‘change and development’ of scientific theories has 
dominated analytical work, it is unsurprising that a legacy remains which neglects 
the internal dynamics of conflict negotiation in favour of a focus on the achievement 
of closure and the generation of knowledge claims that closure implies.
The rise of sociological discourse concerning the internal process of scientific 
‘change and development’ has to a degree addressed this problem of end- 
directedness; further attention has been turned to the processes of anomaly 
identification and negotiation. Sociologists of science have made significant 
attempts to counter the preconceived notions of science. They have made explicit the
134 Kuhn, T. (1962)
135 Lakatos, I. (1976); Lakatos, I. (1970)
136 Machamer, P., Pera, M. & Baltas, A. (2000) p.3
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relation of ‘contingent’ activities to the production of constitutive scientific 
knowledge claims.137 The concept of boundary work in particular comes closest to 
escaping common problems.138 It avoids essentialism, and it accounts for the role of 
individual and group motivations/interests in the structure and dynamics of debate. 
Importantly, it also potentially allows for a discussion of conflict negotiation that 
need not be directed towards the achievement of closure. Boundary work can 
theoretically be conceived as a continuous and necessarily ongoing process. It can be 
understood to have no end, since boundaries must be constantly defended, redefined, 
extended and challenged. However, closure remains paramount in many of the 
treatments in which the constructivist models are tested against case studies; perhaps 
a legacy of the dominant ‘scientific knowledge’ studies that pre-date the sociological 
treatments. Where a constructivist approach, for example boundary theory, is used to 
explore a conflict case study it is chiefly applied to explicate a completed act or 
controversial episode. Overall, as sociologist Bart Simon has pointed out: ‘...few 
constructivist studies of controversy have focussed on the origins of controversies 
and the formation of core-sets’.139
Theoretical tools have been formulated in the context of the inherent belief 
that science should be, and invariably will be, defined by the resolution of conflicts. 
The result is descriptive tools that betray that optimism and reinforce those goals. As 
a result models/treatments often focus strongly, if not entirely, on the means by 
which the resolution is achieved. The rise of an anomaly at the foundation of a 
conflict is assumed. The structure, dynamics and duration of negotiation are 
comparatively irrelevant. And the conclusion and closure of the conflict is identified 
as the point of analytical interest and as the defining moment of the scientific 
enterprise.
In the context of an anatomy of scientific conflict that hinges upon the three- 
part process - anomaly identification, negotiation and resolution - protracted or 
apparently irresolvable controversies seem to defy explanation. Indeed, they might
137 See for key arguments on this issue: Collins, H. M & Pinch, T. J. (1979)
138 For an outline of boundary work theory see Gieryn, T. F. (1995)
139 Simon, B. (2002) Undead science: science studies and the afterlife of coldfusion. Rutgers 
University Press, New Jersey, p.24-25
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simply seem uninteresting in as much as they lack a closure moment and all that that 
signifies. For sociologists the protraction of a controversy is not necessarily 
problematic; it does not interfere with theoretical assumptions. However, from the 
point of view of philosophy, protracted controversies apparently reveal a breakdown 
in the imagined process of the acquisition of scientific knowledge; the terms by 
which essentialists demarcate science largely rely on the power of the scientific 
methodology to resolve conflict through its ‘special’ nature. Protracted controversies 
imply that these demarcation criteria might not withstand application to real life 
episodes in science or explain the dynamics of the production of scientific 
knowledge. From a popular point of view, protracted conflicts threaten to 
undermine the special nature of scientific activity and the objective knowledge 
claims that it is believed to generate. Protracted controversies appear as aberrations, 
or at best perhaps as ‘unfinished’ conflicts that given time will eventually fall within 
the descriptive power of end-directed modelling tools. From a historical perspective 
protracted controversies represent unfinished tales that can tell us little until they 
have reached their conclusion, and which have no real entertainment value until it is 
certain how events will conclude. It is my intention in this project to shift the 
analytical gaze to focus particularly on the neglected intricacies of negotiation.
1.7 Perpetuating forces: an alternative to the passivity of end-directed
controversy analyses
End-directedness has resulted in limited theoretical attention to the specific 
character or dynamics of protracted phases of negotiation or conflict. Although the 
concept of boundary work goes some way to addressing these issues, it does not 
explicitly label boundary activity as an active force for the perpetuation of 
negotiation. It explains some of the means and motivations of negotiation, but does 
not extend its descriptive power to an explanation of how boundaiy work relates to 
the overall dynamics of controversy episodes. It does not provide analysis of how 
boundary activity relates to controversy protraction.
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Examination of the structure and dynamics of protracted controversies, such 
as the directed mutation debate, highlights the central problem associated with this 
perception of and approach to controversy. The forces of perpetuation are resigned, 
in the majority of models, to exist in what we might think of as an interruption 
phase; protracted debates are considered suspended in the negotiation phase. Models 
generally predict that an anomaly will arise, that it will be perceived by the 
appropriate community, that a phase of negotiation will ensue, and that finally, the 
anomaly will be resolved by any number of processes such as assimilation, 
abandonment or redefinition.140 In a protracted controversy, it is essentially 
imagined that this process is stuck in the negotiation phase — that there has been an 
interruption at that point in the process through which scientific activity should 
proceed. That evaluation renders protracted negotiation a passive phenomenon, with 
resolution ultimately inevitable. This is a subtle distinction, but one that is important 
in terms of its tacit classification of the duration of negotiation as a passive variable, 
and the achievement of closure as the active principle of conflict.
To consider protracted phases of negotiation as a passive phenomenon, or as 
part of a process en route to inevitable closure, results in the unfortunate side effect 
of overlooking the very features that characterise and determine the protraction of 
long running conflicts. It is during that period of interruption and drawn out 
negotiation that various features specific to the conflict, and the community involved 
in it, can actively contribute to the perpetuation of the controversy and its failure to 
reach closure.141 It is those active factors of perpetuation that I want to identify in 
this project. Boundary work tells us how these aspects of negotiation are executed,
140 For a detailed discussion of the various modes of closure see: Engelhardt, T. & Caplan, A. 
(Eds.)(1987)
141 In Engelhardt, T. & Caplan, A. (Eds.X1987) the contributing authors explore the influence of 
political and ethical content and connotation on the structure and dynamics of scientific disputes. 
They effectively identify such content as a perpetuating force of controversy negotiation, although 
they express that perpetuation of negotiation instead as impediment to closure; as such they render the 
perpetuation of negotiation passive and assert closure as the inevitable goal of the conflict activity. It 
is worth noting that distinction of expression, since it illustrates again the general tendency of 
theorists to focus on the end directed achievement of controversy closure rather than on the structure 
of the negotiation phase in its own right. In spite of this distinction it is clear from that text that 
political and ethical content would qualify as a perpetuating force of the kind being described here. 
That category is not significant to the case of the directed mutation debate, although it would 
contribute a category o f perpetuation to the ‘general anatomy’ of protracted controversies to which 
this project might contribute.
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but does not follow through to make statements about how the efforts of the 
participants relate to the dynamics of the conflict.
The ‘closure study’142 (discussed above) does adopt a view of closure 
impediments as an active principle in those controversies that are difficult to resolve 
(ie. in controversies with moral or ethical repercussions). However, the project gives 
less attention to the extent to which these impediments might exist as general 
perpetuating forces, alongside other active forces, as part of a general anatomy of 
scientific controversy. Essentially, the authors have identified what might be seen as 
one of many such forces. On account of their focus on policy-making and 
legislation, they have overlooked the relation that their concept of moral and ethical 
impediments to closure might have to a general anatomy of scientific conflicts and 
the forces that prolong them.
This project seeks to turn the focus explicitly upon the protraction of the 
negotiation phase, not in relation to the achievement of closure (so the language of 
impediments to closure is avoided), and as an active rather than passive principle. 
Certain categories of these active forces are identified in the following chapters (3-5) 
and are described for the purposes of this project as ‘perpetuating forces’. This 
selective catalogue of potential perpetuating forces represents a contribution to a 
possible anatomy of protracted controversy that this project aims to offer.
It is worth noting the potential for ‘perpetuating forces’ to increase the symmetry of 
controversy studies. As mentioned above, David Bloor introduced the concept of the 
‘symmetrical’ approach during the 1970s as part of the Strong Programme.143 He 
stated that in order to be symmetrical as historians of science we must consider both 
‘true’ and ‘false’ claims/beliefs in science to have the same kinds of explanation. We 
should not dignify or give special attention to the scientific theories/knowledge that 
we deem to be ‘correct’. We should not think of ideas in the history of science as 
having been right or wrong; such present-centred evaluation, according to Bloor, is 
unproductive. For example, if politics, interestedness, economics and partisanship
142 Engelhardt, T. & Caplan, A. (Eds.)(1987)
143 Bloor, D. (1976)
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are invoked as active factors in the production of false claims, then those causes 
must also be sought out in the production of true claims. Rationality alone should 
not be deemed the hallmark of successful scientific activity. Bloor’s attention to 
symmetry was a reaction against the kinds of explanation that assume that ‘true 
beliefs’ have internalist, essentialist or rationalist explanations, whilst ‘false beliefs’ 
can be attributed to external or social factors. This asymmetrical approach is the 
result of a teleological view of science; the explanations it offers are engineered 
backwards from a known outcome. That approach bears the serious burdens of 
present-centredness and Whig history144.
There is a similar problem of asymmetry in studies of scientific controversy. 
The tendency towards end-directed analyses and closure studies means that we begin 
to dignify resolved controversies, in a similar way to how we might asymmetrically 
dignify ‘true’ knowledge claims. To focus on closure, and reverse engineer an 
explanation of the means by which that resolution has been achieved, is 
problematically teleological and present-centred. Models of controversy borne out of 
attention to closure are only tested against completed conflicts, and so they are only 
tried against the very circumstances that they were designed to describe. Even where 
a thorough sociological discussion of the negotiation phase is given, for example in 
many of the boundary work studies, that explanation still generally pertains to an 
outcome that was known in advance (i.e. the expulsion of a scientist, or the 
monopolization of a scientific field). The means by which the outcome has been 
achieved are being explained, rather than the circumstances of the debate in their 
own right. In this sense, completed controversies become ‘successes’ in the same 
way as the asymmetrical treatments of knowledge see ‘true’ beliefs as successes. 
And the models that test them appear successful because they fit the terms of the 
problem that they were created to test; a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. Unresolved 
controversies are considered pending completion, rather than considered as having 
any special character that determines their protraction.
144 Herbert Butterfield first used the term ‘Whig History’ to describe the problematic representation of 
the past by historians as a narrative of teleological progress towards the present, often involving 
heroes, goals and transhistorical presentations. Embedded in Whig history is a dedication to present- 
centred evaluations o f the past. See: Butterfield, H. (1931) The Whig interpretation of history. G.
Bell, London.
66
The attempt in this project to study an unresolved controversy, and to focus 
attention on the anomaly identification and negotiation phases, aims to achieve a 
better degree of symmetry. I suggest that the concept of perpetuating forces might 
help promote that symmetry, since it encourages the exploration of causes that do 
not dignify rationality or intemalism above partisanship or politics, but rather seeks 
the active elements of controversy protraction across a diverse range of scientific 
controversies. For example, looking at the influences of categories such as 
‘advocacy’, ‘history’, and ‘interdisciplinarity’ does not imply a particular outcome, 
or rely on any outcome to make their study relevant.
1.8 Conclusion: Towards an anatomy of protracted controversy: the
contribution of this project to the wider discourse
Analyses of scientific controversy have come from philosophers, 
sociologists, historians, policy makers, legislators and popular science writers. 
Essentialists have attended to controversy in relation to the demarcation problem, 
and constructivists have followed by addressing conflict as part of the process of 
articulation of the cultural territory of science. Some treatments are focussed on the 
dynamics of knowledge during a conflict, while others describe the activities of 
conflict participants. Popular authors have co-opted scientific controversy for the 
purpose of entertainment, and the media has found it to be an abundant source of 
‘stories’. There is no scarcity of attention to this complex aspect of scientific 
activity.
Whether popular or professional, these treatments have been formulated 
within the even more complex context of the existing perceptions of science and 
conflict. Controversy has been variously attributed as a side effect of science, an 
integral part of its process and an aberration symptomatic of ‘failed’ science. There 
has been a general tendency to focus attention on the resolution or closure of 
controversy, a phenomenon perhaps borne out of the kind of disdain for scientific 
conflict described in section 1.6. As a result, the anatomy of controversy, to which
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these treatments have all contributed, is dominated by the image of controversy as a 
three-part process of anomaly identification, negotiation and resolution. Resolution 
appears as the ultimate goal of conflict activity.
This construction of controversy is problematic in as much as it draws 
attention away from the negotiation phase, wherein the actual material of the 
controversy is in fact located. Constructivist sociologists have attempted to redress 
that balance, but even their negotiation-focussed tools tend to be deployed for the 
analysis of completed episodes of conflict, in which the resolution (the expulsion of 
an individual from the scientific community for example) is the ultimate inspiration 
for the study. So, even in the case of the constructivist models a pitfall exists of the 
same nature that the problem of ‘present-centredness’ creates in the history of 
science.
In this project I argue that one means by which to focus less goal oriented 
attention on negotiation is to think about the protraction of negotiation in terms of 
the active forces that lead to its perpetuation; I refer to these as perpetuating forces. 
That shift of emphasis promotes attention to elements such as personality, 
partisanship, culture and motivation, all of which sociologists have been keen to 
prioritise. Focussing on forces that contribute to perpetuation also reduces the 
problems of present-centred or teleological analyses, i.e. those that start with a 
closed conflict and attempt to work backwards to establish its means of negotiation 
and closure. Attention to the active forces of perpetuation allows a more self- 
contained and symmetrical analysis of negotiation. Particular episodes that constitute 
that phase can be examined in their own right, as active phenomena without 
necessary appeal to the relation they bear to conflict resolution. The remainder of 
this project will be concerned with identifying and discussing a selection of those 
perpetuating forces, using the synthetic methodology that I have outlined here.
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Chapter 2: Case studv: the directed mutation debate. A protracted scientific
controversy.
The ‘directed mutation’ controversy arose in the late 1980s, precipitated by 
observations of bacterial mutation that conflicted with Neo-Darwinian evolutionary 
theory.145 Neo-Darwinian theory states that genetic mutation is random with respect 
to the quality of the environment. In that scheme, organisms become adapted to their 
environment only when they chance to experience a rare beneficial random mutation. 
The organism has no control over its ability to achieve adaptation at the genetic level, 
and the conditions of the environment cannot direct the mutational process towards 
an adaptive outcome. Thus, the evolutionary process is ultimately a precarious one, 
borne out of accumulated ‘lucky’ adaptive events.
The early reports of directed mutation described an alternative adaptive 
mechanism in some bacterial species. Researchers claimed that bacteria subjected to 
environmental stress, in the form of withdrawal of their accustomed nutritional 
substrate, were able to undergo a process of ‘directed mutation’ that enabled them to 
use an alternative food source. Rather than having to rely on the occurrence of a rare 
beneficial mutation to resolve the environmental challenge, it seemed that the bacteria 
were able to undergo mutation of exactly the kind that would render them adapted to 
the new conditions. Their mutational strategy was being directed by the quality of the 
environment, and their adaptation was not just fortunate, but rather purposeful.
The notion o f environment directed mutation conflicts with Neo-Darwinian 
theory in two important ways. Firstly, it implies that non-random mutation underlies 
the adaptive process, which is contrary to the fundamental notion of ‘random’ 
mutation in Neo-Darwinism. Secondly, the achievement of directed mutation would 
rely upon communication between the environment and the genome. To direct
145 The term Neo-Darwinism refers to the evolutionary theory constructed from a combination of 
Charles Darwin’s theory of natural selection [as described in Darwin, C. (1859) On the origin of 
species by means of natural selection. John Murray, London.] and die theory of Mendelian inheritance. 
Neo-Darwinism was synthesised during the 1930s and 1940s by the architects of the ‘modem 
synthesis’, for example Theodosius Dobzhansky, Ernst Mayr and Julian Huxley. Neo-Darwinism is 
synonymous with the modem synthesis. More recently other elements have been combined with the 
theory, for example the new molecular genetics, manifest in concepts such as Francis Crick’s ‘central 
dogma’ (see section 3.2.3). Neo-Darwinian theory has been the foundation of the orthodox study of 
biological evolution since the mid-twentieth century. (Ridley, M. (1996) Evolution. Blackwell Science, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts.)
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adaptation the genome would have to somehow perceive the quality of the 
environment and react to its demands. Neo-Darwinian theory asserts that the genome 
is a closed system, and that information travels only uni-directionally from DNA to 
RNA to protein.146 In the Neo-Darwinian system there is no route of communication 
between the environment and the DNA
In essence directed mutation is non-Darwinian. In addition, it also implies a 
further level of dissent. The notion of cell perception, or even choice, that underlies 
the capacity to direct the mutational effort invokes the already highly controversial 
Lamarckian evolutionary theory.147 Lamarckian theory supposes that organisms 
‘strive’ for their adaptation and acquire traits during their lifetime that can be passed 
to offspring to promote their success. Classical Lamarckian theory has been 
forcefully rejected by the orthodox scientific community, as have the numerous 
incarnations in which its resurrection has been attempted. So, directed mutation was 
not only non-Darwinian dissent, but was also part of a historical legacy of 
Lamarckian resurrections.
This chapter provides a narrative reconstruction of the events of that debate. It 
seeks to recover the details of the two sub-debates that comprised this controversy; 
first, the molecular genetics debate concerning bacterial mutational processes and 
second, the broader conflict precipitated by the Neo-Darwinian response to an 
apparently Lamarckian phenomenon. This chapter is largely non-analytical (see 
Section 2.5), aiming chiefly to provide an illustrative resource to be drawn upon in 
subsequent chapters in which more general analysis of scientific controversy is 
undertaken.148
146 The notion of strictly uni-directional transfer of information from DNA -> RNA —► Protein has 
been a tenet of Darwinian theory since the 1970s. It is termed the ‘central dogma’ and was established 
by Francis Crick. [Crick, F. (1970) The central dogma of molecular biology. Nature, 227: 561-563.] 
Directed mutation implies an exception to this supposedly overarching description of genetic 
behaviour. The central dogma is described in more detail in section 3.2.3.
147 Lamarckian evolutionary theory was first outlined in French naturalist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck’s 
Philosophie Zoologique in 1809. [Lamarck, J. B. (1809) Philosophie Zoologique. (trans. H. Elliot, 
1984) Chicago University Press, Chicago] Lamarck promoted a theory of species transformism at a 
time when the majority o f people were dedicated to die fixity of species. Lamarck imagined that 
species could change over time and that they achieved this by means o f an ‘internal drive’ allowing 
them to ‘strive’ towards a form that would better suit the conditions o f their environment. The history 
of Lamarckism and the question of the theory’s current status are very complex issues. These are 
discussed further in Chapter 3.2
148 Appendix 2 features a ‘cast of characters’ glossary to support reading of this case study.
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However, this chapter does rely on some methodological tools to facilitate the 
narrative reconstruction.149 The description of the advocate and adversary groups 
engaged in this conflict is enabled by sociologist Harry Collins’ core-set 
terminology.150 Although participants in a debate may not be cohered by visible 
bonds such as shared institution or epistemology, Collins’ core-set encompasses all 
those individuals allowing that they be perceived as a kind of self-contained 
community. He states that: ‘This set of persons does not necessarily act like a 
‘group’. They are bound only by their close, if differing, interests in the controversy’s 
outcome.’151 This is an ideal descriptive tool for the international community of 
directed mutation participants, whose disciplinary and institutional affiliations are 
diverse, but who have an enduring interaction as participants in the debate.
The terminology of boundary work theory and the cartographic metaphor is 
also employed.152 That language allows that the directed mutation debate be framed 
as a boundaiy dispute pertaining to the relative authority o f the domains ‘molecular 
biology’ and ‘evolutionary biology’. In that construction, John Cairns’ particular 
brand of advocacy is illuminated as boundary work for expansion, while the defence 
of Darwinism by the critics of directed mutation is boundary work for protection of 
monopoly.
2.1 The directed mutation debate is comprised of two sub-debates
The directed mutation debate has been protracted, enduring in various forms 
for two decades without resolution. The controversy is comprised of two sub-debates, 
which I refer to as the two ‘aspects’ of the debate. One aspect relates to the specific 
dissent concerning the legitimacy of the bacterial mutation observations. The other 
relates to the broader contest that the anomaly provoked, concerning the implications 
of directed mutation for evolutionary biology more generally. These two aspects are 
intertwined, and have each been periodically the more or less dominant strand in the 
overall debate. The emergence, nature and relation of these two aspects are outlined 
in this section.
149 These methodological tools are discussed in more detail in Chapter 1.
150 See Collins, H. (1985); Collins, H. (1981b) The place of the ‘core-set’ in modem science: social 
contingency with methodological propriety in science. History of science, 19: 6-19.
151 Collins, H. (1985) p. 142
152 See Gieryn, T. F. (1995). Boundary theory is described in Chapter 1.
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To describe the history of this debate, and the emergence of its two aspects, it 
is necessary to select some logical point from which to commence a narrative. 
Following precedent153, I have selected the publication of the journal article ‘The 
Origin of Mutants’154 to serve that purpose.155 The research reported in that paper was 
conducted by a team of molecular biologists at The Harvard School of Public Health, 
led by esteemed biologist Professor John Cairns. This paper is significant for several 
reasons:
i) ‘The Origin of Mutants’ includes the first report of ‘directed 
mutation’, and begins the aspect of the debate in which the legitimacy of this 
molecular biological anomaly is negotiated. The many other papers that combine to 
comprise that negotiation proceed from this paper, often citing it as the foundation of 
the conflict. The paper was the first to report that, in bacteria subjected to nutritional 
‘stress’, adaptations seemed to arise as a specific response to that immediate 
environmental challenge. The Harvard team reported that non-lactose digesting 
Escherichia coli (Lac-) bacterial populations, when raised in the absence o f their 
accustomed food, but in the presence of lactose, reverted at high frequency to the 
Lac+ form which is able to utilise lactose as a nutritional substrate. Only those 
bacteria that made the Lac reversion were able to survive the enforced starvation by 
adapting to use the unaccustomed lactose nutrition source that had been provided. It 
seemed that this adaptive Lac+ reversion was occurring at a frequency in excess of
153 In her 1993 review, Patricia Foster, an advocate of Caimsian directed mutation, identifies Cairns, 
Overbaugh and Miller (1988) as the trigger for the debate. [Foster, P. (1993)] Also, popular accounts 
commonly identify that paper as the primary reference on directed mutation, [see Corliss, W. (1994) 
Adaptive mutation. At: www.science-frontiers.com and Latter, J. (1999) Directed mutation and 
Galileo. At: www.members.aol.com/joralat/direct.html] In addition, John Cairns describes that 
publication as the ‘paper that set off all the brouhaha’ (personal communication 10/03).
Cairns, J., Overbaugh, J. & Miller, S. (1988)
,55This paper was not the first to address the function of mutation in starving bacteria. Research 
published earlier in the 1980s [Hall, B. (1982b) Evolution on a petri dish: using die evolved B- 
galactosidase system as a model for studying acquisitive evolution in the laboratory. Evolutionary 
Biology, 15: 85-149.] had described anomalies of bacterial mutation under starvation conditions. 
However, these earlier reports were published without any apparent boundary work activity, and 
significantly without reference to Lamarckism (contra Cairns, Overbaugh & Miller, 1988). The 
publications only described apparent directed mutation in bacteria as a genera-specific anomaly, with 
no reference to die broader implications of the phenomenon. That earlier material was not part of a 
challenge to the authority of evolutionary geneticists.
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what could be achieved by the random mutation that Darwinian theory relies upon.156 
Rather than random mutation underlying bacterial adaptation/evolution, it seemed 
that an alternative adaptive mechanism was operating to permit the bacteria’s 
acquisition of specific genetic traits aimed at the resolution of the nutritional stress. 
This aspect of the debate focussed on the methodological and interpretative conflict 
between those who presented and supported directed mutation data, and those who 
considered the experiments poorly conducted or badly interpreted.
ii) The paper also introduced the more general aspect of the dissent, 
invoking the ongoing conflict between Neo-Darwinian theorists and Lamarckian 
resurrectionists. That aspect concerned the implications of directed mutation for 
evolutionary theory. The control experiments reported in the paper showed that the 
presence of lactose in the medium was an essential pre-requisite for the occurrence of 
the Lac+ reversion at this high frequency. That is to say, under other conditions of 
nutritional stress, i.e. the substitution of an alternative food substrate from lactose, the 
lactose revertants did not accumulate at the same rate as in the lactose plated 
cultures.157 This implies that while adaptive mutations are accumulated in these 
populations, neutral mutations are not concurrently accumulated. Therefore, the 
mutation events occurring were not only adaptive, but were also specific to the 
conditions of the environment. It seemed that the bacteria could engage with their 
environment and respond in a manner appropriate to its demands. This combination 
of ‘adaptivity’ and ‘specificity’ pointed to environment directed modification of the 
genome. Thus, directed mutation is not only distinctly non-Darwinian, but is also 
essentially Lamarckian. ‘The Origin of Mutants’ instigated what would later be 
received as an attempt to resurrect Lamarckian theory.
iii) ‘The Origin of Mutants’ is also significant in that it reveals a 
boundary/authority dispute. It presents directed mutation as a concern not only for
156 That rate of reversion was far in excess of the estimated rate of spontaneous mutation know in E. 
coli. The spontaneous mutation rate for E. coli had been established in: Drake, J. (1969) Comparative 
rates of spontaneous mutation. Nature, 221: 1132.
157 Caims, Overbaugh and Miller (1988), controlled their lactose experiments with observations of 
valine resistance (Valr) mutation. They showed that a population of cells accumulating lactose 
digesting ability in the lactose medium (adaptive mutation) were not concurrently accumulating valine 
resistance (Valr) (a neutral mutation in this medium).
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molecular biologists, but also for evolutionary biologists. It asserts the debate as an 
interdisciplinary conflict. As such, the paper had a significant role in shaping the 
nature and quality of the debate that followed. The authors use rhetoric in this paper 
to shape their observations as an appeal for an extension of the authority of molecular 
biology into the territory of evolutionary biology: that is, an appeal to be able to 
describe phenomena that are normally restricted to the domain of evolutionary 
biology.
In ‘The Origin of Mutants’ the Harvard team go to lengths to emphasise the 
potential gravity of the directed mutation anomaly. They did not shy from the 
implications of their observations for other types of cells than bacteria, nor did they 
avoid the pressing connection of their observations with Lamarckism. Indeed this 
paper embraces Lamarckian rhetoric. The abstract includes the assertion that: ‘...cells 
may have mechanisms for choosing which mutations will occur’.158 This phrase is the 
opening gambit in a rhetorical battle that underpins the Lamarckism versus 
Darwinism aspect of the debate. It also reflects Cairns’ approach to advocacy 
(discussed in section 4.2). Firstly, the use of the word ‘choose’ invokes classical 
Lamarckian theory, in which organisms are considered to achieve adaptation 
consciously through certain deliberate actions. Lamarck thought of organisms as 
‘striving’ for adaptation and being participants in their evolution. The use of this term 
in the opening of the 1988 paper signalled Lamarckian association. Secondly, this 
phrase refers to a system in ‘cells’ rather than only in bacteria. This is a significant 
extrapolation from their observations in bacterial colonies to a much further reaching, 
more contentious statement concerning the possible existence of Lamarckian 
phenomena, not only in unicells, but also in the individual cells of multi-cellular 
organisms. The motives for invoking Lamarckism in this initial paper are considered 
in Chapter 4.2. It will suffice at this stage to recognise that in this initial publication 
Cairns’ team made no attempt at apology or temperance in the presentation of their 
results or indeed in their evaluation of the implications o f those results. The style of 
presentation in this paper forced a broad community to respond to the molecular 
biologists’ claims.
158 Cairns, J., Overbaugh, S. & Miller, S. (1988) p. 142
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iv) Publication of ‘The Origin of Mutants’ corresponds to the inception of the 
‘advocates’ section of the debating community or core-set. Points i) to iii) show the 
advocates fulfilling their first obligations as dissenters. First, they make a contentious 
unorthodox claim, and second, they adopt a rhetorical style that frames and coheres 
their dissent. In that paper they also assert their challenge by carrying out several 
other acts of boundary work.
For example, even at this initial stage Cairns’ Harvard team addressed one of 
the major burdens facing the proponents of a contentious knowledge claim: to 
propose a causative mechanism for the observations.159 Their proposal of mechanistic 
details in this paper indicates its significance as a foundation of a forthcoming debate. 
In 1988, Cairns’ team favoured a mechanism involving a reverse transcriptase 
pathway.160 They proposed the function of such a pathway in a strong and weak 
version. In the strong version, the cell was considered to have some organelle capable 
of assessing the variable mRNA sequences produced under conditions of nutritional 
stress for the usefulness of their protein product. This model stated that any mRNA 
with a beneficial end product could then be reverse transcribed back into DNA to 
allow the proliferation of its protein product. For example, in an environment where 
lactose was the only source of food a variable mRNA that coded for the enzyme 
lactase would have a very useful end product. That mRNA could be reverse 
transcribed back into DNA such that the genome would begin to produce lactase and 
starvation would be resolved. In the weaker version the same stress induced variable
159 The requirement that proponents of contentious scientific claims explain the causative mechanisms 
underlying their observations is identified and discussed in: Collins, H. M. & Pinch, T. J. (1979) and 
Darden, L. & Cook, M. (1994) Reasoning strategies in molecular biology: abstractions, scans and 
anomalies. In: D. Hull, R. Burian & M. Forbes (Eds.) Philosophy o f science association. Vol.II: 179- 
191. Bruno Latour also references die requirement that causative evidence support contentious claims, 
noting that: ‘when controversies flare up the literature becomes technical’. See Latour, B. (1987) 
Science in action. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, p.30
160 Reverse transcriptase is a polymerase enzyme discovered simultaneously in the 1970s by Howard 
Temin [Temin, H. & Mizutani, S. (1970) RNA-dependent DNA polymerase in virions of Rous 
sarcoma virus. Nature, 226(252): 1211-1213.] and David Baltimore [Baltimore, D. (1970) RNA 
dependent DNA polymerase in virions of RNA tumour virus. Nature, 226(252): 1209-1211]. This 
enzyme allows single stranded RNA sequences to produce double stranded DNA sequences by 
synthesis of a complementary nucleotide strand. This enzyme permits the replication of RNA viruses 
within their host, and was discovered through research to discover the mechanism underlying 
retrovirus reproduction. The discovery of this enzyme came as a major blow to the ‘central dogma’ 
[see footnote 19], rendering one half of the process of protein production from DNA bi-directional, 
rather than unidirectional as had been asserted previously.
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mRNAs are the basis, but the reverse transcription of these is at random.161 There are 
several factors that make the proposal of a reverse transcriptase dependent system 
tactically significant.
Firstly, the reliance of the system on the enzyme reverse transcriptase is 
rhetorically significant. Its simultaneous discovery by Howard Temin162 and David 
Baltimore163 in 1970 was a profound challenge to the Neo-Darwinian ‘central dogma’ 
of molecular genetics.164 Invoking a link between the directed mutation observations 
and this molecule promised the benefit of association with previous work in 
molecular biology, that had shown that accepted accounts of molecular level 
evolution were incomplete and imperfect. The association o f their results with the 
discovery of reverse transcriptase provided a theoretical context for their research; 
avoiding the stigma of isolation by association with previous efforts to re-evaluate the 
premise of the ‘central dogma’.
Secondly, a decade before this publication, Lamarckian resurrectionist 
Edward Steele had invoked reverse transcriptase in his proposed mechanism for the 
accumulation of acquired characters in the immune system.165 This further enriched 
the context for the directed mutation observations, since by this time Steele’s work 
had enjoyed a good degree of acceptance in mainstream immunology. Association 
with this work implied the possibility that Steele’s observations could be only the tip 
of the iceberg, indicating a much more far reaching role for reverse transcriptase in
161 Cairns, J., Overbaugh, J. & Miller, S. (1988)
162 Temin, H. & Mizutani, S. (1970)
163 Baltimore, D. (1970)
164 The ‘Central Dogma’ refers to the perceived unidirectional genetic pathway from DNA -  RNA -  
Protein that had become a fundamental tenet of Darwinian molecular genetics by the late twentieth 
century [Maynard-Smith, 1993b The theory of evolution. (3rd Ed.)Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge] The phrase was coined by Francis Crick to describe die universality of unidirectional 
information transfer from the genome to the phenotype. [ See: Crick, F. (1970)] This dogma precludes 
the direct modification of die genome by environmental factors, and renders the genetic material 
inviolate from change initiated at the somatic level. [See: Crick, F. (1958b) On protein synthesis. 
Symposium of the Society for Experimental Biology, XII: 153. Academic Press, New York.] For further 
discussion of Crick’s dogma see Chapter 3.
165Steele had shown that offspring could inherit immunity that their parents had acquired during their 
own lifetimes, and that this occurred by a feedback mechanism mediated by reverse transcriptase. The 
mechanism added the genetic material of parental immunity to the heritable genome. [See: Steele, E. 
(1979) Somatic selection and adaptive evolution: on the inheritance of acquired characteristics. 
Williams & Wallace International Inc, Toronto.] This immune process was accepted as part of 
established immunity theory by the time that Cairns published his early work on directed mutation in 
bacterial populations. See: Steele, E. (1981) Lamarck and immunity: a conflict resolved. New Scientist, 
89: 360-361.
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molecular genetics than was perceived at the time of its description in the 1970s. 
Steele himself had made use of Lamarckian references in his 1970s immunology 
work and went on to make even more radical pro-Lamarckian comment in his book 
Lamarck’s Signature,166 Thus, association with Steele’s work also served to invoke 
an ideological context for the bacterial work of the Harvard team.
Together, the content and style of ‘The origin of mutants’ precipitated and shaped the 
debate that followed. Its combination of anomaly reporting, causative theorizing, 
rhetoric and association making, marked it as the foundation of an authority challenge 
to evolutionary biologists by molecular biologists. The style of the paper 
demonstrates the authors’ careful attention to the obligations of ‘dissenters’ and a 
self-aware approach to their unorthodoxy. The provision of possible causative 
explanations o f directed mutation and the use of Lamarckian references can be 
viewed as acts of boundary work for the forthcoming authority struggle. Cairns’ team 
had not only reported an anomalous finding, but they had framed the anomaly in such 
a way as to construct an effective boundary challenge.
The outcome of this presentation was the emergence o f the two-aspect debate. 
First, there was a contested knowledge claim concerning the existence of a directed 
mutation phenomenon in bacteria, or possibly in ‘cells’. Second, there was the 
implied significance of the phenomenon for evolutionary theory. From this double 
challenge emerged the specific and defined molecular genetics debate, alongside the 
broader debate on evolutionary theory. In relation to the technical molecular 
biological debate Cairns’ team had introduced their observations to an appropriate 
forum for debate. In relation to the broader debate, Cairns’ had essentially ‘thrown 
down the gauntlet’. The style and content of the paper ensured that response to it 
would be forthcoming in relation to both aspects of the contest.
2.2 After ‘The origin of mutants*: the development of a controversy core- set.
In this section, I describe the journal publications on directed mutation that 
appeared in the period 1988 to 1997. That period corresponds to the principally
166 Steele, E., Lindley, R. & Blanden, R. (1998) Lamarck's signature: how retrogenes are changing 
Darwin's natural selection paradigm. Allen & Unwin, St. Leonard’s, Australia.
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journal-based phase of the controversy. After 1997 the Internet forum assumes 
increased importance and becomes the principal forum for this debate in terms of 
scale o f participation. That shift of forums is discussed in section 2.3 and analysed in 
detail in Chapter 5.
The published response to ‘The Origin of Mutants’ was immediate and 
prolific, ranging from specific criticisms of the paper, to further reports of the 
directed mutation phenomenon from other investigators. Understanding the response 
to that paper is key to understanding the structure and quality of the debate over the 
next two decades. To organise these publications I utilise Collins’ ‘core-set’ 
terminology (although not without certain caveats which are discussed throughout 
this section).167 The core-set is useful to this discussion in that it provides a means by 
which to represent those involved in the directed mutation debate as a type of 
community, even without any geographic or institutional cohesion. Rather, the 
principle of membership of the group exists in the fact of involvement with the 
controversy. Also, this membership need not be stable in terms of scale or 
composition, and is therefore suited as a description of the dynamic community that 
contributed to the directed mutation debate during its journal-based phase.
The core-set emerged directly after the publication of ‘The Origin of 
Mutants’. Its scale is difficult to determine, since it was characterised by 
fluctuation of membership, and even changing strategies on the part of its key 
members.169 However, this core-set can be considered loosely composed of: i) 
protagonists and antagonists of the directed mutation phenomenon in molecular 
biology, and ii) protagonists and antagonists of the broader implications of directed 
mutation for evolutionary theory. This division is useful only with the caveat that
167 Collins defines and describes the core-set in: Collins, H. (1981b) and Collins, H. (1985)
I68Collins acknowledges that it is often difficult to determine the point at which the core-set arises. He 
suggests that a good time to consider a core-set initiated is with the publication of some ‘unambiguous 
claim’ [Collins, H. (1981b) 12]. On that premise, I suggest that Cairns’ 1988 paper represents 
emergence of the core-set in this case. Although other publications had described bacterial stress 
experiments, they had not been presented with the rhetoric of controversy, and their claims had 
remained ambiguous in terms of broad significance to evolutionary theory.
169 Collins (1981b) acknowledges that core-set membership is difficult to determine precisely, since it 
is characterized by fluctuation of often-temporary members. In this case, I have selected the authorship 
of 3 or more journal articles pertaining to the controversy, or the undertaking of private 
correspondence with erne of die principle authors, as signifying membership. Although this is not ideal, 
since it does not give a direct measure of an individual’s impact on the controversy, it does at least 
reveal the key participants.
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support for directed mutation as a principle of molecular biology does not 
automatically indicate support of directed mutation as the foundation of broader non- 
Darwinian or Lamarckian principles. In addition, the core-set has a significant 
component whose support of or antagonism towards the directed mutation research 
remains discrete by the nature of their publication forum (for example review articles 
or editorials where bias is discouraged). Numerous key publications, especially in the 
early period, come from reviewers whose articles are supposed to be at least
1 70ostensibly unbiased.
After the mid-1990s, the core-set grouping loses some of its usefulness to this 
analysis, as the scale of the debate is changed dramatically by uptake in the Internet 
forum. The issues of sociological grouping for this debate are dealt with below in full. 
It will suffice at this point to appreciate, with the aid of the core -set terminology, that 
after Cairns’ 1988 publication a debating group emerged to discuss directed mutation 
as both a bacterial phenomenon and a potential example of New Lamarckian 
evolution.
Initially, the antagonists’ key objection was founded upon observations made 
in 1943 by Salvador Luria and Max Delbruck171 during experiments on bacterial 
populations subjected to bacteriophage infection.172 The experiments aimed to assess 
whether the phage resistance mutation arose at random in these populations with 
respect to time of infection, or was more likely to occur after the selective force of 
infection was applied. Essentially this would show whether the resistance mutation 
arose as a response to the phage infection (i.e. was directed by it) or simply occurred 
as a random mutation with no regard for utility. Luria and Delbruck developed an 
assay called the ‘fluctuation test’ that showed that phage resistance mutations arose as 
random events during the culture time of the bacteria, rather than more frequently 
after infection of the population by the phage. This random occurrence of beneficial 
mutations was demonstrated by the large variations in numbers of resistant bacteria 
between independently plated populations. For example, a culture in which the
170 See for example: Stahl, F. (1988) A unicorn in the garden. Nature, 335:112-113.
!71 Luria, S. & Delbruck, M. (1943) Mutations of bacteria from virus sensitivity to virus resistance. 
Genetics, 28: 491 -511.
172 Bacteriophage is a virus that infects and destroys bacterial cells.
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resistance mutation had occurred early in the culture time would have a high number 
of resistance individuals by the time the phage was introduced. Therefore, once plated 
with the phage, this colony would appear to have a high number of resistant 
individuals. Conversely, a population which did not have any individual experiencing 
the chance resistance mutation during the culture time, or which only experienced 
this mutation late on, would not be so populated by the offspring of the resistant 
bacteria. Therefore, once plated with the phage the colony resistance would be much 
less significant than in the early mutant culture. Luria and Delbruck concluded that 
this variation was the result of the resistance mutation arising at random times during 
culture. Their fluctuation test results showed that the mutation to confer phage 
resistance was as likely to occur prior to infection with the phage as after. This 
showed that the selective agent (the bacteriophage) was not responsible for triggering 
mutations to confer resistance.
At first glance these results seem to preclude Cairns’ observations; it seems 
that adaptive mutations do not arise more frequently after a selective pressure is 
applied. However, as Cairns’ team were eager to emphasise, their assay conditions 
were very different from those in the Luria and Delbruck test; in fact, so different that 
a comparison between the two experiments is meaningless. The introduction to ‘The 
Origin of Mutants’ describes the Luria and Delbruck methodology, and explains the 
distinction between their study and that of Cairns’ team. That discussion acted as a 
pre-emptive strike against the invocation of Luria and Delbruck as a precedent 
against their findings.
By studying starvation Cairns’ team were studying the bacterial colony during 
‘stationary phase’. This is a non-growth phase entered by stressed bacterial cells.173 In 
this phase genetic mutations can occur, and any mutation which allows the cells to 
survive the environmental conditions will allow that cell to re-enter growth phase and 
produce a sub-population of adapted cells. Luria and Delbruck’s choice of the 
bacteriophage as the selective agent resulted in the death of the colonies immediately 
after infection if the resistance trait was not present having arisen in earlier culture. 
Their experiments therefore did not allow a stationary phase period in which mutation 
could occur as a response to the environmental impetus to adapt. They were not
173 Cairns, J., Overbaugh, J. & Miller, S. (1988)
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observing post-selection adaptation, because their experimental design did not 
include a post-selective period in which the cells were able to survive and mutate. 
They had not examined the phase in which Cairns’ team claimed to have observed 
mutation directed by the environmental conditions. Luria and Delbruck’s fluctuation 
results were not in fact precedent against the directed mutation work. As Cairns 
himself has said, ‘if you want bacteria to evolve, it’s not fair to kill them’.174
Despite this crucial difference between the bacterial states studied by Luria 
and Delbruck and the Harvard team, the fluctuation test was repeatedly invoked in 
criticism of the new observations.175 Critics of directed mutation were cohered during 
1988 to 1993 by a common invocation of Luria and Delbruck as precedent against the 
Harvard’ observations.176 However, some authors were more perceptive concerning 
the significance of the stationary phase distinction and acknowledged this from the 
outset.177 These individuals instead focussed their objections upon those specific 
aspects of Cairns’ research that they found inadequate in terms of method or control. 
There were two common objections: discrete cell death/reproduction, and the 
appraisal of control mutations as neutral.
Linda Partridge and Michael Morgan first drew attention to these 
methodological issues. Their objections were detailed in the correspondence pages of 
Nature two months after ‘The Origin of Mutants’ appeared in the journal.178 They 
suggested that Cairns’ calculations of population size during stationary phase could 
have been inaccurate due to unaccounted for death or growth occurring during the 
stationary phase. This might occur if natural cell death was equalled by slow division
174 Personal communication with John Cairns, 10/04
175 See for examples: Stahl, F. (1988); Lenski, R., Slafkin, M. & Ayala, F. (1989) Mutation and 
selection in bacterial populations: alternatives to the hypothesis of directed mutation. Proc. Natl Acad. 
Sci. USA, 86:2775-2778; Stewart, F., Gordon, D. & Levin, B. (1990) Fluctuation analysis: the 
probability distribution of die number of mutants under different conditions. Genetics, 124:175-185; 
Lenski, R. & Mittler, J. (1993a) The directed mutation controversy and Neo-Darwinism. Science, 259: 
188-194; Lenski, R. & Mittler, J. (1993b) Directed mutation. Science, 260: 1222-1223.
176 In this period, evolutionary geneticists Richard Lenski and John Mittler, were the key core-set 
antagonists of directed mutation (Lenski was Mittler’s PhD supevisor). They published prolifically and 
asserted Luria and Delbruck as precedent against directed mutation. Alongside them, evolutionary 
geneticist Bruce Levin (who had been post doctoral supervisor to Lenski and would later also mentor 
Mittler), not only published material but also engaged with John Cairns in a ‘heated’ exchange of 
private letters [personal communication with John Cairns 10/03]
77 For example: Prival, M. & Cebula, T. (1992) Sequence analysis of mutations arising during 
prolonged starvation of Salmonella typhimurium. Genetics, 132: 303-310. In which the authors 
acknowledge the important distinction between the use of lethal (i.e. bacteriophage) selective agents of 
the Luria and Delbruck type and the use of non-lethal agents (i.e. starvation) of the Harvard type.
178 Partridge, L. & Morgan, M. (1988) Is bacterial evolution random or selective? Nature, 336:22
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of some other cells, as a result of an impure medium. The result of these discrete 
growth phenomena would be that the population size would not appear to alter and 
yet growth would be occurring. If this was the case, then any mutants arising could be 
of a normal replication dependent type and could therefore be random with respect to 
the environmental quality rather than reliant on a reverse transcription pathway.
This methodological criticism did not account for the observation that neutral 
mutations did not accumulate alongside apparently adaptive mutations. However, 
they also questioned the definition of a neutral mutation. Cairns had identified Valine 
resistance (Valr) as a neutral trait and established that this did not accumulate 
alongside the lactase mutation in the lactose medium, thus demonstrating the 
specificity of the observed mutations. Partridge and Morgan (and later Danchin179) 
suggested that Valr might not be fully neutral, as it might raise the probability of cell 
death when in a lactose medium.180 If that were the case, then a higher rate of 
mutation to Lac+ than to Valr would be expected in a lactose medium anyway.
Multiple objections of this kind emerged in a dedicated discussion section in 
the December 1988 issue of Nature. In that collection of letters, Holliday and 
Rosenberger point out that: ‘It is a guiding principle in science that a radical new 
interpretation (in this case one invoking the inheritance of acquired characteristics) 
should only be considered if simpler explanations based on existing knowledge are 
inadequate.’181 The contributions in that section all appear in service to that
1 S ')agenda ; their commentary collectively encourages that an explanation for the 
anomaly be sought that does not rely on unorthodox speculation.
These commentaries provided a programme for further research, which was 
addressed by the advocates of directed mutation in subsequent papers that comprised
179 Danchin, A. (1988) Origin of mutants disputed. Nature, 336: 527. Danchin expressed concern that 
the use of Valine resistance as a control for the lactose reversion was inappropriate, since it involved a 
frameshift mutation that might behave very differently from lactose reversion under selective pressure.
180 Valr might raise the chance of cell death in a lactose medium on account of its physiological cost to 
the organism. Under the stress conditions of this medium a Valr trait may be too ‘expensive’ in terms 
of physiological energy investment for an organism to maintain life in a medium in which it has no 
survival value. This criticism is valid in terms of its appreciation of the economics of nature and 
associated survival, however, there is no evidence that Valr does carry a cost of this kind in the case of 
E. coli in a lactose medium.
181 Holliday, R. & Rosenberger, R. (1988) Origin of mutants disputed. Nature, 336: 526.
182 Charlesworth, D., Charlesworth, B. & Bull, J. (1988) The origin of mutants disputed. Nature, 336: 
525; Grafen, A. (1988) The origin of mutants disputed. Nature, 336: 525-526; Holliday, R. & 
Rosenberger, R. (1988); Van Valen, L. (1988) The origin of mutants disputed. Nature, 336: 526; 
Danchin, A. (1988); Tessman, I. (1988) The origin of mutants disputed. Nature, 336: 527.
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a period of active methodological debate.183 Cairns responded at once, with his own 
letter appearing at the end of the discussion section.184 In this he addressed each of 
the authors objections, disregarding several of them, but flagging others (i.e. the 
neutrality of Valr) as areas for investigation. Although Cairns acknowledged that his 
letter was ‘primarily a response to our critics’ he also used the opportunity to reassert 
his conviction that ‘it seems almost perverse to maintain, as a matter of principle, that 
such a mechanism [directed mutation] has never evolved.’
Other initial responses were more supportive of the Harvard research. Some, 
while not enthusiastic, or in agreement with Cairns concerning interpretations or 
mechanism at least regarded the potential anomaly as interesting or important. For 
example, two months after the publication of the Harvard results, biologist Spencer 
Benson wrote to Nature that: ‘Although the actual experimental data presented are 
sketchy and the details of the experimental procedures are lacking, one is left with the 
feeling that the phenomenon reported by Cairns’ et al is real and warrants further 
investigation.’186 He adds that: ‘I believe we are seeing a form of directed 
mutagenesis in this selection, though we have no data on how this directed response 
might occur.’187 Others offered more detailed commentary in favour of directed 
mutation.
In particular, two individuals spoke out early in tentative support of the new 
research; Franklin Stahl and Barry Hall. Franklin Stahl, a molecular biologist from 
the University of Oregon, published an article entitled ‘A Unicom in the Garden’ in 
the same issue of Nature as Cairns’ paper.188 This article appeared in the ‘news and
183 For example, directed mutation advocate Barry Hall references the ‘origin of mutants disputed ’ 
discussion in two follow up papers. Hall, B (1990a) Spontaneous point mutations that occur more 
often when advantageous than when neutral. Genetics, 126: 5-16; Hall, B. (1991b) Adaptive evolution 
that requires multiple spontaneous mutations: mutations involving base substitutions. Proc. Natl. Acad. 
Sci., 88: 5882-5886. In those highly technical papers Hall focuses on methodology and the provision 
of experimental detail.
184 Cairns, J. (1988) Origin of mutants disputed. Nature, 336: 527-528.
185 Caims, J. (1988) p.528
186 Benson, S. (1988) Is bacterial evolution random c m * selective? Nature, 336:21-22. p.21
187 Benson, S. (1988) p.22
188 Stahl, F. (1988). This was the first of three review articles published by Stahl on directed mutation. 
His tentative support was indicated in the cryptic title, which he later explained alluded to James 
Randi’s rhetorical question ‘What would you do if I said I keep a unicorn in my back yard?’, that he 
posed during his discussion of the water memory debate that had been raging earlier that year in the 
pages of Nature. [Stahl, F. (1992) Unicorns revisited. Genetics, 132: 865-867. p.866]. The answer to 
this question Stahl says is ‘I would climb over to have a look!’ [Stahl, F. (1992) p.866] Stahl was 
inviting the reader to look more closely at Cairns’ work and not be blinded by assumptions.
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reviews’ section, and while maintaining the style of a review, was generally positive 
about the future of research into directed mutation.189 The article re-emphasised the 
distinction between Cairns’ work and Luria and Delbruck’s. Stahl even theorised a 
possible mechanism for the accumulation of directed mutations in bacterial 
populations. He suggested that the normal genetic mismatch repair systems of the 
stressed bacterial genome may become error prone, if not non-functional, and that as 
a result the genome may accumulate a larger number of mutations than at other points 
in the cell cycle. This increase in rate would make it more likely that an individual 
cell might achieve a beneficial mutation. In proposing this mechanism Stahl is 
suggesting that the mutations observed by Cairns may be the result only of faster 
mutation, rather than mutation specifically directed by the environmental conditions. 
Stahl is effectively offering a weak model as an alternative to the strong model 
proposed by the Harvard team. Although such a mechanism would strip some of the 
Lamarckism from directed mutation, the situation would remain that the bacterial 
cells have in place a mechanism by which to modify the quantity if not the quality of 
mutations at the time of an environmental challenge; a previously unforeseen 
capacity in any cells. Stahl qualifies his proposal of this weaker model, 
acknowledging a forthcoming paper by Barry Hall that promised to report 
experiments showing how several beneficial mutations can arise simultaneously
when selected by the medium, without concurrent accumulation of neutral
♦ 100 mutations.
Barry Hall’s 1988 paper was perhaps the most significant supportive response 
to ‘The Origin of Mutants’ that year.191 Hall had been working with nutrition stressed 
bacterial populations throughout the 1980s at the University of Rochester in New
189 The significance of this paper is described further in Chapter 4. It is an example of ‘publication with 
qualification’ of the kind that Collins and Pinch have described (Collins, H, & Pinch, T., 1979). It was 
included alongside the Harvard paper to act as an editorial qualifier, encouraging the readership to 
view the new work with caution, if not suspicion. Similar qualifying material had appeared in Nature 
alongside Benveniste’s water memory publication earlier that year [see Maddox, J., (1988a) Editors 
note: When to believe the unbelievable. Nature, 333: 787] appearing alongside Davenas, E., 
Benveniste, J. et ah, (1988). Although Stahl seems enthusiastic, he is encouraging a ‘wait and see’ 
attitude. In that 1988 paper he refers to forthcoming confirmatory material on directed mutation that he 
has been made aware of saying: ‘.. .be warned, however, that more difficult challenges are just over the 
horizon.’ (Stahl, 1988 p. 113) A telling expression, that reveals die function of this paper as a qualifier 
of the unorthodox publication.
190 That paper appeared as: Hall, B. (1988) Adaptive evolution that requires multiple spontaneous 
mutations. 1. mutations involving an insertion sequence. Genetics, 120: 887-897.
191 Hall, B. (1988)
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York. He was therefore an obvious candidate to take on the challenge of replicating 
Cairns’ results and to address some of the methodological criticisms. As Stahl had 
promised, Hall’s paper did extend Cairns’ work to describe the accumulation of 
multipoint adaptive mutations. Hall showed that even in a medium where two or 
more factors were limiting bacterial growth the environmental challenges were met at 
a much faster rate than could be achieved by chance alone, perhaps even as much as a 
hundred million times faster. In addition, Hall suggested that only the specific 
combination of mutations required would arise, without concurrent accumulation of 
mutations of no benefit. Hall had extended Cairns’ experiments to encompass a study 
of multipoint mutations too complex to arise in any significant number by chance 
alone. The probability of achieving the multipoint mutation by random mutation 
processes would be extremely low, and yet Hall showed that these multipoint 
mutations could occur at similar rates to the single point mutations that the Harvard 
team had reported.
Hall also modified Cairns’ assays to test for the occurrence of different types 
of mutation. Cairns’ team had only studied the action of point mutations, involving 
the replacement of one nucleotide by another, a relatively simple mutation process. 
Hall extended his study to test for the ability to accumulate mutations requiring 
insertion or deletion of a nucleotide base, such that a frameshift mutation occurs. 
These mutations involved more complicated errors of replication and were therefore 
less likely to arise by chance alone.
Hall also devoted part of his discussion to mechanisms for directed mutation, 
as Cairns, Overbaugh, Miller and Stahl had done before him. His theoretical 
suggestions differed significantly from those of Cairns’ team; if Cairns’ model was 
the strong version of directed mutation, Hall’s was a weak version. Cairns 
emphasised specificity and environment direction of mutation, Hall suggested a less 
directed stress-induced mutational response underlay the apparent directed mutations. 
Cairns’ original strong model and Hall’s weaker model came to represent the two 
main approaches pursued by the supporters of directed mutation in the 1990s.
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Allegiance to one or other of those interpretations divided the protagonists into two 
schools of thought in the period after the initial publications.192
Hall focussed on what he called ‘ hypermutation ’ as the principle underlying 
the directed mutation phenomena.193 This theory suggested that the stressed bacterial 
genome might have the capacity to enter a phase of extremely elevated mutation rates 
as a contingency plan for times of extensive environmental challenge.194 In the 
stronger version of his theory Hall proposed that specific regions of the genome, 
associated with the digestive capabilities of the bacteria, would be the foci of 
hypermutation in the starvation phase such that the chance of achieving beneficial 
mutations of phenotypic significance would be enhanced. The mass mutation effort 
would be targeted specifically enough to allow the mutation of specific genes 
associated with the utilisation of a particular substrate as a nutrient. In the weaker 
version, Hall proposed a phase of genome-wide hypermutation. Such widespread 
mutation would almost invariably be disastrous for an organism. However, 
occasionally, this last ditch effort to survive the conditions would result in the 
creation of an adapted mutant that could exit stationary phase and breed a clone of 
adapted cells.195 In the case of this weakest model, the ‘directed’ element of directed 
mutation is essentially lost. The capacity to hypermutate would be particular to 
bacteria, interesting in its uniqueness, but not significant in terms of implication for 
broader molecular genetics or evolutionary theory. Hypermutation in this form would 
represent a quirk of bacterial evolution, manifesting itself as a contingency plan for 
use in the most extreme hostile environments.
192 For example, John Cairns and Patricia Foster support the strong version, while Franklin Stahl and 
Barry Hall promote the weak version.
193 Hall, B. (1988)
194 This can be considered an active form of the mechanism described in Stahl (1988). Where Stahl 
(1988) considers the rapid mutation process passive and mediated through a breakdown of genetic 
repair systems under stress, Hall (1988) suggests that hypermutation is a controlled and evolved 
physiological process purposed for the acquisition of a vast range of potentially useful mutations.
95 This theory is reminiscent of Richard Goldschmidt’s concept of the ‘Hopefol Monster’. 
[Goldschmidt, R. (1940) The material basis of evolution. Yale University Press, Connecticut] 
Goldschmidt proposed that one off grand scale mutants might have existed creating the 
palaeontological gaps considered as ‘missing links’. These individuals can arise in one generation and 
may have extreme phenotypic differences from their parents, that nevertheless, confer some benefit in 
a changed environment. Hall’s weak model invokes a similar image of a fortunate mutant arising from 
generally disastrous population of non-adaptive large-scale mutants.
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Hall’s 1980s papers did not address the Lamarckian associations that Cairns’ 
team had been eager to emphasise.196 He instead referred only to the experimental 
details, and their immediate implications for the bacterial system. He stated that the 
experiments had indicated a bacterial mechanism for dealing with extreme starvation 
situations, and did not refer to a theory for ‘cells’ in general as Cairns’ team had 
done. Hall’s advocacy of mechanisms less antithetical to Neo-Darwinism 
demonstrates fundamental differences between his agenda and that of Cairns’ team. 
Hall’s objective was to explore the bacterial anomaly, but his motivation did not 
stretch to an agenda of explaining the results in terms outside those permitted in a 
Neo-Darwinian treatment. Whereas the Harvard team had constructed their results as 
a challenge to the authority of evolutionary biologists, and as part of an attempt to 
increase the authority of molecular biology, Hall had not interpreted the anomaly in 
the same way. Whereas Cairns (and Steele (1979) before him197) had been eager to 
frame their observations as Lamarckian, Hall was more moderate and flexible in his 
evaluation of the phenomenon underlying directed mutation. Whereas Cairns moved 
keenly between specific data and broader speculation, Hall maintained a focus on 
bacterial genetics. Hall expressed interest in the anomaly from within his own 
discipline, and did not pursue the implication that other disciplinary groups should 
become involved in the negotiation. He did not make apparent any broader agenda, 
and did not contribute actively to the contest for authority that Cairns’ team had 
framed.
The different character of Cairns’ and Hall’s advocacy of directed mutation is 
examined in detail in Chapter 4.2. In that section, I contrast their approaches as ‘loud’ 
versus ‘quite’ advocacy, and their styles are compared with those of Pons, 
Fleischmann and Jones during the Cold Fusion debate. For the purposes of this 
discussion it suffices to note that by 1990 their qualitatively different approaches 
marked the extremes of the range o f positions adopted by advocates of directed 
mutation. Other advocates in the 1990s took up positions between those two extremes
196 Hall, B. (1982a) Evolution of a regulated operon in the laboratory. Genetics, 101: 335-344; Hall, B. 
(1982b); Hall, B. (1988); Hall, B. (1989) Selection, adaptation, and bacterial operons. Genome, 31: 
265-271.
197 In the 1970s Edward Steele had proposed a system of acquired immunity in mammals, and had 
emphasised the degree to which such a system would support a resurrection of Lamarckian theory. See 
Steele, E. (1979) and Steele, E, Lindley, R. & Blanden, FL (1998)
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as they expressed support of directed mutation -  becoming either more ‘Caimsian’, 
or more invested in hypermutation theory.
The remainder of the 1980s discourse on directed mutation was dedicated 
mainly to the replication and slight modification of Cairns’ observations, with Hall 
offering the most comprehensive treatments.198 These repetitions were met by critic’s 
proposals of unproblematic interpretations of what appeared as ‘directed’ 
evolution.199 The advocates’ further investigations aimed to fulfil the obligations for 
methodological stringency that critics demanded. Cairns answered methodological 
queries and complaints both in the correspondence pages of Nature and through 
personal communication with several researchers.200 Replicability is a key 
requirement for any new observation, and not until this requirement had been met 
would it be acceptable to extend the research to assays of other unicellular organisms 
or to a theory of directed mutation in multicellular organisms.
Hall was a major force in the effort to replicate and confirm the Harvard 
results. He published six papers between 1988 and 1991 that detailed observations of 
starvation experiments in E. coli.201 His experiments showed that Cairns’ 
observations could be repeated using the same basic assays. In addition, each article 
made a small contribution to the perpetuation of the debate by extending the assays, 
for example, to describe directed mutation for other substrate utilization, or 
adaptations involving other types of mutation i.e. ffameshift and substitution. In 1990 
Hall confirmed that: ‘Evidence for Caimsian mutations has now been found in all 
cases where it has been sought’202, and in 1992 he published observations of directed
198 Hall, B. (1988) Hall, B. (1989)
199 Lenski, R. (1989) Are some mutations directed? Trends in Ecology and Evolution, 4:148-150.
200 In particular, Cairns entered into debate with evolutionary biologist Bruce Levin. Through letters, 
the two scientists debated the relevance o f fluctuation analysis to the Harvard assays [Personal 
communication with John Cairns 10/03.] Levin published on this issue in 1990 [Stewart, F„ Gordon,
D. & Levin, B. (1990)] Bruce Levin was unwilling to release the materials of that private debate for 
die purposes of this project, although John Cairns stated that he would release his copies with Levin’s 
permission. In 2000 Levin co-authored a general article addressing die issue of adaptive evolution in 
bacteria. In that article he referred to Hall and Lenski’s work, but not to Cairns’ or Fosters’. [Levin, B. 
& Bergstrom, C. (2000) Bacteria are different: observations, interpretations, speculations and opinions 
about the mechanisms of adaptive evolution in prokaryotes. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, USA, 97: 6981-6985]
201 Hall, B. (1988); Hall, B. (1989); Hall, B. (1990a); Hall, B. (1990b) Directed evolution of a bacterial 
operon. Bioessays, 12: 551-558; Hall, B. (1991a) Spectrum of mutations that occur under selective and 
non-selective conditions in E.coli. Genetica, 84: 73-76; Hall, B. (1991b)
202 Hall, B. (1990a) p. 15
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mutation in the unicellular fungus Yeast.203,204 This provided the first evidence of the 
phenomenon in non-bacterial cells, and thereby, the first evidence in favour of 
Cairns’ claim that directed mutation might be a process in ‘cells’. This report also 
began to answer Hall’s own demand that: ‘If Caimsian mutations are of evolutionary
•  205importance, then they must occur in a variety of organisms... ’
Yet, in his many publications Hall remained disengaged from the Lamarckian 
dissent that Cairns had raised, illustrating the character of his advocacy. Despite 
being engaged in scientific dissent he maintained a moderate approach, avoiding 
speculation. Hall’s articles focussed on the presentation o f data and proposals of 
mechanism. They were highly technical, and less discursive than Cairn’s offerings. 
His presentation lacked the more inflammatory material concerning the implications 
of the theory for evolutionary biologists. Perhaps as a result, review material and 
correspondence more frequently addressed Cairns’ publication than Hall’s, although 
Hall consistently received citation in technical contributions to the debate.
Hall also did not engage explicitly in the authority contest that the Harvard 
publication had implied between molecular biology and evolutionary biology. He did 
not highlight the broad challenge to evolutionary biology or Darwinism. As a result, 
generally, the criticisms levelled at Hall were based on methodological queries. Hall 
responded to these by ensuring that his next publication incorporated the solution to 
identified methodological problems. However, in criticisms of Cairns’ work there 
was a greater opportunity to take issue with the broader agenda, and to criticise 
ongoing attempts to resurrect Lamarckian theories.
The different response to Cairns’ and Hall’s work can be traced back to ‘The 
Origin of Mutants’. The Lamarckian associations and speculative theorising in that 
paper instigated dissent. Hall had even published on adaptive mutation in bacteria in 
the early 1980s without provoking any similar response.206 Whereas Hall was able to 
modify his future methodology to answer criticism, Cairns could not hope to so easily 
placate his critics since the resolution of his point of dissent required more than
203 Hall, B. (1992) Selection induced mutations occur in yeast. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 89: 4300- 
4303.
204 Directed mutation in Yeast was also reported in: Steele, D. & J inks-Robertson, S. (1992) An 
examination of adaptive reversion in Saccharomyces cerevisiae. Genetics, 132: 9-21.
205 Hall, B. (1990a) p.6
206 Hall, B. (1982b)
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appeal to data or modification of methodology for resolution. Critics’ response to the 
two authors took on the quality that Cairns had predicted in 1988 when he stated that:
‘At its extremes it was an argument between reductionists and 
romantics - between those who sought to explain the evolution, and the 
behaviour of the biosphere in terms of the laws of physics, and those 
who wished to make the success of evolution just another 
manifestation of the mysteriousness of living things.’
Cairns’ tone and presentation resulted in the critics’ perception of him as one of these 
romantics, whereas Hall’s style made him appear more compatible with the 
reductionists.
Despite Hall’s more moderate approach his mechanistic theories had 
significant impact in scientific terms, and he came the closest of any of the advocates 
to achieving a degree of acceptance for directed mutation. In 1990, Hall formally 
proposed ‘hypermutation’ as a mechanistic theory for directed mutation.208 Building 
upon his earlier strong and weak versions of hypermutation he proposed a model in 
which a proportion of the cells in a bacterial colony might enter a hypermutable state 
during which their genome rapidly and randomly mutates. Any one of that population 
experiencing a beneficial mutation might exit stationary phase, and reproduce to form 
a clone of adapted cells. Hypermutation of a sub-population provided a means by 
which an adaptive response could be mounted to environmental stress, without relying 
on an assumption of non-random mutation. Cairns had presented a strong model of 
directed mutation based on cell choice and reverse transcription; Hall added to that 
this weaker model of random hypermutation as an evolved strategy for rapid 
adaptation in hostile environments.
Hall’s hypermutation theory was popular amongst the protagonists of directed 
mutation, but also popular as an explanation amongst those critics troubled by the 
Lamarckian associations emphasised by Cairns. As Hall pointed out: ‘Because the 
randomness of spontaneous mutation forms such a basic part of our view of biological 
processes, most of us may be more comfortable with an underlying random
207 Cairns, J., Overbaugh, J. & Miller, S. (1988) p. 145
208 Hall, B. (1990a)
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mechanism than with a directed one.’209 Although, he adds: ‘We should be cautious, 
however, about rejecting the notion of ‘directed’ mutations simply because it makes 
us more comfortable to do so.’210 Hall still maintained that hypermutation might focus 
the mutational effort on those specific gene loci most likely to yield an adaptive 
mutation; thus making the process directed, but not in the exact sense that Cairns had 
anticipated. The site specific hypermutation concept was agreeable to the dedicated 
directed mutationists (Patricia Foster advocated hypermutation after 1993), whereas 
genome-wide hypermutation theory, or hypermutation of a sub-population of bacterial 
cells, were more popular with individuals who wished to express the directed mutation 
phenomena within the bounds of Neo-Darwinian theory.
Repetitions of the directed mutation observations, and the extension of the 
original E. coli assays to show the process in other unicells, did not help the debate 
reach resolution. By the early 1990s dozens of mechanisms for directed mutation had 
been proposed, from the most Lamarckian to the almost wholly Neo-Darwinian. 
Cairns’ Harvard team had proposed the most controversial and Lamarckian 
mechanism in their first paper, suggesting that the selective conditions instructed the 
genome to mutate specifically and that reverse transcriptase enabled the process.211 
Davis had presented a similarly strong model, suggesting that the agent of selection 
itself engaged with the DNA, inducing transcription and creating regions of single 
stranded DNA. Those single strand regions are vulnerable to damage, and so 
mutation would be localised at sites specifically related to the selective conditions.212 
Stahl213, and later Boe214, had proposed the ‘slow repair’ models. These stated that 
under conditions of nutritional stress the normal DNA repair enzymes might be slow 
to act and so might allow mutations to accumulate at an elevated rate in stressed 
colonies. In the strong form these DNA errors are localised at sites related to the 
stress conditions, in the weaker model the DNA errors would be genome wide and 
more random. Hall had rejected these models in favour of the trial and error models
209 Hall, B. (1990a) p.15
2,0 Hall, B. (1990a) p.15
211 Cairns,J., Overbaugh, J. & Miller, S. (1988)
212 Davis, B. (1989) Transcriptional bias: a non-Lamarckian mechanism for substrate-induced 
mutations. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 86: 5005-5009.
213 Stahl, F. (1988)
214 Boe, L. (1990) Mechanism for induction of adaptive mutation in Escherichia coli. Molecular 
Microbiology, 4: 597-601.
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related to the various modes of hypermutation.215 Connolly and Winkler216, and 
Ninio217 had suggested that a special kind of bacterial cell, known as a transient 
mutator, might underlie directed mutation. These cells have a naturally high mutation 
rate due to having either a mutator gene, or a faulty repair gene. Those cells would 
contribute the mutations that the population required to overcome the environmental 
challenge. However, experiments failed to confirm that any of these mechanisms was 
responsible for directed mutation, but also failed to eliminate any of them.
The issue of the specificity of the mutations arising under selection remained 
hotly contested. In the early 1990s it remained unclear whether the mutations that 
accumulated were only those that had some utility, or whether neutral mutations were 
also occurring alongside the adaptive mutations. This issue was at the heart of the 
debate, since, the more specifically the mutations were directed to the environmental 
demands, the more Lamarckian the interpretation of the phenomenon must be. In 
1992 Foster remarked that: ‘Perhaps the most astounding aspect of directed mutation 
is, of course, that it is ‘directed’, i.e., only those mutants that are selected for arise in 
the population. Cells under selection are not, apparently, accumulating useless 
mutations.’218 She lamented that: ‘Unfortunately, this is the aspect that is least 
supported by experimental evidence.’219
One key problem had been identifying a truly neutral mutation that could be 
used as a control study. The accumulation of the Valine resistance mutation had been 
examined several times , and it had been concluded that this non-selected mutation 
was not arising at the same rate as the beneficial mutations elsewhere in the genome. 
So, it appeared that the mutations arising were specifically directed to the demands of 
the environment. However, it had been argued that Valine resistance might be either a 
special case or not fully neutral221 Similar concerns about neutrality, and the
215 Hall, B. (1990a); Hall, B. (1991b)
216 Connolly, D. & Winkler, M. (1989) Genetic and physiological relationships among the miaA gene, 
1-methylyhio-N6-  (A2 -  isopentenyl) -adenosine tRNA modification, and spontaneous mutagenesis in 
Escherichia coli K-12. Journal of Bacteriology, 171: 3233-3246.
217 Ninio, J. (1991) Transient mutators: a semiquantitative analysis of the influence of translation and 
transcription errors on mutation rates. Genetics, 129: 957-962.
218 Foster, P. (1992) Directed mutation: between unicorns and goats. Journal of bacteriology, 174: 
1711-1716. p. 1712
2,9 Foster, P. (1992) p. 1712
220 Cairns, J., Overbaugh, J. & Miller, S. (1988); Hall, B. (1988); Hall, B. (1990a)
221 Stahl, F. (1990) If it smells like a unicorn.... Nature, 346: 791; Drake, J. (1991) Spontaneous 
mutation. Annual Review of Genetics, 25: 125-146.
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advantages of genetic intermediates, plagued studies of double adaptive mutations. 
Cairns’ team had cited adaptations that require a double mutation as likely cases of 
directed mutation222, since the chance of double mutation being achieved by chance 
alone, as Foster has put it, are ‘unreasonably low’ 223 Hall had provided two dramatic 
examples of double mutations arising at frequencies far in excess of that predicted by 
chance or random mutation 224 However, it was argued that even these results might 
be the result of ill-judged neutrality, or the cryptic advantage of certain 
intermediates.225
So, in the early 1990s it was clear that the directed mutation phenomenon 
existed in bacteria, and also in the unicell yeast. The appearance of direction occurred 
in relation to several different kinds of mutation, including point, substitution and 
frameshift. And even adaptive changes relying on the simultaneous achievement of 
two very rare mutations seemed to occur quite commonly under selective conditions. 
However, despite these confirmations, the criticisms of directed mutation persisted 
and retained the quality that they had taken on in the late 1980s. The issue of 
specificity was key, and the interpretation the ‘directed’ aspect of the phenomenon 
was very much open to debate.226 Luria and Delbruck’s fluctuation analysis retained 
significance for the critics of directed mutation. The onus remained on the supporters 
of directed mutation to demonstrate that that precedent was not relevant.
The strongest and perhaps most enduring critics of directed mutation were 
evolutionary biologists Richard Lenski and John Mittler. They were critical of 
Cairns’ rhetoric and dismayed at the invocation of Lamarckism. As early as April 
1989, Lenski co-authored a response to the directed mutation observations with 
Francisco Ayala, an ardent Neo-Darwinian. They proposed Darwinian explanations 
for the apparent anomaly, and explained away the contentious factors that Cairns had 
highlighted. In relation to Cairns’ invocation of Lamarckism they stated:
222 Cairns, J., Overbaugh, J. & Miller, S. (1988)
223 Foster, P. (1992) p.1712
224 Hall, B. (1988)
225 Mittler, J. & Lenski, R. (1992) Experimental evidence for an alternative to directed mutation in die 
bgl operon. Nature, 356: 446-448.
226 Benson, S., Decloux, A. & Munro, J. (1991) Mutant bias in non-lethal selections results from 
selective recovery of mutants. Genetics, 129: 647-658. In which the authors propose several alternative 
causes of apparent specificity in bacteria adaptation.
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‘Cairns et al. . .assert that directed mutation in bacteria (if it is demonstrated to 
exist) ‘could in effect provide a mechanism for the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics’. We disagree with this claim; we also view it as potentially harmful in 
that it may seem to give credence to prescientific claims that have been thoroughly 
disproved.’227
They further blast Cairns’ Lamarckism saying: ‘...even if directed mutation 
were demonstrated in bacteria, this would not support in any manner whatsoever the 
traditional notions of Lamarck and his followers concerning the acquisition of 
adaptive characteristics.’228 They conclude that any invocation of Lamarckism in 
relation to directed mutation in bacteria ‘may perpetuate mistaken beliefs concerning 
heredity that are still widely held outside scientific circles.’229
In 1990 Richard Lenski first co-authored with John Mittler on directed 
mutation230 Their association represents one of the most stable in the core-set, 
alongside that of John Cairns and Patricia Foster. The authors presented evidence 
against the Harvard interpretation of the directed mutation anomaly, and offered
'YX1alternative explanations for the findings. In 1993, they published a lengthy 
criticism of directed mutation. In that paper they reiterated the principles of Neo- 
Darwinian theory that precluded Cairns’ observations and gave a detailed description 
of Luria and Delbruck (1943) as evidence against the reliability of the directed 
mutation observations. The authors did not deny that a phenomenon had been 
observed in starved bacterial populations, but rather they suggested it had been 
misinterpreted. The main body of that review article describes the standard Neo- 
Darwinian explanations that might account for apparent directed mutation. Lenski 
and Mittler presented a summary of the various mechanisms that had been proposed 
by that time. These included:
227 Lenski, R., Slatkin, M. & Ayala, F. (1989) p.2777
228 Lenski, R., Slatkin, M. & Ayala, F. (1989) p.2778
229 Lenski, R., Slatkin, M. & Ayala, F. (1989) p.2778
230 Mittler, J. & Lenski, R. (1990) New data on excisions of Mu from E. coli MCS2 cast doubt on 
directed mutation hypothesis. Nature, 344: 173-175.
231 Mittler, J. & Lenski, R. (1990); Mittler, J. & Lenski, R. (1992)
232 Lenski, R & Mittler, J. (1993a)
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1. Reverse transcription of specific beneficial mRNA.
2. Reverse transcription of random mRNA.234
3. Achievement of adaptation by mutation through slow or error prone mismatch
• 235repair.
4. Adaptation through hypermutation of either the whole genome or specific useful 
areas of the genome.236
Lenski and Mittler addressed these proposed mechanisms and described how 
each, while showing a particular capacity in bacteria to achieve adaptation in extreme 
conditions, could be re-described to remove the element of direction, and more 
importantly, the notion of cell ‘choice’. They suggested that the random reverse 
transcription o f mRNA, increased mismatch repair and hypermutation need only rely 
on random genetic processes compatible with Neo-Darwinian theory. The mutations 
were not specific, they only appeared so on account of the re-growth only of those 
mutants which were successfully adapted by their mutation to the environment 
conditions. The underlying principle therefore remains random mutation coupled to 
natural selection as Neo-Darwinism demands. The authors acknowledged that non- 
Darwinian interpretations had been offered by others, but stated simply that: ‘Various 
molecular models have been proposed that might explain these directed mutations, 
but the models have not been confirmed.’237
In their 1993 paper, Lenski and Mittler made the lack of a demonstrable 
mechanism for directed mutation the greatest burden of proof for the advocates of 
directed mutation. Foster had already acknowledged the obligation to reveal 
mechanism , and just four months earlier Foster and Cairns had published a paper 
exploring a further three potential mechanisms for directed mutation; two strong 
directed models, and one weaker random model.239 From the start, each of Cairns’ 
and Hall’s papers had included the details of hypothesised mechanisms for directed
233 As proposed in Cairns, Overbaugh & Miller (1988) as the strong version.
234As proposed in Cairns, Overbaugh & Miller (1988) as the weak version.
235As proposed in Stahl, 1988
236 Barry Hall proposed, and was the strongest advocate of, hypermutation in its various forms from 
1989.
237 Lenski, R. & Mittler, J. (1993a) p. 188
238 Foster, P. (1992)
239 Foster, P. & Cairns, J. (1992) Mechanisms of directed mutation. Genetics, 131: 783-789.
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mutation, demonstrating their own appreciation that such detail was required 
alongside observation. In 1993, their appreciation of that requirement was heightened 
as Lenski and Mittler explicitly criticised the deficit of mechanism in directed 
mutation theory. After 1993, the demonstration of mechanism was the primary focus 
of both advocates and adversaries in this debate.
The significance allotted to the identification of mechanism by the critics and 
supporters of directed mutation relates to the recognised processes for acquiring 
credibility. The perceived need to propose a mechanism on the part of the advocates 
of directed mutation, most particularly in the initial phases, led to publications 
becoming very speculative. This quality of course only served to foster the critics’ 
claims that reports of directed mutation were speculative and unsubstantiated. 
However, Cairns was apparently unperturbed by their criticism and responded stating 
that it was ‘...too selective and partisan to be useful.’240
In 1993, Patricia Foster, o f Boston University, summarised the evidence for 
directed mutation with her own review article of the findings to date.241 Support for 
directed mutation was becoming diffuse, as advocates dispersed their allegiances 
amongst the range of strong and weak models that had become available. Cairns and 
Foster stood almost in isolation as proponents of the stronger models. Critics had laid 
out a programme for further investigation to serve their agenda of Neo-Darwinian 
adherence242, and in her review Foster countered that by offering research guidance 
for supporters of the theory.
By 1993 Foster had already co-authored two directed mutation papers with 
John Cairns.243 She had been involved with directed mutation from the beginning, 
being acknowledged in the 1988 Harvard paper for reading of manuscripts in 
preparation244. Foster had been a graduate student in Cairns’ laboratory and had been 
recruited to the debate during her studentship.245 She eventually became the most
240 Cairns, J. (1993) Directed mutation. Science, 260: 1221-1223. p. 1221
241 Foster, P. (1993)
242 See Lenski, R. & Mittler, J. (1993a) in which the authors describe experiments that might 
demonstrate their Darwinian interpretation of directed mutation.
243 Cairns, J. & Foster, P. (1991) Adaptive reversion of a frameshift mutation in Escherichia coli. 
Genetics, 128: 695-701; Foster, P. Sc Cairns, J. (1992)
244 Cairns, J., Overbaugh, J. & Miller, S. (1988)
245 Foster had worked throughout the early 1980s on bacterial mutagenesis with her Harvard 
colleagues. See: Foster, P., Eisenstadt, E. & Cairns, J. (1982) Random components in mutatgenesis. 
Nature, 299: 365.
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persistent and prolific member of the advocates’ section of the core-set, and John 
Cairns now acknowledges her as the leading authority on directed mutation.246 In 
1991, Foster and Cairns had focused on a reverse transcriptase based mechanism, 
asserting the strong model of directed mutation.247 They reported results of 
experiments demonstrating that the presence of the RecA gene was required for 
directed mutation events to be observed in bacterial populations. This observation 
showed that DNA was being replicated during stationary phase mutations and added 
credence to Cairns’ theory of multiple variable mRNA generation and reverse 
transcription as the principle underlying directed mutation. In 1992, the two authors 
had pursued the strong models addressing two hypotheses: i) the selective conditions 
‘instruct’ the cell which DNA sequence changes to create and ii) the selective 
conditions induce transcription of the gene encoding the relevant protein, and the 
transcription is inherently mutagenic.248 Foster had become Cairns’ strongest ally. 
Like Hall, she supported the claim that an apparently directed process appeared in 
bacterial mutation. But, going beyond Hall, she also supported Cairns’ contentious 
interpretation of the anomaly, and its implications for evolutionary theory.
In 1993, Foster did not shy from framing the debate as a conflict between 
Neo-Darwinians and New Lamarckians.249 The rhetorical approach that Cairns had 
adopted as part of the authority struggle with the evolutionary biologists is mirrored 
in Fosters’ contributions. She acknowledges a molecular biological problem 
alongside an evolutionary biological problem and, like Cairns, she extrapolates from 
the Petri dish to the general phenomena of evolution. Foster’s willingness to describe 
evolutionary outcomes made her Cairns’ ally in his struggle for the extension of 
molecular biologists’ authority.
In 1993, Foster identified the Lamarckian implications of Cairns’ 1988 paper 
as the major cause of the quality and quantity of response. Essentially, Foster 
identified the Lamarckism versus Darwinism element of the debate as a primary force 
in its perpetuation. She acknowledges that, although the criticisms levelled at the 
directed mutation publications tend to be of a methodological nature, it seems that the
246 John Cairns (personal communication 06/04)
247 Cairns, J. & Foster, P. (1991)
248 Foster, P. & Cairns, J. (1992) p.785
249 Foster, P. (1993)
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motivation for raising the criticisms stems from antagonism towards the Lamarckian 
principles linked to the anomaly. As Foster says: ‘Even in peer reviewed articles, 
scientists have exhibited a surprising fervour, verging on the religious, in debating 
this issue.’250 Foster also identifies the role that dogma had played in the criticisms, 
stating that: ‘Features of Neo-Darwinian molecular genetics that have been credited 
as fundamental to our understanding of evolutionary genetics exist as an additional 
challenge to the directed mutation community’. The burden for the directed 
mutation researchers was not just to prove the existence and reliability of their initial 
observations, but also to show that these findings were a substantial opposition to 
accepted principles of evolutionary theory. In terms of the conflict of directed 
mutation with the Luria and Delbruck findings, Foster says that the pre-existing 
fluctuation test data had been a serious impediment, since to ‘criticise it seems almost 
sacrilegious’.
As Foster wrote this article, the phenomenon of ‘directed’ mutation was being 
discussed as a reality of bacterial stationary phase. The specificity of that ‘direction’ 
and the reliance of the phenomenon on non-random mutation nevertheless remained 
contentious. The possible Lamarckian interpretation of the theory had gained no 
favour with the critics, and so the core-set remained sharply polarised on the issue of 
the potential implications of directed mutation for evolutionary theory. Foster’s 1993 
review, and Lenski and Mittler’s 1993 article, can be viewed as marking the end of 
the phase of publications asserting and reasserting the anomaly of directed mutation, 
and as the beginning of the protracted theoretical debate that has retained momentum 
to the present day. On the issue of the existence of an evolved adaptive mutational 
process in bacteria the core-set had come to some agreement; that process had been 
demonstrated. On the issue of strong versus weak interpretations, the existence of the 
phenomenon outside bacteria, and the interpretation of the significance for 
evolutionary theory, the advocates and adversaries remained sharply delineated.
In terms o f its boundary work function, Foster’s 1993 review represents a 
regrouping device for the protagonists of directed evolution. It reasserted the terms of
230 Foster, P. (1993) p.468
251 Foster, P. (1993)
252 Luria,S. & Delbruck, M. (1943)
253 Foster, P. (1993) p.470
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the authority challenge to evolutionary biology from molecular biology, by re­
emphasising the evolutionary implications of the molecular observations. The review 
takes stock of achievements and failures, at a time when the challenge for advocates 
of directed mutation was shifting towards the requirement to demonstrate the 
molecular mechanism for directed mutation and extend directed mutation assays to 
other organisms. Like Cairns, Foster invokes Lamarckism to assert that challenge and 
to frame the dissent. Her article focuses on those elements o f the debate that had kept 
the core-set so divided, highlighting the need for a concerted effort towards 
consensus amongst the advocates.
In 1992, Franklin Stahl had published the second of his three review articles 
on directed mutation and had acknowledged the requirement for a focus on 
mechanism, stating that: ‘Some critics appear to be blindly sceptical of the 
demonstrations offered in support of the view that cells can mutate in a directed way. 
By failing to provide a proven (or even attractive) hypothesis, the recent work of 
Foster and Cairns (1992) is unlikely to quiet such detractors.’254 In 1993, Foster’s 
tone remained optimistic, as she pointed out that their adversaries were equally 
lacking effective counter arguments for the mechanisms that had been suggested.
After 1993, theoretical problems continued to mount alongside an absence of 
any significant new data from further bacterial research. Evidence for a mechanism 
was lacking, largely due to the absence of any technologies or methodologies that 
might be able to visualize a molecular mechanism of the type that had been 
hypothesised. The strong version of directed mutation was heavily laden with 
speculation, and necessarily so. Yet the speculative accounts could not be abandoned, 
since critics continued to emphasise the lack of mechanism as the greatest hurdle for 
the advocates o f directed mutation. The aspect of the debate that dealt with the 
molecular biological problem had lost momentum as a result. The same criticisms 
resurfaced time and again, and the same issues concerning experimental design and 
interpretation were still being discussed. A turning point had arrived in the
254 Stahl, F. (1992) p.867
255 As late as 1994 Foster and Cairns were addressing the apparent refutation of directed mutation by 
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negotiation phase. Stagnation and circular argument could only be avoided by a 
change of approach to suit the obligation to discover mechanism
Directed mutation received this much-needed boost in the mid-1990s when 
biologist Susan Rosenberg joined the debate. Like Foster she would be a persistent 
advocate and a prolific author. Also, like Foster, she would recruit and co-author with 
many other researchers throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. In 1994 Rosenberg 
produced three papers on directed mutation. These confirmed the role of 
recombination in adaptive mutation, and linked that process to hypermutation in 
certain strains of bacteria. Rosenberg pursued mechanistic explanations for directed 
mutation, taking on that key responsibility of advocacy in this period. Foster and 
Rosenberg had worked simultaneously, but independently, during 1993-1994 to 
collect qualitative data demonstrating directed mutation. In 1994, they presented that 
data in a pair of papers in the July issue of the journal Science. The two authors 
presented sequence analyses that showed stressed bacterial genomes undergoing 
novel mutational processes to produce specific kinds of mutation. By refining the 
focus of their study on the genome, rather than the bacterial colony, they bypassed all 
the methodological criticisms concerning counting and discreet cell growth and death 
that had been a major part the debate from the beginning. Their quantitative approach 
was exactly what the debate required to move beyond the initial phase of repetition 
and negotiation.
Franklin Stahl said: ‘with essentially one [stroke], this qualitative observation 
rules out the possibility that the whole thing was an unintentional fake.’258 In a review 
appearing alongside the two papers Elizabeth Culotta wrote that the papers showed 
that ‘something exceptional was happening in Cairns’ experiments’.259 She reported 
that even Richard Lenski was now convinced that some unusual mutational process 
was at work, at least in the experimental system 260 Meanwhile, Hall published a
236 Harris, R., Longerich, S. & Rosenberg, S. (1994) Recombination in adaptive mutation. Science,
264: 258-260; Rosenberg, S. et al (1994) Adaptive mutation by deletions in small mononucleotide 
repeats. Science, 265: 405; Rosenberg, S. (1994) In pursuit of a molecular mechanism for adaptive 
mutation. Genome, 37: 893-899.
257 Rosenberg, S. et al (1994); Foster, P. & Trimarchi, J. (1994) Adaptive reversion of a frameshift 
mutation in Escherichia coli by simple base deletions in homopolymeric runs. Science, 265: 407-409.
238 Quoted from personal communication in Culotta, E. (1994) A boost for ‘adaptive’ mutation.
Science, 265: 318-319.
239 Culotta, E. (1994) p.318
260 Culotta, E. (1994)
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forceful article, restating that directed mutations are ‘immediately, rather than only 
potentially, advantageous’ (i.e. they are specific) and attacking Lenski and Mittler’s 
(1992) experiments and conclusions.261 Negotiation was back on.
However, neither of the two papers addressed the specificity of the mutations, 
and so avoided the most contentious element of the debate. Regarding specificity, 
Culotta reported that Lenski and others remained totally unmoved. She acknowledges 
that by 1994 the issue of specificity was still wide open. Some authors claimed to 
have demonstrated specificity, others claimed to have shown neutral mutations 
accumulating alongside the adaptive. In their 1994 papers, Rosenberg and Foster both 
invoke mechanisms that rely on a degree of random mutation, essentially weaker 
models of directed mutation. As Foster puts it: ‘The question becomes not whether 
the process is random, but where does the randomness appear.’262 Culotta reports that 
Lenski and Mittler see this move towards the weaker models as a sign that their 
opponents have retreated from ‘anything that challenges evolutionary dogma’. 
Mittler concludes that: ‘The debate is getting down to bacterial physiology in 
stationary phase now. It’s an important area of investigation -  but it’s unlikely to be 
Lamarckian.’264
In Lenski and Mittler’s view the position adopted by Foster and Rosenberg in 
1994 signalled the end of the challenge to evolutionary biology. Their advocacy of 
weaker models of directed mutation reduced the significance of the anomaly for 
evolutionary biologists. Mittler’s observation that the debate ‘was getting down to 
bacterial physiology’ was really an observation that the debate had shifted from the 
boundary between evolutionary biology and molecular biology, and moved back 
inside the territory delineated for molecular biology. As such, its authority challenge 
had subsided, and Lenski and Mittler’s defence of the authority of evolutionary 
biology, and the Neo-Darwinian orthodoxy that underpinned it, became redundant. 
Although Hall had questioned their 1992 experiments and conclusions in 1994, the 
authors did not respond in print. Hall’s challenge came from within ‘bacterial 
physiology’ and a response related to the defence of authority was thus not required.
261 Hall, B. (1994) On alternatives to selection-induced mutation in the Bgl operon of Escherichia coll 
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Lenski and Mittler’s commentary reported in Culotta’s review marks their exit from 
the debate, and the controversy core-set. By focussing on technical experimental 
detail, and removing speculative extrapolations (as their critics had demanded) Foster 
and Rosenberg had been forced to retreat from the authority contest that Cairns’ 
approach had framed. By implying the need to retreat from that boundary as a 
‘scientific’ obligation for the molecular biologists, the evolutionary biologists had 
achieved the boundary protection that retained their monopoly.
Thus, during 1994 the fortunes of the two aspects of the debate divided 
dramatically. The molecular biological anomaly of directed mutation achieved a 
degree of acceptance, although only in abstraction from the implications for 
evolutionary biology that it had been originally bound to. Directed mutation research 
was acceptable, but only provided it was not attached to an authority challenge to 
evolutionary biology. A new phase of debate began in which the strong and weak 
models of directed mutation were explored in qualitative detail. The journal debate 
had been re-enlivened, but without the dual aspect that had originally characterised it. 
This new negotiation was conducted largely within the molecular biological 
community, amongst its group of specialists. Explicit attention to the Lamarckian 
versus Darwinian element of the debate declined in the journals. Evidence for the 
strongest and most Lamarckian models was scarce, and so negotiation in journal 
treatments stagnated on that issue. The core-set that had formed in service to that 
debate began to decay. Lenski and Mittler perceived that their defence was more or 
less complete. Lenski betrays what had been the two authors’ agenda of boundary 
work for defence, using the word ‘retreat’ to describe the directed mutation 
advocates’ shift o f attention to weaker models.
The Lamarckism versus Darwinism aspect of the debate did not disappear 
altogether, or reach resolution. It remained understood that directed mutation, 
whatever its cause or nature, would have a bearing on evolutionary theory; it was 
mentioned, but remained tacit and secondary to the molecular debate. Lenski and 
Mittler’s exit from the debate did not imply resolution, or that they perceived the 
negotiation to have been completed. Rather, without explicit attention to the 
challenge of directed mutation to Neo-Darwinism, defence of orthodoxy of the kind 
that they had offered was no longer required or appropriate. The authority challenge
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had abated, and so had the need for defence of authority. By 1995 only Open 
University professor of biology Brian Goodwin echoed the hard line, that ‘neo- 
Darwinism had failed as an evolutionary theory’ in light of the ‘evidence for a role of 
directed mutation in adaptive response’ and the discovery that ‘genes can evidently
•  * 265respond to environmental circumstances by non-random adaptive mutation’.
Susan Rosenberg drew the advocates towards technical, qualitative 
investigation of directed mutation. Her 1994 papers demonstrated attention to detail 
and focussed on methodology and the provision of data. Foster followed suit, and 
pursued an investigation of the population dynamics and mutational specificity of 
bacterial colonies during Lac+ adaptive reversion. The results of that work she 
reported in great technical detail, without accompanying commentary on the broader 
evolutionary implications.266 In 1995, Galitiski and Roth began an investigation of 
the role of the F-plasmid (extranucleic genetic material in bacteria) in adaptive 
mutation, concluding that some recombination, and some plasmid transfer between 
bacteria, were probably involved in directed mutation.267 These authors described 
how bacteria use certain fertility factors to control the degree to which they conjugate 
with one another and exchange plasmid material in a kind o f sexual reproduction. 
They suggest that less ‘fertile’ bacteria achieve less adaptive reversion during 
selection for lactose reversion, and that therefore, adaptive mutation is related to the 
primitive sexual reproduction of bacteria. In the same issue of Science biologist 
Radicella’s team confirmed that selection induced mutation and plasmid transfer are 
inseparable.268 Alongside their papers molecular biologist James Shapiro provided a 
review article summarising the findings on the role o f biochemical process in 
adaptive mutation. He stated that the demonstration of these kinds of evolutionary 
strategies ‘...moves mutation beyond the realm of ‘blind’ stochastic events and 
provides a mechanistic basis for understanding how biological requirements can feed
'Jf.Q
back into genome structure’. Even after seven years of debate, Shapiro still gave
265 Goodwin, B. (1995) Neo-Darwinism has failed as an evolutionary theory. The THES, 19.05.95.
266 Foster, P. (1994) Populations dynamics of a Lac- strain of Escherichia coli during selection for 
lactose utilization. Genetics, 138: 253-261.
267 Galitski, T. & Roth, J. (1995) Evidence that F-plasmid transfer replication underlies apparent 
adaptive mutation. Science, 268: 421-423.
268 Radicella, J., Park, J. & Fox, M. (1995) Adaptive mutation in Escherichia coli: a role for 
conjugation. Science, 268: 418-420.
269 Shapiro, J. (1995) Adaptive mutation: who’s really in the garden. Science, 268: 373-374.
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space in that paper to statements of the distinction between the adaptive mutation 
assays and the work of Luria and Delbruck. Shapiro had noted the limitations of 
Luria and Delbruck’s lethal selection methodology, and had published on this in 
1984, providing useful precedent for the directed mutation claims against the 
Fluctuation Test.270 Foster confirmed that adaptive reversion did appear to be linked 
to the conjugal functions of bacteria, but added that the process did not seem to rely 
on actual conjugation events.271 This implied that adaptive mutations occurred during 
stationary phase DNA synthesis, which was occurring in cells preparing to transfer 
plasmid material. Again, this material was presented without commentary on broader 
implications.
As Mittler had predicted, it seemed that the debate really was ‘getting down to 
bacterial physiology’, with an explicit focus on problems related to molecular factors. 
As Shapiro had put it in April 1995, ‘adaptive mutation has returned to the 
mainstream of molecular genetics’.272 Cairns also contributed to the discussion of the
*y07 ‘7
role of plasmid transfer in directed mutation, in a letter to the journal Science. 
Following the new trend in the debate Cairns kept his comments technical, and 
focussed on mechanism. Although, he did complain that Radicella274 and Galitiski 
and Roth275 had concluded on some issues that they had not tested, thus 
overemphasising the role of plasmid transfer, and that, Galitski and Roth cited Foster 
‘seeking support’, but in a misleading way. This approach and tone demonstrates the 
legacy o f Cairns’ role as principal advocate; he retained responsibility for ensuring 
fairness, even without explicitly pursuing the broader aspect of the debate.
This shift towards molecular debate suited Barry Hall, who had always 
avoided the broader evolutionary speculations. In 1995, Hall continued his technical 
investigations o f bacterial mutation, and began to move directed mutation research 
into a new area, looking at the possible role of the process in the emergence of some
270 Shapiro, J. (1984) Observations on the formation of clones containing araB -  lacZ cistron fusion. 
Mol Gen. Genet, 194: 79-90.
271 Foster, P. & Trimarchi, J. (1995) Adaptive reversion of an episomal frameshift mutation in 
Escherichia coli requires conjugal functions, but not actual conjugation. Proc. Natl Acad Sci., USA, 
92: 5487-5490.
272 Shapiro, J. (1995) p.374
273 Cairns, J, (1995a) Adaptive mutation and sex. Science, 269: 289.
274 Radicella, J., Park, J. & Fox, M. (1995)
275 Galitski, T. & Roth, J. (1995)
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tumours.276 This investigation, interestingly, brought the debate back into contact 
with its origins; Cairns’ initial observations of directed mutation arose from the 
context of his attention to mutation as a factor in carcinogenesis.277 Meanwhile, 
Foster and Rosenberg (independently) continued to carry out technical investigations, 
co-authoring with a variety of specialists, and investigating the roles of recombination 
and DNA repair in more detail.278 Each of their contributions added to the 
understanding of the molecular processes underlying the appearance of adaptive 
mutation in selective cultures.
After 1995, Hall maintained his focus on hypermutation, and remained the 
most prolific author on this theory. Cairns’ original strong theory of an environment- 
directed reverse transcriptase mechanism had not been demonstrated, and it seemed 
much more likely that one of the weaker models (that relied upon a variety of more 
random mutational processes) would explain the generation of the mutations. 
Foster279 and Rosenberg began to adopt Hall’s notion of genome-wide hypermutation 
in their research. Rosenberg led a research team investigating the location of 
hypermutation within the evolving bacterial colony. In 1997, they reported that 
hypermutation occurred in a sub-population of cells within the colony.280 That is, 
some cells in a colony had the capacity to enter a transient state of hypermutation 
during physiological stress, and effectively sacrifice themselves in an effort to 
achieve adaptive mutation.
276 Hall, B. (1995a) Adaptive mutations in Escherichia coli as a model for the multiple mutational 
origins of tumours. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci., USA, 92: 5669-5673; Hall, B. (1995b) Evolutionary 
potential of the ebgA gene. Mol. Biol. Evol., 12: 514-517 
7 Cairns’ describes the relationship between directed mutation and cancer studies in: Cairns, J. (1998)
Mutation and cancer: die antecedents to our studies of adaptive mutation. Genetics, 148: 1433-1440.
278 Foster, P. et al (1995) Proofreading-defective DNA polymerase II increases adaptive mutation in 
Escherichia coli. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci., USA, 92: 7951-7955; Longerich, S., Rosenberg, S. et al. 
(1995) Adaptive mutation sequences reproduced by mismatch repair deficiency. Proc Natl. Acad Sci., 
USA, 92: 12017-12020; Foster, P. Trimarchi, J. & Maurer, R. (1996) Two enzymes, both of which 
process recombination intermediates, have opposite effects on adaptive mutation in Escherichia coli. 
Genetics, 142: 25-37.
279 Foster applies the notion of hypermutation in: Foster, P. (1997) Nonadaptive mutations occur on the 
F’ episome during adaptive mutation conditions in Escherichia coli. Journal of Bacteriology, 179: 
1550-1554.
280 Torkelson, J., Rosenberg, S. et al (1997) Genome-wide hypermutation in a sub-population of 
stationary-phase cells underlies recombination-dependent adaptive mutation. EMBO, 16(11): 3303- 
3311.
281 Theories of adaptive mutation relying on hypermutation in a sub-population of the colony were 
supported at this time by the discovery by other authors that ‘mutator’ type bacterial cells were much 
more common in colonies than had previously been considered. These individual bacteria have a 
specific tendency to mutate much faster and more diversely than other cells in the population. These
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Glimpses of the broader dissent remained. Galitiski and Roth had moved 
towards the stronger interpretation of directed mutation and had begun to seek the 
‘general phenomenon’ which they suggested would have ‘evolutionary 
implications’.282 They went as far as to say: ‘Since organisms typically exist under 
relatively adverse or selective conditions, the potential importance of adaptive 
mutability is great’, which echoed Cairns’ earlier broad statement that ‘...cells may 
have mechanism for choosing which mutations will occur.’
In 1997, the contentious issue of specificity reappeared. Hypermutation theory 
implied that neutral mutations should appear alongside selected mutations. Earlier 
research had showed time and again that adaptive mutations seemed to arise 
preferentially, and that neutral mutations, such as Valine resistance, were not 
accumulated at the same rate.283 In 1997, Hall addressed specificity, and confirmed 
that in the ebg system adaptive mutations arose without concurrent accumulation of 
neutral traits.284 This report moved directed mutation back towards the stronger 
models, with their focus on environment direction of the specific quality of mutation. 
In contrast to the predictions of hypermutation, Hall argued that it appeared that 
neither carbon nor amino acid starvation were generally mutagenic. He suggested that 
the ebg gene of E. coli provided a system in which specificity could be studied 
without invoking the problems of neutrality interpretation that had plagued other 
investigations. In the conclusion of that paper, Hall went on to demonstrate that 
specificity might be commensurate with hypermutation, despite its counter-intuitive 
appearance. He suggested that the appearance of specificity might be created by an 
underlying process of ‘selective recapture’, in which mutations are occurring 
abundantly and randomly in the population, but only those that are specific and
mutator types would constitute the sub-population invoked by directed mutation advocates in the mid- 
1990s. Leclerc et al (1996) High mutation frequencies among E. coli and Salmonella pathogens. 
Science, 274: 1208-1211; Grady, D (1996) Quick-change pathogens gain an evolutionary edge. 
Science, 274: 1081.
282 Galitski, T. & Roth, J. (1996) A search for the general phenomenon of adaptive mutability. 
Genetics, 143: 645-659.
283 Specificity is reported in: Cairns, J., Overbaugh, J. & Miller, S. (1988); Foster P. (1992); Hall, B. 
(1988); Hall, B. (1990a); Hall, B. (1990b); Cairns, J. & Foster, P. (1991); Foster, P. & Cairns, J. 
(1992); Hall, B. (1995c) Genetics of selection-induced mutations. UvrA, UvrB, UvrC and UvrD are 
selection-induced specific mutator loci. Journal of Molecular Evolution, 40: 86-93.
284 Hall, B. (1997) On the specificity of adaptive mutations. Genetics, 145: 39-44.
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selected become visible/countable, because only those survive and produce clones. 
That explanation allowed that apparent specificity was created by a more random 
process of hypermutation. Temperate as ever, Hall argued that specificity was evident 
in evolving bacterial strains (as the strong models demand), but suggested that a weak 
interpretation of that appearance was perhaps appropriate.
In 1997, Foster also addressed specificity, but reported that in the F-episome 
neutral mutations were accumulating alongside adaptive ones.286 This conclusion was 
in contrast to her earlier advocacy of mutational specificity. In that paper, Foster 
corrected her 1994 conclusions287; acknowledging that unselected tetracycline 
mutations in fact arise at roughly the same rate as selected Lac+ reversions, and that 
these neutral mutations had been missed in the previous assays because of their 
extranucleic origin. Foster and Hall’s attention to specificity did not lead to the 
resolution of this contentious issue, although Hall did demonstrate that apparent 
specificity could be accounted for by the now popular hypermutation models. So in 
1997, although the question o f specific environment direction had not been resolved, 
the bacterial phenomenon of adaptive mutation, as it was by this time more 
commonly termed, was being described as part of a bacteria specific physiological 
response to stress.
The shift from dual to single aspect in the debate was addressed by Bryn 
Bridges in a 1997 review article.288 Through his characterisation of the directed 
mutation advocates, he reminds us how Cairns’ advocacy had always differed from 
that other supporters. He says that: ‘while some evolutionary biologists found the 
idea o f directed mutation disturbing because of its echoes of Lamarckism, molecular 
biologists displayed their customary ingenuity in proposing ways in which it might be 
achieved without threatening conventional dogma.’289 While that characterisation 
suits Hall, and in some respects Foster, it is much less accurate regarding Cairns. He 
had not been interested in reducing the impact of directed mutation on the dogma of 
evolutionary biologists. By the late 1990s, the outcome was that while Cairns had
285 The theory o f ‘selective recapture’ was proposed in: Cairns, J. (1995b) Response from Cairns. 
Trends in Microbiology, 3: 293.
286 Foster, P. (1997)
287 Foster, P. (1994)
288 Bridges, B. (1997) Hypermutation under stress. Nature, 387: 557-558.
289 Bridges, B, (1997) p.557
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failed to gamer support for the strong model with its Lamarckian tones, other directed 
mutation protagonists had quite successfully promoted the weaker models (i.e. 
genome-wide hypermutation) and had perpetuated the negotiation of directed 
mutation in journals in relation to the investigation of those less unorthodox models. 
Bridges does however confirm that: ‘Although there have been many attempts to 
prove or disprove the hypothesis of directed mutation, none has been totally 
convincing.’ Bridges’ review in 1997 anticipated the ultimate endurance of both 
aspects of the debate. He says simply; ‘We shall see.’291
And the debate did endure. In April 1997, a team of Estonian microbiologists 
extended observations of directed mutation to Pseudomonas sp., providing a new 
prokaryotic example of the phenomenon.292 At the same time, several researchers 
began to turn attention to the specific means by which hypermutation, and associated 
mutator phenotypes, might have arisen in evolutionary history. Because mutation is 
generally deleterious, evolution has suppressed and minimized the rate of mutation. 
Hypermutation therefore represents a special case, requiring a new evolutionary 
explanation for its origin. Lenski re-emerged, co-authoring a paper describing the 
evolutionary processes underlying the high mutations rates evolved in some 
pathogens and cancers. Meanwhile, a group of scientists from France, reported that 
mutator alleles were able to greatly accelerate the mutation rate during directed 
mutation.294 Rosenberg confirmed the mutator hypothesis in 1998, demonstrating the 
existence o f a minority of mutator phenotype cells in the bacterial population, capable 
of transient hypermutation during extreme selection.295 The physiology of directed 
mutation was being revealed in more and more detail.
Also, in 1998, members of the core-set revisited the classic lac+ reversion 
system for the study of adaptive mutation in stationary phase. Answering critics, 
Rosenberg, and Foster and Cairns, re-assayed the system to demonstrate that the lac+
290 Bridges, B. (1997) p.557
291 Bridges, B. (1997) p.558
292 Kasak, L., Horak, R. & Kivisaar, M. (1997) Promoter-creating mutations in Pseudomonas putida: a 
model system for the study of mutation in starving bacteria. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci., USA, 94: 3134- 
3139.
293 Sneigowski, P., Gerrish, P. & Lenski, R. (1997) Evolution of high mutation rates in experimental 
populations of E. coli. Nature, 387: 703-705.
94 Taddei, F., Maynard-Smith, J. et al (1997) Role of mutator alleles in adaptive evolution. Nature,
387: 700-702.
295 Rosenberg, S., Thulin, C. & Harris, R. (1998) Transient and heritable mutators in adaptive 
evolution in the lab and in nature. Genetics, 148: 1559-1566.
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revertants (lactose digesting bacteria) emerged post-selection for lactose digestion 
and were thereby adaptive in their nature, rather than random spontaneous pre­
selection mutants.296 This re-asserted the anomaly that formed the basis of the 
molecular aspect of the debate, and highlighted that 10 years of negotiation had still 
not resolved the central issue. Also, Hall provided a review article summarising the 
data since 1993, arguing for the strong interpretation of ‘direction’ that: ‘Adaptive 
mutations are spontaneous mutations that occur in microorganisms during periods of 
prolonged stress in non-dividing or very slowly dividing populations...that are 
specific to the environmental challenge that causes that stress.’297
In 1998/1999 the first decade of directed mutation was evaluated in several 
review articles. Patricia Foster summarised the findings from the first ten years, 
describing how it had come to be understood that: ‘...[Although] the mutations that 
arise during selection are not ‘adaptive’ in the original sense, the mutagenic 
mechanism that produces these mutations may nonetheless be of evolutionary 
significance.’298 Foster cited the various hypermutation hypotheses (hypermutation in 
a sub-population, transient hypermutation, hypermutation of certain gene loci, or 
hypermutation of the entire genome) as the likely mechanisms of adaptive mutation. 
She did not conclude on the specificity of the mutations, nor did she expand upon 
what the ‘evolutionary significance’ of the mutations might be.
In the same volume of Genetics Rosenberg provided a similar review of the
^oofirst decade of research. In that paper, she and her co-authors identified 1997 as a 
turning point in the debate. They suggested that at that time attention shifted towards 
hypermutation models as the principle of directed mutation. Both Foster and 
Rosenberg’s reviews include details of new hypotheses for the hypermutation 
mechanism o f directed mutation; even as they reviewed the debate, they contributed 
to its next phase. They remained firmly focussed on the molecular biological debate 
as they instigated that next phase, with both new hypotheses being technical and 
largely specific to molecular biology. To clarify that focus, Rosenberg added in her
296 Foster, P. & Cairns, J. (1998) Adaptive mutation of a lacZ amber allele. Genetics, 150: 1329-1330; 
McKenzie, G. Lombardo, M. & Rosenberg, S. (1998) Recombination-dependent mutation in 
Escherichia coli occurs in stationary phase. Genetics, 149: 1163-1165.
297 Hall, B. (1998a) Adaptive mutagenesis: a process that generates almost exclusively beneficial 
mutations. Genetica, 102/103: 109-125.
298 Foster, P. (1998) Adaptive mutation: has the unicorn landed. Genetics, 148: 1453-1459.
299 Rosenberg, S., Thulin, C. & Harris, R. (1998)
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conclusion that, in the past year, the mutational process under study had been shown 
to be not ‘directed in a Lamarckian way to selected genes’.300
A review by John Cairns appeared alongside Foster and Rosenberg’s papers, 
in which he described the relationship between cancer studies and the study of 
directed mutation phenomena.301 In addition, both Foster and Rosenberg also offered 
further reviews of the first decade of directed mutation elsewhere. In a later 
contribution to Genetics, Rosenberg summarised the facts that had been determined 
in relation to directed mutation.302 Her team stated that adaptive mutation is 
recombination dependent, occurs only during stationary phase and only under 
conditions of non-lethal selection. They concluded that its most likely cause was 
recombination-dependent stationary phase hypermutation. A few months later Foster 
echoed their conclusions in a contribution to The Annual Review o f  Genetics.
Meanwhile, Hall pursued his study of the ebg gene. In 1998, he published 
results showing that mutation in that gene was regulated by activity at another gene 
locus (PhoPQ).304 Disruption of the PhoPQ gene dramatically reduced the rate of 
adaptive mutation in the ebg gene. The fact that mutation at ebg was being regulated 
by another gene implied that mutation at that site was not simply the result o f a stress 
response based on slow repair or damage. Rather, gene control implied an evolved 
system for achieving adaptive mutation at ebg. Hall’s observations indicated that 
adaptive mutation at ebg at least was not a result of starvation stress, but rather a 
response to it. Interestingly, having been the least inflammatory of the advocates in 
the first few years of the debate, by 1997 Hall was focussing more attention on the 
contentious issue of specificity than any other researcher.
By the late 1990s, at a superficial level, the argument concerning the role of 
strong versus weak models of directed mutation appeared to have been resolved by 
the explanations coming from the hypermutation advocates. For the molecular 
biologists, directed mutation could be expressed as a special feature of extra-nuclear
300 Rosenberg, S., Thulin, C. & Harris, R. (1998) p. 1564
301 Cairns, J. (1998)
302 McKenzie, G., Lombardo, M. & Rosenberg, S. (1998).
303 Foster, P. (1999) Mechanisms of stationary phase mutation: a decade of adaptive mutation. Annual 
Review of Genetics, 33: 57-88.
304 Hall, B. (1998b) Adaptive mutagenesis at ebgR is regulated by PhoPQ. Journal o f Bacteriology,
180: 2862-2865.
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evolution in stressed bacterial populations. And for the evolutionary biologists that 
sufficed as resolution. Provided that the problem of directed mutation had an 
explanation within molecular biology the conflict was under control. Without the 
implications of the strong models, directed mutation no longer provided the material 
of an assault on the authority of evolutionary biology. In that regard, in the journal 
based phase of the debate, the boundary work of directed mutation had failed to 
extend the authority of molecular biology into the territory of evolutionary biology.
In terms of the journal-based debate, the strong Caimsian version of directed 
mutation, which had always been the most controversial element of the debate, had 
been eclipsed by the discussion of weaker interpretations. The aspect of the debate 
that dealt with the resurrection of Lamarckism had been overshadowed by technical 
investigations and negotiations. In 1998, immunologist, and Lamarckian enthusiast, 
Edward Steele ascribed the absence of Lamarckian debates in the key journals to a 
conspiracy amongst journal publishers to suppress anti-Darwinian investigations.305 
In the case of directed mutation, the eclipse of the Lamarckian elements in the journal 
debate appears to have less sensational causes.
First, the requirement asserted by the critics, and perceived by the advocates, 
that a mechanism be determined had not been achievable in relation to the strong 
models. This was recognised by several of the advocates by the mid 1990s, notably 
Patricia Foster, and they began to pursue models of directed mutation that might yield 
mechanism. By moderating their approach regarding the significance of directed 
mutation for evolutionary theory, those advocates enabled the debate to continue in a 
form that journal publishers could entertain i.e. as a debate that seemed to produce 
new data and valid points for negotiation. Second, even beyond the problems of 
finding evidence for the strong models the advocates had begun to perceive the huge 
burden o f proof that rested on their community whilst directed mutation existed as a 
challenge to evolutionary theory. Several authors had begun to think of Darwinism as 
defended as a kind o f religious principle, and perhaps retreated from the strong 
models as a reaction to the degree of dissent that they had precipitated. The 
advocates’ approach after 1994 stripped away some of that burden, and allowed the 
molecular biological debate to proceed. Thirdly, it had chiefly been Cairns who had
303 Steele, E., Lindley, R. & Blanden, R. (1998)
- 111-
advocated the strong models; he had launched the authority bid based on those 
models and had managed the dissent that was precipitated (answering Lenski and 
Mittler for example on several occasions and engaging in personal exchanges with 
many critics). As retirement distanced him from the debate, and his former graduate 
student (Foster) took up his mantle with a more moderate twist, the strong models 
necessarily had a decreased presence.306
The circularity of the directed mutation debate continued to be an impediment 
to resolution. While Foster and Rosenberg307 took on a more temperate attitude to the 
contentious issues of ‘environment direction’ and specificity, others began to revisit 
the stronger versions of adaptive mutation. In 2004, Foster remarked that ‘it is 
interesting that the original Roth-Stahl model has evolved so that it is now almost 
exactly what Cairns and I proposed years ago.’308 Meanwhile Foster stated, in her 
own view, that mutations were not directed in the way that she and Cairns had first 
thought, but that rather adaptive mutation was a complicated stress induced response, 
that depended on selection, but was not directed by it as such. With all this circular 
argument the strong version of directed mutation, the Lamarckism versus Darwinism
306 As late as 2003 Cairns and Foster spoke out to support the ‘transient hypermutating sub-population 
theory’ that Hall (1990) had previously championed. In that paper, Cairns and Foster still referred to 
‘the evident ability of E. coli to produce plenty of Lac+ revertants when they are needed’, and added 
the ‘stronger’ question of whether ‘...the existence of hypermutators [is] simply the happy result of 
other reasons for selecting that degree of precision of gene expression’. Cairns, J. & Foster, P. (2003) 
The risk of lethals for hypermutating bacteria in stationary phase. Genetics, 165; 2317-2318. Also, 
Foster continued to advocate hypermutation elsewhere: Foster, P. et al (2003) Error prone polymerase, 
DNA polymerse IV, is responsible for transient hypermutation during adaptive evolution in 
Escherichia coli. Journal o f Bacteriology, 185(11): 3469-3472.
307 By 2000, both Foster and Rosenberg were exploring the specifics of hypermutation as an agent of 
adaptive mutation, and both eventually concluded that a Lamarckian type mechanism was probably not 
at work. See: Bull, H., McKenzie, G., Hastings, P. & Rosenberg, S. (2000a) Evidence that stationary- 
phase hypermutation in Escherichia coli is promoted by recombination. Genetics, 154: 1427-1437; 
Bull, H., McKenzie, G., Hastings, P. & Rosenberg, S. (2000b) The contribution of transiently 
hypermutable cells to mutation in stationary phase. Genetics, 156: 925-926. Foster, P. (2003); Foster, 
P. (2004) Adaptive mutation in Escherichia coli. Journal o f Bacteriology, 186: 4846-4852.
308 Foster, P. (2004). Stahl and Roth had both previously offered ‘weak’ models of directed mutation 
that allowed for a fully Darwinian interpretation, but by the late 1990s had strengthened the models 
and focussed on the gene amplification theory. See: Andersson, D, Slechta, S. & Roth, J. (1998) 
Evidence that gene amplification underlies adaptive mutability of the bacterial lac operon. Science, 
282: 1133.
309 Foster, P. (2004)
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debate, and the authority challenge that all this implied, might have reached a form of
A
natural closure. And yet it did not.
2.3 The extension of the directed mutation debate in the Internet context: 
changing scale and agendas as a new community takes on the 
controversy.
As hypermutation became the primary journal-based theory for the 
mechanism of directed mutation, Cairns’ original strong theory found support in a far 
more prolific medium. In the late 1990s the Internet was emerging as a new forum for 
debate on the Lamarckian implications of directed evolution, and with this transition 
came a vast array of new participants. What had previously been a controversy 
significant to a handful o f researchers, constituting a core-set, was becoming the 
intellectual property of a fascinated lay public and a broader scientific community.
Pre-existing material from the journal-based debate was prolifically 
reproduced in this new medium, alongside novel discussion material of this 
unexplained bacterial phenomenon. The journal materials were re-evaluated and re- 
expressed in the rhetoric of many and diverse agendas. As the theory of directed 
mutation was transformed by extended participation, it was re-shaped to become a 
conceptual modelling tool for mathematics and computer science, an example of the 
repression of unorthodoxy in science, and even a tenet of a broader spiritual 
appreciation of self will and progress. The fact that the Internet provided this 
opportunity for communication between individuals from effectively different ‘social 
worlds’, makes it a candidate for description as a ‘boundary object’.311 As a 
‘boundary object’ the Internet allowed communication across the boundaries between 
scientists, amateurs scientists and the public. It allowed the material of the directed 
mutation debate to be translated into forms comprehensible to the different groups, 
but that was not under the control of any of those groups. Although it is perhaps
310 The modes of closure in scientific debates are discussed in Chapter 1. Closure by ‘abandonment’, 
or by apparent resolution, are just two of a range of mechanisms by which debates are considered to 
reach resolution. See Ed. Engelhardt & Caplan (1987)
311 The notion o f ‘boundary objects’ has been introduced in: Star, S & Griesemer, J. (1989) 
Institutional ecology, ‘translations’ and boundary objects: amateurs and professionals in Berkley's 
museum of vertebrate zoology, 1907-39. Social Studies of Science, 19: 387-420.
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analytically interesting I will not pursue this interpretation of the Internet, since I am 
more interested in the notion of the Internet forum as a physical arena for debate.
It is at the stage of uptake of the directed mutation debate by the online 
community that the core-set terminology, useful to the description of the debate in the 
professional journal context, loses its descriptive power. Extension in the Internet 
forum increased the scale of the debate manifold beyond Collins’ allowances, and
•  312makes his terminology less suited to description of directed mutation online. 
Although some of the original core-set remain engaged with the debate, they are now 
part of a much larger and more diverse community. That larger community has 
multiple agendas and is comprised of specialists and non-specialists, leaving it 
outside the descriptive power of Collins’ model.
In the Internet forum, the scientific debate continued. In the personal pages of 
academics, or on professional and institutional sites methodology and mechanism 
were discussed. These materials existed alongside amateur discussions and new 
interpretations of the journal debate. In this section, I introduce some o f the online 
materials, to illustrate the changing identity of the debate in this forum. The structure 
and dynamics of the debate online are considered in detail in Chapter 5, where the 
growth and change of the debate in the Internet forum is addressed explicitly and 
examined empirically.
The appeal of directed mutation in the Internet forum was perhaps enhanced 
by the broader cultural context of the 1990s. In that period, the public understanding 
o f science had become a key issue, and there was much debate about how science
31 ^should be communicated. Popular interest in science was increasing, fostered 
through mass media attention to the public understanding of the new sciences of 
reproductive technology, cloning and the genetic modification of foodstuffs.314 To the
312 The failure of Collins’ core-set terminology to describe the debating community after uptake on 
the Internet need not indicate that its use as a grouping tool for the early debate is undermined. Collins 
acknowledges that the core-set rarely persists beyond a ten-year period [Collins, H. (1981)]. He 
attributes this decay to the usual processes of controversy resolution, or to the abandonment of the 
controversy. In the case of directed mutation, it seems that the change of scale diffused the core-set, 
and that this could be acknowledged as an additional means by which a core-set may decay in a 
natural way.
3.3 Gregory, J. & Miller, S. (1998) Science in public. Perseus Pubishing, Cambridge, MA; Lock, S. 
(2008) Lost in translations: discourse, boundaries and legitimacy in the public understanding of 
science in the UK. PhD Thesis, University College London.
3.4 Levy, J. (2004) Controlling the course of scientific advance: the case of human embryology. PhD 
thesis, University of Southampton.
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newly engaged public some of the most appealing aspects o f science were the 
controversies and moral debates. In particular, unorthodox science of the type that 
fringe journals such as the Fortean Times have documented captured the public 
imagination, and these kinds of publication began to serve a growing public interest. 
Lyall Watson’s 1991 Foreword to The Best o f  the Fortean Times says of the 
procedures of establishment science and mainstream science publication that:
4 Most workers accept that these procedures are cumbersome and 
make science inherently conservative and resistant to change. But 
what is not generally acknowledged is that this is a political process 
rather than a scientific one. It depends upon personal preference, upon 
the votes o f a scientific jury - every member of which would be 
disqualified from any normal inquiry on the basis of blatant conflict of 
interest. And yet it is on the verdict handed down by such courts that 
we are expected to exercise our preferences and construct our beliefs 
about the world. And that just isn’t good enough.’
Much of the late 1990s Internet material on directed mutation served this type of 
agenda, and the cultural enthusiasm for controversy and unorthodoxy made the story 
of directed mutation popular.316 In the context of the Internet forum, the directed 
mutation debate was easily translated to become a narrative of unorthodox research, 
potentially threatening to the mainstream of science and significant to our view of 
human evolution. In that construction the research was characterised as unfairly 
marginalized, and discredited through a broader establishment conspiracy to suppress 
controversial or unorthodox findings. That interpretation was encouraged by some of
315 Watson, L. (1991) Foreword. In: A. Sisman (Ed.) The best of the Fortean Times: the journal of 
strange phenomena. Futura Publications, London, p.7
316 This broad enthusiasm for anomalous/unusual science in the late century is even reflected in the 
pages of the prestigious journal Nature. In 1988-1989 the journal hosted the debates on ‘the memory 
of water’ (1988), ‘directed mutation’ (1988-1989) and ‘cold fusion’ (1989). Editor John Maddox 
presented each of these cases alongside editorial reservations, which appealed for reader’s scepticism. 
See: (on water memory) Maddox, J. (1988a) Editor’s note: When to believe the unbelievable. Nature, 
333: 787; (on directed mutation) Stahl, F. (1988); (on cold fusion) Maddox, J. (1989b) Another red 
herring leads nowhere. Nature, 339: 253. Maddox presented this contentious material to a 
contemporary readership with an enthusiasm for such dissent, but did so without compromising the 
legitimacy the journal or his editorial process. Thus, he achieved a compromise between the 
readership’s wants and the objectives of the journal.
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early journal publications, in which the defence of Neo-Darwinian orthodoxy inspired 
some advocates of directed mutation to complain of unfair treatment, and some 
commentators to acknowledge the special burden of proof facing non-Darwinian 
theorists.317
The cultural enthusiasm for this construction of the repressive nature of 
orthodox science was enhanced by the longer-term growth of public distrust of 
science. Throughout the second half of the twentieth century the public perception of 
science had changed. The scientist was no longer viewed as the white haired genius, 
questing for knowledge through a benign tradition. Rather, science and the scientist 
had been transformed in popular perception into a servant of the state, bound by 
funding to undertake potentially corrupt and ethically flawed research. This loss of 
faith in the objectivity and honesty of the scientific profession had begun in the post­
war climate, in which as sociologist Jerome Ravetz acknowledges: ‘it was in the 
public record that with the A-bomb science had tasted sin, and that with the H-bomb
^ 1 0
it had found it sweet’. This sense of corruption was fed in the 1990s as tales of 
unlicenced human cloning experiments and illegal assisted reproduction procedures 
filled the popular press.320 The resulting public perception of science in the late 
1990s, as the directed mutation debate moved into the public arena through its 
extension in the Internet forum, was ripe to accept this debate as an example of 
repression of unorthodoxy by a mainstream of corrupt self-serving science 
professionals. In this light, directed mutation had been discredited to protect 
established careers and research grants of those individuals who held authority and 
wielded it to their advantage.
There are several instances of the uptake of directed mutation to suit this type 
of agenda. William Corliss’ site ‘Science Frontiers’ is perhaps the most illustrative 
example. This is an on-line bi-monthly newsletter that reviews the ‘unusual and 
unexplained’ drawn from the world’s journals. Corliss describes the features he 
selects as: ‘those observations and facts that challenge prevailing scientific
317 See for examples: Cairns, J. (1993); Foster, P. (1993)
3,8 Levy, J. (2004)
319 Ravetz, J. (1990) Orthodoxies, critiques and alternatives. In: R. Olby, G. Cantor, J. Christie & M. 
Hodge (Eds.) Companion to the history of modem science. Routledge, London, p. 902
320 Levy, J. (2004)
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paradigms’.321 The Science Frontiers newsletter first referenced the directed mutation 
research in 1988, directly after the publication o f Cairns, Overbaugh & Miller (1988). 
Corliss describes the research findings and asks: ‘Could anything be more 
heretical?’322, he adds: ‘Will Nature now dispatch a ‘hit squad’ to Harvard?’323 Again 
in 1989, 1990, 1991 and 1994 Corliss’ newsletter discussed directed mutation. The 
1990 November- December issue of the newsletter demonstrates some of the 
sensationalism which often characterises the construction o f science to suit this kind 
of agenda. Concerning the concept of mutation under stress he asks: ‘What sort of 
environmental stress would cause humans to mutate? What would we turn into if, 
say, global temperatures rose 5 degrees?’324 In the 1991 May-June issue Corliss 
suggests that the Darwinism versus Lamarckism aspect of the debate has been at the 
heart of the ‘discredit’ of Cairns’ research.325 In the 1994 November- December issue 
Corliss reiterates his conclusion concerning Cairns’ research that: ‘This claim was too 
awful to accept’.326
Corliss’ site is important in several respects. While it gives attention to a vast 
range of subjects generally considered as pseudo-science, it is also replete with 
intelligent comment on issues drawn from scientific literature, such as directed 
mutation. Corliss demonstrates an understanding of the debates that he addresses. He 
is trained as a scientist, having a bachelor and masters degree in physics. Corliss had 
been producing his newsletter commentaries since early on in the journal-based phase 
o f the debate, but his independent status and position outside an academic institution 
rendered him part of the crowd of onlookers that surround the core-set.
As the journal debate moves away from Lamarckian references, and towards 
the weaker hypermutation models, Corliss’ material becomes more significant. As the 
Lamarckism versus Darwinism aspect of the negotiation was eclipsed in the journals,
321 www.science-frontiers.com
322 www.science-frontiers.com/sfD60/sfD60p07.htm
323 www.science-frontiers.com/sfD60/sfD60p07.htm Here, Corliss is alluding to the treatment of 
scientist Jacques Benveniste in the period after his controversial ‘water memory’ findings were 
published in the journal Nature in the late 1980s. Having published his work, the editorial team then 
dispatched a group to Benveniste’s laboratory to test the validity of his results. They concluded from 
this highly unusual visit that his results were invalid, and thus the same journal that had validated his 
work with publication shortly afterwards reported the disproof of his findings. For details of the water 
memory case see Chapter 5.6
324 www.science-frontiers.com/sfD72/sfD72b06/htm
325 www.science-frontiers.com/sfD75/sfD75b06.htm
326 www.science-frontiers.com/sfD96/sfD96b08.htm
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sites like Corliss’ became the refuge for that part of the debate. I have already argued 
that the molecular biological problem of directed mutation could not be resolved 
without resolution o f the Darwinism versus Lamarckism element of the debate. So 
while the journals hosted the negotiation of the molecular biological aspect of the 
debate, the Internet became the forum for negotiation of the broader contest.
In Internet keyword searches for directed mutation, ‘Science-Frontiers’ 
always features in the top ten of the hits generated. This is one of the key criteria for 
how visible an Internet resource will be, since people tend to view only the first few 
hits generated by any particular search. In addition, other sites that focus on fringe 
science phenomena frequently cite or link to Corliss’ material on directed 
mutation.327 This further raises the profile of the site. Corliss presented a new 
construction of the directed mutation debate to an interested popular audience, while 
retaining a link to the journal debate through citation and the reproduction of paper 
sources online. Science-Frontiers provides an example of some of the contributions 
that bridged the gap between the professional and popular during uptake in the 
Internet forum.
Internet sites like Corliss’ retain a link to the scientific debate in as much as 
they refer to published material, engage with the scientific details with some degree 
of understanding and interpretative ability, re-print articles and revisit the debate over 
a period of time adding further commentary when new resources arise in the print 
medium. By contrast, there are numerous sites that take only the most basic principles 
of directed mutation and put these to work within their own agenda, without further 
recourse to scientific reference and in the absence of skills for the evaluation of the 
journal materials. Various sites of this quality exist on the Internet, with perhaps the 
most significant being related to the discussion of science, religion and spirituality 
issues.
An example of this form of uptake exists in Henry Bayman’s online book 
‘Science, Knowledge and Sufism'?2* Bayman cites Cairns’ work on directed mutation 
as an example o f how science has shown that starvation conditions lead to genetic 
behaviours outside the explanatory power of standard scientific theory. He suggests 
that this provides scientific proof that hypo-nutrition or ascetic starvation, as carried
327 See for example: www.talk-origins.com & www.amasci.com
328 Bayman, H. (2000) http://home.att.net/~nungan/sufiway [offline Dec. 2004]
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out in some religions (i.e. Buddhism), can lead to the altered states of consciousness 
which these groups claim some of their members can achieve. He states that directed 
mutation is evidence that the human spirit, when subjected to starvation conditions, 
can achieve changes outside the laws of physics, just as the bacteria can achieve 
mutations which fall outside the explanatory power of molecular genetics. Bayman 
overlooks that, in the bacteria, mutation is directed to the achievement of substrate 
utilisation for the avoidance o f starvation. He also fails to appreciate that the bacteria 
have only been starved of certain nutrients (he says they have been given ‘no food’). 
Although commentary of this kind does not contribute explicitly to negotiation of 
either aspect of the directed mutation debate, it does promote further engagement. In 
that regard it serves to help increase the life expectancy of the debate, bringing new 
individuals into contact with the concepts and diversifying the meanings of directed 
mutation. Furthermore, Bayman’s knowledge of this subject is possibly an example 
of the way in which directed mutation was being disseminated across the Internet. 
Although Bayman may not have come into contact with the theory in online 
materials, it seems a more likely point of contact than the scientific literature. At 
the very least, Bayman’s discussion is an example of the uptake o f a controversial 
scientific principle, in a form far removed from the construction that exists in paper 
publication, to suit a substantially different agenda.
As the meanings of directed mutation diversified in the Internet forum two 
new scientific applications for the theory arose: i) directed mutation was incorporated 
as an algorithm in evolutionary programming in computer science and ii) directed 
mutation was described as a factor pertaining to quantum theory. This uptake and use 
o f the theory illustrates how the Internet allowed directed mutation to take on new 
meanings and be absorbed into other disciplines. In these two examples, directed 
mutation was transferred into other professional contexts.
The computer science of ‘evolutionary computing’ was developed during the 
1960s, as a tool for the potential evolution of programming sequences of artificial
329 Bayman’s brevity of explanation and almost total lack of provision of scientific information 
pertaining to the phenomenon of directed mutation make it unlikely that he synthesised his treatment 
from journal sources. There are no references for the material he mentions, and not even a full name 
for Cairns. This indicates that Bayman’s information has probably been constructed from one or a few 
poorly detailed secondary sources online. What Bayman offers is probably a third hand account of 
directed mutation.
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intelligence (Al) systems.330 This programming assay utilised the population, 
mutation and evolution concepts drawn from biological evolutionary theory as a 
problem-solving device by which to select effective programming sequences for the 
design of Al computer systems. The theory for this system is premised on the 
mapping of multiple solutions (appearing as possible computer code sequences) to 
any given problem within a ‘search space’, areas of which have higher fitness than 
others, measured by the usefulness of the solutions in that particular cluster area. 
Populations can be formed on the basis of selection for highest fitness of the solution 
to the given problem, and from these populations new generations (of computer 
sequence) can be bred through cross over and mutation. The extent of cross over and 
mutation can be set by the programme’s operator, such that various rates and extents 
of change over time (evolution) can be assayed.
The more sophisticated system of genetic algorithms was proposed in 1975 by 
John Holland, who outlined a form of evolutionary computing premised on the 
precise laws of chromosome, gene and nucleotide action as expressed in the 
biological theory of genome evolution. In 1992, a workable system of ‘genetic 
programming’ was created by John Koza, in which sequence evolution could be 
assayed through the rules of molecular genetics.332 In the late 1990s, the concept of 
directed mutation came into use as one of the test algorithm tools applied by 
evolutionary genetics programmers. The element of direction, when applied through 
evolutionary computing, determined that the mutation phase o f the assay would occur 
inline with some pre-determined rules, rather than at random as usual. These rules 
allow new sequences to be generated with a tendency towards the incorporation of 
sequence elements that have been useful products of past assays. Therefore, the kinds 
of mutation that are generated have a view to utility; they are directed to be useful by 
the criteria that have been developed in past assays. The rise o f this type of 
evolutionary computing in the late 1990s illustrates the diffusion of meanings of 
directed mutation that occurred in the Internet forum. It demonstrates how the theory 
was taken up and modified to suit a different agenda or purpose. Computer
330 The invention of evolutionary computing is credited to Rechenberg, who detailed the original full 
system in: Rechenberg, I. (1973) Evolutionsstrategie. Formmann-Holzboog, Verlag, Stuttgart.
3 1 Holland, J. (1975) Adaptation in natural and artificial systems. University of Michigan, Michigan.
332 Koza, J. (1992) Genetic programming: on the programming of computers by means of natural 
selection. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
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programmers were not interested in the authority dispute underlying the directed 
mutation debate, in fact, they were not even interested in the legitimacy of the 
directed mutation claims. Rather, the notion of directed mutation was taken up in 
abstraction from those negotiations, and put to work in principle.
Recently there has been an attempt to apply the theory of quantum mechanics 
to evolutionary theory. In 2000 Johnjoe McFadden published a theoretical text on this 
connection entitled Quantum Evolution,333 In that text, McFadden presented a bold 
hypothesis, predicting that, since the material of heredity is located in the single 
molecule DNA, the processes involving that molecule will be governed by quantum 
laws. He describes how adherence to these laws would confer upon organisms the 
ability to control specific molecular mechanisms, including for example the capacity 
to mutate their genes specifically and as a response to environmental pressures. 
McFadden claimed this capacity could represent the root o f consciousness and free 
will. The claims of this text, although profoundly speculative, illustrate a meeting of 
various incarnations of directed mutation. The text uses concepts drawn from the 
computer modelling of genetic and evolutionary phenomena (genetic algorithms), 
evidence from the molecular study of the behaviour in bacterial genomes under stress 
(the original directed mutation research) and the concepts of the origin and function 
of free will and spirituality (as linked to directed mutation by some spiritualist groups 
publishing online). McFadden’s intellectual project is illustrative of the state of the 
directed mutation debate in the period after its extension o f scale in the Internet 
forum. It is conceivable that his hypothesis could not have come about without the 
changed scale o f the debate in the late 1990s.
In terms of the Internet forum providing an extension of the journal-based 
debate, the contributions have been mixed. Some contributions remain professional, 
and some professional materials are reproduced and made available online. Also, 
some contributions bridge the gap between the professional and popular, referring to 
and reproducing professional materials, and offering non-professional commentary 
on them. Some o f the other materials are more plainly non-professional, and are 
completely discrete from the journal-based debate. In other cases directed mutation 
has been taken up in abstraction from the debate and been put to ‘in principle’ use.
333 McFadden, J. (2000) Quantum evolution: life in the multvverse. Penguin, London.
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The relative proportions of each of these kinds o f treatment are described in Chapter 
5, in which a quantitative analysis illustrates their relative scale change.
Overall, the focus of the online materials is more on the Darwinism versus 
Lamarckism aspect of the debate than the molecular biological aspect. The 
Lamarckism versus Darwinism dissent is approached in this forum with renewed 
vigour, and without the constraints of journal editors and peer review that material is 
able to come to the fore. The situation at the time of writing is that the journal debate 
provides the forum for the negotiation of the molecular biological phenomenon of 
directed mutation in unicells. In that forum the Darwinism versus Lamarckism 
problem is still acknowledged, but has not commonly been negotiated explicitly since 
the mid 1990s. Meanwhile, the Internet provides the forum for the negotiation of the 
more contentious material of the Lamarckism versus Darwinism aspect of the debate. 
The molecular biological problem is also negotiated online, but often only in 
treatments motivated by attention to the broader contest.
The result is that the Internet provides the context for an ongoing challenge to 
the authority of evolutionary biology. In the Internet forum that challenge has been 
taken up from a range of perspectives. Some contend that evolutionary biology has 
assumed authority that should be allocated to creation science. Others challenge the 
authority of the discipline by asking what justifies the monopoly of Darwinism. 
Though these challenges take a different form from Cairns’ in 1988, the result is 
similar in that the authority and boundaries of evolutionary biology are being 
questioned and challenged. So, as the boundary contest is eclipsed in the journal 
treatments with the decline of attention to the broader debate, it becomes apparent 
that we must follow that level of dissent into the new arena of the Internet forum. 
Chapter 5 seeks to achieve that tracking of the two aspects of the debate.
This chapter highlights key features from the history of the directed mutation 
controversy. From this narrative the areas of interest become apparent, and the two 
aspect nature of the debate is elucidated. The issues arising from this narrative are 
explored further in the following chapters. In Chapter 3, the Lamarckism versus 
Darwinism aspect of the debate is examined, and the historical legacies underlying 
that conflict are discussed. In that chapter this case study is located within the context
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of the broader and more enduring debate. In the language o f cultural cartography I 
identify ‘Lamarckism’ and ‘Darwinism’ as ‘old maps’, and the activity of the 
directed mutation debate is located in relation to those. Through this discussion the 
significance of Lamarckian association in the late twentieth century is clarified. In 
Chapter 4, some of the intrinsic factors of both aspects o f the debate are examined. 
The clash of scientific disciplines and Cairns’ particular style of advocacy are 
explored, and each of those features is considered as an agent o f controversy 
perpetuation. I frame the debate as a boundary contest, and consider the 
activity/motivation of advocates and adversaries in that light. In Chapter 5, the impact 
of uptake of the debate in the Internet forum is examined empirically, and a detailed 
analysis is provided of the scale and identity change of the debate in that context.
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Chapter 3: The intellectual and cultural context of the directed mutation 
debate: an agent of controversy perpetuation?
In this chapter I discuss three of the six perpetuating forces that I identify in 
this project: historical legacies, the use of ‘old maps’ of cultural authority, and 
scientific dogma. I suggest that the context created by these factors resulted in the 
protraction of the directed mutation debate. I argue that the directed mutation debate 
has not been ‘local’ or ‘episodic’, but instead is part of a larger ongoing conflict in 
evolutionary biology, and that, action and motivation in the contest have been 
determined by the legacies of the larger conflict. This chapter places directed 
mutation in the intellectual and cultural context of late twentieth century 
evolutionary debate. In particular, I argue that widespread cultural and intellectual 
adherence to Darwinism can be identified as a key force in the generation of negative 
responses to the directed mutation research (section 3.1). Also, I argue that 
antagonism towards directed mutation was reinforced by contemporary negative 
perceptions of both Lamarckian theory and the previous attempts to reinvent 
Lamarckism (section 3.2). I suggest that ‘old maps’ of Darwinism and Lamarckism 
were consulted during the directed mutation debate, thus bringing history to bear on 
that contest. Finally, I describe certain dogmas that arose in evolutionary biology as 
a result of the historical legacies of Darwinism and Lamarckism. I argue that these 
dogmas reinforced the details of the old map, and acted as impediments to effective 
negotiation (section 3.2.3).
In section 3.1, I argue that the legacy of the rise of Darwinism during the 
twentieth century significantly influenced negotiation in the directed mutation 
debate. I illustrate that widespread intellectual and cultural attachment to Darwinian 
theory was a feature of the late twentieth century. I use Thomas Gieryn’s concept of 
‘old maps’334 to describe how a stable Darwinian authority was constructed during 
the twentieth century and subsequently deployed in new conflicts pertaining to 
evolutionary theory. I argue that the authority, or even monopoly, of Darwinism was 
recorded on an old map, ready to be unfurled in new contests as a tool for the 
protection o f existing authority.
334 Gieryn identifies the possible role of old maps in Gieryn, T. (1999a). The concept of old maps, and 
their relevance to this project, is discussed in Chapter 1 (section 1.3).
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I use the language of boundary work to describe how individuals throughout 
the twentieth century contributed to the construction of the old map and the enduring 
identity of Darwinism that it represents. In particular, I describe the activities of the 
architects of the modem synthesis as boundary work for monopolization, and 
demonstrate how they were able to vastly increase the authority attached to 
Darwinian theory. I argue that the Darwin centennial in 1959 can be identified as the 
point at which the constructed authority of Darwinism began to be deployed as an 
‘old map’ and to persist between conflict episodes. I argue that reference to the old 
map of Darwinism during the directed mutation debate complicated the conflict, and 
increased attention to the implications of the molecular phenomenon for 
evolutionary theory in general.
In section 3.2, I argue that an old map record of Lamarckism was also 
developed during the twentieth century, and later called upon in the directed 
mutation debate. The old map record of Darwinism confers authority, acting as a 
summary of all the authority won during a series of conflict episodes. Conversely, 
the Lamarckian old map reinforces the lack of authority attached to Lamarckism. I 
describe how the progressive defamation of Lamarckism, coupled with the rise of 
Darwinism, reinforced a persistent negative identity of Lamarckian theory. I argue 
that the defamation of Lamarckism became a tacit understanding, which ultimately 
influenced the directed mutation debate. I show that reference to the old map of 
Lamarckism itself became contentious. I describe how the old map identity of 
Lamarckism was constructed from the sum of failed attempts by Lamarckians to 
gain authority. In particular, I discuss how the map records the contributions of Paul 
Kammerer and Trofim Lysenko. I describe the historical construction of those 
individuals as what I term ‘iconic failures’, and show their role as a foil to the 
Darwinian icon that was created during the centennial celebration.
In section 3.3 I discuss the impact of scientific dogma on the directed 
mutation debate. I describe how the old map has been reinforced by a series of 
persistent dogmas (or laws) in evolutionary biology. In this section, the construction 
of dogmas by Darwinians is described as one element of their boundary work for 
monopolization. In particular, I describe Francis Crick’s ‘central dogma of 
evolutionary biology’ and argue that this represents a key landmark on the old map
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of Darwinism. I suggest that the dogmatism of evolutionary biology generated a 
particularly unreceptive climate for the directed mutation research. I argue that the 
requirement that directed mutation theorists overcome dogma forced increased 
obligations of proof and refutation upon them.
Overall, this chapter describes how factors beyond the local and episodic 
have contributed to the negotiation of directed mutation. The genesis, perpetuation 
and deployment of certain pro-Darwinian and anti-Lamarckian attitudes are analysed 
here to illuminate the context for non-Darwinian work in the late twentieth century. 
This chapter demonstrates how some well-developed preconceptions of both 
Darwinism and Lamarckism can be viewed as determinants of the quality and 
protraction of the directed mutation debate. I aim to illustrate that with this scientific 
controversy, and perhaps scientific controversies more broadly, the quality and 
dynamics of the debate do not rest only on the participants’ engagement with the 
specific material of the contentious research. Rather, engagement is influenced more 
broadly by the social and intellectual context, and is informed or enforced by 
reference to old maps, endowing certain biases and predilections that underscore the 
activity of advocates and adversaries. Recognition of the effects of such legacies is 
essential to understanding the tone and protraction of the directed mutation
335controversy.
3.1: A context for Darwinian adherence in the late twentieth century: the 
creation of an old map of Darwinism.
Chapter 1 identified the two aspects of the directed mutation controversy. 
The first comprising methodological and theoretical issues, the second concerning 
the broader conflict of Darwinism versus Lamarckism. That second aspect involves 
attempts to maintain the authority of Darwinism as the principal theory of evolution 
versus the challenge from individuals who seek to gamer some of that authority for
335 Phase 3 of Harry Collins’ empirical program of relativism (EPOR) [see Collins, H. (1981a) Stages 
in the empirical programme of relativism. Social studies of Science, 11:3-9] seeks to identify die 
influence of social and cultural factors on the negotiation of dissent and the achievement of 
consensus. Trevor Pinch has pointed out that few analyses have achieved phase three of the program. 
This project aims to address negotiation in the directed mutation controversy in relation to the 
influence of history and cultural context, and thereby achieve analysis that reaches phase 3 of the 
EPOR.
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non-Darwinian theories. I argue that, the opponents of directed mutation deployed an 
old map in their attempt to protect the authority of Darwinism. By the time of the 
directed mutation debate that old map had developed significant persistence and had 
been adopted culturally and intellectually in a number of tacit and explicit ways. 
This section traces the genesis and perpetuation of that old map as a way of 
illuminating the activity of, and motivation for, this aspect of the debate.
The genesis of the old map of Darwinism is traced here as a function of the 
accumulation and exercise of cultural authority by the agents of the modem 
synthesis in the period 1930-1960. In this period various authors became vocal 
advocates of Darwinism, and began a process that can be best described as boundary 
work for monopolization. Their expressed goal was to assert Darwinism as the 
primary evolutionary theory. Through a phase of recruitment, and under the auspices 
of various committees and societies, this group constructed the authority of 
Darwinism and eventually translated that authority into a persistent identity of 
Darwinism in the form of an old map. This section describes the rise of Darwinism 
to a position of persistent cultural authority.
To illustrate the genesis of the old map, I trace the boundary work for 
Darwinian monopoly from its beginnings in four canonical texts from the theories 
architects (3.1.1), through a phase of cohesion and consolidation as the Committee 
on Common Problems (CCP) (3.1.2), through expansion in the creation of the 
Society for the Study of Evolution (SSE) (3.1.2) and finally to the phase of 
deployment, during the Darwin centennial (3.1.3).
3.1.1: Seeking the origins of Synthetic Theory
The version of Darwinism recorded on the old map emerged from the 
‘modem synthesis’ and is commonly termed ‘Neo-Darwinism’. Synthetic theory 
combined Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection with Mendelian 
genetics. It allowed biologists to work with a common theory, overcoming serious 
interdisciplinary differences in their early twentieth century epistemological 
approaches (see below). As Ceccarelli has put it: ‘[The synthesis] did not signal the 
triumph of one field over the other, nor was it immediately sparked by a new theory
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or discovery. Instead, the synthesis was an interdisciplinary agreement that
336cooperation between the paradigms was both possible and desirable’. The 
synthesis was as much an organisational achievement for biology as it was an 
epistemological transition.
The first step towards identifying the origins of the old map is to determine 
the period in which the synthetic movement arose. The synthesis period in modem 
biology is difficult to define in terms of commencement, protraction and completion. 
Historian Peter Bowler has analysed this period in detail.337 In Bowler’s view, the 
synthetic movement arose in the early 1900s at the end of the period that he refers to 
as the ‘eclipse of Darwinism’.338 Bowler describes how, in that period, biology had 
become fragmented. The rediscovery of Mendelian genetics had driven apart 
experimental and field biologists. In genetics laboratories Darwinism had been 
largely abandoned since the theory appeared to have little relevance at a molecular 
level; mutation was all-important and adaptation and selection provided no 
illumination of genetic principles. Meanwhile, naturalists and field biologists had 
similarly abandoned Darwinism on different grounds. They retained the Darwinian 
focus on geographic factors as agents of evolution, but when considering adaptation 
they favoured more Lamarckian mechanisms. Palaeontologists considered evolution 
to have occurred in a linear fashion, driven by either some Lamarckian mechanism 
or orthogenesis. This divide in biology was compounded by each group’s 
perception that their methods were superior to the others.340
During this fragmentation, Darwinism was almost abandoned. The theory 
only increased in value in the 1920s when population biology began to resolve the 
divide between geneticists and naturalists.341 With that new alliance between sub­
disciplines, the merit of natural selection as a force for evolution became apparent. 
Bowler suggests this alliance might represent the commencement of the synthetic 
period. He states:
336 Ceccarelli, L. (2001) Shaping science with rhetoric: the cases of Dobzhanksy, Schrodinger and 
Wilson. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
337 Bowler, P. (1989) Evolution: the history of an idea. Revised edition. University of California 
Press, Berkeley, California.
338 A period at the turn of the twentieth century when Darwinian theory had declined in popularity and 
ceased to be used by the majority of scientists.
339 Bowler, P. (1989)
340 Ceccarelli, L. (2001)
341 Ceccarelli, L. (2001)
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‘Population genetics was important not so much because it supplied totally new 
concepts but because it destroyed the legacy of anti-Darwinian feeling and focussed 
attention on new research opportunities.’342
The rise of population genetics provided a more pro-Darwinian context, in which the 
kind of work that would lead to synthesis became possible.
Other authors have offered alternative explanations for the rise of the 
synthetic movement. For example, philosopher Lindley Darden has argued that the 
synthesis arose because the development of knowledge in each of the dissociated 
disciplines had advanced to the point where the material for synthesis had become 
available. Only at that time when each discipline was so developed could each offer 
the elements required for effective synthesis.343 Garland Allen argues that a 
conceptual transformation precipitated the synthetic period. He suggests that 
geneticists had to become less mechanistic and atomistic and that with this achieved 
they were able to perceive the holistic reality of evolution that involved populations 
and organisms in environments. That enabled the geneticists to perceive the merit of 
field naturalism and so move towards synthesis.344 Conversley, historian Betty 
Smocovitis has argued that it was more the field naturalists who underwent 
conceptual change to permit the rise of the synthesis. She suggests that for synthesis 
to become possible the biological sciences had to move towards mechanized 
concepts and language, and attempt to produce theories more like those in the harder 
sciences. To achieve that transition the naturalists had to embrace the value of 
experiment and proximate causal explanation.345 Finally, historian Joseph Cain has 
argued that the co-operation that underlay the synthesis was promoted by 
sociopsychological motives. He argues that field workers were losing status and 
funding in relation to the experimental workers and that they sought synthesis in an 
attempt to retain authority and ensure their inclusion in the evolutionaiy studies
342 Bowler, P. (1989) p.308
343 Darden, L. (1986) Relations among fields in the evolutionary synthesis. In: W. Bechtel (Ed.) 
Integrating scientific disciplines. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht.
344 Allen, G. (1975) Life science in the twentieth century. John Wiley & Sons, New York.
345 Smocovitis, V. (1992) Unifying biology: the evolutionary synthesis and evolutionary biology. 
Journal of the History o f Biology, 25: 1-65.
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community.346
There is general agreement that the beginnings of the synthetic movement 
can be traced to the 1920s, with the necessary precursor of population genetics 
emerging in that decade. However, that period does not correspond exactly with the 
beginning of the boundary work for monopolization that I discuss here. The 1920s 
provided the more pro-Darwinian context, but the boundary work that shaped the 
synthesis requires a more specific point of origin. To trace the origins of the old map 
the first acts of boundary work must be identified.
Russian Biologist Theodosius Dobzhansky’s Genetics and the Origin o f  
Species347 appears to many authors as the text that framed and defined the modem 
synthetic approach.348,349 I argue that in this text we see the first acts of boundary 
work for Darwinian monopolization. Leah Ceccarelli describes this book as:
‘...an evolutionary treatise that did more to influence interdisciplinary 
agreement than any other; it got the word out about developments in theory and data 
in the different disciplines, built a new conceptual understanding in the minds of its 
readers, and convinced people from different social groups that it was in their best 
interest to draw disciplines together.
And Dobzhansky biographer Mark Adams goes as far as to state:
‘Theodosius Dobzhansky...was one of the most important biologists of the twentieth 
century. Consider his achievements. The central architect of the modem evolutionary 
synthesis...he integrated diverse biological specialities in his remarkably influential 
classic, Genetics and the Origin o f  Species (1937) - a book that reoriented the 
thinking of many biologists and whose subsequent editions constituted the evolving 
locus classicus o f the new view.’
346 [See Cain, J. (1993) Common problems and cooperative solutions: organizational activity in 
evolutionary studies, 1936-1947. Isis, 84: 1-25.]
347 Dobzhansky, T. (1937) Genetics and the origin of species. Columbia University Press, New York.
348 Bowler, P. (1992) The environmental sciences. Harper Collins, London.
349 Leah Ceccarelli has studied the impact of Genetics and the origin of species, and described the 
status awarded to the text. See Ceccarelli, L. (2001)
350 Ceccarelli, L. (2001) p.24
351 Adams, M. (1994) Introduction: Theodosius Dobzhansky in Russia and America. In: M. Adams
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Several factors make Dobzhansky a prime candidate for architect of the 
modem synthesis, and founder of the old map identity of Darwinism. In the context 
of the fragmentation of biology Dobzhansky possessed a virtually unique breadth of 
learning across this divide. His training and experience as both an experimental 
biologist and naturalist allowed him to perceive the potential compatibility of the 
approaches and to describe, in his 1937 publication, what he perceived as a unified 
approach to biology. He had trained in the tradition of natural history in Russia, and 
throughout his career he conducted field research. Yet, he also learned genetic 
techniques in Russia and pursued laboratory based genetics research after he moved 
to the United States in the late 1920s.352 The iconic status attached to his 1937 
publication largely stems from appreciation of the unique skills that enabled 
Dobzhansky to transcend the dichotomy that had divided researchers.
Dobzhansky’s success in 1937 was as a popularizer of Darwinian theory. He 
did not develop new theories in his text, but rather used his skills to enable a new 
presentation of existing theory. He translated the complex mathematical models of 
the population geneticists into a form that biologists from other disciplines could
' I C ' l
understand. Historian Bentley Glass says of Dobzhansky’s presentation that:
‘...for the first time, the profound significance of the work done in population 
genetics in Russia and Germany was combined with an exposition of the new Neo- 
Darwinism stemming from R. A. Fisher, Sewall Wright, and J. B. S. Haldane...’.354
Dobzhansky himself recognised this as his key contribution, saying that synthesis 
was ‘in the air’ and that his role was to ‘popularize’ existing theories that were
' J C C
stifled by ‘abstruse’ and ‘esoteric’ mathematics. Dobzhansky was familiar with 
the innovative techniques developed by Russian geneticists during the 1920s, and 
thought these presented an opportunity for progress in evolutionary research. When
(Ed.) The evolution o f Theodosius Dobzhansky: essays on his life and thought in Russia and America. 
Princeton University Press, New Jersey, p.3
352 Ceccarelli, L. (2001)
353 Ceccarelli, L. (2001)
354 Glass, B. (1980) The roving naturalist: travel letters of Theodosius Dobzhansky. American 
Philosophical Society, Philadelphia. Introduction.
355 Ceccarelli, L. (2001)
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he moved to T. H. Morgan’s ‘fly room’ at Columbia University in 1927 he imported 
these techniques along with his geneticist/naturalist balance.356 After 1927 
Dobzhansky’s publications are dominated by reports o f specific chromosomal
357observations in Drosophila. His 1937 Genetics and the Origin o f  Species in many 
respects stands out from his other published material in the period, being singular in 
its scope and attention to the broad theories of genetics and evolution.
Dobzhansky’s personal background also promoted him as a key agent in the 
contest between Darwinians and Lamarckians. His status as a Russian emigre 
indicates a possible cultural bias underlying the triumphalist narrative of Darwinism 
that he promoted. By 1937, when Dobzhansky’s Genetics and the Origin o f  Species 
was published, Russian science had been debilitated by the profound impact of 
Lysenkoism on scientific theory and practice. Following the advent of Stalinism in 
the 1930s, Dobzhansky was vilified in Russia. He was considered a traitor, and as 
Lysenko rose to power Dobzhansky became a focus for press attention where he was 
represented as “a ‘fly-lover and man-hater,’ a tool of machinating capitalists and 
American imperialism.’ The disastrous national science policies promoted by 
Lysenko were largely bred out of adherence to Lamarckian principles. Therefore, 
Dobzhansky had a personal motivation for disavowing Lamarckism. To Dobzhansky 
the abandonment of Lamarckism as a tool for applied evolutionary work appeared as 
a practical necessity for the avoidance of a crisis in science; Dobzhansky had a 
cautionary tale to offer.
While Dobzhansky’s text might represent an iconic origin of the modem 
synthesis in terms of its content, its favourable reception relied upon the concurrent 
development of a receptive audience primed for the rhetoric of disciplinary 
unification. Joe Cain has highlighted the widespread calls for unification across 
Britain and America, and described the period 1936-1947 as ripe for co-operative 
activities in biology. The combination of Dobzhansky’s approach and the primed 
audience meant that this text ‘quickly and profoundly influenced evolutionary 
studies in America’, making him one of the ‘central and most influential participants
356 Adams, M. (1994)
357 Dobzhansky, T. (1937)
358 Adams, M. (1994)
359 Adams, M. (1994) p.5
360 Cain, J.( 1993)
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in this period of evolutionary studies’. The several editions of the text were received 
very well, and ‘their widespread use as textbooks exemplified this broad 
influence’.361
Therefore, on several levels, Dobzhansky’s 1937 text provides a logical place 
to seek the first acts of boundary work and the origins of the old map. I argue that 
Dobzhansky’s boundary work strategy relied upon two devices: first, the promotion 
of Darwinism as a single theory that might unite the biological sciences, second, the 
concurrent rejection of Lamarckism as a viable alternative. In Genetics and the 
Origin o f  Species we see this strategy outlined and put into action.
In the following sections I describe four foundational texts of the modem 
synthesis, beginning with Dobzhansky’s, to illustrate the boundary work project of 
the synthesis architects.362 It should be noted that the search for boundary work in 
these canonical texts does not assume that these authors were from the very start 
acting specifically as a corporation for the advancement of Darwinism. In this first 
phase of synthesis these iconic texts were produced perhaps more in service to 
individual interests, than to a self-conscious programme for Darwinian monopoly. 
There was a general consensus within biology that the disparate areas of field and 
laboratory science should be united. Dobzhansky offered Darwinism as a principle 
for unification. The three subsequent texts that I describe (Huxley 1942, Mayr 1942, 
and Simpson 1944) follow Dobzhansky’s lead, but with important motivations 
beyond that of Darwinian expansion. In particular, Mayr was keen for his specialist 
area of taxonomy or systematics to be included in the synthesis, while Simpson was 
keen that paleontologists not be left out. Dobzhansky offered a suggested style for 
achieving synthesis, and Huxley, Mayr and Simpson followed at least partly 
pragmatically. Initially, as the authors pushed for authority, their primary concern 
was perhaps just to be attached to it.
361 Cain, J. (1993) p.9
362 The analysis I offer here of these canonical texts is not intended to recommended this ‘boundary 
work for synthesis and expansion’ reading as the only one possible. I follow Cain’s caution that these 
texts should be considered to have polyvalent readings and associated meanings. [Cain, J. (2003) A 
matter of perspective: multiple readings of George Gaylord Simpson’s ‘tempo and mode in 
evolution’. Archives o f Natural History, 30(1): 28-39] In this project, my search for boundary work is 
a methodological device for recovering the emergence of trends in evolutionary biology that I wish to 
trace to the late twentieth centuiy.
363 Cain, J. (1993)
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The first acts of boundary work for monopolization: Theodosius Dobzhansky and
Genetics and the Orizin o f  Species (1937)
Dobzhansky’s 1937 text introduces the new framing of Darwinism and 
Lamarckism that I argue became central to the boundary work of the synthesis 
architects; his narrative promoted Darwinism, while neglecting and tacitly defaming 
Lamarckism. Dobzhansky presents Darwinism as a tool for forging a union between 
geneticists and naturalists, offering to mend the problematic divide in the life 
sciences. For Dobzhansky, the problem was that naturalists largely adhered to 
Lamarckism and geneticists largely overlooked the importance of Darwinian theory. 
Dobzhansky offered to mend this rift by indicating to the latter group the value of 
Darwinism to their work, while presenting the Lamarckism of the former group as an 
unfortunate outcome of the disciplinary divide.
The main body of the work is a restatement of Darwinian theory in light of 
Dobzhansky’s special skills bridging this divide. Mayr has observed that: ‘In a way, 
the synthesis was nothing but confirmation of Darwin’s original theory...’364 In this 
text we see Dobzhansky reiterating Darwinian theory in relation to developments in 
twentieth century science. Ceccarelli has said that Dobzhansky’s challenge was to 
‘lay out the theory that supported the possibility of collaboration’, and ‘inspire each 
side to believe that cooperative action was in its own best interest’.365 He achieved 
this aspect of his project through simplifying complex mathematics, providing 
examples of field work proofs for mathematical theories, introducing map metaphors 
to bolster population genetics predictions, surveying new data and collating research 
findings, directly addressing the reservations naturalists’ had concerning the validity 
o f laboratory study and addressing geneticists concerns regarding the use of field 
work. He did all this whilst also assuring ‘each side that he supported their core 
beliefs’.367
Meanwhile, Dobzhansky presents the extraction of Lamarckism from 
evolutionaiy theory as a practical necessity for the new approach:
364 Mayr, E. (1998) p.xiii
365 Ceccarelli, L. (2001)
366 Ceccarelli, L.. (2001)
367 Ceccarelli, L. (2001) p.40-41
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‘Considerations of space have forced us to refrain from a detailed discussion of some 
of the objections that have been advanced against the genetic treatment of 
evolutionary problems. Thus, Lamarckian doctrines find but a brief mention. The 
treatment had to be made assertive rather than polemic, dogmatic rather than 
apologetic.’368
The removal of Lamarckism as an opposition to Darwinism serves a dual 
purpose. Firstly, this approach has the immediate effect of tacitly asserting the 
authority of Darwinism, suggesting that there is no viable alternative to the theory 
and so implying that inevitability recommends its uptake. For Dobzhansky that 
inevitability would be expressed ‘assertively’ and ‘dogmatically’. Secondly, the 
extraction of Lamarckism as an antithesis to Darwinian work has the long-term 
effect of underpinning the emerging triumphalist narrative of Darwinian history; the 
authority of Darwinian theory is reinforced by the sense that it has triumphed over 
Lamarckism. The apparent necessity of by-passing Lamarckism, which Dobzhansky 
describes as a consideration of ‘space’, actually functions as a rhetorical device 
underpinning his singular attention to Darwinian theory.
By constructing biologists’ pluralistic approaches to evolution as a side-effect 
of disciplinary divide, Dobzhansky eliminates the need to refute Lamarckism. In his 
framing, Darwinism is an all-purpose tool that requires no bolstering from alterative 
theories. Thus, Lamarckism doesn’t need to be refuted, but rather abandoned for 
pragmatic purposes. Dobzhansky offers a ‘get out’ to Lamarckian supporters, 
allowing them to recognise their use of Lamarckism as an unavoidable outcome of a 
wider divide in biology, rather than a defining feature of their work.
This formative text recommends a boundary work strategy for the expansion 
of the authority of biology, evolutionary theory and Darwinism. Dobzhansky 
recommended first the broad application of Darwinism, and second, the omission of 
alternative theories (especially Lamarckism). The result is an early version of the 
triumphalist representation of Darwinism -  it appears as an unchallenged theory of 
evolution. In this text Lamarckism is ignored, only later does the stigmatization and
368 Dobzhansky, T. (1937) Preface
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active defamation of the theory begin (see section 3.2). At this stage, Dobzhansky’s 
principal goal was to increase the authority of biology by mending internal rifts (with 
Darwinism as a tool for that project). Only later, once the rifts are mended, does the
•  •  •  369drive to assert Darwinian monopoly become a motivation in itself.
To appreciate the extent to which Dobzhansky’s approach was deployed in 
the contest for authority, it is essential to appreciate the influence his text had upon 
other agents of the synthesis, and the biological community in general. Several 
authors have addressed the texts’ influence. Biologist William Provine says that it 
was the most influential evolutionary text of the twentieth century, and that:
‘...it was required reading for all evolutionists (I have yet to find an 
evolutionist trained in the United States between 1937 and 1960 who did not read the 
book)...’370
Ernst Mayr, fellow synthesis architect and historian of evolutionary theory, has 
asserted that:
‘There is complete agreement among the participants of the evolutionary synthesis as 
well as among historians that it was one particular publication that heralded the 
beginning of the synthesis, and in fact was more responsible for it than any other, 
Dobzhansky’s Genetics and the origin o f  species.’371
Biologist Steven Jay Gould has gone as far as to say that:
‘.. .his book had been the direct instigator of all volumes that followed.’372
369 Mayr has suggested that there was significant consensus between biologists by the time the 1947 
Princeton conference concluded the work of the Committee on Common Problems of Genetics, 
Paleontology and Systematics. [See Mayr, E. (1980a)]
370 Pro vine, W. (1981) Origins of the genetics of natural populations series. In: R. Lewontin et al 
(Eds.) Dobzhansky’s genetics of natural populations I-XLI1L Columbia University Press, New York.
p7174
Mayr, E. (1982) The growth of biological thought: diversity, evolution and inheritance. Harvard 
University Press, p.569
372 Gould, S. J. (1982) Introduction. In: T. Dobzhansky, Genetics and the origin of species. Columbia 
University Press, New York, p.xxvii
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Julian Huxley and Evolution: The Modern Synthesis (1942)
A second book frequently cited as a foundational text of the modem
373 •synthesis is Julian Huxley’s Evolution: The Modern Synthesis (1942). Like 
Dobzhansky, Huxley had some unique qualities as a biologist in this period. His 
academic interests were eclectic. He had a keen interest in behaviour, as well as 
embryology and systematics. He had trained as a zoologist, with an interest in 
ornithology. He was a firm believer in the value of education, following the 
humanist tradition throughout his life, and producing popular works from early in his 
career.374 Zoologists Paul Harvey has stated that Huxley’s legacy is ‘more one of 
inspiration than of scientific achievement.’375 His interest in popularisation made 
him a valuable recruit for the synthesis movement, which would require
176popularisation in order to assure its status within cultural cartography.
Huxley bore the legacy of his grandfather, Thomas Henry Huxley. T. H. 
Huxley had been Charles Darwin’s greatest defender in the period immediately
o *7'7 t
subsequent to the publication of The Origin O f Species. The dichotomy of 
naturalists and geneticists, that had inspired so much Lamarckian support in field 
naturalists, mirrored a divide in Julian Huxley’s own career between the legacy of 
his Darwinian advocate grandfather and the abandonment of Darwinism manifest in 
some of his own research interests (i.e. field ornithology).
Huxley coined the term ‘modem synthesis’ in this text, providing definition 
for the movement through the process of naming. Huxley introduced the book as part 
of a new concerted reform in evolutionary science, stating that:
‘The time is ripe for an advance in our understanding of evolution. Genetics, 
developmental physiology, ecology, systematics, palaeontology, cytology,
373 Huxley, J. (1942) Evolution: the modern synthesis. George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London.
374 Huxley, J. (1926) Essays in popular science. Chatto & Windus, London; Wells, H., Huxley, J. & 
Wells, G. (1930) The science of life. Waverley Book Company, London.
375 Harvey, P. (1990) Review: The legacy of Julian Huxley -  ‘evolutionary studies’ edited by M. 
Keynes and G. Ainsworth. New Scientist, 1715.
376 Claims for cultural authority have to be articulated to those in adjacent territories before boundary 
delineations can be finalized; making the ability to communicate the authority claims to a wider 
audience a valuable skill.
377 Darwin, C. (1859)
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mathematical analysis, have all provided new facts and tools for research: the need
378to-day is for a concerted attack and synthesis.’
Like Dobzhansky, Huxley placed emphasis on the need to unite the disparate 
fields in biology; acting as a British counterpart to Dobzhansky in his role as 
ambassador of unification.379 Cain has suggested that Huxley’s key contribution to 
the synthesis project was as a publicist of the coherent and communal approach to 
biology.380 His boundary work is apparent in rhetoric such as ‘advance’ and ‘attack’. 
Like Dobzhansky, Huxley perceived the route to reunification to be via the broad 
application of Darwinism. He says that:
‘Biology at the present time is embarking upon a phase of synthesis after a period in 
which new disciplines were taken up in turn and worked out in comparative 
isolation. Nowhere is this movement towards unification more likely to be valuable 
than in this many-sided topic of evolution; and already we are seeing the first-fruits
1 0 1
in the re-animation of Darwinism.’
Huxley follows Dobzhansky’s approach to the divide in biology; he does not 
reprimand non-Darwinian groups. Again, adherence to alternative theories is framed 
as an unavoidable effect of disciplinary division. Again, the solution is apparently 
simple; if biology is united then the value of Darwinism is obvious. Only division 
has made alternatives appear valuable. Unlike Dobzhansky, Huxley does not justify 
the removal of Lamarckism from his summary of evolutionary theory; he just leaves 
it out. His text makes only a handful of references to Lamarckism. To Huxley, the
378 Huxley, J. (1942) p.8
379 Huxley had been involved alongside Dobzhansky in an effort to cohere the disparate specialists in 
biology through the formation of the Society for the Study of Speciation in 1939. This was intended 
as an informal body for the exchange of ideas and information. [Cain, J. 1993] It was short lived, 
despite efforts by Mayr to intervene and galvanise the project. The society has been examined by 
historian Joe Cain [Cain, J. (2000) Towards a ‘greater degree of intergration’: the Society for the 
Study of Speciation 1939-1941. The British Journal for the History of Science, 33: 85-108] Although, 
as Cain acknowledges, it was too short lived to ‘merit a claim for major impact within the 
community’ (Cain, J. 2000 p.85), I would still argue that it demonstrates early boundary work by the 
key architects of the synthesis. They later succeeded in forming a more successful society to 
consolidate their efforts in the form of the Committee on Common Problems in Genetics and 
Paleontology (see below).
380 Cain, J. (1993)
381 Huxley, J. (1942) p.13
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removal of Lamarckism is not a consideration o f ‘space’ as Dobzhansky proposed in 
1937, nor is it a part of an emergent agenda that has to be clarified (as is the 
inference of Dobzhansky’s justification of omission). In Huxley’s treatment, the tacit 
omission of Lamarckian theory reflects a tenet of the new movement he has named. 
This shift towards the obfuscation of Lamarckism as an opposition to Darwinism 
would later contribute to the historical appearance of Darwinian triumph over 
Lamarckism. This approach implies that no further debate of the conflict between 
Lamarckism and Darwinism is required. Following Dobzhansky’s recommendations 
regarding ‘space’, Huxley simply says: ‘Nor need I go in detail through the 
wearisome discussion of the various scientific ‘proofs’ of Lamarckian inheritance 
that have been advanced.’382 In terms of his boundary work strategy, Dobzhansky 
had found a recruit in Huxley.
Ernst Mavr and Systematics and the Origin o f  Species (1942)
During the 1940s much of the increase in the disciplinary authority of 
Darwinism resulted from the success of the early authors, such as Dobzhansky, in 
the recruitment of vocal supporters. The publication of Ernst Mayr’s Systematics and 
the Origin o f  Species (1942)383 provides an example of this vital early recruitment. 
Mayr’s career began in his native Germany, with his first publication appearing in 
1923. His early papers appeared in German and were exclusively focussed on 
ornithology. Mayr was primarily a field investigator and the majority of his pre- 
1930s papers report fieldwork expeditions. Mayr’s classifications were grounded in 
taxonomy. In the context of his practical work in field biology ‘species’ for Mayr 
were a unit manifest in taxonomic difference rather than a theoretically problematic 
grouping per se. Mayr carried out his research without recourse to a theory of 
genetics, and as such represented the genetics versus naturalist divide. In 1936, as 
Dobzhansky prepared Genetics and the Origin o f  Species for publication, Mayr 
attended Dobzhansky’s Columbia lectures and was impressed by the notion of
382 Huxley, J. (1942) p.458
383 Mayr, E. (1942) Systematics and the origin of species. Columbia University Press, New York.
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uniting geneticists and naturalists.384 Mayr began to collect reprints of basic genetics 
publications and sought to teach himself this aspect of biological science. During this 
phase of intellectual development Mayr was encouraged and guided by frequent 
correspondence with Dobzhansky, with whom he shared a growing association.385 In 
the late 1930s Mayr adopted Dobzhansky as his mentor, and after reading Genetics 
and the Origin o f  Species he became a disciple of the new programme for united 
biology. He reported that Dobzhansky’s 1937 text ‘delighted’ him.386
In 1939, Mayr published a paper on sex ratios in birds (Mayr, 1939), putting 
into practice for the first time the genetics skills he had accumulated. Meanwhile, 
Dobzhansky moved to the Columbia zoology department, putting Mayr and himself 
together in New York.387 Mayr also began to attend the Cold Spring Harbour 
Symposia, which at the time represented the United States’ premier genetics 
meetings.388 By 1943 Mayr had begun his own genetics research using Drosophila, 
with plans to extend his studies to pigeon stocks, as a way of bringing his new skills 
back to bear on his passion of ornithology. As he made this transition towards 
genetics, Mayr was also being recruited to Dobzhansky’s synthesis programme. He 
was becoming a Darwinian, and following the programme Dobzhansky had laid out 
in Genetics and the Origin o f  Species. Mayr’s intellectual transition was exemplified 
in his 1942 publication, Systematics and the Origin o f  Species. The introduction to 
that text was provided by Dobzhansky, in which he states:
‘During the last decade the conclusions reached by many of the specialists have 
begun to converge towards a set of general principles applicable to the entire realm 
of living matter. One can only hope that this will occur in increasing measure in the 
future. Biology, it seems, is no longer in its childhood, as a science, it is approaching 
its maturity.’389
384 Cain, J. (2002) Epistemic and community transition in American evolutionary studies: the 
‘Committee on Common Problems in Genetics, Paleontology and Systematics’ (1942-1949). Studies 
in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 33: 283-313.
385 Cain, J. (2002)
386 Mayr, E. (1980a) How I became a Darwinian. In: E. Mayr & W. Provine (Eds) (1980)
387 Cain, J. (1993)
388 Cain, J. (2002) Also between 1939 -1941 Mayr became involved alongside Dobzhansky and 
Huxley in an attempt to form the Society for the Study of Speciation. See Cain, J. (2000) and footnote 
46 of this text.
389 Dobzhansky, T. (1942) Introduction. In: Mayr, E. (1942) Systematics and the origin of species.
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For Dobzhansky, this maturity was an outcome of the unification that he had 
advocated. In writing this introduction Dobzhansky identified Mayr as one of the 
group of specialists who have begun to forge unification; the unifying principle 
being the broad application of Darwinian theory to biological research. Dobzhansky 
effectively acknowledged Mayr’s recruitment in that introduction, identifying him as 
an ally in the programme for authority extension. As Cain has put it: ‘In Mayr,
- lg n
Dobzhansky knew he had a bulldog’.
On Mayr’s part, the title of his book acts as a signal of his joining the 
movement; Dobzhansky wrote Genetics and the Origin o f  Species (1937) and five 
years later his disciple Mayr added Systematics and the Origin o f  the Species (1942). 
In Mayr’s preface he asserts the link more vocally, stating:
‘I am indeed indebted to Th. Dobzhansky [...], who aided in countless ways in the 
preparation of the manuscript and who encouraged and inspired me throughout.’391
By 1942 Mayr had become one of the dedicated synthesis architects that were 
cohered at the Columbia zoology department. That group included Dobzhansky and 
Simpson. Since 1940, Mayr had ‘worked aggressively’ alongside them to 
construct ‘a common-problems research community in evolutionary studies and to 
establish themselves at that community’s centre’.
Despite Mayr’s location within the synthesis cohort at Columbia, and the 
appearance in his introduction that his recruitment is complete, the main text of 
Systematics and the Origin o f  the Species tells a slightly different story. Like 
Dobzhansky, Mayr refrains from discussion of Lamarckian alternatives to Darwinian 
evolutionary theory. In that regard he appears to have assumed the device that 
Dobzhansky recommended in 1937. However, in places, his earlier career as a 
naturalist marks his treatment. For example, Mayr states that:
Columbia University Press, New York, p.vii
390 Cain, J. (2002) p.295
391 Mayr, E. (1942) p.x
392 Cain (1993) has called this group the ‘New York Circle’.
393 Cain, J.( 1993) p. 10
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‘The opinion was formerly widespread among taxonomists (including even Darwin) 
that the germ plasm can react to the needs of the body.’394
And adds to this:
‘...it seems premature to assert with too much positiveness that all gene mutation is 
strictly random.’395
Irrespective of these occasional allusions to Lamarckian views, Mayr’s text overall 
represented a further forceful publication in favour of the synthesis programme. 
Despite his allusion to non-random mutation, Mayr does not go as far as to mention 
Lamarckism. As Burkhardt puts it: ‘...Mayr did not even bother to reject 
Lamarckism...he simply did not refer to it.’ In that sense, Mayr’s approach 
follows Dobzhansky’s strategy.
In subsequent years Mayr gained further influence as a member of the 
synthesis movement, especially through his role in the Committee on Common 
Problems in Genetics, Palaeontology and Systematics (discussed below). His 
dedication to Darwinism became more refined and despite his early concerns 
(reflected to a degree in his 1942 publication) he became one of the most enduring 
and ardent advocates of Darwinism in the twentieth centuiy. Certainly, Mayr was a 
valuable early recruit to the movement for synthesis and to the authority struggle that 
had begun.
George Gaylord Simpson and Tempo and Mode in Evolution (1944)
In 1944 Simpson published Tempo and Mode in Evolution?91 In that text, he 
allied himself with the synthesis movement and attempted to contribute hard 
theoretical material to the programme that Dobzhansky and Huxley had begun. 
Walter Fitch and Fransisco Ayala have examined Simpson’s motivation, and state
394 Mayr, E. (1942) p. 67
395 Mayr, E. (1942) p. 68
396 Burkhardt, R. (1980) Lamarckism in Britain and the United States. In: E. Mayr & W. Provine 
(Eds.) The evolutionary synthesis. Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, p.349
397 Simpson, G. (1944) Tempo and mode in evolution. Columbia University Press, New York.
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that he authored his 1944 work self-consciously in the wake of the Dobzhansky’s 
1937 text, acknowledging its influence on his own work, saying that: it ‘profoundly 
changed my whole outlook’.398,399 He not only shared Dobzhansky’s aim of uniting 
genetics with natural selection, but also subscribed to the principle of Darwinian 
unification that Dobzhansky had advocated. Simpson had been a Darwinian 
enthusiast since his college days, and had ‘found in Darwin a point of view, a 
philosophical stance, that resonated with his own.’400
Fitch and Ayala are keen to indicate that, much of the success of 
Dobzhansky’s Genetics and the Origin o f  Species had been his success at writing 
‘...in prose that biologists could understand.’401 Simpson’s Tempo and Mode in 
Evolution added rigour to this with its technical account of evolutionary dynamics. 
In the introduction Simpson emphasised the merit of a theoretical and technical 
approach to synthesis, stating that:
‘Facts are useless to science unless they are understood. They are to be understood 
only by theoretical interpretation...The one merit that is claimed for this study is that 
it suggests new ways of looking at facts and new sorts of facts to look for.’402
In this statement Simpson reasserts the value of using a theoretical programme 
(Darwinism in this case), both for better understanding existing work, and for 
achieving learning in the future.
Simpson’s approach to Lamarckism in this text is very much in line with 
Dobzhansky’s recommendation. Firstly, Simpson barely mentions Lamarckian 
theory at all. When he does address the issue he states briefly that:
‘Experiments in the present century.. .not only have failed to corroborate that there is
398 Fitch, W. & Ayala, F. (Eds.) (1995) Tempo and mode in evolution: genetics and paleontology 50 
years after Simpson. National Academies Press, p.iii
399 Cain, J (1993) has attributed Simpson, and Mayr’s contributions to synthesis in part to their 
professional interests. In that reading, Simpson ‘self-consciously authored in the wake of 
Dobzhansky’ (as did Mayr) to ensure that their specialisms be included in the powerful new synthesis. 
They wanted to ensure the future of Paleontology and Systematics respectively. Therefore, part of 
their boundary work was in service to disciplinary interests.
400 Laporte, L. (1990) The world into which Darwin led Simpson. Journal of the History of Biology, 
23(3): 499-516.
401 Fitch, W. & Ayala, F. (Eds.) (1995) p.iv
402 Simpson, G. (1944) p.xviii
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such a process [as Lamarckian evolution] but also have shown that it is highly 
improbable if not impossible.’403
As historian Richard Burkhardt observes: in Simpson’s analysis ‘Lamarckism was 
not so much disproved as discarded’.404 True to Dobzhansky’s boundary work 
strategy, Simpson pursues synthesis, advocating Darwinism, while omitting 
Lamarckism.
These contributions from the primary architects of the synthetic programme 
highlight key points of interest in this early period. Firstly, we see that a vital initial 
step towards synthetic theory was the establishment of an agenda and associated 
programme for authorship. Dobzhansky (1937), and subsequently Huxley (1942), 
achieved this through the publication of simple, yet forceful and influential, texts. 
Secondly, we see how this programme began to be translated into a broader project, 
as first a new and vocal author is recruited (Mayr) and second, complexity is added 
back by Simpson (1944). Historically, these examples are not isolated contributions 
from these authors. Each of these authors made other contributions in the period, 
both to the synthetic approach and also in their individual fields. Also, of course, 
many other authors contributed to the early synthesis period.
The selection of texts described above serves to expose tenets of the 
emerging modem synthetic programme, illustrating the boundary work activities that 
had begun to drive towards Darwinian monopoly. As a pragmatic device of the 
unificationists’ a certain approach to the presentation of Darwinism and Lamarckism 
emerged. Dobzhansky made that approach explicit in his 1937 text, and Huxley, 
Mayr and Simpson followed his recommendations -  to broadly apply Darwinism 
‘assertively’ and ‘dogmatically’ whilst excluding alternative theories, namely 
Lamarckism. An identity of Darwinism and Lamarckism began to emerge that would 
later inform the old map of Darwinian authority.
The next phase of Darwinian expansion involved the spread of the synthesis 
programme and its attached authorial approach through further recmitment and 
publicity. In this phase of scale change we see the importance of the move away
403 Simpson, G. (1944)
404 Burkhardt, R. (1998) p.349
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from individual authorship, and the trend towards a growth in authority under the 
auspices of larger associations and communities.
3.1.2: The growth of the synthetic movement
As Huxley’s Evolution: The Modern Synthesis was being printed (1942) and 
reprinted (1943) a further consolidation of the new movement was occurring. On the 
6th of February 1943 the US National Academy of Science ‘Committee on Common 
Problems of Genetics and Palaeontology’ (CCP) was established.405,406 This 
committee was a joint body set up by the Division of Geology and Geography and 
the Division of Biology and Agriculture of the National Research Council (NRC).407 
The CCP’s core membership was largely comprised of architects of the modem 
synthesis.408 Simpson and Dobzhansky had worked together since 1941 to press the 
NRC to set up the committee 409 The formation of this committee was an important 
act of boundary work; it consolidated the synthesis programme, and was a powerful 
tool for the recmitment and scale change that monopoly required.
The stated aim of the CCP was to forge links between sub-disciplines, 
eliminating the problematic divisions that Dobzhansky, Huxley and Mayr had 
highlighted. In particular, the committee was purposed to bring paleontologists, who 
had feared being left behind as the wave of experimentalism swept away the less 
desirable field and museum sciences, in line with the synthesis programme. 
Simpson, along with fellow paleontologists Horace Wood and Glenn Jepsen had 
acted to ensure their specialism’s inclusion in the CCP project.410
^Although the CCP was not the only committee established in the late 1930s and early 1940s as part 
of the synthesis project, its endurance and increasing support make it the most relevant example to 
this narrative of increasing intellectual authority, (see also footnote 45)
406 After 1944 the committee was renamed ‘The Committee on Common Problems in Genetics, 
Paleontology and Systematics’. Cain, J. (1993)
407 Jepsen, G., Simpson, G. & Mayr, E. (Eds.) (1949) Genetics, paleontology and evolution. Princeton 
University Press, New Jersey.
408 Of particular note: The committees divisional chairmen were: Theodosius Dobzhansky (section on 
genetics), Ernst Mayr (section on systematics), G. Ledyard Stebbins (Vice-Chairman Western Group) 
and George Gaylord Simpson (overall chairman) [Jepsen G., Simpson, G. & Mayr, E. (Eds.) (1949) 
p.xi].
409 Cain, J. (1993)
4,0 Cain, J. (2002)
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The materials generated by this committee aimed to emphasise the links 
between sub-disciplines, and to subject the work of disparate groups to Darwinian 
theory;411 effectively Dobzhansky’s 1937 recommendations in action. This approach 
brought the work of ecologists, systematists, field naturalists and geneticists within 
the remit of the modem synthesis, and thus by definition, into the remit of 
Darwinism. Cain suggests that the real work of this period can be considered to have 
been the development of a new ‘epistemic community’412; an activity that 
underwrites the architects’ bid for increased disciplinary authority and reinforces 
their boundary work. In service to that new epistemic community the CCP acted as a 
tool for ‘assisting the transition of recmits into the fold and for pressing further with 
the harvest of new fruits’ 413 Boundary work for expansion had started to take effect.
This committee was intended as a temporary alliance of interested 
individuals with the goal of carrying out the problematic, but apparently necessary, 
unification of the biological sciences. The committee remained active despite 
wartime conditions, and bulletins of correspondence ensured its survival414 Ernst 
Mayr edited these bulletins, and thus acquired a powerful forum for the deployment 
of his own growing Darwinian agenda. As Cain has put it: ‘Mayr was an aggressive 
and invasive editor: prompting queries, recruiting additional materials, instigating 
interaction.’415 The CCP galvanised and deployed the synthesis programme, and as 
Cain had pointed out: ‘bulletin correspondence often articulated a community 
identity and helped define shared beliefs’.416
The architects of the synthesis continued to press for expansion. In 1944 
Simpson had returned from war, wanting to make changes at the CCP and extend its 
influence.417 Cain has noted of the architects that: ‘...seeking organisational 
expansion, they signalled a desire to raise their project to a level comparable with
411 The largest collection of these papers appears in: Jepsen, G., Simpson, G. & Mayr, E. (Eds.) 
(1949)
412 Cain, J. (2002) Epistemic communities have been described by Knorr Cetina [Knorr Cetina, K. 
(1999) Epistemic cultures: how the sciences make knowledge. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
MA.]
4,3 Cain, J. (2002) p.309
414 Jepsen, G., Simpson, G. & Mayr, E. (Eds.) (1949)
415 Cain, J. (2002) p. 304
416 Cain, J. (1993) p. 12
417 Cain, J. (1993)
-146-
other well-established ventures in biology’.418 The architects were pressing for 
disciplinary authority as part of their boundary work for expansion. Their individual 
interests had been served through the CCP, and systematics and paleontology had a 
more secure place in the synthesis, as Mayr and Simpson had been keen to ensure. 
Through the CCP the scale of the synthesis movement had been increased, and its 
influence extended. Cain suggests that: ‘The CCP seems ideally described as an 
incipient moment in the expansion of this community...a foothold for efforts 
towards a professional society and journal’.419 The 1947 Princeton conference that 
would conclude the work of the CCP ‘acted as a kind of debutants’ ball for the 
epistemic community’.420 That community was now ready to deploy its epistemic 
approach more widely. The next stage for the Darwinians was to push for more 
authority within science, and across the cultural cartography.
The work of the CCP was summarised in a 1947 meeting at Princeton, and 
the committee’s recommendations and outcomes were published in 1948421 and 
1949422. This meeting, and the publications it generated, is often cited as the 
completion of the terms and content of the modem synthesis. It also marks the 
achievement of consensus within biology regarding the increased authority of 
Darwinism. In Mayr’s discussion of the 1947 meeting he remarks that: ‘...it was 
almost impossible to get a controversy going, so far reaching was the basic 
agreement among the participants.’423 He adds that: ‘It was not that the synthesis was 
hammered out during the Princeton conference -  rather, the conference constitutes 
the most convincing documentation that a synthesis had occurred during the previous 
decade.’424
The conference can also be viewed as the completion of the first phase of the 
boundary work that would ultimately create the old map of the authority of 
Darwinism. In the period 1937-1947 the foundations of Darwinian monopoly had
418 Cain, J. (1993) p. 13
419 Cain, J. (2002) p.309
420 Cain, J. (2002) p.309
421 Jepsen, G. (1948) Genetics, paleontology, and evolution. Princeton University Press, Princeton,
NJ.
422 Jepsen, G., Simpson, G. & Mayr, E. (Eds.) (1949) Genetics, paleontology, and evolution.
Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
423 Mayr, E. (1980a) Prologue: some thoughts on the history of the evolutionary synthesis. In: Mayr 
& Pro vine, (Eds.)(1980) p.42
424 Mayr, E. (1980a) p.42
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been laid; the merit of Darwinism had been asserted, Lamarckism had been extracted 
as an opposition, and the ‘modem synthesis’ had become ‘evolutionary biology’. 
That had been achieved through a handful of canonical texts, the bulletins of the 
CCP, and recmitment under the auspices of the CCP. An appearance of Darwinian 
predominance, and a ratifying historical account of the accomplishment of that 
predominance, had been set in place. The message of the architects of the synthesis 
was established and already being disseminated in their publications; they had 
created what Knorr-Cetina would call an ‘epsitemic community’.425
The committee’s collected works in Genetics, Palaeontology and Evolution 
(1949) highlight the broad utility of Darwinism across the biological sciences. They 
do not refer to alternative evolutionary theories in detail. Lamarckism receives barely 
a mention amongst the 23 papers that comprise the volume. This omission reflects 
Dobzhansky’s recommendation; that Lamarckism should be omitted due to 
considerations of ‘ spacev. Adherence to that approach was perhaps ensured by the 
fact that Dobzhansky was one of the chairmen of the committee.
The status of Dobzhansky and other of the synthesis architects within the 
CCP illustrates how, through leadership, the personal agendas of some individuals 
became reflected in the broader ideology of this group of theorists. We see how a 
few individuals, dedicated to the promotion of Darwinism, and extraction of 
Lamarckian opposition, were able to use their roles within the CCP for the 
deployment of their agenda to a wider audience. The boundary work of a few 
individuals was translated to become the strategy adopted across biology as various 
interest groups jostled for increased authority. The formation of the CCP made the 
increase in scale of the synthesis movement official, and provided a context for the 
recruitment and training of new members.
In March 1946, a new society had been formed from the committee to ensure 
that what begun as a temporary programme for reform would have longer-term 
influence in the development of evolutionary biology. The original committee had 
aimed to solve an apparently immediate problem for the future of evolutionary
425 See: Knorr Cetina, K. (1999) Cetina’s epistemic communities share methodology, and use the 
same tools and language. They have common standards, and approach their work in a particular way. 
In the strong version, the epistemic community shapes the understandings and identities of its 
members. This provides an apt description of the community that emerged in the wake of the CCP.
-148-
biology (the division of disciplines), and the new society took over once the 
programme extended in scope from problem-solving to the management of the new 
evolutionary programme that arose from unification. The new society was named 
‘The Society for the Study of Evolution’ (SSE), and a grant from the American 
Philosophical Society ensured its permanence. After lobbying by Huxley the journal 
Evolution was established to present the society’s work, and its first edition appeared 
in 1947 with Mayr as editor.426 What had started as a programme for unification, had 
grown into evolutionary biology. The modem synthesis became a comer stone of the 
biological sciences, and thus so too was Darwinian theory. Boundary work for the 
expansion of the authority attached to Darwinian theory had become boundary work 
for the monopolization of evolutionary biology.
The SSE had not been formed by the broad community of individuals 
working on evolutionary problems in the period, but rather by a discrete partisan 
group with a defined goal of promoting Darwinian theory and eliminating 
Lamarckian debate. The SSE became their permanent manifestation. With this 
transition, what had been the agenda of a small group of unificationists had become 
the agenda of the dominant movement in evolutionary biology. As Cain has noted: 
‘Effectively in control of the SSE and fairly clear about the sort of work that 
interested them, members of the New York Circle were able to define a mainstream 
in American evolutionary studies largely based on their own interests.’427 The effect 
of this was to render Darwinism the primary theory of evolution, carried to 
dominance by the advocacy of a group that had become hugely influential and had 
undergone significant scale change. In addition, the neglect of Lamarckism, which 
had been enforced through the agenda of this group, became a status quo in 
evolutionary biology.
Thus, influence and voice of a handful of key individuals was first enhanced 
by their cohesion as the CCP, and later increased by their self-styling as the 
mainstream of evolutionary biology (as the SEE). The architects of the synthesis had 
won and constructed authority for their movement. The naming of the new 
committee as the society for the ‘evolution’ was a powerful rhetorical device
426 Cain, J. (1993)
427 Cain, J. (1993) p. 23
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implying their monopoly of the cultural authority available in evolutionary biology. 
Implied authority can be an important boundary work device.
Meanwhile, subsequent to the formation of the SSE some of the individual 
architects of the synthesis continued to press for expansion across the cultural 
cartography. Bowler has noted that some authors attempted to ‘extend the new 
Darwinism into a general world view’. In particular, Simpson (1949) and Huxley 
(1953) offered texts that were intended to ‘go beyond the technical details of the 
theory into a broader vision of the nature and purpose of life’.428
It is useful to consider the increase in scale and extension of authority of the 
synthesis agents in the terms of some established models o f group activity in science. 
Highlighting scale changes within the synthesis movement throughout the 1930s, 
1940s and 1950s reveals the extension of intellectual and cultural authority that was 
achieved. In particular, the increasing membership of the synthesis group indicates 
how a change in scale was able to confer the increase in authority that allowed the 
synthesis group to achieve monopoly. Also, consideration of the leadership structure 
within this growing group indicates how the agendas of a few individuals from the 
1930s and early 1940s period were able to achieve widespread influence. Collins’ 
‘core-set’ theory is perhaps the most useful tool for exploring these dynamics 429
In the case of the early synthesis authors, the designation ‘core-set’ reflects 
the intemational/multi-institutional composition of the group and the discrete nature 
of their intellectual programme. In the late 1930s and early 1940s context of 
disciplinary divide these individuals undertook a cohesive, forceful assertion of the 
authority of Darwinism. Collins’ methodology describes grouping during 
controversial episodes, and using it to describe the synthesis group reminds us that 
their early work was indeed contentious. Their strong advocacy of Darwinism 
emerged in a context of Darwinian eclipse; they were attempting to resurrect a 
theoretical approach that many researchers had abandoned. The controversial nature 
of this programme is even more apparent when we consider that Neo-Lamarckism
428 Bowler, P. (1983) p.325 [and see: Simpson, G. (1949) The meaning of evolution. Yale University 
Press, New Haven; Huxley, J. (1953) Evolution in action: based on the Pattern Foundation Lectures 
delivered at Indiana state University in 1951. Chatto & Windus, London.]
429 See Collins, H. (1981b); Collins, H. (1985). The core-set is introduced in this project in Chapter 2.
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had gained support and authority during the period of the eclipse and was in fact 
being used by perhaps the majority of evolutionary theorists.
Core-set terminology enables description of the response of the broader 
scientific community to the early work of the synthesis authors. In the initial phase 
the scientific community are interested on-lookers, who follow the debate and wait 
for the core-set scientists to negotiate the controversial issue.430 These individuals 
are the consumers of the first wave of texts produced by the core-set (i.e. 
Dobzhansky, 1937; Huxley, 1942; Mayr, 1942; Simpson, 1944). During the 
formation of the CCP we see the core-set grow as further key participants are 
recruited from this body of on-lookers. This phase of recruitment represents the first 
change of scale of the synthesis programme. This increase in scale conferred 
legitimacy and increased cultural authority; the core-set’s initially small esoteric 
circle had been expanded by subscription. This activity is anticipated in core-set 
situations and follows the pattern predicted in Collins’ Empirical Programme of 
Relativism (EPOR).431
Phase one of Collins’ EPOR examines the processes whereby the core-set 
presents new work to the broader community. This new work represents the 
‘interpretive flexibility of scientific knowledge’ and shows that ‘different 
interpretations of the natural world are available to different scientific actors’.432 
Phase two of the EPOR seeks to explain the processes by which the community 
considers how this new work might be integrated with existing theory, and considers 
how any contentious element of that work might be resolved by use of closure 
tactics. The architects’ canonical works, and the setting up of the CCP in 1943, 
exemplify these two phases of activity respectively. Collins’ EPOR describes how, 
during phase two, the mainstream community effectively decides whether new 
information/interpretations will be rejected or accepted. Interestingly, in the case of 
the Darwinian synthesis, the body set up to cany out those phase 2 tasks was largely 
comprised o f the very authors of the new approach -  a sure tactic to achieve 
acceptance.
430 Pinch, T. (1990)
431 Collins, H. (1981a); Collins, H. (1983) An empirical relativist program in the sociology of 
scientific knowledge. In: K. Knorr-Cetina & M. Mulkay (Eds.) Science observed: perspectives on the 
social study o f science. Sage publications, London.
432 Pinch, T. (1990) p.92
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Phase three considers the process by which acceptance of contentious 
material results in broad uptake by the mainstream scientific community. In Collins’ 
model this final stage also takes into account the cultural context of the scientific 
community, which in part informs the likelihood of any such uptake. Collins 
suggests we should account for the impact of the wider cultural context on those 
processes by which consensus is reached within the scientific community, which I 
move on to do below.433 In section 3.1.3 I describe how the synthesis authors 
achieved this phase of the EPOR.
In the case of the synthesis movement, the application of the EPOR reveals 
the fascinating way in which the synthesis authors achieved increased authority. 
Choices concerning the achievement of consensus, and the integration of new 
interpretations of the natural world, might be expected to rest with the mainstream, 
since this is the perceived site of intellectual power and cultural authority. However, 
in the case of the synthesis group, their gradual increase in scale and power allowed 
their activity to subvert this standard centre versus periphery expectation. The 
original core-set had moved closer to the centre by merit of gradual subscription 
from the mainstream. The final act of integration was affected not by the choice of 
the broader community, but rather by the self-redefinition of the group. In 1946, the 
group renamed themselves the Society for the Study of Evolution434, and through 
this device not only integrated themselves into the mainstream, but in fact redefined 
themselves as the mainstream. Thanks to their union of individually powerful 
supporters, and funding from the American Philosophical Society, the original core­
set and their new supporters had affected an intellectual coup.
The means by which this transition was achieved is clarified if we consider 
the core-set in light of actor-network theory.435 Mike Michael and Lynda Birke have 
described how scientists engage actively in constructing the core-set (and thus a
433 Pinch, T. (1990)
434 Jepsen, G., Simpson, G. & Mayr, E. (Eds.) (1949)
435 Actor-Network theory was largely developed as a result of: Callon, M.(1986) Some elements of a 
sociology of translation: domestication of the scallops and fishermen of St. Brieuc Bay. In: J. Law 
(Ed.) Power, action and belief. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.; Latour, B. (1987) and Law, 
J.(1987) Technology and heterogenous engineering: the case of the Portuguese expansion. In: W. 
Bijker, T. Hughes & T. Pinch (Eds.) The construction of technological systems: new directions in the 
sociology and history o f technology. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusettes.
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network), by enrolling certain actors over others, in service to their agenda.436 Those 
actors can be human or non-human, and they can be excluded from or included in a 
network in order to serve certain purposes. Michael and Birke suggest that scientists 
must interpose themselves between the target entity and its pre-existing associations, 
thus creating it anew as an actor in each engagement.
This process of enrolling entities is an ideal way to view the synthesis 
architects’ actions as core-set members. In that case, they enrolled an image of 
Lamarck and an image of Darwin and Darwinism as actors attached to their core-set. 
They created those images from scratch, stripping them of their association to a 
protracted, complex and less-polarised history. They also enrolled the grouping tools 
of societies, and later the ‘public’ (during the centennial, as I describe below). Their 
construction of those actors served their interest of creating a stronger and larger 
network. Michael and Birke suggest that a stable network is one in which all the 
actors are managed effectively to contribute to a goal. In the case of the synthesis 
authors, and their management of the actors they enrolled, we see an excellent 
example of that kind of management to achieve a goal.
The next section seeks the mode of deployment of the intellectual and 
ideological tenets that had been set in place during the formulation of the modem 
synthesis, tracing the extension of Darwinian intellectual authority through cultural 
enforcement, network extension and phase 3 of Collins’ EPOR.
3.1.3: The deployment of the synthetic approach and Darwinian triumphalism: 
boundary work at the Darwin Centennial
Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 describe how the advocates of Darwinism 
progressively won authority in the intellectual context during the 1940s. By the 
1950s their original minority endeavour had come to represent mainstream 
evolutionary biology. This section describes how the group affected a further 
dramatic increase of scale, extending their influence beyond the scientific 
community. In this section, the period of the Darwinian centennial (1958/1959) is 
discussed to illuminate how the synthesis group won cultural authority and
436 Michael, M. & Birke, L. (1994) Enrolling the core-set: the case of the animal experimentation 
controversy. Social Studies of Science, 24(1): 81-95.
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completed their boundary work objectives. This section describes how cultural 
authority validated the old map of Darwinism.
The Darwin centennial in 1959437 served several functions for the architects 
of the modem synthesis. The provident timing of this anniversary provided them 
with an excellent opportunity to affect a timely assertion, extension and deployment 
of the authority they had gained since the late 1930s. The notion of Darwinian 
triumph had been used as a key rhetorical device in the extension of authority during 
the 1940s. The centennial celebration provided an opportunity for these authors to 
reinforce and further disseminate the triumphant identity of Darwin and Darwinism.
The centennial celebration provided the opportunity to continue cohering 
and extending the intellectual programme of the synthesis gang. Opportunities to 
physically regroup and discuss new developments were important for the 
advancement of the modem synthetic approach. In addition, the more informal, less 
intellectually charged element of the centennial meetings, i.e. the celebration by non­
professionals of Darwin as a scientific hero, provided a promotional opportunity.
The University of Chicago Darwin Centennial Celebration (November 1959) 
provides the best example of how this event was commandeered by certain 
individuals, institutions and communities to serve specific functions and suit various 
agendas. That celebration manifest boundary work with two functions: First, the 
coherence, reinforcement and extension of the intellectual authority of Darwinian 
evolutionary theory. Second, the extension of cultural authority, such that Darwinism 
would attain further authority in relation to other adjacent areas of expertise and 
would achieve authority in the public awareness.438
The University of Chicago began planning its centennial in 1955, with 
resident anthropologist Sol Tax as chief organiser.439 Tax was assisted in his
437 In this discussion I refer to 1959 as the year of the Darwin centennial. This is based upon the 
selection of that year (100 years since die publication of die Origin of Species) for die celebration at 
Chicago University. It should be noted that other groups, notably many in the UK, chose to celebrate 
the centennial in 1958 to mark one hundred years since the reading of Darwin and Wallace’s joint 
paper on natural selection at the Royal Society [Smocovitis, V. (1999) The 1959 Darwin centennial 
celebration in America. Osiris, 2nd Series, 14: 274-323]
438 Asserting authority to those outside the immediate intellectual community was important.
Territories are agreed, and cultural authority is allocated, through negotiation with those who share 
your boundaries. It is no use to say that you have all the authority if nobody agrees.
439 Smocovitis, V. (1999)
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planning by key members of the Society for the Study of Evolution.440 In fact, the 
role of the SSE in planning and contributing to so many of the worldwide centennial 
celebrations was so marked that its president, Edgar Anderson, began to suffer stress 
and exhaustion related illness. Upon finally attending the Chicago Celebration in 
1959, after so much hard work in the planning phase, Anderson reported that the 
event and its speakers ‘got him so excited that they eventually ‘did him in”.441 
Anderson was subsequently hospitalised for three weeks.442 The synthesis supporters 
had again positioned themselves to maximise their influence. Their heavy 
involvement with the organisation of the celebrations meant that their agenda was 
carried forward and deployed in new contexts, just as it had been when the CCP and 
SSE were established.
One of the earliest Chicago centennial organisational tasks, carried out in 
1956, was the recruitment of about fifty scientists as contributors to the planned 
centennial event.443 A series of themes for discussion were agreed upon and during 
1957 and 1958 the chosen authors individually prepared papers that would later be 
collected as a published report of the meeting. For the meeting itself, the authors 
would split into groups and hold topic based panel discussions with the public.444 
The aim overall appears to have been to effect a ‘live’ version of the task that 
Dobzhansky had begun in 1937 when he published Genetics and the Origin o f  
Species', to subject issues related to evolution to the analytical and descriptive power 
of Darwinism.
The conference began on November 24th, 1959 and ended November 28th in 
time for the Thanksgiving holiday. At least 2,500 people registered to attend, along 
with the 250 delegates, representing 189 colleges, societies and institutes who 
presented material at the event.445 Historian Vassiliki Smocovitis describes this event 
as: ‘five days of scientific discussions, pageantry, ritual and theatrical spectacle’.446
440 Tax describes the organization of the Chicago centennial in: Tax, S. (1960a) Introduction. In: S. 
Tax (Ed.) Evolution after Darwin, Volume 1: the evolution of life. University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago.
441 Smocovitis, V. (1999) p. 277
442 Smocovitis, V. (1999)
443 Tax, S. (1960a)
444 Tax, S. (1960a)
445 Smocovitis, V. (1999)
446 Smocovitis, V. (1999) p. 278
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What was the boundary work function of the centennial celebrations, and the 
Chicago meeting in particular? How did the centennial help extend the cultural 
authority of Darwinism? Smocovitis suggests numerous means by which 
celebrations of this type can be manipulated to serve such agendas within science. 
Several of the functions she identifies in the case of the Chicago Darwin Centennial 
are relevant to this discussion.
Firstly, Smocovitis identifies the apt timing of the Darwin centennial as a 
particular benefit to the authors of the modem synthesis at this juncture in their rise 
to authority. By the late 1940s the synthesis architects had established their 
endeavour as a ‘new discipline with a self-aware community of individuals who 
identified themselves as ‘evolutionary biologists”.447 Thus, they had attained 
authority within the intellectual and academic community. The timing of the 
centennial provided them with an opportunity to consolidate and extend that 
influence. As Smocovitis states:
‘The anniversary of the publication of the landmark work ushering in their field of 
interest was a well-timed opportunity to retell the life story of Charles Darwin, who 
was reinvented as the ‘founding father’ of their discipline. It also served as the 
perfect opportunity to establish once and for all - for wide audiences - the facility of 
evolution by natural selection.’448
A retelling of the history of Darwinism, particularly with the triumphant tone that 
this celebration inspired, was of vital importance to the synthesis group since ‘...so 
much o f what it meant to be a twentieth-century evolutionary biologist hinged on 
identification with the narrative of Darwin’s life and work’.449 To the non­
professional audience attracted by the centennial events the assertion of a triumphant 
Darwinian narrative, as a vindication and affirmation of the synthesis work, acted as 
a powerful tool for recruiting support. The story of a ‘founding father’ acted with a 
public relations service; history was being used to compound the identity and 
authority o f the new ‘evolutionary biologists’. Through the retelling of the narrative
447 Smocovitis, V. (1999) p. 279
448 Smocovitis, V. (1999) p. 279
449 Smocovitis, V. (1999) p.279
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of Darwin’s life and work he was constructed as both an icon of the ‘modem’ and of 
unified biology, and also as a cultural symbol of success and even genius in the 
science. History served boundary work; affirming the status and authority of 
Darwinism and suggesting that a legacy of ‘genius’ and triumph underlay that 
authority. The history of Charles Darwin’s own life and work was used to convey 
this sense to the public.
Historian Patricia Fara has described the process of the construction of 
scientific genius in relation to Issac Newton.450 Fara uses the case study of the 
construction of Newton’s genius in scientific and popular culture as a means by 
which to identify the traits of an individual that lend them to this treatment. The 
categories Fara identifies provide a useful tool for understanding the process by 
which Charles Darwin’s character and enterprise were reconstructed during the 
formulation of the modem synthesis and the centennial celebrations. Using her 
model we can explain the constmction of Darwin’s genius as boundary work 
purposed to extend the authority of Darwinism in the cultural domain. In particular, 
Julian Huxley’s contribution to the three-volume report of the Chicago Centennial 
provides a clear illustration of that project451
Fara says that the traditional ‘genius’ is generally set apart from society.452 In 
the retelling of Darwin’s life story during the centennial this theme was highlighted. 
Darwin’s isolation aboard the HMS Beagle, his self imposed seclusion in later life at 
his remote home at Downe House, the loneliness of his prolonged illnesses and the 
isolating guilt concerning his ‘secret’ research and theory all became themes.453 This 
image of genius often involves moments of epiphany or vision. In the case of 
Newton we are presented with the iconic image of his seeing a falling apple and 
identifying the force of gravity. The idea of moments of imagination is key to the 
traditional picture of genius, since it strips the subject from the context of a scientific 
community making them isolated in their endeavour. Julian Huxley’s centennial 
contribution highlights this theme in relation to Darwin, stating that:
450 Fara, P. (2002) Newton: the making of genius. Columbia University Press, New York.
451 See Huxley, J. (1960) The emergence of Darwinism. In: S. Tax (Ed.) Evolution after Darwin, 
Volume 1: the evolution of life. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
452 Fara, P. (2002)
453 Huxley, J. (1960) and Barlow, N. (Ed.) The autobiography of Charles Darwin. Collins, London.
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‘...late in 1938 he ‘happened to read for amusement Malthus on Population'...and 
the idea of natural selection immediately flashed upon him.’454
In addition, he emphasises the role of imagination in Darwin’s work, stating that:
‘Although his laborious patience in the collection and synthesis of factual evidence 
has rarely been rivalled...yet sudden intuition was responsible for some of his most 
important discoveries of principle, notably natural selection and the explanation of 
biological divergence...’ 455
Also, Fara states that a genius must manifest an internal creative urge and passion.456 
Again, Darwin’s life story supports this requirement. We hear how Darwin strived to 
develop his theory over many years, not wanting to publish until he had perfected the 
work. He was tormented by the theological implications of his work, and yet was 
driven by an urge to produce a theory. In the Chicago Centennial publications Julian 
Huxley says of Darwin that: ‘he had an inborn passion for natural history...’ and 
that:
‘Another characteristic of Darwin was his extraordinary diffidence, coupled with a 
passion for completeness and a reluctance, so extreme as to appear almost 
pathological, to publish to the world his ideas on the controversial subject of 
evolution before he had buttressed his arguments with a body of evidence which 
would overwhelm opposition by its sheer vastness.’457
Huxley also speaks of Darwin’s ‘constant ill health’ and ‘neurotic symptoms 
springing from unconscious conflict or emotional tension’ 458 Reference to these 
aspects of Darwin’s personality reinforces the notion of his passion; his dedication 
was so profound as to permeate his mental state and cause his health to deteriorate.
454 Huxley, J. (1960) p.5
455 Huxley, J. (1960) p.5
456 Fara, P. (2002)
457 Huxley, J. (1960) p.2-3
458 Huxley, J. (1960) p.3
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Attention to these details also fosters the Romantic image of Darwin as a man 
‘tortured’ by his art, a popular theme in the creation of images of genius.
Fara describes the traditional genius as an individual constructed almost as a 
religious icon, or whose work appears to have the presence of religious ideology.459 
The story of Darwin’s endeavour lends itself to this construction. Darwin himself 
was well aware of the conflict of his theory with religious doctrine. His work was 
received as a challenge to established theology. So, rhetoric arises defining Darwin 
as a force in the progressive secularisation of society. Darwin’s theory strips God 
from nature and by that act his work replaces theology. In the Chicago centennial 
publication, Huxley highlights this aspect of Darwin’s endeavour, quoting from a 
1844 letter (from Darwin to Hooker) Darwin’s confession that: ‘to assert that species 
are not immutable is ‘like confessing to a murder’!’.460 Huxley emphasises Darwin’s 
guilt, using the evidence of his delay of publication to highlight the conflict between 
his work and theology. Not only does this imply that Darwin’s work took on a 
significance akin to religious doctrine as it became accepted in the twentieth century, 
but also this rhetoric serves the additional function of presenting Darwin as a true 
revolutionary in a time ill-prepared for his contribution.
In addition to these inferences of scientific genius there are some more 
insistent statements on Darwin’s genius. For example, in the Chicago Centennial 
publication, Julian Huxley says of Darwin’s contribution to evolutionary work that: ‘ 
...he also contributed far more than Wallace, or indeed than any other man, to the 
solution of the problem and the development of the subject.’461 He goes on to say: 
‘Charles Darwin has rightly been described as the ‘Newton of Biology’... \ 462
Huxley also indicates that even as he wrote this account of Darwin’s life for 
the centennial collection he was mindful of a programme for the construction of 
genius and was self-aware of his role as an agent of that construction. He refers to 
Kroeber, who had written on the anatomy of genius, stating that:
‘Kroeber has demonstrated that the effective manifestation of genius requires not
45V Fara, P. (2002)
460 Huxley, J. (1960) p.4
461 Huxley, J. (1960) p.l
462 Huxley, J. (1960) p.l
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only an exceptional individual talent, but depends also on the circumstances and 
sometimes accidents of place and period; nowhere is this better illustrated than in the 
person of Darwin.’ 463
So, as the centennial celebration enlivened the history of evolutionary 
thought the public were being taught that Charles Darwin and evolutionary theory 
were synonymous. The focus on particular features of Darwin’s personality and 
work played to the cultural identity of ‘genius’, facilitating the construction of 
Darwin as a historical icon. The centennial materials put history to work to validate 
the authority of twentieth century Darwinian theory. One key result was that, as the 
centennial celebration boosted Darwin’s cultural identity, the authors of the modem 
synthesis garnered public support in respect of their role as Darwin’s contemporary 
manifestation.
As well as increasing the cultural authority of Darwinism, the centennial 
celebration also played a role in internally strengthening the ‘synthesis gang’. 
Support for the synthetic approach from within the academic community had 
increased enormously in the late 1940s, particularly in the wake of the foundation of 
the SSE and the establishment of the journal Evolution. After this rapid phase of 
recruitment the nature of the programme (as advised in Dobzhansky (1937) and 
Huxley (1942)) was in need of reinforcement, and its protagonists and newer 
supporters required an opportunity to take stock and consider their new authority. 
Smocovitis identifies the regrouping function of celebration as a vital motivation for 
the organisation of large-scale events like the centennial 464 She describes how this 
event was nested with the development of the synthesis that had occurred in the 
previous two decades:
‘In the wake of the evolutionary synthesis of the 1930s and 1940s, the anniversary in 
1959, coming twelve years after the Princeton meetings (during which evolutionists 
celebrated the reconfiguration of the biological disciplines around the new science of 
evolutionary biology), was perfectly timed to reassess the state of the art by the
463 Huxley, J. (1960) p.8
464 Smocovitis, V. (1999)
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community of individuals that had worked to create a synthetic, unified science of 
evolution.’465
During the Chicago Centennial the voices of the early architects of synthesis 
returned to the fore in what had become, by that time, a much larger community. 
This act, of what Smocovitis would call ‘disciplinary memory’466, allowed their 
agenda to regain any influence that had been lost in the larger/more diffuse 
endeavour that evolutionary biology had become. By invoking ‘disciplinary 
memory’ the identity of the group was reinforced, and the synthetic approach was 
solidified around the core ideals that had inspired it. In volume one of the conference 
proceedings, we see the strong alliance of the original core-set reunited at the 
forefront of evolutionary biology. Papers by Dobzhansky, Huxley, Simpson and 
Mayr all appear in this volume 467
The Chicago centennial was only one of a huge number of celebrations 
undertaken internationally. The functions of celebration identified by Smocovitis can 
be viewed as generally applicable across that mass of celebrations. The international 
celebration of the Darwin centennial had a considerable impact, a key element of 
which was to publicise the intellectual material of the modem synthesis to the public. 
Through the action of celebration, manifest both in prolific new publications and 
actual physical celebratory events, the modem synthesis and Darwinian 
triumphalism were given new cultural and social meaning through communication to 
new audiences and broader availability. The primary tools used for this 
communication were the reiteration of the history of the rise of Darwinian theory and 
the iconisation of Charles Darwin himself. These two devices formed the boundary 
work by which this next phase of monopolization was achieved.
3.1.4: The boundary function of the centennial publications: publication as a means 
of programme extension and deployment
465 Smocovitis, V. (1999) p.278
466 Smocovitis, V. (1999) identifies the act of invoking ‘disciplinary memory’ as one of the key tools 
in the process of defining disciplinary identity. This occurred on two levels at the time of the 
centennial celebrations. Firstly, the community invoked the memory of Darwin, as a founding father 
of evolutionary theory. Secondly, the community of evolutionary theorists invoked the memory of its 
own ‘founding fathers’ (i.e. Dobzhansky and Huxley) as a way of asserting their identity.
467 Tax, S. (Ed.) (1960a)
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A brief overview of some of the materials published in the period around the 
1958/1959 Darwin centennial demonstrates the next stage of boundary work for 
expansion and the drive towards monopoly. The texts are too numerous to discuss 
here in specific detail. Therefore, this section seeks to highlight categories within 
that body of material, assessing their role in the process of extension and the 
deployment of the synthetic programme in the wider cultural context. Broadly 
speaking the published centennial materials fall into four main categories.
Firstly, there are materials that represent the ongoing intellectual work of the 
synthesis architects and their increasing network of supporters. These materials 
address epistemological and theoretical problems, and seek to extend the application 
of Darwinism to new kinds of intellectual problems in other areas of biology. They 
rely upon the approach that had been applied during the early years of synthesis. 
Their boundary work devices are the same; the assertion of Darwinism as the 
principal tool for biology and the concurrent removal of Lamarckian alternatives. In 
some cases, these materials represent the outcomes of physical meetings or symposia 
organized as special centennial events by various organisations or groups. One of the 
most notable works of this type is the three-volume Chicago centennial series edited 
by anthropologist Sol Tax.468 This work features contributions from the principal 
architects of the synthetic movement, and summarises the intellectual progress made 
during the panel sessions held at the Chicago meeting. Analogous materials were 
also generated from centennial meetings at other locations. For example, extensive 
proceedings were produced by the Botanical Society of the British Isles469, The 
Royal Society of Victoria, Australia470 and from the Centenary and Bicentenary 
Congress held in Singapore471 amongst others. This category also includes new
468 Tax, S. (1960a); Tax, S. (Ed.) (1960b) Evolution after Darwin, volume 2: The evolution of Man. 
Chicago University Press, Chicago; Tax, S. (Ed.) (1960c) Evolution after Darwin, volume 3: Issues in 
evolution. Chicago University Press, Chicago.
469 See Wanstall, P. (Ed.) (1961) A Darwin Centenary. Botanical Society of the British Isles, London. 
The report of the conference held by the Botanical Society of the British Isles in 1959 to mark the 
publication of The Origin of Species.
Leeper, G. (Ed.) (1962) The Evolution of Living Organisms. Melbourne University Press,
Parkville. The report of a symposium to marie the centenary of Darwin’s Origin of Species and of the 
Royal Society of Vicotoria, held in Melbourne, December, 1959.
471 Centenary and Bicentenary. The report of a congress held in Singapore from December 2-9, 1958, 
in celebration of the centenary of die formulation of the theory of evolution by Charles Darwin and 
Alfred Russell Wallace, and the bicentenary of the publication of the 10th edition of the Systema
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academic texts produced without a connection to a physical meeting or celebration. 
Some examples of this type of work are Nature and M an’s Fate: On Evolutionary 
Theory and Human Evolution, With Special Reference to Darwin’s ‘Origin o f  
Species ’,472 which extended the application of Darwinism to the circumstances of 
human evolution, and Darwin and the Modern World View.473
Secondly, there are materials that promote the cohesion of the modem 
synthetic programme and its supporters. These materials had two functions: First 
they acted to internally strengthen the programme through the act of ‘disciplinary 
memory’. Second, they made key materials of the synthetic movement available to 
new and diverse audiences. These texts were of several types. For example, in 1964 
Dobzhansky’s Genetics and the Origin o f  Species was reissued474, which can be seen 
as both an act of disciplinary memory for the synthesis authors and a reassertion of 
his original synthetic programme. Also, the 1958 publication of A Book That Shook 
the World: Anniversary Essays on Charles Darwin’s ‘Origin o f  Species 475 brought 
together the early core-set members, Dobzhansky and Huxley (amongst others), as 
contributors to a text summarising the impact of Darwinism on contemporary 
biology. Furthermore, in 1964, a facsimile version of the first edition of Darwin’s 
Origin o f  Species, with a new introduction by Ernst Mayr was published.476 This 
edition of Darwin’s text was the favoured version of the agents of the modem 
synthesis, since it expressed Darwinian theory in its original and ‘purest’ form; that 
is the form that Darwin presented prior to later amendments when he strayed further 
towards Lamarckian explanations for hereditary.477 It is this first edition that asserts 
natural selection in its strongest form, and therefore the edition that most suited the 
synthesis authors as a reference for their Darwinism. The reissuing of this text made
Naturae by C. von Linnaeus.
472 Hardin, G. (1959) Nature and Man ’s fate. Rinehart, New York.
473 Greene, J. (1961) Darwin and the modern world view. Louisiana State University Press, Louisiana.
474 Dobzhansky, T. (1964) Genetics and the origin of species. (3rd edition, revised) Columbia 
University Press, New York.
475 Huxley, J. (Ed.) (1958) A book that shook the world: anniversary essays on Charles Darwin’s 
origin o f species. University of Pittsburg. Pennsylvania.
476 Mayr, E. (Ed.) (1964) The origin of species: facsimile of the first edition. Harvard University 
Press, Massachusetts.
477 Huxley had tried to limit the damage of Darwin’s own Lamarckism to the story of Darwin as the 
founding father of modem evolutionary biology. In his centennial contribution he stated of Darwin’s 
Lamarckian references that: ‘These ‘Lamarckian’ errors clearly sprang from the total ignorance of 
19th century biology on the subject of heredity’. [Huxley, J. (1960) p. 14] Releasing Darwin from 
responsibility for Lamarckian sympathies.
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their favoured primary source available to new audiences.
Thirdly, there are materials generated purely for the purpose of 
communicating synthetic Darwinian theory to a wider, generally non-specialist 
audience. These texts represent some of the earliest ‘popular’ accounts of Darwin 
and Darwinism. Key examples in this category include the production of historical 
and biographical materials on Darwin and Darwinism, and the production of guides 
to the reading of the primary sources for the non-specialist. Several biographies were 
issued in this period for example Charles D arwin1*, Charles Darwin: a great life in 
brie f19, Charles Darwin: evolution by natural selection480 and Charles Darwin the
A O  1
Founder o f  the Theory o f  Evolution and Natural Selection. Also, a version of 
Darwin’s autobiography was produced in 1958 with Darwin’s granddaughter, Nora 
Barlow, as editor.482 This text was particularly valuable as it was short and easy to 
approach for the non-scientist. 1958 also saw the publication of the same
A O ' l
autobiography alongside selected letters by Francis Darwin. The production of 
these texts made ‘life and times’ material on Darwin available to the more general 
reader, which was essential to the successful construction of Darwin as the founding 
father of modem evolutionary thought. The role of Darwin as founder was also 
reinforced by the publication of historical works addressing the impact of his 
contribution, for example, Charles Darlington’s Darwin’s Place in History.484 Non­
specialist access to the material of Darwinian theory was also facilitated in this 
period by texts such as The Darwin Reader, which was published one year apart in 
both America and Britain.485
Finally, there are publications that served the function of increasing access to 
sources on Darwin and Darwinism. This category includes the numerous foreign 
language translations of existing materials that were produced as an outcome of the 
centennial. These include translations of The Origin o f  Species, along with various
478 First UK edition: Moore, R. (1957) Charles Darwin Hutchinson, London.
479 First US edition: Moore, R. (1955) Charles Darwin: a great life in brief Alfred Knopf, New York.
480 De Beer, G, (1963) Charles Darwin: evolution by natural selection. Nelson, London.
481 Wichler, G. (1961) Charles Darwin: the founder of the theory of evolution and natural selection. 
Pergamon, Oxford.
482 Barlow, N. (Ed.) (1958) The autobiography of Charles Darwin. Collins, London.
483 Darwin, F. (Ed.) (1958) (reprint from 1892, 1st edition) The autobiography of Charles Darwin. 
Dover Publications, New York.
484 Darlington, C. (1959) Darwin’s place in history. Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
485 Bates, M. & Humphrey, P. (Eds.) (1956) The Darwin reader. Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York; 
Bates, M. & Humphrey, P. (Eds.) (1957) The Darwin reader. Macmillan, London.
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other specialist and non-specialist texts, in various European languages, for example, 
French486, German487, Danish488, and Portuguese489.
The huge wealth of material published as part of the centennial celebrations 
served to increase the appearance that the Darwinism was the principal, if not the 
only, tool for evolutionary work. By the mid-1960s the key primary sources of the 
Darwinian movement were readily available, and there was an abundance of material 
relating to Darwin and Darwinism for the wider audience. Partly on account of these 
materials, and partly on account of the high profile of the centennial celebrations 
themselves, Darwinism had been given a new and clear meaning to a hugely 
extended audience nationally and internationally. Darwin’s name had become 
synonymous with the concept of evolution. The synthesis architects had first implied 
monopoly (i.e. in the naming of the SSE), but as they captured the public 
imagination and regrouped their endeavour during the centennial they achieved the 
monopoly that they sought. By the mid-1960s evolutionary biology was 
monopolized by the synthetic approach. And that achievement was not transient. An 
enduring identity of Darwinism had been created. Mayr has remarked that: ‘...no 
major revision of the consensus of the 1940s became necessary during the ensuing 
years, only a somewhat increased sophistication in certain formulations that had 
been oversimplified originally’.490,491 The consensus on Darwinian monopoly within 
biology was significant. Mayr suggests that by 1947 those scientists who had not 
become Neo-Darwinians were simply the remains of an ‘older generation’ who were 
‘unable to convert’.492
486 For example: Canguilhem, G. (1959) Les Concepts de ‘lutte pour l’existence’ et de ‘selection 
naturelle’ en 1858: Charles Darwin et Alfred Russel Wallace. Les Conferences du Palais de la 
Decouverte, Series D: histoire des sciences, 61: 17.
487 For example: Genschel (1959) Charles Darwin: Mensch zwischen Glauben und Wissen.
488 For example: Ostenfeld (1959) Charles Darwin: Personlighed og sygelighed.
489 For example: Selegaao natural. Centenario da communicagao de Darwin and Wallace sobre a 
selegao natural. Publica9des aculsas do Museu Nacional No. 46, 1963.
490 Mayr, E. (1980a) p.43
491 That oversimplification can be seen as a legacy of Dobzhansky’s recommendation that treatments 
be ‘assertive’ rather than ‘polemic’. [See: Dobzhansky, T (1937) Preface] He intended that style as a 
strategy for the promotion of Darwinism. Once a broad Darwinian consensus had been achieved less 
assertive texts were an option and that return to greater detail and ‘sophistication’ is essentially what 
Mayr has noted in the period post-1940s.
492 Mayr, E. (1980a) p.43
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The next phase of increase in the cultural authority of Darwinism came when 
other kinds of authors and specialists turned attention to the theory and its 
development. The high profile of the centennial publications made them a perfect 
source for historians and for textbook writers in the period after 1960. Also, the 
journal Evolution made some of the more technical work of the synthesis readily 
available to authors of secondary sources on Darwin and Darwinism. Any historian 
of science or textbook writer turning attention to evolutionary theory in this period 
would find abundant information on the rise of the modem synthesis and its relation 
to Darwin’s nineteenth century work. The nature of the materials available gave the 
impression that Darwinian triumph characterised the history of modem evolutionary 
theory; the volume and high profile of those materials would create the appearance 
of a single-track history for the development of evolutionary thought.
The broad uptake of this triumphalist narrative is evident in the decades that 
follow the Darwin centennial. For example, evolutionary theory began to be 
transmitted to new generations through school textbooks, with the focus on Darwin 
as founding father. Elements of Charles Darwin’s biography were attributed iconic 
status as part of the pedagogical construction. In particular, Darwin’s study of the 
Galapagos finches became a popular tool for introducing the concepts of variation 
and interspecies competition that are foundational to an understanding of natural 
selection.493 As the new generation of biologists was trained they learned that 
Darwinism was synonymous with evolutionary theory. By 1980 Mayr remarked that: 
‘The Darwinian ...interpretation of evolution is now so nearly universally accepted 
among biologists that the present generation of evolutionists can hardly comprehend 
the opposition that the theory of natural selection still encountered in the 1920s and 
1930s.’494
493 For example, these trends are illustrated in the materials of the Nuffield Foundation Teaching 
Project, created between die 1960s and 1980s. The Nuffield Project was the most significant attempt 
to control and guide science teaching in the UK prior to the 1988 introduction of the National 
Curriculum. The foundation provided comprehensive teaching materials and textbooks, thus carrying 
their agendas and perspectives into classrooms nationwide. The Nuffield Biology Series reflects the 
triumphalist narrative of Darwinism, and teaches the modem synthesis exclusively as die theory of 
evolution. I have studied the Nuffield reforms and materials in detail elsewhere. See: Jarvis, L. (2000) 
Science in textbooks: A study of the Nuffield Foundation Science Education Reforms, 1960-1988. 
MSc thesis, Imperial College London.
494 Mayr, E. (1980a) p.3
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In the post-1960 deployment of Darwinian authority, Ernst Mayr took 
another significant role as he transformed himself into a historian of Darwinian 
theory. In the decades after the centennial, Mayr’s publications host his deployment 
of the triumphalist narrative. It is perhaps in his work that we see one of the best 
examples of the preservation of the old map record of Darwinism. For example, 
Mayr’s 1976 Evolution and the diversity o f  life is a collection of his own essays, 
which have been compiled in such a way as to reinforce the goals of the synthesis 
group. Mayr follows the principles of the early synthesis authors: i) he restates the 
theory of evolution, which is represented only by Darwinian theory ii) he asserts the 
broad value of the theory as a tool for unification in biology and iii) he dismisses the 
opposition of Lamarckism. In that text Mayr achieves that third goal by means of an 
interesting rhetorical device. Rather than ignoring Lamarckism Mayr states that he 
will address it, but qualifies that attention by saying that:
‘As long as the battle between Darwinians and Lamarckians was raging, it 
was quite impossible to undertake an unbiased evaluation of Lamarck. For this we 
are now ready, after it has been demonstrated conclusively that the various causal 
explanations of evolution, usually designated as Lamarckism, are not valid. Not that 
it really needed this final proof.. . ,495
Mayr is not arguing against Lamarckism, nor is he ignoring it, instead he sets 
out to describe it as a historical phenomenon - a vanquished opponent to Darwinism. 
Again, implied authority is being used as a boundary work device. In case any doubt 
remained Mayr’s conclusion on the issue of Darwinism versus Lamarckism is that:
‘This fight is now a matter of history since the Darwinian interpretation of 
the causal explanation of evolution has gained a total victory; it is now accepted by 
every well informed biologist.’496
Other authors joined Mayr in the deployment of the triumphalist narrative. 
Andrew Brown has noted that self-styled ultra-Darwinian Richard Dawkins
495 Mayr, E. (1976) Evolution and the diversity of life. Harvard University Press, Mssachusetts. p.222
496 Mayr, E. (1976) p.248
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proclaimed, in his 1976 best-seller The Selfish Gene, that: ‘There is such a thing as 
being just plain wrong, and that is what, before 1859, all answers to these 
[evolutionary] questions were.’ And that, in 1995, Daniel Dennett added that ‘natural 
selection is a ‘universal acid’ able to eat away at all other explanations of what goes 
on in the world until the true Darwinian stories of competition among genes 
appear.’497 Brown suggests that the result is that modem Darwinism seems 
‘intoxicatingly powerful’ 498 These kinds of statements are all the more important to 
the deployment of the triumphalist narrative because they appear in popular works, 
intended for mass consumption by non-scientific readers. These authors are 
involved, alongside many others, in policing the boundaries of the Darwinian 
authority that had been established by the twentieth century boundary work.
The result o f all this remains culturally manifest today. Charles Darwin 
remains synonymous with evolution in popular culture, and his iconic status 
continues to be fostered by the media and advertisers who use his image and ideas 
frequently in parody, pun and paraphrase. In addition, educational textbooks still 
echo the Darwin triumphalism so keenly emphasised during the centennial, a 
situation that Michael Ghiselin attributes as a function of the ‘successive teams of 
plagiarists’ that create these kinds of texts.499 Zoologist Mark Pagel has observed 
that: ‘Darwin’s ideas have been caricatured, misrepresented, used and abused’ and 
that ‘politicians, schoolteachers, academics, doctors, lawyers, economists, 
psychologists and even dieticians use him for their ends’.500 All this elevates 
Darwinism to a position of high status in cultural awareness.
In the case of the history of science, the circumstances of Darwin’s depiction 
have changed to a degree on account of epistemological transitions within that 
discipline. Between the 1950s and 1970s, as the history of science emerged as an 
independent specialism, much attention was directed toward the creation of scientific 
biographies. The focus of these works were those scientists who might be considered 
as ‘founding fathers’ for modem science. This type of work was necessarily present-
497 Brown, A. (1997) Feud for thought. The Guardian, 11.06.97 [cf. Dawkins, R. (1976) The Selfish 
Gene. Oxford University Press, Oxford; Dennett, D. (1995) Darwin’s dangerous idea: evolution and 
the meanings o f life. Penguin, London.]
498 Brown, A. (1997) p.2
499 Ghiselin, M. (1994) Replicating a fiction. The imaginary Lamarck: A look at bogus ‘history’ in 
schoolbooks. The Textbook Letter, 5 (4). Online at: www.textbookleague.org/54mark.htm
500 Pagel, M. (1998) A man for all seasons. New Scientist, 2120: 44-45
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centred and fixated upon ‘genius’. As the discipline matured over the following two 
decades this approach began to be perceived as ‘Whiggish’ and too uni-dimensional 
to provide a realistic expose of past scientific activity. The most significant move to 
reform this style was precipitated by the introduction of the social constructivist 
approach. That approach sought to contextualise past scientific activity against a rich 
backdrop of contemporary social, political and cultural history. Ironically, even 
though the history of science took this turn away from ‘the great white man of 
science’ tradition, Charles Darwin remained a focus of study. Instead of histories 
that described his tortured genius, the new accounts began to ground Darwin’s 
endeavour in the Victorian context. Although Whig history had been abandoned, 
Darwin remained a favourite subject for the new kinds of treatment. This is perhaps 
because the deployment of Darwinian triumphalist histories since the 1950s had left 
a legacy that was difficult to identify as a bias, and even more difficult to escape as a 
tacit influence.
In conclusion, this section has illustrated how the agents of the modem 
synthesis effected their transition to a position of significant authority and influence 
within the scientific community. The contest for authority began when a ‘core-set’ 
launched a bid for monopolization of evolutionary science. Through a phase of 
recmitment, the core-set became a community of ‘evolutionary biologists’. In this 
transition, they carried with them a strong agenda of Darwinian advocacy coupled 
with disregard for Lamarckism. They utilised the affirmative power of history to 
provide a legacy for their Darwinian adherence, and Darwinism became the principal 
theory of evolution. That community, with the original core-set intact at the heart of 
a much larger association, then deployed the power they had gained to create a 
culture of Darwinian adherence both internal and external to the cultural territory 
‘science’. To affect this extension that community utilised the timely Darwin 
centennial as a tool for reassertion and deployment of their agenda. Cultural 
authority was then propagated under the theory’s own momentum as, often 
subconsciously, other kinds of authors took up and transformed the material of the 
synthesis and the centennial to create new kinds of intellectual and cultural products.
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By the time of the directed mutation debate in the 1980s and 1990s the 
authority of Darwin and Darwinism in relation to the cultural cartography was so 
marked and had such a legacy that the very notion of anti-Darwinian work was by 
nature controversial, inflammatory and intellectually repellent. An old map had been 
created and had gained persistence through the boundary acts of its architects. It had 
reached a level of persistence and tacit cultural significance that meant that it would 
be called upon in any new conflict in evolutionary theory. The immediate defence of 
Darwinism in response to the early directed mutation reports (identified in chapter 2) 
can be seen as an example of an old map being unfolded and consulted by 
communities convinced of the stability of Darwinian authority. The use of that old 
map had a profound influence on the negotiation phase of the directed mutation 
debate; being largely responsible for evoking the highly contentious Lamarckism 
versus Darwinism aspect of the debate. The mode of negotiation of directed 
mutation, and its perpetuation, becomes clearer when we realise that activity in that 
late twentieth century evolutionary conflict has its roots not in the specific or local 
circumstances of the debate, but rather in the historical legacy of boundary activity 
undertaken many decades before.
3.2: The ‘iconic failure’ of Lamarck and Lamarckism: A second old map 
influence on the directed mutation debate.
The directed mutation debate was not only shaped by cultural and intellectual 
adherence to Darwinism. The Lamarckian associations of the research also invoked 
other areas of the old map, on which the accumulated outcomes of contests between 
Lamarckism and Darwinism had been recorded. The old map identity of Darwinism 
validated its authority, while the old map identity of Lamarckism recorded 
defamation, failure and rejection. In the late twentieth century the old map 
representation of Lamarckism was deployed to imply predetermined failure in this 
new contest.
John Cairns had constructed directed mutation as a possible Lamarckian 
phenomenon. The historical legacies of the rise of Darwinism, coupled with the 
historical legacies of the decline of Lamarckism, served to make that framing
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particularly controversial. Section 3.1 identifies the development of positive attitudes 
towards Darwinism throughout the mid-late twentieth century. While this process 
was occurring an associated, but negative, set of attitudes was developing towards 
Lamarckism. As the authority of Darwin and Darwinism was being constructed, 
Lamarckism was being both passively and actively shaped as its antithesis.
Two factors contributed to the construction of the negative identity of Lamarckism:
i) The notion of failed Lamarckian opposition to Darwinism was
constructed as a part of the triumphalist narrative. This was 
achieved in two ways. First the triumph of Darwinism was implied, 
rather than stated explicitly, by the extraction of Lamarckism from 
the works of the early synthesis authors. Second, explicit reference 
to failed Lamarckism was useful to the Darwinian narrative since 
Lamarck could act as an anti-hero foil to the Darwinian hero that 
was being constructed. The notion of the rise and success of 
Darwinism was asserted and highlighted by reference to the 
theory’s triumph over Lamarckian opposition, especially during the 
period of the Darwin centennial. The notion of a hero and of 
triumph is more meaningful where a villain or opponent is 
identified. For example, in the Chicago centennial publication, 
Huxley describes Darwin’s ardour and dedicated study and 
suggests that this resulted in his theory being ‘impressive’ and 
‘convincing’, he contrasts Darwin’s theory with Lamarckism, 
which he characterises as a ‘brief sketch’ and a ‘speculative 
picture’.501 Michael Ghiselin has identified the perpetuation of this 
kind of comparison as part of the persistent triumphalist narrative 
of Darwinism in the late twentieth century. He suggests that 
textbook authors and other kinds of writers use reference to a 
constructed image of Lamarck to enhance the image of Darwinian
501 Huxley, J. (1960) p.8
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success in their representations. Ghiselin argues that the result of
502that tactic has been the construction of a ‘false dichotomy’.
ii) Other factors than the rise of Darwinism also contributed to the old
map identity of Lamarckism. The history of twentieth century 
Lamarckism includes the activity of individuals, in particular Paul 
Kammerer and Tofim Lysenko, who as advocates of Lamarckism 
are alleged to have undertaken fraudulent practice. Their stories 
have received attention because narratives of conflict and 
pathological science have broad appeal as popular historical 
accounts. The construction of these Lamarckian sympathisers as 
villains is self-sufficient and does not require the foil of a 
Darwinian hero to encourage interest. These individuals are 
constructed as ‘iconic failures’, and at this level narratives 
concerning their activity are complementary rather than 
contributory to the history of Darwinism recorded on the old map.
In this section a selection of representations of Lamarck and Lamarckism are 
considered to demonstrate the action of: i) the construction of a defamed history of 
Lamarckism with a service role to the triumphalist Darwinian narrative and ii) the 
construction of iconic failures as stand-alone phenomena in history. In terms of the 
construction of iconic failures, the cases of Paul Kammerer and Tofim Lysenko are 
described in detail. In this section I also consider the ‘closure rhetoric’ that has 
shaped late twentieth century perceptions of Lamarckian theory. I describe the 
historical representation of the ‘three fold closure’ of Lamarckian opposition, in 
which, ‘iconic closure’ of Lamarckian debate is attributed firstly to August 
Weismann, secondly to Luria and Delbruck and thirdly to Francis Crick and his 
central dogma of molecular genetics.
3.2.1: The Construction of Iconic Failures: Kammerer and Lysenko
502 Ghiselin, M. (1994)
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Paul Kammerer:
The standard narrative describing the life and work of Austrian biologist Paul 
Kammerer provides an example of the construction of fraud or ‘iconic failure’ in the 
history of science. Kammerer’s story is of course not the only example of a narrative 
of scientific fraud and discredit503, however, certain of its features make it 
particularly memorable and lead to its retelling. Firstly, the nature of the alleged 
fraud lends the story to development as an iconic episode. Many stories of scientific 
fraud involve the forgery of complex calculations or the fraudulent interpretation of 
data. These cases are often difficult to describe and may only be meaningful to 
specialists. However, in Kammerer’s case accusations focus on the doctoring of 
biological specimens. It is claimed that Kammerer tampered with specimens to give 
them an appearance that supported a Lamarckian interpretation of their evolution. 
Thus, the alleged fraudulence was uncomplicated, and requires no specialist 
knowledge to appreciate. Secondly, Kammerer’s suicide subsequent to the 
accusations of fraud, and the fact that the case appears to a degree unsolved, lends 
the appeal of mystery, increasing the story’s value as a popular tale. Thirdly, the 
story invokes the popular long-term conflict between Darwinians and Lamarckians, 
and seems to confirm the cultural identities of Lamarckism and Darwinism that 
appear on the old map.
The construction and deployment of this ‘failure’ narrative for Kammerer’s 
Lamarckian work is interesting to this analysis on two levels. Firstly, the story acts 
in a service role to the triumphalist Darwinian narrative that was being propagated 
by agents of the synthesis. The accusations against Kammerer came in the 1920s, 
and provided a timely example for the synthesis authors of the disreputable nature of 
recent Lamarckian research. Indeed, the synthesis authors made some of the early 
accusations against Kammerer and begun the framing of this tale of scientific 
discredit (see below). Secondly, the story acts as part of a separate, but related, 
narrative describing the decline of Lamarckism in the twentieth century. This 
material does not relate directly to the triumphalist narrative of Darwinism, but 
rather acts alone as part of the broader historical discourse describing the fall of
503 For example, sociologists Gieryn and Figert have provided a detailed account of the fraud 
accusations made against psychologist Sir Cyril Burt in the 1970s and the construction of him as a 
failed or pathological scientist, see Gieryn, T. & Figert, A. (1986)
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Lamarckism in the twentieth century. Thus, Kammerer’s case is used to both assert 
the merits of Darwinism and also to confirm the demise of Lamarckism. In that 
regard, Kammerer’s story contributes to the old map identities of both Lamarckism 
and Darwinism.
Paul Kammerer’s 4iconic failure’
Between 1902 and 1926 Paul Kammerer investigated the inheritance of 
acquired characteristics at the prestigious Viennese Institute for Experimental 
Biology. He demonstrated remarkable experimental skill in the culture and breeding 
of reptiles and amphibians.504 Kammerer was able to get these animals to breed in 
vastly modified controlled habitats, and was able to study the inheritance, over 
several generations, of the physical features that arose as a result. That is to say, he 
was able to test the heritability of features that had arisen during an organism’s 
lifetime as a direct response to the requirements/pressures of their environment.505
Through experiments using salamanders, and perhaps most famously the 
Midwife Toad (Alytes obstetricans), Kammerer demonstrated the action of this 
Lamarckian process.506 The best-known experiment, and the most significant to the 
narrative of ‘failure’, examined the inheritance of acquired secondary sexual 
characters in the Midwife Toad. Under natural conditions this species breeds in 
terrestrial habitats. During mating the male clasps the female above the back legs 
and collects and fertilizes the string of eggs that she releases. This act of coupling is 
standard for frogs and toads. However, the majority of species carry out this process 
in aquatic environments. To facilitate the coupling males develop rough pigmented 
patches on their front limbs during the mating season, enabling them to maintain a 
hold on the female throughout the process of external fertilization. These patches are 
called nuptial pads, and are absent in the midwife toad on account of its terrestrial 
lifestyle.
504 Koestler, A. (1971)
505 Interestingly, Kammerer had not set out to demonstrate Lamarckian evolution. When he began his 
career he was a firm believer in the principles of Mendelism and Weismannism. Only as he bred new 
generations from his original stocks did he begin to perceive the heritability of the phenotypic 
modifications that had been induced in his specimens (Koestler, 1971).
506 See: Kammerer, P. (1923) Breeding experiments on the inheritance of acquired characters. Nature, 
111: 637-640; Kammerer, P. (1924) The inheritance of acquired characteristics. Boni & Liveright, 
New York.
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Kammerer’s experiments were designed to test the phenotypic effect of 
forcing these terrestrial toads to reproduce in an aquatic environment.507 Kammerer 
claimed that after several generations in the aquatic environment male toads began to 
develop the nuptial pads characteristic of aquatic species. The development of these 
pads did not appear to occur by the process of random mutation and subsequent 
natural selection that Darwinian theory demands. Rather, the nuptial pads arose in 
direct response to the new environmental challenge. The report was made more 
contentious by Kammerer’s claim that the change was heritable. He claimed that his 
results provided the first experimental evidence in favour of the inheritance of 
acquired characteristics.
The standard story of Kammerer’s ‘failure’ centres upon a preserved midwife 
toad specimen from one of the later generations of his protracted experiment. This 
particular specimen was considered central to the credibility of his work, and from 
1910 onwards sceptics began to request loans of this midwife toad with nuptial 
pads.508 English Darwinian William Bateson was Kammerer’s greatest critic.509 He 
engaged in debate with Kammerer over a period of fourteen years, and maintained 
that verification of the authenticity of the midwife toad specimen was at the heart of 
the credibility of Kammerer’s Lamarckian theories.510 Not only did Bateson himself 
make repeated requests to examine the midwife toad, but he also encouraged others 
to try and get a close look at the material if they visited Vienna. We might consider 
these activities as an evidence of Bateson carrying out boundary work for the 
exclusion of Kammerer. From that perspective, Bateson’s construction of a fraud 
case against Kammerer is a powerful tool for the achievement of his boundary work 
objectives. Kammerer biographer Arthur Koestler suggests that Bateson’s tone when
507 Koestler, A. (1971)
508 Koestler, A. (1971)
509 See for Bateson’s critique of Kammerer: Bateson, W. (1923a) Dr Kammerer’s testimony to the 
inheritance of acquired characters. Nature, 112: 344-345; Bateson, W. (1923b) The inheritance of 
acquired characters in Alytes. Nature, 112: 391; Bateson, W. (1923c) Experiments on Alytes and 
Cona. Nature, 112: 899.
510 That Bateson placed so much emphasis on this specimen troubled Kammerer. In his view the 
midwife toad experiments were not die most definitive Lamarckian evidences he had produced. 
Kammerer attributed the appearance of the nuptial pads to atavism, which was subtly different form 
the inheritance of acquired characters. Kammerer was always keen to encourage more attention 
towards his experiments on sea squirts, which he considered far more definitive [Koeslter, A. (1971)]. 
Kammerer’s Lamarckian work was eventually discredited on the basis of a reexamination of a 
specimen that he had never asserted was a definitive example of the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics. This adds a lamentable element of misunderstanding to Kammerer’s tale.
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giving these recommendations always implied that the specimen was likely not to be 
authentic.511
In 1923, Kammerer visited England and brought with him the last preserved 
midwife toad specimen to have survived the disruption of the war. Not only were 
specimens lost during the war, but also a lack of resources caused Kammerer’s 
surviving lineage of toads to die off. The experiment had come to an end, and it 
would take many years and rare breeding skills to recreate the results. A key concern 
for Bateson, and also for Kammerer, was that the experiments had not been 
successfully repeated by any other researcher. However, this was because no other
c p
researcher had managed to breed the midwife toad in an aquatic environment. 
During his 1923 visit Kammerer’s last specimen was examined by researchers at 
Cambridge University and at the Linnean Society in London. The phenotypic 
appearance of the nuptial pads was verified and, they were also examined 
microscopically. Interestingly, Bateson did not attend the meeting at Cambridge and 
never examined the specimen during Kammerer’s trip to England, yet he maintained 
his focus on the verification of the authenticity of this specimen after it was returned
cn
to Vienna. Science journalist, Richard Milton, suggests that, at this time, 4a 
pronounced anti-Kammerer faction developed’. Led by Bateson, they mounted 
'frequent attacks’ on his work and implied that the 'experiments must be erroneous 
or fraudulent because the inheritance of acquired characteristics is impossible’.514 
Kammerer had only limited support, largely led by Ernest MacBride, one of the last 
supporters of recapitulation theory, and a staunch advocate of Lamarckism.515
In early 1926, G. K. Noble, curator of reptiles at the American Museum of 
Natural History, visited the Vienna Institute and requested to examine the midwife 
toad specimen. Koestler demonstrates that Noble had long been an ally in Bateson’s 
campaign against Kammerer, and that Bateson encouraged the visit.516 A few months 
after his visit to Vienna Noble reported his examination of Kammerer’s specimen in
5,1 Koestler, A. (1971)
512 Koestler, A. (1971)
5,3 Koestler, A. (1971)
514 Milton, R. (1994) Forbidden science: suppressed research that could change our lives. Fourth 
Estate, London.
515 See: MacBride, E. (1924) An introduction to the study of heredity. Williams & Norgate, London.
516 Koestler, A. (1971)
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Nature.511 He stated that a simple low magnification examination of the toad had 
revealed that the nuptial pads had been generated not by the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics, but rather by the injection of Indian ink into the epidermal tissue.
Shortly before these accusations were made Kammerer had been invited to 
transfer to Russia and build an institute for experimental biology.518 In the weeks 
before Noble’s accusation Kammerer had made preparations to move, arranging for 
his equipment to be packed and transported.519 However, days before his transfer 
Kammerer committed suicide, apparently shooting himself on an Austrian mountain 
path. The note he left stated that the pressure of the accusations had been too much
• •  • 520for him. Kammerer’s suicide of course appeared as an admission of guilt.
Almost immediately after Kammerer’s death the story of his life and work 
began to be translated into an iconic tale of fraud and discredit. The effect of this 
translation was such that Arthur Koestler, writing in 1971, stated:
‘Nobody who reads about Kammerer in current books on biology could believe in 
his innocence. ’ (Koestler, 1971:122)
Kammerer’s ‘iconic failure’ was addressed by a variety of authors, interestingly, 
including some of the agents of the modem synthesis. In his 1926 text, Essays in
c 'y  i
Popular Science , Julian Huxley dedicates a chapter to the consideration of the 
theory of acquired characters.522 In this treatment he asserts that Lamarckian theories 
of the inheritance had become obsolete. He suggests that there might be means by 
which the ‘germplasm’ can be influenced by the environment, but that this would be 
a rare phenomenon. On the issue of Kammerer and his ‘proofs’ of Lamarckian
517 Noble, G. (1926) Kammerer’s Alytes. Nature, 118: 209-211.
518 This is especially important in light of the state of Russian biology in this period. Lamarckism was 
gaining popularity at this time, and just a few years later Tofim Lysenko would facilitate the rise of 
Lamarckism in Russia to state of institutionalization. Had Kammerer survived to take up this position 
he would have found a more permissive context in which to carry out his non-Darwinian work.
519 Koestler, A. (1971)
520 Burkhardt, R. (1998)
521 Huxley, J. (1926) Essays in popular science. Chatto & Windus, London.
522 In 1926 this was still a valid topic for an evolutionary text, with many biologists using some 
version of acquired character theory in their research. Only later, once the modem synthesis had been 
established, did it become less desirable to address Lamarckian theory. In his formative text, Genetics 
and the Origin o f Species (1937), Dobzhansky recommended that Lamarckism be removed from 
materials authored as part of the synthetic project.
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inheritance Huxley states:
4 Now Dr. Kammerer claims himself to have experimentally demonstrated the 
inheritance of acquired characters in salamanders, in toads and ascidians. In the brief 
space I have at my disposal, and at the risk of seeming curt, I can only say that his 
work has not carried conviction to biologists as a whole, and in particular to those 
who ought to be best qualified to judge -  the students of heredity, with Bateson, 
Baur, Morgan, Goldschmidt and Johannsen at their head. No-one has ever been able 
to repeat them, and distinguished workers like Herbst have obtained quite opposite 
results.’ 523
In his 1942 text Evolution: The Modern Synthesis, Huxley makes plainer still his 
view of the discredit attached to Kammerer’s research. He explains:
4Nor need I go in detail through the wearisome discussion of the various scientific 
'proofs’ of Lamarckian inheritance that have been advanced. I would merely say that 
subsequent work has either disproved or failed to confirm the great majority of them. 
An unfortunate suspicion rests on Kammerer’s work, and his results on salamanders 
have not been confirmed by Herbert (1924).’ 524
These two examples show how allusions to Kammerer’s 'fraud’ begin to be 
refrained as statements asserting the fact of that fraud. We might consider that 
Huxley co-opted the theme of Kammerer’s fraud to bolster the boundary work for 
Darwinian monopolization with which he had engaged.
Dobzhansky adds to the contemporary construction of failed Lamarckism, 
stating that:
523 Huxley, J. (1926) p.33-34. The extent to which this appraisal of Kammerer is a purposed 
construction rather than an account is made clearer if we consider Arthur Koestler’s (1971) reply to 
these accusations. Koestler demonstrates from archival sources and interviews that: Firstly,
Kammerer thought that only his sea squirt experiments showed die inheritance of acquired characters. 
He did not claim the same of his salamander or toad research. Secondly, as I have mentioned above, 
Kammerer’s experiments had not been repeated because no other researcher had been able to raise 
amphibians in the manner required. In Huxley’s statement, quoted here, the implication is quite 
different.
524 Huxley, J. (1942) p.458
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‘Inheritance of acquired characters...apparently does not take place. The few 
remaining believers in this contingency, epigones of Lamarckism, can adduce no 
critical evidence in support of their convictions; at any rate up to the present their
525speculations have proved barren as working hypotheses.’
Dobzhansky does not mention Kammerer or his work directly. By this device 
Dobzhansky renders Kammerer just another of those ‘epigones of Lamarckism’. 
This approach fits with the statement that Dobzhansky makes in the preface to this 
same text that: ‘Considerations of space have forced us to refrain from a detailed 
discussion of some of the objections that have been advanced against the genetic 
treatment of evolutionary problems. Thus Lamarckian doctrines find but a brief 
mention.’526
In 1946 biologist Richard Goldschmidt discussed the case, and added 
accusations that notebooks from Kamamerer’s lab had been doctored. He stated: 
‘...statements were found in Kammerer’s papers that did not tally. There had not 
been sufficient time, according to his own records, for the generations he claimed to 
have been bred.’ He explained that Kammerer had probably become ‘..so absorbed 
with the necessity for proving his claims that he started inventing results or 
‘doctoring’ them.’527 Kammerer’s iconic failure began to be deployed through 
educational textbooks and popular culture. Biologist Aronson Lester has pointed out 
that from as early as 1938 Kammerer’s story was ‘regularly told to biology students 
as an object lesson.’
By the 1980s, Kammerer’s case was in use as a historical example of the 
‘problems’ of Lamarckian support; his failure had become a landmark on the old 
map of Lamarckism. In Evolution and the Diversity o f  Life, Mayr says that hindsight 
allows us to interpret Kammerer’s positive results as fraud and, in the same volume 
of collected essays, Richard Burkhardt adds that Kammerer’s suicide appears as an 
admission of guilt.529,530 Evolutionaiy biologist Steven Jay Gould retold the story of
525 Dobzhansky, T. (1937) p. 18
526Dobzhansky, T. (1937) p.xi
527 Goldschmidt, R. (1949) Research and politics. Science, 109: 219-227. p.221
528 Lester, A. (1975) The case of the midwife toad. Behaviour Genetics, 5(2): 115-125
529 Mayr, E. (1998) Preface. In: E. Mayr & W. Provine (Eds.) The evolutionary synthesis. Harvard 
University Press, Massacusetts.
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the Indian ink in his 1980 popular essay collection, and added that: ‘...ironically 
Kammerer performed a Darwinian experiment without recognizing it...but 
concluded that he had demonstrated a Lamarckian effect’.531 This construction adds 
stupidity to fraud.
Kammerer’s research seems to exemplify ‘pathological science’ of the kind 
that Irvine Langmuir532 has outlined. That characterisation arises from the fact that 
his experiments appeared repeatable only by certain individuals, and only in certain 
ways. Since one of the hallmarks of science is replicability, Kammerer’s research 
offered an example of perversion of the scientific method and practice. It shows 
trainee scientists how science should not be. To support Kammerer’s findings in the 
1920s demanded a degree of experimenters’ regress of the kind that Collins has 
described.533 Experimenters’ regress allows that when an experimental repetition 
fails to produce positive results that failure is designated as a sign that the 
experiment has not worked, rather than as a sign that the underlying hypothesis is 
flawed. In Kammerer’s case, the regress centred around his special ability to raise 
experimental amphibian stocks. When others failed to replicate Kammerer’s 
observation he and his supporters attributed that fact to the inability of others to raise 
organisms in the altered environments.534
The treatment of Kammerer’s story by key agents of the modem synthesis 
and their supporters served to create a narrative of Lamarckian failure in a service 
role to the triumphalist Darwinian narrative. In their constructions Lamarckism is 
discarded and the inevitable outcome is the assertion of Darwinian authority. This 
construction of Kammerer also appeals to the popular enthusiasm for stories of fraud
530 Burkhardt, R. (1998)
531 Gould, S. J. (1980) The panda’s thumb. Penguin, New York.
532 Langmuir, I. (1989) Pathological science. Physics Today, 42: 36.
533 Collins, H. (1974)
534 It is worth noting that the designation of Kammerer’s approach as an example of experimenters’ 
regress does not take into account the role of ‘tacit knowledge’ in the achievement of certain 
experimental findings. Michael Polanyi [Polanyi, M. (1958) Personal Knowledge. Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, London] first described tacit knowledge, to describe how some experimental procedures 
rely on a significant degree of craft knowledge or skill that cannot be made explicit in written form 
and remains inarticulable. Jermone Ravetz [Ravetz, J. (1971) Scientific Knowledge and its social 
problems. Oxford University Press, London] and Harry Collins [Collins, H. (1974); Collins, H. 
(1985)] have investigated further the way that tacit knowledge influences the production of 
knowledge, and the role that training has in transmitting craft skills. In the case of Kammerer his 
skills in the breeding of amphibians might represent such craft knowledge, and as such the 
designation of his work as pathological science may exist as a construction of the Kammerer fable, 
rather than as a valid analysis of Kammerer’s practice.
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and discredit in science. The repetition of Kammerer’s story in histories and
535textbooks is often a function of that enthusiasm.
Tofim Lvsenko: politicised iconic failure.
During the 1930s Russian scientist Tofim Lysenko became a powerful force 
in Russian science and politics. He promised a theory of genetics consonant with 
Russian political ideology. His evolutionary theories provided a biological basis for 
the hope that mass social change could be effected in only a few generations, with 
improvements being passed to future generations not only through education, but 
also through heredity. His primary concepts were taken directly from Paul 
Kammerer’s troubled research. By invoking Lamarckian principles, Lysenko was 
able to confirm that the evolution of the Russian state would be progressive, and that 
the socialist state was within reach. Lysenko denounced survival of the fittest and 
Mendelian genetics as tools of the Bourgeois, used to stifle optimism for progress in 
human societies.536 In place of these principles, Lysenko invoked the accumulation 
of acquired characteristics and altruism as the agents of evolution.
Although Lysenko enjoyed more influence than Kammerer, his work 
eventually became the focus of similar accusations and retrospective re-evaluative 
scrutiny. During the mid century it emerged that Lysenko had used political 
connections to bypass the requirement for stringent biological evidence. He was 
eventually denounced as an authority in 1965, after serious crop failures resulted 
from the application of his methods to agriculture.537
Robert Young has examined the representations of Lysenko and Lysenkoism 
that emerged during the twentieth century , essentially examining the construction 
of Lysenko that became one of the major landmarks on the old map. Young argues 
that a standard narrative of Lysenko’s failure has arisen, and that it has been 
perpetuated for two reasons. Firstly, the story of Lysenko’s downfall illustrates a
535 For example, Arthur Koestler’s treatment of the case in a self-contained narrative that is not related 
to the Darwinian agenda. [Koestler, A. 1971]
536 Bowler, P. (1992)
537 Milner, R. (1990) The encyclopedia o f evolution: humanity’s search for its origins. Facts on file, 
New York; Ravetz, J. (1990)
538 Young, R. (1978) Getting started on Lysenkoism. Radical Science Journal, 6/7: 81-105.
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popular theme in science studies; it acts as a cautionary tale concerning the ‘intrusion 
of the alien values of politics and ideology into the domain of value-neutral 
science’.539 Secondly, representations of Lysenko tend to focus on the relationship of 
Lysenkoism to Stalinism, emphasising the use and abuse of power under that regime. 
This approach results from Western authors use of the Lysenko story as part of a 
broader standard narrative that defames communism. Young refers to this standard 
characterisation as ‘red-baiting’. He concludes that the combination of these 
authorial motivations has led to the production of treatments of Lysenkoism that are 
generally marked by ‘self-congratulation’ and use Lysenko as a cautionary tale 
against both the general abuse of science for political ends and communist politics 
specifically.540
Lysenkoism became an object lesson against the combination of science and 
politics.541 Lysenko’s failure has been recalled and reinforced by subsequent authors. 
For example, Gould characterises the Lysenko affair as ‘appalling’.542 The 
combination of Lamarckism and its enthusiast Lysenko is perceived to have set back 
Russian agriculture, and indeed society, thirty years; a harsh condemnation for an 
already defamed theory of evolution. Bowler suggests that this representation of 
Lysenkoism promoted the idea that ‘Lamarckians can behave as badly as anyone 
else.’543 On the old map record of Lamarckism, the landmark of Lysenkoism records 
the stigma suffered by association with this historic episode.
By the end of World War II the state of biology, and in particular 
evolutionary science, had changed dramatically. Eugenics had been stigmatised 
irreversibly by the Nazi ethnic cleansing polices, and science itself had suffered from 
association with the politics and events of the war. The use of the A-bomb in
Young, R.( 1978) p.81
540 Young cites several classic treatments of Lysenko as examples of the perpetuation of this standard 
narrative: Joravsky, D. (1970) The Lysenko affair. Harvard University Press, Massachusetts; 
Medvedev, Z. (1969) The rise andfall ofT. D. Lysenko. Columbia University Press, New York; 
Graham, L. (1973) Science and philosophy in the Soviet Union. Alfred Knopf, New York; Lecourt, D. 
(1977) Proletarian science? The case o f Lysenko. NLB Press, London. He argues that Lewontin and 
Levins treatment of Lysenko is almost unique in escaping these problems, since, it retells the Lysenko 
story from the perspective of the Marxist history of science and so adopts a necessarily different 
perspective from that in the standard narrative. See: Lewontin, R. & Levins, R. (1976) The problem of 
Lysenkoism. In: H. Rose & S. Rose (Eds.) The radicalization o f science. Macmillan, London.
541 Bowler, P. (1992)
542 Gould, S. (1980) p.67
543 Bowler, P. (1992) p.458
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Hiroshima and Nagasaki had transformed science in the public mind from being a 
noble endeavour into a servant of the state - a potentially uncontrolled threat to 
human life on a large scale. The technologies used to kill in wartime had tainted 
science with malign intent. The change of scale and funding had reinvented science 
as a slave to money, compelled to meet political objectives. Science since the war 
was irreversibly linked to national security.
It was no longer desirable to populations that social ideologies be justified 
through association with scientific theory. The manner in which Lamarckism had 
been utilised in Russia in the twentieth century was no longer inviting. In this 
climate, Lamarckism suffered considerable decline; without the benefits of its 
progressive view as a tool for social policy planning, Lamarckism had little to offer. 
The links to social policy that some Neo-Lamarckians had forged now appeared to 
be fraught with moral and ethical problems that could lead to the misuse of science. 
Neither Kammerer nor Lysenko had provided any sound evidence that Lamarckism 
operated at a molecular, or indeed organism level. Thus, there was no impetus to 
seek Lamarckian phenomena either in the lab or in the field. Not only had Kammerer 
and Lysenko lost their contests for authority, but also the culture of distrust for links 
between science and ideology meant that further authority was withdrawn from 
them. Not only did those ‘inside’ science reject their work, but also the inhabitants of 
adjacent cultural territories agreed that such work should not be included as 
‘science’.
The Kammerer and Lysenko episodes appear to confirm that adherence to 
Lamarckian principles is unwise. It seems that Kammerer was encouraged towards 
fraud because he could not generate genuine physical evidence of Lamarckism. Also, 
it appears that Lysenko followed bad practice and used political alliances to protect 
his position because he also was not able to generate results. Irrespective of the 
historical accuracy underlying these constructions, they are nevertheless recorded on 
the old map. The inclusion of these constructions as landmarks forms part of the 
record of stigmatisation and defamation. That record remains for reference during 
new contests.
On the old map, the stories of Kammerer and Lysenko further assert the 
success of Darwinism. While Lamarckians have exhibited weakness in experiment,
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the Darwinians have been rigorous, for example, in population studies and 
Drosophila genetics. The identity of Lamarckism on the old map was contributed to 
by William Bateson’s boundary work and fraud accusations against Kammerer, the 
synthesis authors reinforcement of those accusations, and finally by the cultural 
stigma of Lysenko’s marriage of science and political ideology. Where the 
Kammerer narrative had added fraud as a landmark, the Lysenko story added abuse 
of power and political corruption. The old map features Kammerer and Lysenko not 
only as failures in their own contests for authority, but also as exemplars of the 
stigma attached to Lamarckian sympathy; the construction of these two individuals 
as frauds stigmatised the act of Lamarckian support.
3.2.2: Some other features of the old man identity of Lamarckism.
Michael Ghiselin has examined the fate of Lamarck and Lamarckism during 
the twentieth century.544 Although Ghiselin does not use Gieryn’s ‘old maps’ 
language, he is nevertheless effectively examining the construction, form and 
deployment of the old map identity of Lamarckism. Ghiselin uses school textbooks 
to demonstrate the construction and perpetuation of what he calls ‘the imaginary 
Lamarck’. He argues, as I do here, that the construction of Lamarckism has been 
undertaken in part in a service role to the triumphalist construction of Darwinism. He 
suggests that the Lamarck in school textbooks is used as a straw man for Darwinism 
to topple. He adds that this tactic demands that a fictitious Lamarckism be invented 
i.e. one that enables comparison and contrast with Darwinism. This leads to what 
Ghiselin calls the development of a ‘false dichotomy’ between Lamarckism and 
Darwinism. Cultural perception of that constructed dichotomy is perhaps one of 
factors that makes the old map identities of Lamarckism and Darwinism so persistent 
between conflict episodes, and thus gives such endurance to the authority allocations 
that the map records. I argue that the Lamarckism constructed to serve this 
dichotomy has contributed several key features to the old map.
The Darwin versus Lamarck dichotomy that Ghiselin traces in school 
textbooks relies upon the construction of Lamarck as a precursor to Darwin, with
544 Ghiselin, M. (1994)
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Lamarckism superseded by Darwinism. This adds a record of ‘abandonment’ to the 
record of discredit I have described above. Ghiselin explains that, to act as a 
precursor, Lamarck is constructed as the architect of a theory of evolution, the 
originator of the theory of acquired characteristics and as a natural scientist. 
However, he points out, Lamarck neither originated the notion of evolution nor that 
of the inheritance of acquired characters. He presented his views on evolution 
alongside little scientific evidence, and his work was regarded at the time as 
philosophy rather than science. Ghiselin argues that Lamarck was principally a 
metaphysician, and that his interest in evolution was bom out of that enthusiasm. He 
states that:
‘Textbooks pit Lamarck against Darwin in a mythical contest from which Darwin 
emerges victorious. To perpetuate that myth, the textbook-writers lead students to 
believe that Lamarck embraced the inheritance of acquired characteristics, that 
Darwin rejected it, and that this is the crucial difference between the two men’s ideas 
about evolution.’
Irrespective of the historical accuracy of this presentation the old map nevertheless 
comes to record Lamarckism as an outmoded precursor of Darwinism. For Ghiselin 
this goes as far as to imbue Lamarckism with a significance it never had.
Ghiselin describes how the Darwin versus Lamarck dichotomy relies on 
certain common rhetorical devices, the perpetuation of which he traces through a 
succession of school textbooks. The most common of these is the trivialising of 
Lamarck’s theoretical work, with the clearest example being the story of the giraffe’s 
neck. That story suggests that Lamarck proposed that giraffes developed long necks 
after successive generations of the species stretching and elongating their necks as 
they reached for leaves in taller and taller trees. Through this process of use, and the 
acquiring of characters, each new generation arrived with a longer neck than the last. 
Ghiselin demonstrates that Lamarck’s theory is often illustrated using only the 
example o f the giraffe’s neck. This is perhaps the most iconic feature of the 
construction o f Lamarckism, and the story has been retold in countless introductions 
to evolutionaiy theory. However, as Ghiselin points out, Lamarck never proposed
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the case of the giraffe as proof of the theory of acquired characters, rather he 
suggested it briefly as a hypothetical example of how evolution might occur. In fact, 
the English translation of Lamarck’s 1809 Philosophie Zoologique is 405 pages 
long, and the giraffe reference appears only once and is two lines long.545 
Furthermore, Charles Darwin discusses the giraffe’s neck in the sixth edition of The 
Origin o f  Species. Ghiselin says that, in spite of this, textbook authors have been 
recycling the iconic oversimplification of the giraffe story for decades to indicate the 
inadequacy of Lamarckian theory. Historian of science Ron Roizen suggests that the 
perpetuation of the giraffe story, and its use a tool for the trivialisation of 
Lamarckian theory, has led to the fact that ‘for most of us, Lamarckian evolutionary 
theory has been reduced to the bogus example of the giraffe’s neck’.546
The dichotomy between Darwinism and Lamarckism is further enforced by 
isolating one theory from the other (except in the link manifest between precursor 
and successor), and pronouncing them mutually exclusive theories. Ghiselin argues 
that this impression of isolation is promoted by the fact that few textbook treatments 
refer to Darwin’s own support of a theory of acquired characters. Darwin refers to 
Lamarck and was well aware of the content of his work. Therefore, rather than 
isolation, there is instead a degree of intellectual continuity in the work of these two 
theorists. In the construction of Lamarck as a precursor of Darwin it seems that the 
fifty years between the two men’s contributions divided them completely. However, 
this does not take account of the continuum of evolutionary thought that existed in 
the intervening period. Lamarck and Darwin are far more intellectually and 
historically linked than the textbook representations generally imply.
So, the constructions of Kammerer and Lysenko’s iconic failures appear as 
landmarks on the old map, denoting fraud and recording the legacy of discredit. 
Meanwhile, the map is added to by other kinds of authors who emphasise historical 
abandonment over discredit. These constructions serve a role in the construction of 
the triumphalist narrative of Darwinism, but they also contribute to a stand-alone 
identity of Lamarckism that was being created simultaneously. What Ghiselin
545 Lamarck, J. B. (1809)
546 Roizen, R. (1971) The argument of philosophie zoologique. History of science seminar at Berkley, 
Califorinia. Transcript available at: www.roizen.com/ron/lamarck.htai
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considers to be the perpetuation of an identity of Lamarck by ‘successive teams of 
plagiarists’ is, in the terms of this chapter, perpetuation of the old map identity of 
Lamarckism. The replication of the construction of failed Lamarckism shows how 
the identity/authority of Lamarckism achieved the cultural stability and persistence 
that Gieryn sees as the hallmark of an old map.
3.2.3: The three deaths of Lamarckian theory and the rise o f dogma in evolutionary 
biology: closure rhetoric perpetuates the old maps of Darwinism and Lamarckism
In this section I describe the three ‘deaths’ of Lamarckism that appear on the old 
map: August Weismann’s germ/soma divide, Luria and Delbruck’s fluctuation test 
and Francis Crick’s central dogma. These three major refutations are important 
landmarks on the record of the decline and discredit of Lamarckism, and each is 
represented as the final blow for the theory. Attempts to resurrect Lamarckism have 
been made subsequent to each refutation, and the old map identity of Lamarckism 
has been deployed to control those attempts.
The significance attached to these refutations resulted in the rise of certain 
Darwinian dogmas in evolutionary biology. I argue that these dogmas are recorded 
on the old map as confirmations of the monopoly of Darwinism in evolutionary 
biology. These dogmas assert the validity of the refutations and ensure their 
perpetuation as features of the old map.
August Weismann shuts down Lamarckism.
August Weismann is credited as having achieved the first experimental 
refutation of Lamarckism. In 1893, Weismann published the results of mouse 
experiments that apparently confirmed the failure of Lamarckian heredity and 
environment directed evolution.547 A protracted study of the heritability of tail 
amputation had lead Weismann to conclude that environmental influences upon a 
parent generation could not effect the phenotype of offspring; traits acquired during 
a lifetime could not be passed through heredity to subsequent generations. 
Weismann identified a division between the reproductive cells and the body cells,
547 Weismann, A. (1893) The germ plasm: a theory of heredity. Scott publishing Company, London
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which he defined as the germ/soma divide. He branded the germ cells immune to the 
effects of somatic cell modification by the environment.548 That barred the route for 
the inheritance of acquired characters.
In the tum-of-the-century context these results enjoyed enhanced credibility 
because they had been generated through experimental work. At that time practical 
experimentation was regarded as the best route for understanding heritability and 
adaptation. In the relation to the old map record, Weismann’s work appears to have 
precipitated decline in Lamarckian support around the turn of the century. As Bowler 
puts it: 4 Weismann’s theory had a crucial implication for evolution: it made 
Lamarckism impossible’.549 However, I have mentioned above that no such decline 
in Lamarckian support was evident at that time. Bowler acknowledges the actual 
contemporary impact of Weismann’s work: 4 Far from putting Darwinism on a firmer 
footing, his campaign backfired and ignited a wave of anti-Darwinian feeling that 
swept through biology in the decades around 1900.’ The effect of this was that: 
4...many biologists preferred to move into the Neo-Lamarckian camp.’550 So 
Weismann’s work, which is credited historically as a major blow to Lamarckism, in 
fact had the opposite result. His refutation has been constructed subsequently to 
support the image of a steady rise of Darwinism and steady decline in Lamarckisn 
support.
What can a broader view of Weismann’s work tell us? Weismann had studied 
a mutilation effect, and concluded from this the invalidity of the 4use/disuse’ theory. 
While his concept of the germ/soma divide may have been legitimate, the existence 
of that divide could not be tested through the inheritance of mutilation. Weismann 
failed to test the results of use/disuse effects, and instead tested for the inheritance of 
injury. Despite these methodological problems, Weismann’s work has nevertheless 
been constructed as precedent against Lamarckian inheritance. When Edward Steele 
published his theory of acquired immunity in 1979551, Weismann’s barrier was 
invoked as one serious impediment to the acceptance of the results.552 Similarly, in
548 Maynard-Smith, J. (1993b)(3rd edition)
549 Bowler, P. (1989)(revised edition) p.251
550 Bowler, P. (1989) p. 117
551 Steele, E. (1979).
552 Pollard, J. (1984) Is Weismann’s barrier absolute? In: Mae-Wan Ho & P. Saunders (Eds.) Beyond 
Neo-Darwinism: an introduction to the new evolutionary paradigm. Academic Press, London.
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the case of directed mutation, Weismann was again cited as an example of precedent 
against the claims.553 It seems, therefore, that in spite of the practical problems of 
Weismann’s experiment, its results were incorporated into the persistent identity of 
the legitimacy of Lamarckism. The old map summarizes all the contests that 
Lamarckism is perceived to have lost, and Weismann’s results where constructed as 
a key one of those losses.
Michael Ghiselin suggests that Weismann’s experiments have been 
constructed as an iconic refutation of Lamarckism.554 From the time of their 
publication they have been cited as a key disproof of Lamarckism, and that recurrent 
citation has gained its own momentum and persistence through replication. Ghiselin 
states that Weismann’s experiments have been ‘mindlessly cited in many textbooks’ 
to exemplify the ‘tests’ that Lamarckism has failed. Ghiselin suggests that textbook 
authors are effectively required to demonstrate how the contest between Lamarckism 
and Darwinism was decided in favour of Darwinism. He argues that they use the 
notion of ‘tests’ to give iconic examples of Lamarckian failure. The three examples 
o f closure that I discuss in this section have been constructed and perpetuated on 
account of their usefulness as examples of ‘tests’ affirming the superiority of 
Darwinism.
Salvador Luria and Max Delbruck shut down Lamarckism (again).
In 1943, Luria and Delbruck published results of bacterial experiments that 
appeared to rule out mutation as a directed or adaptive response to environmental 
change.555 They had raised bacteria in media containing bacteriophage virus; an 
agent of lethal infection. The only bacteria able to survive the infection would be 
those that had achieved resistance through mutation. The aim of the assay was to test 
whether these resistant mutants arose as a result of directed adaptation influenced by 
the infection, or at random times during the culture irrespective of the presence of 
the infectious agent. To support the Darwinian model these mutations would have to 
occur at random, as a chance mutation that happened to confer benefit where it arose 
in the company of bacteriophage. Alternatively, in support of directed mutation,
553 Lenski, R., Slatkin, M. & Ayala, F. (1989)
554 Ghiselin, M. (1994)
555 Luria, S. & Delbruck, M. (1943)
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increased levels of resistance mutation would occur subsequent to the introduction of 
infection.
After culturing the bacteria alongside the bacteriophage, the researchers 
measured the quantity of resistant mutants in each colony. They created the 
‘fluctuation test’ as a statistical analysis of the distribution of the resistant mutants.556 
This test predicted that the distribution resulting from random (not environment 
directed) mutation would appear as a ‘normal’ distribution, or as a bell curve. With 
random mutation the number of mutants would vary widely between individual 
replica-plated cultures, depending upon the point during the culture time at which the 
chance resistance mutation arose. A colony experiencing the beneficial mutation 
early on would contain a large number of resistant mutants when replica plated, 
since these would have had a chance to reproduce. Conversely, in a culture where the 
beneficial chance mutation occurred late on or not at all there would be far less 
resistant individuals in the replica-plated culture. The ‘normal’ distribution would 
therefore indicate that the resistance mutation arose at random during bacterial 
culture, and not at a common point determined by the introduction of the 
bacteriophage as a selective agent.
Luria and Delbruck’s 1943 paper reported that the bacteriophage resistance 
mutation exhibited this normal distribution; that is, bacterial mutation is random with 
respect to selective pressure. When the Harvard directed mutation research was 
published decades later, Luria and Delbruck’s fluctuation test was invoked as 
precedent against the results. That invocation appeals to the authority attached to 
Luria and Delbruck on the old map, and suggests that the new conflict be resolved 
on the basis of existing authority allocations. Cairns’ team had anticipated this, and 
dedicated space in their first paper to a lengthy description of the difference between 
their methodology and that used by Luria and Delbruck. They argued that the 1940s 
work had been undertaken using a lethal agent as the selective force. This meant that 
the bacteria had no chance to evolve to suit the conditions since they were killed at 
once unless they were resistant.
Luria and Delbruck’s research embodied a problem similar to Weismann’s. 
The effect concluded upon was not the one that had been tested. Luria and
556 Luria, S. & Delbruck, M. (1943)
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Delbruck’s assay did test for the frequency of phage resistance as a random 
mutation, however, it did not allow for a phase of adaptive mutation and yet 
concluded that it did not exist. Cairns’ experiments differed in that they impeded the 
growth of the bacteria rather than killing them. This left the bacteria alive in a 
stationary, non-reproductive state and with an impetus to undergo change, adapt, and 
re-enter growth phase.
Luria and Delbruck’s results are presented historically in much the same way 
as Weismann’s. Their fluctuation test is acknowledged as final definitive evidence 
against adaptive mutation, and thus Lamarckian environment directed evolution. 
Interestingly, alongside the construction of Weismann’s work, the ‘fluctuation test’ 
represents the second lethal blow to Lamarckian theory - which would appear as a 
rather redundant achievement. The reason for this apparent inconsistency in the 
historical presentation of this double termination of Lamarckism is that only half of 
the story of this ‘closure’ is being told. The presentation of Weismann’s work as 
conclusive is deceptive. In fact, as described above, his test was considered by many 
to have been invalid from its very premise. The traditional narrative describes 
Weismann’s publication as the point of the demise of Lamarckism, and yet history 
betrays the presence of an active community of Neo-Lamarckians who attributed 
very little importance to his research. The construction of a second demise of 
Lamarckism is necessary because the theory had not been closed down by 
Weismann’s work. By the 1940s, with Lamarckism at full strength in Russia, it had 
again become necessary to attempt the kind of definitive refutation of Lamarckian 
principles that the old map records Weismann had already achieved.
The ‘Central Dogma’ Shuts down Lamarckism (for the third time)
The rise of molecular genetics led to the proposal of extensions to the rules of 
heredity. In particular, the principle of unidirectional information transfer from 
genetic material to proteins was reinforced by developments from the 1940s 
onwards. In 1958, Francis Crick, co-discoverer of the structure of DNA, re­
expressed this principle in the rhetoric of his theory of genetic structure:
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‘The transfer of information from nucleic acid to nucleic acid, or from nucleic acid 
to protein may be possible, but transfer from protein to protein, or from protein to
557nucleic acid is impossible.’
Francis Crick termed this principle the ‘Central Dogma of molecular 
genetics’.558 He, and others, believed this principle was one of the constants of 
genetics, and that it barred communication between the environment and the 
genome. Crick later admitted that he had not been aware of the exact meaning of the 
word ‘dogma’ when he had coined this phrase, and that connotations of blind faith 
and unquestioning belief had been unintentional.559 Despite this error the reception 
of his ‘dogma’ was in fact concurrent with its literal sense. It became self-fulfilling; 
a justification for the unidirectional transfer of information from DNA to protein, 
rather than a description of this apparent phenomenon. An example of the self- 
fulfilling nature of this dogma is provided in John Maynard-Smith’s The Theory o f  
Evolution:
‘It follows that Weismann’s views must be accepted and Lamarck’s rejected, 
provided that two points can be established: i) that the central dogma of molecular 
biology is true, and ii) that the changes in the structure of organisms induced by 
changes in their environment cannot be transmitted direct to the next generation, 
without first being translated into nucleic acid.’560
This statement betrays the significance attached to Crick’s dogma, especially in 
terms of its role as a refutation of Lamarckian principles.
The ‘central dogma’ thus appears as the third ‘final blow’ for Lamarckism. 
The combination of Crick’s certainty regarding unidirectionality, with the 
constructions of Weismann and Luria and Delbruck, rendered debate on environment 
to DNA communication closed in the mid-late twentieth century.561 The deployment
557 Crick, F. (1958a) The biological replication of macromolecules. Symp. Soc. Exp. Biol., XII: 138
558 Maynard-Smith, J. (1993b)(4th Edition)
559 Judson, H. (1996) The eighth day of creation. Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Press, New York.
560 Maynard-Smith, J. (1993b) p.80
561 This denial of environment to DNA communication endured in spite of Temin & Baltimore’s 1970 
[Temin, H & Mitzutani, S. (1970); Baltimore, D (1970)] discovery of the enzyme reverse
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and repetition of these ‘closure’ episodes rendered directed mutation inevitably 
controversial. To a community that had experienced these three refutations the very 
concept of working on a phenomenon that relied upon environment to DNA 
communication was contentious. These three closure episodes had come to feature 
on the old map, and as that old map was unfurled during the directed mutation 
debate it seemed to offer immediate refutation of that new challenge.
3.3 Conclusion: the cultural and intellectual context for non-Darwinian 
research in the late twentieth century.
What does this tell us about the context for the directed mutation debate, and how 
does this help us understand the activity we see in that controversy? A key aim of 
this project is to identify forces of controversy perpetuation. To what extent can the 
social and cultural context of the directed mutation debate be attributed as an agent 
of controversy protraction?
By the late twentieth century the authority of Darwinism had achieved 
persistence between conflict episodes. A stable cultural identity of Darwinism had 
emerged based upon the numerous perceived successes of the theory and its 
proponents. An old map identity of Darwinism had emerged, constructed during the 
modem synthetic period, deployed and strengthened during the centennial 
celebrations and perpetuated through the activity of numerous authors in the later 
century. The old map summarised Darwinian successes during the numerous 
contests for authority in evolutionary biology. By the late twentieth century 
Darwinian theory was the only explanatory tool for evolutionary work in widespread 
use. Furthermore, Darwinism had not only achieved authority in relation to the 
intellectual community. The boundary work of the synthesis authors, and the work of 
subsequent textbook authors had created and deployed a popular cultural identity of 
Darwin and Darwinism. Even beyond the academic arena Darwinism had become 
synonymous with evolution. Charles Darwin had been constructed as the theory’s
transcriptase, which transforms RNA into DNA -  making possible half of the journey between protein 
and DNA that Crick’s Dogma rules out. The dogma has persisted, even though, as biochemist 
Laurence Moran has put it, ‘the demise of the central dogma of evolutionary biology is becoming an 
annual event.’ [Moran, L. (2007) Personal Blog at www.sandwalk.blogspot.com.]
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founding father, and his endeavour had been framed to fulfil the criteria for the 
public understanding of genius in science. The old map of Darwinism had been 
constructed, deployed and perpetuated; it confirmed the authority of Darwinism and 
was ready to be unfurled at once in the directed mutation conflict as a point of 
reference for deciding the outcome of this new contest.
Meanwhile, Lamarckism had been stigmatised, and the old map recorded its 
decline. Associations with fraud had been made both as part of the Darwinian 
triumphalist narrative and also as part of the separate histories of Lamarckian decline 
and pathological science. Textbook authors and popular writers constructed 
Lamarckism as a precursor of Darwinism, and described its eclipse by the newer 
theory. The old map, therefore, also became a summary o f the abandonment of 
Lamarckism in favour of Darwinism. Finally, episodes of iconic closure of 
Lamarckism became embedded in intellectual and cultural understandings of the 
history of Lamarckian opposition. The old map came to include the three refutations 
of Lamarckism (Weismann, Luria and Delbruck and the central dogma) as key 
features of the landscape of discredit.
The result of all this is historically interesting. When we view the history of 
evolutionary biology we do so through the lens of the old map images of 
Lamarckism and Darwinism. We see Darwinian triumph versus the decline of 
Lamarckism. However, historically twentieth century evolutionary biology in 
practice does not reflect those old map assertions. In spite of the accumulated 
closures of Weismann, Luria & Delbruck and Crick’s dogma, theorists have 
continued to discuss Lamarckism and even attempt its resurrection. Since each of the 
closures was flawed in important ways, the ultimate refutation of Lamarckism seems
c f / y
incomplete. Late twentieth century evolutionary biology was in practice more 
pluralistic than the old maps reveal. Bowler acknowledges this stating: ‘the orthodox 
historiography of the Darwinian Revolution passes over the anti-Darwinian theories 
as irrelevant. They do not lie on the main line of conceptual development from 
Darwin to the modem genetical theory of natural selection... \ 563
562 Weismann tested mutilation not acquired characters, Luria and Delbruck killed their bacterial 
subjects before they could evolve, and the discovery of reverse transcriptase exploded half of Crick’s 
dogma.
563 Bowler, P. (1989) p.92
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Even as the synthesis was being constructed Lamarckians remained active. In 
the 1940s and 1950s Waddington remained a vocal Lamarckian and authored on 
acquired characteristics.564 There has been continuity in twentieth century 
Lamarckian work, for example, with researchers recently providing details of the 
molecular basis for the theoretical claims that Waddington had made decades 
before.565 Edward Steele’s theory of acquired immunity has been accepted, and 
Cairn’s Harvard team keenly read Lamarckism into their bacterial observations. 
And, as a foil to ultra-Darwinian advocates such as Mayr, Dawkins and Dennett, 
there have been vocal Lamarckian supporters. Edward Steele is of particular note.566 
There are many other examples of late twentieth century Lamarckian work besides 
these. In fact, enough that Burkhardt has announced them ‘too numerous and 
diverse’ to be dealt with effectively in his ‘short paper’ on Lamarckism in Britain 
and the United States.567 Bowler attributes historians’ neglect of these alternate 
theories to the ‘imbalance created by the Darwin industry in the history of 
science’.568 What this reveals is that in the case of old maps, the map and the terrain 
do not necessarily agree. That further illustrates the extent to which old maps 
themselves are constructed tools for serving agendas, rather than historical records. 
Old maps are created by boundary work, and then they become tools of boundary 
work.
It is a larger project than can be undertaken here, but there remains a history 
of late twentieth century Lamarckism to be recovered from the skewed history that 
the old maps promulgate. Bowler has attempted to recover some of that history, 
rehabilitating the ‘forgotten anti-Darwinians’. He urges that ‘a thorough study of
564 See for example, Waddington, C. (1942) Canalization of development and the inheritance of 
acquired characters. Nature, 150: 536-565; Waddington, C. (1953) Genetic assimilation of an 
acquired character. Evolution, 7: 118-126.
565 Rutherford, S. & Lindquist, S. (1998) Hsp90 as a capacitor for morphological evolution. Nature, 
396: 336-342; McLaren, A. (1999) Too late for the midwife toad. Stress, variability and Hsp90. 
Trends in genetics, 15(5): 169-171.
566 However, the fate of these ‘hidden’ Lamarckians demonstrates die punishments exacted on those 
that defy the old map declarations. In Steele’s case he has lost credibility, university affiliation, and is 
in a court battle to defend his professionalism. See: Steele, E. (1979) Somatic selection and adaptive 
evolution: on the inheritance o f  acquired characteristics. Williams & Wallace International, Toronto, 
Ontario; Steele, E., Lindley, R. & Blanden, R  (1998) Lamarck’s signature: how retrogenes are 
changing Darwin’s natural selection paradigm. Allen & Unwin, St Leonard’s, Australia; Steele, E. 
(2000) The evidence for Lamarck. Quadrant, XLIV (364): 47-56.
567 Burkhardt, R. (1980) p.343
568 Bowler, P. (1989) p.93
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these theories is essential if there is to be an accurate understanding of how 
evolutionism developed...’.569 Historians have begun to show the way, developing a 
suspicion concerning the traditional (or old map) characterisation of Lamarck’s 
theory and his construction as a defeated precursor for Darwin. Work has begun to 
dispel some of the myths that the old maps have introduced.570
On account of all this, in 1988, the suggestion of a non-Darwinian molecular 
process was profoundly problematic. It went not only against the consensus of the 
academic community, but also against the consensus recorded in the cultural 
cartography more widely regarding the authority attributed to Darwin and 
Darwinism. In addition, not only had Cairns and his team proposed a non-Darwinian 
model, but they had also framed their work as a Lamarckian resurrection. This 
alliance with Lamarckism invited the stigma of unorthodoxy. Reference to the old 
map confirmed for the opponents of directed mutation that Lamarckian resurrections 
had already been rejected in many contests. The proponents of directed mutation had 
attached themselves to a legacy that seemed to automatically invalidate their 
claims.571
The degree, stability and persistence of the cultural authority attached to 
Darwinism in the late twentieth century determined the severity of antagonism that 
greeted the directed mutation publications. The old map recorded Darwinian
569 Bowler, P. (1989) p.93
570 See for examples, Ghiselin, M. (1994); Barthelemy-Madaule, M. (1982) Lamarck and the mythical 
precursor, (trans. M. Shank) MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
571 Cairns, Overbaugh & Miller’s (1988) alliance with Lamarckism appears counter intuitive. It seems 
unwise to have invoked the legacy of Lamarckian resurrection when we consider the stigma that this 
necessarily attached to their work. Their motivations for this alliance are explored in chapter 4.
572 Other ‘non-Darwinian’ theoretical work met with similar antagonism in the late twentieth centuiy. 
Of particular note: The theory of acquired immunity [Gorczynski, R. & Steele, E. (1981)
Simultaneous yet independent inheritance of somatically acquired tolerance to two distinct H-2 
antigenic halotype determinants in mice. Nature, 289: 678-681; Steele, E. & Gorczynski, R. (1981) 
Inheritance of acquired somatic modifications of the immune system. In: T. Hraba & M. Haskete 
(Eds.) Cellular and molecular mechanisms o f immunological tolerance. Marcel Dekker, New York] 
Of which Walter Fitch stated: ‘The reason for there being little concern among Darwinists for this 
rather common inheritance of acquired characters is that ‘die inheritance of acquired characteristics is 
more of a slogan that captures part of the Lamarckian spirit than a statement of distinctiveness from 
Darwinism.’ [Fitch, W. (1982) The challenges to Darwinism since the last centennial and the impact 
of molecular studies. Evolution, 36: 1133-1143. p.l 137] Also, the paleontoloigcal theory of 
punctuated equilibria and macro-evolution, which states that the Darwinian theory of ‘gradualism’ in 
evolution is not supported by the fossil record, which instead betrays periods of rapid evolution 
interspersed with periods of evolutionaiy stasis. [Eldredge, N. & Gould, S. J. (1972) Punctuated 
equilibria: an alternative to phyletic gradualism. In: T. Schopf (Ed.) Models in paleobiology.
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theory as orthodoxy. The same map also recorded the triumph of the theory over 
Lamarckism in a succession of contests. The directed mutation work was therefore 
necessarily controversial since it conflicted with the ‘records’. The invocation of 
Lamarckism by the Harvard team meant that what might have been a debate in 
molecular biology, instead necessarily became an incarnation of the much longer 
running Darwinism versus Lamarckism conflict. What might have been a local and 
episodic contest became part of a continuum of dissent, and was linked to a historical 
legacy of conflict. Rather than the debate involving the drawing and redrawing of 
boundaries, instead old maps were unfurled and used as points of reference for this 
new contest. At once, decades of precedent became relevant to the negotiation of this 
anomaly, and the debate took on a scale and protraction much in excess of what 
would have been likely without the invocation of this legacy o f evolutionary debate.
Freeman, San Francisco.] Which Fitch disregards, saying: ‘...I can only conclude that punctuated 
equilibria are quite consistent with Darwinism.’ [Fitch, W. (1982) p.l 140]
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Chapter 4: The role of ‘the clash of sub-disciplines’ and 'advocacy’ in the 
perpetuation of the directed mutation debate.
In this chapter, I examine a further two of the six perpetuating forces that I identify 
in this project: ‘the clash of sub-disciplines’ and ‘advocacy’. In section 4 .11 describe 
how an inter-disciplinary contest, between molecular biologists and evolutionary 
biologists, contributed to the protraction of the directed mutation debate. I suggest 
that Gieryn’s boundary work theory can be applied to analyses of contests between 
groups of science specialists as effectively as it can be used to describe contests 
between science and other cultural domains. In section 4.1.2, I attempt to 
characterise molecular biology and evolutionary biology to determine their different 
styles, and attribute some controversy perpetuation to their different approaches. In 
section 4.1.3 I examine an analogous case of disciplinary conflict: the clash of 
chemists and physicists during the Cold Fusion debate.
In section 4.2 I deal explicitly with the role of John Cairns in the directed 
mutation debate. I examine his role as an advocate, and seek the boundary work 
motivations and interests that underpinned his approach. In section 4.2.1, I offer a 
biography of this key participant, and locate his involvement with this controversy 
within his long career as a prestigious and esteemed scientist. In section 4.2.2 I use 
the language Merton’s ‘norms’ to illustrate that Cairns retained his attention to his 
obligations as a scientist even though he chose to engage with unorthodoxy. In 
section 4.2.3 I examine the boundary work carried out by the advocates and 
adversaries in this conflict in more detail, and in particular, I attempt to explain why 
Cairns chose to make a Lamarckian association. In section 4.2.5, I contrast Cairns 
style of advocacy with that of Barry Hall, characterising them as ‘loud’ and ‘quiet’ 
advocates respectively. I argue that Cairn’s particular style (loud) increased the life- 
expectancy of the contest, perpetuating negotiation as a tactic of his advocacy. In 
section 4.2.6, I describe the analogous case of Stanley Pons and Martin 
Fleischmann’s ‘loud’ advocacy versus Steve Jones ‘quiet’ advocacy in the Cold 
Fusion debate.
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4.1 The clash of disciplines.
The directed mutation anomaly arose in the context of molecular biological research, 
yet the implications of the anomaly were constructed as a problem for Neo- 
Darwinian evolutionary theory. Therefore, the debate precipitated a clash between 
the disciplinary groups ‘molecular biology’ and ‘evolutionary biology’. The majority 
of participants in the debate are members of one or other of those communities, and 
the core-set is composed of advocates of directed mutation who are molecular 
biologists and their adversaries, who are evolutionary biologists.
4.1.1 Molecular biology versus evolutionary biology.
The delineations that separate science into sub-disciplines have been studied from a 
variety of perspectives. The oldest approaches are essentialist, and assume that 
science is divided into disciplines because nature itself is divided into aspects.573 
Sociological approaches have arisen more recently. The earliest of these were based 
on interest theories, and they considered that scientists operated in disciplinary 
groups as a strategy for competing effectively for scarce resources. In the interest 
models, groups of scientists, or individuals, compete for publication priority, funding 
and public esteem. The majority of interest models focussed on the competition 
between individuals, although they also often took into account the motivations for 
disciplinary associations. For example, when two or more disciplines are involved in 
a contest the practitioners of each branch of science act as a ‘corporation’ and 
compete in groups.574
With the rise of the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) disciplinarity 
began to be looked at in new ways, particularly from a constructivist perspective. 
Some of the SSK studies looked at the demarcation of science from non-science, and 
it was from that attention that boundary work theory and cultural cartography arose. 
However, boundary theory has rarely been extended to address the processes by
573 McAllister, J. (1992)
574 McAllister, J. (1992)
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which the internal delineations of science are determined and maintained. As 
Thomas Gieryn has noted, the studies have focussed on the delineation of science 
from non-science and the activities that determine that demarcation.575 Recently, 
contributions from cognitive sociology have turned further attention on the 
disciplinary demarcations.576 These treatments move away from the interests focus, 
and instead consider how disciplinarity influences the knowledge claims of the 
scientific sub-communities. These studies consider the corporate differences that 
underlie the approaches of the disciplinary groups and how those differences 
influence the knowledge products of the communities.
In this section, I argue that a useful way of examining the role of 
disciplinarity in controversy is to extend boundary theory, and to an extent the 
cartographic metaphor, to an analysis of the internal delineations of science. This 
method allows the activities of advocates and adversaries from different disciplinary 
groups to be framed as boundary work. To enable this method the cartographic 
metaphor must be refined to have a further level of focus than in standard boundary 
work analyses. This increased level of focus can be thought of as a modification of 
the cartographic gaze. The order of boundary normally considered, i.e. that between 
science and the other non-science cultural domains like politics and art, is equivalent 
in the cultural cartography to a national boundaiy. A refined gaze, that allows a 
study of disciplinarity within science, visualises boundaries that are equivalent in the 
cultural cartography to state or county delineations.
One of the problems with the cartographic metaphor is that it implies 
adjacencies that are not necessarily relevant or useful. The geography of, and 
distance between, the delineated areas on the map do not reflect stable adjacencies or 
relations between areas of culture. The cartographic metaphor is necessarily 
illustrative rather than descriptive. It provides a visual metaphor for delineation, but 
it does not reflect the actual relationship between territories in terms of adjacency or 
overlap. We cannot begin to paste terms like ‘science’, ‘politics’ and ‘art’ into the 
blank spaces and hope to have depicted the relations between the areas of culture. To
573 Gieryn, T. (1999a)
576 Gieiyn, T. (1999a)
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understand the relationship between territories the cartographic metaphor has to 
become the multiple maps metaphor, in which there is no one constant map of 
culture, only maps that emerge from the way the delineations are looked at. For 
example, from some perspectives chemistry and physics would be adjacent on the 
map, overlapping even, and comparatively friendly. However, under some 
circumstances, i.e the cold fusion debate that I discuss below, the delineation of 
these territories becomes sharply defined, they act as islands and are at war with one 
another. So cartographies are as local and episodic as the territory delineations that 
they provide a metaphor for.
To avoid the confusion that stems from misleading adjacencies, I suggest that 
it might be helpful to use a more abstract graphic to depict the internal delineations 
of science. For example:
The benefit of using this circular graphic of delineation is that it allows notions of 
orthodoxy/unorthodoxy and centre/periphery to be included in the visualization of 
the internal space o f science. For example the most orthodox and mainstream work
Genetics Ecology
Bio-
Chemistry
Quantum 
Physics .
Botany
Not
Science
Figure 2: An abstract depiction 
of the territory ‘science’
Figure 3: An abstract depiction 
of a few of the disciplinaiy 
delineations within the territory 
‘science’
in any discipline would be located on this abstract map close to the centre. The more
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unorthodox work is closer to the periphery. Some work or theories exist at the edges 
and are marginalized, being on the verge of being rejected from the territory 
‘science’. The graphic therefore allows for the fact that even within the specific 
disciplines that comprise science there is not absolute consensus regarding 
theoretical frameworks. There is heterogeneity within disciplines caused by the fact 
that the various practitioners might subscribe to a variety of different schools of 
thought. Furthermore, as Martin Rudwick has observed in relation to the Devonian 
controversy, the territories delineated within science do not necessarily ‘enclose an 
undifferentiated interior of equal competence’. Therefore, when attention is turned 
to scientific disciplinarity, and contests between disciplinary groups, there remains a 
considerable amount of heterogeneity in practice and competence to be taken into 
consideration.
Genetics Ecology
Quantum
Physics
Bio- 
[i chemistry
Botany Periphery
\
\
N/ Marginalisation
Figure 4: Notions of centre, periphery and marginalization can be built into the abstract depiction of 
the interior of the territory science.
In the case of the directed mutation debate, the site of contest is at the 
delineation that separates evolutionary biology and molecular biology. The conflict
577Rudwick, M. (1985) p.419
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between evolutionary biologists and molecular biologists was the result of a contest 
for authority between the two communities. The directed mutation researchers had 
made statements about the implications of a bacterial anomaly for evolutionary 
theory. Essentially, they had attempted to extend their authority to make statements 
about issues normally outside the domain of their discipline. The evolutionary 
biologists perceived those statements as an infringement, and attempted to reassert 
their singular authority to describe evolutionaiy phenomena. The first publications 
on directed mutation show this disciplinary boundary dispute emerging.
Sociologist James McAllister has argued that, to make a contribution to SSK, 
it is not enough to describe the tension between disciplines. Analyses must go 
further and consider the extent to which that tension influences the nature of the 
knowledge claims that emerge from the different disciplinary groups.578 In the case 
of the directed mutation debate, we can see how the boundary motivations of each of 
the communities are reflected in their approach to the knowledge claim. The 
activities in the early part of the debate are very similar in nature to those that 
McAllister has observed during the disciplinary contest of the Cold Fusion debate 
(see 4.1.2). For example, the molecular biologists are enthusiastic about the 
prospects for a ‘strong version’ of directed mutation theory. They assert theories that 
include environment direction of very specific mutations, and view those theories as 
very much in conflict with Neo-Darwinism and the central dogma. For the molecular 
biologists, the stronger the version of directed mutation the more impact it has on 
evolutionary biology. In turn, the more influence the anomaly has on evolutionary 
biology the stronger their case for an extension of their authority into the domain 
usually exclusive to evolutionary biologists.
Meanwhile, the evolutionary biologists were interested in reducing or 
eliminating the impact of the anomaly on their discipline. It was in their interest to 
eradicate the anomaly, and so with it eradicate the material of the molecular 
biologists’ challenge to the boundaries of their discipline. For that reason they 
employed two tactics in their response. First, they attempted to attribute the 
phenomenon to error or poor methodology. Second, they offered explanations that
578 McAllister, J. (1992)
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allowed for the existence of the observations, but did so within a framing that made 
them non-Lamarckian, and not anti-Darwinian. Those authors (i.e. Stahl, and later 
Lenski and Mittler) offered a weak model of directed mutation that allowed for a 
special mutational process, specific to bacteria and existing as a stress response to 
challenging environments. The evolutionary biologists did not go as far as to 
attempt to discredit the directed mutation researchers, but they did imply they that 
had misinterpreted the significance of their observations for evolutionary theory.
McAllister suggests that disciplinary contests have the effect of (i) colouring 
participants’ responses with professional interests, (ii) encouraging corporate 
responses on the part of participants, and even (iii) influencing the very nature of the 
knowledge claims that contestants present. We see this borne out in the directed 
mutation debate. Firstly, the advocates’ mode of presentation was selected in service 
to their professional interests of expanding their authority. They not only reported an 
anomaly, but also asserted its challenge to evolutionary biology. Meanwhile, their 
adversaries’ criticisms served their interest of protecting their existing authority. 
Secondly, evolutionary biologists banded together in their criticism, forming a 
united front (particularly Levin, Lenski and Mittler), acting in corporate response to 
the threat. As biologist Billy Goodman has put it: ‘Cairns’ article galvanised 
evolutionary biologists’.579 Thirdly, the nature of the advocates knowledge claim 
was influenced by the disciplinary authority contest -  being framed as Lamarckian, 
where without that contest it might just have passed as a bacterial anomaly (see 
below for contrast, Hall who made similar observations but reported them without 
framing an authority challenge).
Bound up with the legitimacy of the directed mutation claims was the issue 
of which disciplinary group possessed the authority to describe the phenomenon. 
Their motivations regarding that authority struggle in part determined their activity 
during the debate.
4.1.2 Molecular biology versus evolutionary biology: a conflict of ‘styles’ of
science.
579 Goodman, B. (1992) Directed mutations: heredity made to order. Mosaic, 23(1): 24-33
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In this section, I argue that the different approaches of the molecular biologists and 
the evolutionary biologists are also partly attributable to underlying differences in 
‘style’ between the two groups. I attempt to characterise these sub-disciplines, taking 
into account differences in their methodology, knowledge base and growth as a way 
of contrasting their nature and practice. I suggest that these differences have made it 
difficult for the two groups to carry out effective negotiation. I describe their 
different approaches using the language of Kuhn’s ‘paradigms’ and Lakatos’s 
‘research programmes’. I argue that molecular biology encourages that its 
participants act as a research school, while the nature of evolutionary biology 
encourages a tendency towards paradigm defence.
To establish a characterisation of the two disciplines it is necessary to start 
by making some general statements about what distinguishes the two groups styles.
Evolutionary Biology
This branch of science is cohered by its participants’ consensus regarding the broad 
utility of Darwinian theory as a tool for revealing the processes and history of 
evolution. The discipline is convened around that ‘one big theory’ - and a range of 
laws, or dogmas, have been created which validate and protect its centrality. For 
example the ubiquity of Survival of the Fittest ensures the action of Natural 
Selection, and The Central Dogma ensures that the material of Natural Selection is 
random with respect to the demands of the environment. Adaptation is central to 
interpretations within evolutionary biology. Evolutionary biologists are engaged in a 
project to submit more and more elements of the natural world to analysis through 
the adaptionist programme of Neo-Darwinism. They take new cases and use their 
‘one big theory’ to create explanations and new knowledge claims regarding 
evolutionary history. The new material examined can be from any level of nature; 
from the microbiological, to macro-evolutionary phenomena of tempo and mode in 
evolution. Biologists Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin have described this
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work as ‘evolutionary story-telling’ and stated that it dominates activity in
< -o n
evolutionary biology.
The theoretical basis of evolutionary biology is also dignified by a ratifying 
history of its success and triumph over other theories, and is consolidated by stories 
of a founding father who is characterised as a ‘genius’ (see Chapter 3). Much rests 
upon consensus regarding the value of the discipline’s key theory, and as a result 
there is very little heterogeneity within the discipline in terms of alternative 
knowledge claims or beliefs regarding the processes of evolution. The body of 
knowledge that has been created by the application of Darwinian theory through the 
adaptionist programme is open to little review.581 The theory is assumed correct and 
therefore its interpretations cany authority. Attempts from within the community to 
alter tenets of the theory are not welcomed.582 The result is that while new 
knowledge claims are added through the application of the theory to more cases, 
other claims are not being replaced or revised.
Overall, the activity in evolutionary biology might be characterised best 
using the familiar language of Kuhn’s ‘paradigm’. Kuhn suggested that paradigms 
determine what is to be examined, how things should be examined, and what kind of 
interpretations should be made within a discipline. This fits the disciplinary 
activity that I have described in this characterisation. In service to that paradigm 
evolutionary biologists carry out ‘paradigm defence’, protecting their ‘one big 
theory’ from anomalies and challenges by rejecting them or negating them, and 
declaring them not serious enough to demand a revision of the paradigm. The
580 Gould, S. J. & Lewontin, R. C. (1979) The spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: 
a critique of the adaptionist programme. Proceedings of the Royal Society o f London, Series B, 205 
(1161): 581-598.
581 Steven Jay Gould challenged the adpationist programme in evolutionary biology. He argued that 
not every trait and behaviour in the natural world should be submitted to ‘story-telling’ to reveal its 
probable adaptive value. Gould declares that it is a troubled methodology in which ‘plausibility alone 
is a criterion for accepting speculative tales’ [Gould & Lewontin (1979) p.581j. Gould’s critique was 
not well received and was challenged robustly; in particular, by Richard Dawkins, a keen adaptionist. 
See Sterelny, K. (2001) Dawkins vs Gould: survival of the fittest. Icon Books, Cambridge; Brown, A. 
(1997)
582 For example Niles Eldredge and Steven Jay Gould, who attempted to explain gaps in the fossil 
record not as missing items that are yet to be found, but rather, as evidence of rapid spells of 
evolution interspersed with long periods of stasis. This conflicts with the Darwinian tenet of 
‘gradualism’ in evolution, [see: Eldredge, N. & Gould, S. J. (1972); Eldredge, N. (1989) Time 
frames: the evolution o f Punctuated Equilibria. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.]
583 Kuhn, T. (1962)
206
success of evolutionary biologists in protecting the Neo-Darwinian paradigm is 
determined by their success at limiting dissent. Thus, we can see one goal of the 
evolutionary biologists’ criticism of directed mutation as the defence of the Neo- 
Darwinian paradigm. The authority of evolutionary biology is necessarily linked to 
the endurance and continuation of the Neo-Darwinian paradigm -  essentially 
because evolutionary biology is Neo-Darwinian theory. Thus boundary work for the 
protection of authority leads evolutionary biologists to defend the paradigm which 
convenes their authority.
Molecular Biology
In molecular biology practices are rather different. Rather than having a single 
theory acting as a paradigm, molecular biology instead has a body of knowledge and 
an associated range of methodologies that have produced that knowledge. In place of 
laws, there is accumulated observation that demonstrates patterns or general rules. 
There is not one central issue that must be agreed upon between practitioners, other 
than that there is a molecular world. New work in the discipline emerges as other 
areas of the molecular world are scrutinised, examined using any of numerous 
methodologies, and described in an agreed language. New claims have to come from 
experiments, rather than from predictive story telling based on theory. There is 
reasonable internal heterogeneity, which does not cause fundamental problems since 
there is no major impetus for complete consensus. Individual knowledge claims do 
not necessarily carry huge importance, since they do not directly reflect upon the 
authority of the method that created them. In molecular biology lots of new claims 
are constantly added, and lots are revised. Those revisions occur without 
undermining the disciplinary practice. This is much less at stake in molecular 
biology, since contests do not demand defence of one central theory.
The language of Lakatos’ research programmes helps us contrast the activity 
in molecular biology with that in evolutionary biology. Lakatos’ model views the 
scientific enterprise as marked by: growth, the discovery of new facts, the
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development of new techniques and the achievement of more precise predictions.584 
Lakatos suggests that research programmes have a ‘hard core’ of theory (negative 
heuristics), which is surrounded by an ‘auxiliary belt’ of hypotheses (positive 
heuristics). This belt of hypotheses protects the hard core, with objections and 
conflicts dealt with as positive heuristics. Successful research programmes grow 
over time, those that are unsuccessful degenerate and their hard core is falsified. For 
Lakatos, the ‘work’ in research programmes is the processing of the auxiliary belt 
hypotheses. It is a cumulative task to which all workers contribute. Research 
programmes proceed through ‘problem shifts’ -  not requiring any ‘revolution’ to 
change course, but rather a shift of the heuristics that define the research 
programme.
A key difference between the Lakatosian model and the Kuhnian is in the 
way that anomalies are dealt with. In paradigm theory any anomaly represents a 
threat to the paradigm and must be either rejected or redefined. Otherwise, the 
paradigm must be abandoned and a ‘revolution’ must occur. In the Lakatosian 
model, the hard-core is protected from conflict and negotiation, and need only come 
under threat if the programme itself begins to degenerate. Lakatosian type practice 
reflects the details of the characterisation of molecular biology that I have offered. 
Of course these traits are not entirely absent from evolutionary biology, but in that 
discipline they are the outcome of a practice that serves a single theory, whereas in 
molecular biology these traits define the practice.
These relatively unarticulated differences in practice between the disciplines makes 
them badly suited to engage together in negotiation. In the case of the directed 
mutation debate this difference in styles led to each discipline approaching the other 
in a way that was quite inappropriate. For example, the molecular biologists set 
about launching an assault on the central paradigmatic premise of evolutionary 
biology, creating a most offensive situation from the perspective of evolutionary 
biological practice. They launched an assault that had a significance beyond 
anything that could happen within their own discipline. Meanwhile, the evolutionary
584 Lakatos, I. (1970)
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biologists demonstrated a similar lack of understanding of appropriate practice in 
molecular biology by attempting to refute the new claims by recourse to precedent 
from dogma. Molecular biologists were subjected to a stifling of their interpretive 
flexibility.
The result was that evolutionary biologists were violently opposed to the 
implications of directed mutation and wanted the anomaly to be reinterpreted as 
unproblematic, while the molecular biologists felt that over-strong pressures of proof 
had been placed upon them by a community that used empty precedent as refutation. 
The molecular biologists were asking that the anomaly be accepted, but for the 
evolutionary biologists its assault on the Neo-Darwinian paradigm prevented that. 
Thus, the styles of the groups meant they did not know how to cope with the other’s 
approach, or necessarily how to understand the contest in the context of the others 
disciplinary practice. For the molecular biologists closure would mean the synthesis 
of these bacterial observations into the body of knowledge, or their rejection as 
incorrect. For the evolutionary biologists closure would mean refuting the existence 
of any anomaly, or reinterpreting the anomaly such that it came within the 
explanatory power of their paradigm. The result was that the two groups did not 
even share an idea of how this debate might end, let alone how that might be 
achieved.
This difference in styles is reinforced by the different intellectual challenges 
of molecular biology and evolutionary biology, and by the training of specialists in 
each field. Molecular biologists’ desire to share authority regarding the right to 
describe evolutionary phenomena did not suddenly confer upon them an 
understanding of or training in evolutionary biology. As Paul Rainey has pointed 
out:
‘Despite the fact that molecular biologists confront the stuff of evolution on a daily 
basis, our understanding of this process is at best fuzzy and at worst just plain
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wrong! Unfortunately there is nothing new here and the situation is unlikely to
• 585improve without a rethink of the way undergraduate microbiologists are trained.’
Thus the appeal for expansion by any discipline amounts to an application to share 
authority without necessarily sharing practice. In the case of evolutionary biology 
this is a further threat. One aspect of evolutionary biology that gives it integrity and 
authority is that it is practiced by evolutionary biologists. If others begin to engage, 
and introduce their own practice, then evolutionary biology ceases to be a thing in 
itself, and instead becomes a branch of study in various other science disciplines. 
This fact makes this contest even more problematic.
4.1.3 An analogous case: chemistry versus physics in the cold fusion debate.
On March 23rd 1989 electrochemists Martin Fleischmann and Stanley Pons held a 
press conference at the University of Utah to announce their discovery of ‘cold 
fusion’. They stated that palladium metal immersed in a heavy water solution, under 
electrostatic pressure, could generate four times the energy required to set the 
process in motion. Essentially, they claimed to have discovered a safe, clean process 
by which to generate energy.586 They had made thermal measures of the excess 
energy released, and had detected neutrons, tritium and helium, implying a nuclear 
fusion process underlay the energy production.
Inevitably, their announcement attracted huge attention from the media, the 
public and scientists. Not only was the promise of this new way of producing energy 
of great practical importance, but also it implied an entirely new interpretation of the 
physics of fusion. In addition, the announcement of the discovery through a press 
conference was highly unusual, and appeared controversial to the scientific 
community. Pons and Fleischmann had bypassed the standard professional controls 
of peer review and journal publication, choosing instead to make sensational claims
585 Rainey, P. (2004) Bacterial populations adapt - genetically, by natural selection, even in the lab! 
Microbiology Today, 31 (Nov): 160-162.
586 Simon, B. (2002)
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directly to the popular media.587 Immediately after the press conference, attempts to 
replicate the results began internationally, and a furious debate concerning their 
legitimacy was set in motion. However, it was not only the nature and replicability 
of the results that caused dissent. The Utah announcement had also precipitated an 
interdisciplinary clash between chemists and physicists.
Pons and Fleischmann were chemists, yet the material of the cold fusion 
claims was grounded in physics. Not only had they ‘published’ outside their narrow, 
specialist electrochemistry field, but they had done so without first consulting 
colleagues with special skills in physics or nuclear physics. Furthermore, the 
physical process that their results implied went against tenets of energy physics. 
Both the material and the style of their announcement were controversial, and 
transgressed limits of theory and practice. The greatest contention rested upon the 
fact that a pair of chemists claimed to have made a discovery of exceptional 
importance in the field of physics.
The majority of objections came from nuclear physicists, who argued that it 
was unlikely that a chemical process of any kind could produce a nuclear reaction, 
and that it would certainly not exist to a degree that would allow any commercial 
production of energy.588 Most critics suggested that Pons and Fleischmann’s results 
were the outcome of poor interpretation or experimental error. The replications 
attempted worldwide did not resolve the issue. Some reports emerged supporting the 
claims, while others suggested that no such effect existed. Some critics went as far 
as to make accusations of fraud, others settled for a verdict of incompetence and 
poor professionalism.589
Only one month after the Utah press conference Pons and Fleischmann 
appeared before congress to request $25 million for research into cold fusion.590 
Effectively, congress was being asked to decide the credibility of the cold fusion 
research, a highly unusual situation in the negotiation of scientific authority.591
587 Gieryn, T (1999a)
588 Simon, B. (2002)
589 Simon, B. (2002)
590 Peat, D. (1989) Coldfusion: the making of a scientific controversy. Contemporary Books,
Chicago.
591 Gieryn, T. (1999a)
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Witnesses were called to attest to the viability of Cold Fusion. The clash between 
chemists and physicists is reflected in the statements collected. Pons and 
Fleischmann placed emphasis upon the implications for national economics and 
safer power production. Conversely, when Steve Jones, a physicist from Brigham 
University, was called as a witness he emphasised how far away the observations 
were from being transformed into a usable technology, and added that quite possibly 
an application might never emerge. Jones pointed out that his team had made similar 
observations, but had not published because the results were far from being 
confirmed, and further from being applied as a technology.592 He implied that Pons 
and Fleischmann’s announcement had been premature. While the chemists 
emphasised the applications of cold fusion, the physicists insisted that science must 
come before technology. Ultimately, congress offered no funding. It seemed they 
favoured Jones’ argument that facts must precede speculation.593 Nevertheless, Pons 
pursued Cold Fusion at the American Chemical Society (ACS) in April 1989, where 
7,000 delegates heard him announce that chemists had ‘saved the day’. 594
In May 1989 the American Physical Society (APS) met and physicists 
negotiated the claims without inviting the press. They sought to reintroduce 
professional rigour into the sensationalised debate.595 Pons and Fleischmann did not 
attend despite being invited. Gieryn states that the APS meeting was the site at 
which Pons and Fleishmann were constructed as object lessons regarding the 
transgression of scientific norms, and were pushed to the periphery of orthodox 
science.596 At the APS conference the physicists reasserted the boundaries of 
physics, which had been challenged by Pons and Fleischmann. To limit the damage 
to the authority of physics, and science in general, the physicists sought to brand 
Pons and Fleischmann as unscientific, and even fraudulent. Gieryn and Figert have 
observed this method of protecting professional authority in scientists’ ‘status 
degradation’ of Sir Cyril Burt.597
592 Gieryn, T. (1999a)
593 Gieryn, T. (1999a)
594 McAllister, J. (1992)
595 McAllister, J. (1992)
596 McAllister, J. (1992)
597 Gieryn, T. & Figert, A. (1986)
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Pons and Feischmann had made a double transgression. First, the manner in 
which they had announced their work had offended against established practice. 
They had threatened to undermine the authority of science by introducing 
sensationalism and speculation into a cultural domain that is cohered by its 
disavowal of those tactics. Second, they had made an assault on the disciplinary 
boundaries of physics. Not only had they made statements that conflicted with 
physical laws, but they had also done so without themselves being physicists. They 
had attempted to assert authority in a territory of which they were not members.
The debate was short-lived, and order among the disciplines was restored. By 
July 1989 John Maddox wrote in a Nature editorial that: ‘The brief spell in April 
when it seemed as if cold fusion would permanently divide chemists and physicists 
has left no trace.’598 Chemists had made a challenge to the boundaries of physics, 
physicists had defended their territory, and the debate was deemed closed with no 
change to authority required.
Sociologist James McAllister has offered a thorough treatment of this clash 
between chemists and physicists.599 He considers the conflict to be based on 
professional interests, and describes how disciplinarity exists as a social construct 
for the management of authority and funding. He argues that the cold fusion episode 
put at stake the corporate interests of both the physicists and chemists. For the 
chemists, the cold fusion ‘discovery’ offered to increase the public standing of their 
discipline, and increase the authority allocated to their community. This would result 
in the fulfilment of interests related to the acquisition of funding, since money would 
be directed towards chemistry communities for the investigation of cold fusion and 
the development of technologies. For physicists, the emergence of cold fusion from 
an alternative disciplinary context threatened to undermine the authority of their 
specialism, and disrupt the boundaries that cohere their community. It also 
threatened loss of finances, since money for fusion research would be redirected 
towards chemistry and away from the physics.
598 Maddox, J. (1989c) End of cold fusion in sight. Nature, 340:15.
599 McAllister, J. (1992)
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So it was in the interests of chemists that the claims prove correct, and in the 
interest of the physicists that the claims be rejected. McAllister goes as far as to 
suggest that it was in the physicists’ interests to actually discredit the chemists and 
their claims.600 To protect their disciplinary authority it was necessary to 
demonstrate that only physicists are able to do fusion research, and that chemists do 
not have the required skills to approach the subject. McAllister suggests that the 
response of the physicists at the APS in 1989 demonstrates their pursuit of that goal; 
at that meeting they not only branded the experiments unrepeatable, but also 
denigrated the methodology and practice of Pons and Fleischmann.
McAllister describes how the disciplinarity of the groups involved in the 
Cold Fusion debate determined their relationship with and reaction to the knowledge 
claims of Pons and Fleischmann.601 In the months immediately after the Utah press 
conference the advocates and adversaries were collected in three main bodies; the 
APS , the ACS and the Electrochemical Society. McAllister argues that the members 
of each discipline showed solidarity under the disciplinary banner of these 
organisations, showing their corporate reaction to the challenge. At the ACS and 
Electrochemical Society meetings the mood was positive and repetitions with 
positive outcomes were presented. Conversely, at the APS negative replications 
were reported, methodological problems were emphasised and the technological 
aspirations of the chemists were dismissed. Both groups were examining the same 
anomaly, and both had access to the same reports. However, the disciplinary 
associations of each group encouraged them to construct the situation in very 
different ways, both of which supported the interests of their particular discipline. 
Their approaches to the knowledge claim existed as a tool of their disciplinary 
professionalisation in this debate, and thus of the boundary work for either 
expansion or protection.
4.1.4 How the clash of sub-disciplines perpetuates negotiation.
600 McAllister, J. (1992)
601 McAllister, J. (1992)
214
In the case of the cold fusion debate it seems that the clash of sub-disciplines 
resulted in the fairly rapid closure, although, that closure was achieved by discredit 
of the Utah claims, rather than by the achievement of consensus regarding the 
validity of the cold fusion claims. The scientific mainstream rejected cold fusion, 
following the lead of the physicists, who declared the debate resolved in their 
favour. However, as Bart Simon points out in his analysis of ‘the afterlife’ of cold 
fusion, not a great deal changed in terms of the amount of support for the theory and 
research into the phenomenon as a result of the declarations of closure.602 The same 
is true of the directed mutation debate. By the mid-1990s evolutionary biologist 
Daniel Dennett felt confident to proclaim that directed mutation debate was over and 
that the theory had been safely discredited.603 However, those assertions of closure 
didn’t indicate a decline in interest in the phenomenon. In the case of directed 
mutation the assertion of discredit didn’t even signal an end to journal publications 
on the issue.
So, although interdisciplinary authority struggles might encourage statements 
that imply closure has been achieved, the reality is quite different. The clash of 
disciplines actually serves to perpetuate controversy. The involvement of a 
disciplinary clash in a scientific contest results in an increase in the significance of 
the outcomes of the contest. Both sides in the debate are pursuing outcomes/closures 
that serve the interest of their community, and each disciplinary group acts as a 
corporation in the pursuit of their goals related to the extension or protection of 
authority. As the groups negotiate there is more at stake than the acceptance or the 
rejection of the contested knowledge claim. For the group that is attempting to 
extend its authority into another discipline’s territory the perpetuation of the debate 
becomes an interest in itself. The greater life expectancy they can give to their 
challenge, through their advocacy, the greater their chance of success. Conversely, 
the group engaged in protection of their authority is interested in limiting the life 
expectancy of the challenge. They therefore use closure rhetoric and attempt to 
dampen the impact of the challenge. How each group positions itself in the contest is
602 Simon, B. (2002)
603 Dennett, D. (1995)
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related to more than the material of the knowledge claim itself. As McAllister has 
pointed out, a group’s very reaction to, framing of and position on a particular claim 
can be motivated as much by disciplinary interests, as by the nature of the scientific 
claim itself.604
In the case of both cold fusion and directed mutation it is possible to 
hypothesise that the debates might have been conducted differently had they not 
incorporated this element of disciplinary competition. McAllister has attempted to 
show this by comparing the case of cold fusion to a similar debate (the ZETA 
episode605) that did not involve the clash of disciplines. It is problematic to use that 
kind of methodology to assert that the outcome of a debate might have been 
different, since it implies an asymmetrical and present-centred approach. However, I 
suggest that it is feasible to make the case that controversies might be more quickly 
resolved without the clash of disciplines being involved. With the clash of 
disciplines come further degrees of dissent than are manifest in uni-disciplinary 
contests. Essentially, a contest is ‘worsened’ when the material of the debate comes 
to include professional interests, stake-holdings, and boundary work. There are 
many more points of conflict in those kinds of debates than in cases where the 
dissent is confined to the material of an anomaly.
Debates are also protracted by the different ways that groups practice. 
Whereas the protraction caused by disciplinary interests is partly a conscious tactic, 
the perpetuating factors that arise from the different practices between disciplines 
are more subtle and accidental. Each of the groups in a disciplinary clash might 
work with totally different relationships to anomaly, as is the case in the comparison 
of molecular biologists and evolutionary biologists. Their different approaches mean 
they have different identities of the significance of anomaly, and different notions of
604 McAllister, J. (1992)
605 In this case, the contested claim also related to the generation of energy by a controlled fusion 
process. It centred around apparatus in use at the Atomic Energy Research Establishment in the UK. 
In 1957 it was claimed that the Zero Energy Thermonuclear Assembly (ZETA) had generated excess 
energy during a fusion experiment. This claim arose from within the nuclear physics community, and 
was contested, negotiated and resolved within that community between 1957-1958. It was concluded 
that the appearance of fusion had been an artefact, but as McAllister points out that resolution was 
achieved without any ‘bad-tempered controversy’ and without either the advocates or adversaries in 
the debate casting aspersions regarding the other’s practice. (McAllister, 1992 p. 39)
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how to negotiate and resolve observations of anomaly. These differences in 
approach can be significant enough that the groups involved in an attempt to close a 
conflict might not share enough common ground to recognise the same outcomes as 
closure, let alone agree about how negotiation might best direct resolution.
For the molecular biologists directed mutation in bacteria can be added to 
their knowledge complex. The addition of the claim does not jeopardise other areas 
of their knowledge, and it can be synthesised. For the evolutionary biologists, the 
claim must be rejected so as to protect the tenets that cohere their discipline. To 
accept the claim would require a major revision of existing knowledge. The stakes 
are effectively much higher in evolutionary biology. The terms of debate are 
different for each group, and so debate is stifled at its very premise. Both groups 
engage in what they see as negotiation -  one group seeking synthesis, the other 
seeking rejection -  but in effect they have no shared goal in terms of the closure they 
anticipate.
The negotiation becomes protracted as the molecular biologists proceed from 
observations to theory in service to their agenda. They focus on speculative theories 
as a way of achieving potential resolution. They try to explain the mode of directed 
mutation, and attempt to negotiate that topic with the evolutionary biologists. 
Meanwhile, the evolutionary biologists are less interested in mechanism than in 
eradicating the challenge to their discipline. Although they demand details of 
mechanism from the molecular biologists, as I have described earlier, this is more a 
rhetorical device to assert pressure across the disciplinary divide. Evolutionary 
biologists have existing assumptions that refute directed mutation, for example the 
central dogma and the fluctuation test. While the directed mutationists push for 
synthesis, the evolutionary biologists remind them of this precedent. So, the groups 
appear to be negotiating, but are in fact talking at each other, rather than to each 
other; closure becomes a remote possibility.
4.2 Dedicated advocacy perpetuates negotiation: introduction.
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In this section Cairns’ role in the directed mutation debate is considered, and 
his dedicated advocacy is highlighted as one of the principal perpetuating forces in 
this conflict. I describe his contributions to science through a short biography, and 
highlight the two controversies in which he has been a central character. I describe 
Cairns’ self-aware role as an advocate, and consider the interests and motivations 
underlying his advocacy. I use boundary work methodology to explore Cairns’ 
Lamarckism, arguing that this unorthodoxy might be seen as a tool of advocacy. I 
contrast Cairns’ advocacy with that of Barry Hall, portraying the two authors 
respectively as ‘loud’ and ‘quiet’ advocates. Finally I describe the roles of 
analogous ‘loud’ and ‘quiet’ advocates in the Cold Fusion debate.
4.2.1 John Cairns: A short biography606
Figure 6: John Cairns at the 1978 Cold Spring 
Symposium on Quantitative Biology.
Figure 5: John Cairns at the Max Delbruck 
Harbor Laboratory dedication at 
Cold Spring Harbor in 1981.
Hugh John Cairns, or John Cairns as he is better known, was bom in Oxford, 
England on November 21st, 1922. He was named after his neurosurgeon father Sir 
Hugh Cairns who had achieved a degree of academic and professional celebrity as 
the first Professor of Surgery at Oxford’s Radcliffe Infirmary. He attended 
Edinburgh Academy from 1933 to 1940, and then moved to Balliol College, Oxford
606 The details of this biography have been constructed from personal communication with John 
Cairns.
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where he attained a BA degree in 1943.607 After graduation, Cairns followed in his 
father’s footsteps and studied medicine at Oxford University. He attained his MD 
qualification in 1946. As a medicine graduate he worked first as a House Physician 
at the London Postgraduate Medical School from 1946-1947 and then, for the 
remainder of 1947, at the department of paediatrics at the Royal Victoria Infirmary, 
Newcastle. Between 1947 and 1949 Cairns returned to the seat of family celebrity 
and worked as a clinical pathologist at the Radcliffe Infirmary in Oxford, 
undertaking technical work in cancer biology.608 In 1948 he married Elspeth 
Forster, and changed his name to Hugh John Forster Cairns.
Cairns spent the following two years at the Walter and Eliza Hall Institute in 
Melbourne, Australia, where he worked on influenza virus replication with the 
support of British Foreign Office funding. He was subsequently obliged to work for 
three years in service to the Foreign Office and so, in 1952, took a post at the Virus 
Research Institute in Entebbe, Uganda.609 In Uganda he studied numerous 
indigenous diseases and local parasitic conditions, and became interested in the viral 
and DNA factors underlying some forms of cancer. He began to make key 
contributions to the study of viruses, being the first to describe the reproductive and 
lytic release cycle of the influenza virus in 1952610. In 1955 Cairns returned to 
Australia, where he joined the John Curtin School of Microbiology at the Australian 
National University. He continued his work on viruses, focussing on influenza, 
vaccinia and bacteriophage. In 1957 a fellowship from the Rockefeller Foundation 
allowed Cairns to spend a four month sabbatical at the California Institute of 
Technology learning the tissue culture of viruses from Renato Dulbecco who had
607 See “Cairns, Hugh John Forster” in Porter, R. & Oglivie, M. (Eds.) (2002) The Hutchinson 
Dictionary of Scientific Biography, Volume 1. Helicon Publishing, Oxford.
608 Cairns, J. & Lajtha, L. (1948) Loss of white cells in bone marrow culture. Nature, 162: 536-537
609 Fenner, F. & Curtis, D. (2001) John Cairns and autoradiography. In: The Curtin School of Medical 
Research: the first fifty years, 1948-1998. Brolga Press, Australia.
610 Cairns, J. & Edney, J. M. (1952) Quantitative aspects of influenza virus multiplication. I. 
Production of the incomplete virus. Journal of Immunology, 69: 155; Cairns, J. (1952b) Quantitative 
aspects of influenza virus multiplication. III. Average liberation time. Journal of Immunology, 69: 
168; Fazekas de St. Groth, S., & Cairns, J. (1952) Quantitative aspects of influenza virus 
multiplication. IV. Definition of constants and general discussion. Journal of Immunology, 69:173; 
Cairns, J. & Mason, P. J. (1953) Production of influenza A virus in the cells of allantois. Journal of 
Immunology, 71:38.
219
developed the technique with his colleague Marguerite Vogt.611 In California he 
lived with fellow molecular biologists Jan Drake, Matthew Meselson612 and Howard 
Temin613, in a house that was ‘in the throes of the N15-N14 transfer experiment that 
was to settle the semi-conservative nature of the replication of bacterial DNA’614.
Back at the John Curtin School, in 1959, Cairns reported the first of his 
better-known achievements, the first genetic mapping of an animal virus.615 In 1960, 
while on a year long National Institutes of Health (NIH) funded sabbatical from the 
Australian National University, Cairns worked in Alfred Hershey’s laboratory at 
Cold Spring Harbor and added to his virology achievements by making the first 
measurement of the T2 bacteriophage DNA molecule.616 That experiment further 
confirmed the double stranded structure of DNA that Watson and Crick had
611 Dulbecco’s development and teaching of the tissue culture techniques is considered to have 
revolutionised the study of viral agents. The tuition that Caims received from Dulbecco enabled much 
of his subsequent research in virology. For details of Dulbecco’s tissue techniques see: Kevles, D. 
(1993) Renato Dulbecco and the new animal virology: medicine, methods and molecules. Journal of 
the History of Biology, 26(3): 409-442 and for primary sources: Dulbecco, R. & Vogt, M. (1954) 
Plaque formation and the isolation of pure lines with poliomyelitis viruses. Journal of Experimental 
Medicine, 99:167-182; Dulbecco, R (1966) The plaque technique and the development of quantitative 
animal virology. In: J. Caims, G.S. Stent & J. D. Watson (Eds.) Phage and the origins of molecular 
biology. Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Press, New York.
612 In 1958 Mathew Meselson, along with Franklin Stahl, demonstrated that bacterial DNA replicates 
by the splitting of the DNA helix, and the replication of a new second strand using the original as a 
pairing template. This is the mode of replication that Watson and Crick had predicted when they 
described the helical structure [Watson, J. & Crick, F. (1953) The structure of DNA. Cold Spring 
Harbor Symposium on Quantitative Biology, 18: 123-131]. Meselson and Stahl showed, using 
radioactive marking, that each newly generated DNA helix is comprised of one strand drawn from the 
parental DNA and one complementary strand synthesised from the appropriate nucleotide bases. 
[Meselson, M. and Stahl, F. (1958) The replication of DNA in Escherichia coli. Proc. Natl. Acad. 
Sci., 44: 671-682.] John Caims later called their transfer experiment ‘the most beautiful experiment 
in biology’ [see Judson, H. (1996) p.163)]. In the 1980s and 1990s Franklin Stahl wrote a series of 
important reviews of directed mutation (see Chapter 2). These include: Stahl, F. (1988); Stahl, F. 
(1990); Stahl, F. (1992)
613 Howard Temin went on to identify the retroviral enzyme ‘reverse transcriptase’ that enables the 
transcription of RNA into DNA. He co-discovered the enzyme with David Baltimore, and in 1975 the 
two men, and their supervisor Renato Dulbecco, shared a Nobel Prize for their work. The existence of 
reverse transcriptase undermines the central dogma of molecular genetics, which relies upon uni­
directional information transfer from DNA to protein (see Chapter 3 ). [Temin, H. & Mizutani, S. 
(1970); Baltimore, D. (1970)]
614 Caims, J., Stent, G & Watson, J. (Eds.) (1966) Phage and the origins of molecular biology. Cold 
Spring Harbor Laboratory Press, New York, p.252-253
615 Gemmell, A. & Caims, J. (1959) Linkage in the genome of an animal vims. Virology, 8, 381-383.
616 Caims, J. (1960) The initiation of vaccinia infection. Virology, 11: 603; Caims, J. (1961) An 
estimate of the length of the DNA molecule of T2 bacteriophage by autoradiography. Journal of 
Molecular Biology, 3: 756-761; Caims, J. (1962b) A minimum estimate for the length of the DNA of 
Escherichia coli obtained by autoradiography. Journal of molecular biology. 4: 407-409; Caims, J. 
(1962c) Proof that the replication of DNA involves separation of the strands. Nature, 194: 1274.
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described in 1953617 and further illustrated semi-conservative replication of the kind 
that Meselson and Stahl618 had recently demonstrated.619 This was followed in 1963 
by the release of his celebrated ‘autoradiographs’ of the bacterial plasmids of 
Escherichia coli.620 These ‘photographs’ showed for the first time the circular 
cytoplasmic DNA of bacteria that would later become the foundation of recombinant 
DNA technology. The virology work that Caims undertook while at the John Curtin 
School is cited as the basis for his election as a Fellow of the Royal Society in 
1974.621
In 1963 Caims left Australia for America, and his earlier achievements 
helped him gain the prestigious and high profile post of Director of the Cold Spring 
Harbor Laboratory of Quantitative Biology, which he held until 1968. During 
Caims’ tenure the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory was officially created, from a 
merger between the Long Island Biological Association’s Biological Laboratory and 
the Carnegie Institution of Washington’s Department of Genetics. He led the 
institute through what is considered to have been ‘the time of its greatest financial 
insecurity’; a commitment that left his family ‘with no house and with capital of 
only a few thousand dollars’.622 At Cold Spring Harbor Caims was a member of the 
‘phage group’, a group of geneticists that included Max Delbruck, Salvador Luria, 
Alfred Hershey and James Watson amongst others.623 In 1966 Caims, Watson and
617 Watson, J. & Crick, F. (1953)
618 Meselson, M. and Stahl, F. (1958)
6,9 Caims, J. (1962b) Caims, J. (1962c)
620 Caims, J. (1963a) The bacterial chromosome and its manner of replication as seen by 
autoradiography. Journal of Molecular Biology, 6:208-213; Caims, J. (1963b) The form and 
duplication of DNA. Endeavour, 22:141; Caims, J. (1963c) The chromosome of Escherichia coli. 
Cold Spring Harbor Symp. Quant. Biol. 28,43-46. Caims use of autoradiographic techniques was 
often innovative and represents his central methodological contribution to the phage group at Cold 
Spring Harbor during the 1960s. See for his discussion of the development of the techniques [Caims, 
J. (1962a) The application of autoradiography to the study of DNA viruses. Cold Spring Harbor 
Symposia on Quantitative Biology, 27: 311; Caims, J. (1966a) The autoradiography of DNA. In: J. 
Caims, G. Stent & J. Watson (Eds.) Phage and the origins of molecular biology. Cold Spring Harbor 
Laboratory Press, New York; Caims, J. (1966b) The bacterial chromosome. Scientific American, 214: 
36; Davem, C., Caims, J., De Lucia, P. & Gunsalus, A. (1967) The bacterial chromosome as a unit of 
structure and replication. In: H. Vogel, J. Lampen & V. Bryson (Eds.) Organizational Biosynthesis 
.Academic Press, New York.
621 Fenner, F. and Curtis, D. (2001)
622 Caims, J. (1997) p.127
623 The constitution and achievements of the ‘phage group’ are described in: Caims, J., Stent, G.S. & 
Watson, J.D. (Eds) (1966). Historian Horace Judson [Judson, H. (1996)] describes the phage groups
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Gunther Stent published collected essays celebrating the new molecular biology that 
had emerged from the ‘phage school’, in honour of Max Delbruck’s 60th birthday.624 
In 1967 Caims received recognition for his achievements, being made a fellow of 
the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
In 1968 Caims resigned his directorship of Cold Spring Harbor wishing to 
return to research, and the position was taken by James Watson. Caims remained on 
the research staff of Cold Spring Harbor until 1973. In 1969 Delbruck, Luria and 
Hershey shared a Nobel Prize for establishing the bacteriophage as the model system 
for molecular genetics research, a task they had largely achieved at Cold Spring 
Harbor during Cairns’ directorship.
In the following five years Caims simultaneously held professorships at The 
State University of New York and The American Cancer Society. He was also 
American Cancer society Professor at Cold Spring Harbor from 1968-1973. In 1973 
Caims returned to England to assume the directorial role at the Mill Hill 
Laboratories of the Imperial Cancer Research Fund, London. By this time he was a 
highly respected and accomplished cancer biologist, virologist, molecular biologist 
and geneticist. At the Mill Hill laboratories he was remembered as ‘a profound 
thinker with marvellous vision and scientific imagination’.625 From 1975 Caims 
produced a series of general papers on cancer, and began to address the social 
implications of the ‘cancer problem’.626 In 1978 he published Cancer: Science and 
Society, a book based on his two decades of work on cancer biology.627 In 1980 he 
was offered a professorship in the Harvard University Department of Microbiology, 
and returned to America. At Harvard he became head of the School of Public Health
as a community cohered by communication more than geography, but who were able to make their 
community physical at Cold Spring Harbor each year. Their aim was to investigate every aspect of 
bacteriophage biology and to assert the phage as the principal tool and model for molecular biological 
work. Judson analogises the group to the community that existed in Copenhagen around physicist 
Neils Bohr. Luria had been Bohr’s student and Judson suggests he modelled the group on his earlier 
experiences in Bohr’s community.
624 Caims, J., Stent, G. & Watson, J. (Eds.) (1966)
625 Austaker, J. (1988) A history of the Imperial Cancer Research Fund, 1902-1986. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford.
626 Caims, J. (1975a) Mutation, selection and the natural history of cancer. Nature, 255: 197; Caims, 
J. (1975b) The cancer problem. Scientific American, 233(5): 64-78.; Caims, J. (1977) Some thoughts 
about cancer research in lieu of a summary. In: H. Hiatt, J. Watson & J. Winsten (Eds.) Origins of 
human cancer. Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Press, New York.
627 Caims, J. (1978) Cancer: science and society. W. H. Freeman, San Fransisco.
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and won regard as a public health biologist. He continued to contribute to the cancer 
debate628, becoming a key figure in the controversy over the effectiveness of 
chemotherapy629, and eventually consolidated his contributions in his book Matters 
o f Life and Death: Perspectives on Public Health, Molecular Biology, Cancer and 
the Prospects fo r  the Human Race.630 Caims continued to write on cancer issues
•  • 631during his involvement in the directed mutation debate.
At the end of 1991 Caims retired from the Harvard School of Public Health 
and returned to Charlbury, Oxfordshire where he now lives. He remained Emeritus 
Professor of Harvard and is now also Emeritus Professor of Cancer at the Clinical 
Trial Service Unit at Oxford University. Caims has two sons and a daughter.
4.2.2 John Caims’ ‘normal’ science
Until his involvement with two controversial episodes during the 1980s John 
Caims was very much an orthodox scientist; the details of his biography illustrate 
his firm association with the institutions and practices of orthodox science. Caims 
held prestigious positions, and received many grants, reflecting his share in the 
cultural authority attached to science. In this section, I use the language of Robert 
Merton’s ‘norms’ of science to illustrate Caims’ participation in practices 
appropriate to his location inside the territory ‘science’. As I described in chapter 1 ,1 
intend the language of Merton’s normative scheme to be revealing as descriptive 
tool, but I do not intend the essentialism of his scheme to figure in this analysis. I 
argue that Caims fulfilled obligations of the kind that Merton has identified as 
‘norms’, and in turn received affirmation from his community of a kind that Merton
628 Caims, J. (1980) Bacteria as the proper subjects for cancer research (The Leeuwenhoek Lecture). 
Proceedings of the Royal Society, Series B, 208: 121; Caims, J. (1983) An onlooker’s view of the 
war against cancer. Harvard Medical school Bicentennial Symposium', Caims, J. (1985b) The present 
status of the cancer problem. Human Toxicology, 4(3): 341-343.
629 Caims, J. (1985a) The treatment of diseases and the war against cancer. Scientific American, 
253(5): 51-59.And, see section 4.2.3.
630 Caims, J. (1997)
631 Caims, J. (2000b) The interface between molecular biology and cancer research. Mutational 
Research, 42(2/3): 423-428; Caims, J. (2002) Somatic stem cells and the kinetics of mutagenesis and 
carcinogenesis. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA, 99: 10567-10570.
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has described as ‘rewards’. 632 This approach demonstrates that Caims did not 
engage in unorthodoxy during the 1980s because he was by nature an unorthodox 
scientist. Rather, Caims’ contentious contributions in that period did not match the 
character of his approach earlier in his career.
Merton’s four principal norms (communism, universalism, disinterestedness 
and organized scepticism) can be used as categories for considering Caims’ activity 
during his early career. First, the norm of communism enjoins a scientist to share 
their findings with their community and others, and we see Caims do this through 
his very numerous publications. Second, the norm of universalism suggests that 
scientists must base their decisions and evaluations on ‘pre-established impersonal 
criteria’. It also asks that scientists be immune to biases based on race, gender, 
nationality and social class. Again, there are indications that Caims’ has fulfilled this 
obligation; his career being international, his co-authorships numerous and diverse. 
Third, disinterestedness requires that scientists focus their efforts on the institutional 
goal of science rather than on any personal gains. Again Caims’ adherence to this 
norm is apparent. Many of his contributions, especially during the 1960s, were the 
outcomes of research that he had embarked upon to help solve some problem that 
was hindering progress for the community, or to confirm the work of others. For 
example, his measurement of the viral genome was purposed to confirm the semi­
conservative replication of DNA that was the chief concern of Meselson and Stahl in 
that period. Also, his development of autoradiography provided a vital tool for the 
genetics community that would enable many other researchers successes in the 
coming years.633 Caims acted as a participant in the institutional project, rather than 
as an individual driven by personal goals. He says himself that: ‘Much of the 
pleasure of being a scientist comes from being part of a communal effort and being 
able to observe at close quarters the continual evolution in our understanding of the 
world around us.’634 Merton’s norm of disinterestedness does not go as far as to 
demand that a scientist be altruistic. Nevertheless, Caims’ exceeds the obligations of
Merton, R. (1942)
633 For discussion of Cairns’ autoradiographic technique see: Caims, J. (1966a)
634 Caims, J. (1997) p.xi
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the norm, allowing his family finances to suffer during his directorship of the 
financially unstable Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory.635
Finally, the notion of organized scepticism demands that scientists adopt a 
position devoid of dogmatic attachment to certain ideas, and instead practice the 
suspension of judgement. There is no evidence that during his early career Cairns 
was inflexible in his views or quick to judge the outcomes of his work or others. 
Rather, his open-mindedness and commitment to investigation is reflected in his 
description of the experience of scientific work. He says: ‘You wrestle with some 
problem for months or years and, as you do experiments and read about other 
people’s experiments, you find that the pieces of the puzzle are magically 
rearranging themselves, as though you were watching a private display of some 
abstract form of evolution.’ In this description Cairns’ abstracts the researcher from 
the process of their research; the outcomes simply unfold by virtue of the method 
applied. This does not imply that he considers it appropriate for the researcher to 
consciously aggravate the process by applying judgement or dogma.
So it appears, at least in terms of Merton’s interpretation, that Cairns fulfils 
the criteria of ‘normal’ science. Merton goes on to describe how scientists that 
adhere to the norms will be ‘rewarded’ by their community and peers.636 In this 
regard Cairns’ experiences prior to the 1980s are also in keeping with Merton’s 
scheme. For example, Cairns’ received financial rewards; he was in constant 
employment and was the recipient of several grants and fellowships. At times he was 
in simultaneous receipt of the sponsorship of several institutions and associations. 
Furthermore, financial support for his work came from prestigious sources such as 
the Rockerfeller Foundation. Cairns co-authored with several well-regarded 
individuals in his field, for example James Watson,637 a fact that demonstrates he 
had gained the regard of his peers and was in receipt of the reward of association. 
Cairns’ employment record shows some of the most meaningful ‘rewards’ that the 
scientific community has to offer. The 1960s directorship of Cold Spring Harbor 
was a prestige post. He also filled important and prestigious leadership roles at the
635 Cairns, J. (1997) p. 127
636 Merton, R. (1942)
637 Cairns, J., Stent, G. & Watson, J. (Eds.) (1966)
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Mill Hill Laboratories in London and at the Harvard University School of Public 
Health. His success at gaining these posts illustrates that the scientific community 
not only allocated him a share of the authority of science, but also saw him as a 
suitable administrator and public face of the territory. Cairns has held professorships 
at several universities and institutes internationally, a fact that represents both a 
reward and a signifier of authority from each of those institutions. Cairns received 
clear Mertonian-type rewards in 1967, with his election as a fellow of the American 
Academy of Arts and Sciences, and 1974, with his election as a fellow of the Royal 
Society. Throughout his career Cairns’ work has achieved publication in the most 
prestigious journals, for example, Nature, Science, Journal o f  Immunology, 
Virology, Genetics and the Journal o f Molecular Biology.
4.2.3 John Cairns’ unorthodoxv
In terms of boundary theory, and using Merton’s norms and rewards language for 
clarification, it seems that at least until the 1980s John Cairns adhered to the 
obligations conferred by being ‘inside’ the territory ‘science’, and was rewarded by 
his community as a result. However, during the 1980s two episodes of controversy 
changed Cairns’ relation to orthodoxy.
1. Unpopular conclusions from four decades in cancer research 
In 1985 an article by John Cairns appeared in the journal Scientific American.638 It 
addressed what Cairns called the ‘war against cancer’, and offered an evaluation of 
the success of the campaign based upon Cairns’ many years in cancer research. In 
that article, Cairns stated that chemotherapy was being vastly over-used, and that its 
uptake as the principal treatment for cancer was not supported by evidence that it 
significantly improved survival. He claimed that ‘the cancer data are so discouraging 
that it is difficult to discuss them in public’. He suggested that aggressive treatments 
did not live up to their promotion, and that resources and research would be far 
better directed towards the improvement of screening techniques.
638 Caims, J. (1985a)
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In that paper, Cairns demonstrated statistically that improvements in 
screening yielded far greater increases in survival rates than aggressive 
chemotherapies. He also added a political angle to this dissent, arguing that the 
single greatest impediment to the war against cancer was governments’ 
unwillingness to combat smoking. He attributes that unwillingness to the desire to 
collect taxes from cigarettes. Most alarmingly, he adds that, the British government 
in particular, but also the America to a degree, choose to allow smoking to continue 
because it decreases the amount of old age benefit they are required to pay out by 
shortening life expectancy. Overall, Cairns suggests that every advance that has been 
made in the treatment of cancer is ultimately outweighed by the US government’s 
impotence on the smoking issue.
Cairns launches several attacks in the article. He accuses the medical 
profession of promoting a comparatively useless therapy, he accuses the government 
of worsening the cancer problem, and even suggests that governments use cancer as 
part of a plan to decrease the elderly population. However, the article generated 
surprisingly little debate. In particular, it is notable that this article was not 
responded to in any significant degree in scientific journals. Political scientist 
Michael Lemer has studied the impact of Cairns’ 1985 publication as part of a broad 
study of the twentieth century cancer therapies debate.639 He considers it interesting 
that Cairns’ very inflammatory article did not precipitate much response from the 
scientific community.
To explain this lack of response, it is useful to consider Collins’ and Pinch’s 
categories of ‘boundary work for rejection’. As described in Chapter 1, they suggest 
that rejection of an authors’ work, and the possible associated removal of authority 
from that author, can be achieved either explicitly or implicitly, and that rejection 
can also be expressed in either the ‘constitutive’ or ‘contingent’ forums.640 In 
Collins’ and Pinch’s language, we might think of the response to Cairns’ 1985 as 
‘implicit rejection’ in the ‘constitutive forum’. That is to say, the terms of his dissent 
were not addressed and argued against, but rather his commentary was ignored by
639 Lemer, M. (1996) Choices in healing: integrating the best of conventional and complementary
approaches to cancer. MIT Press, Massachusetts. 
a ° Collins, H. & Pinch, T. (1979)
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his professional peers. This kind of response has the boundary work function of 
marginalizing the dissent, but also represents the implicit acknowledgement by the 
community that Cairns had offered commentary that was not acceptable within the 
territory ‘science’. This implicit rejection by his peers is a signifier of the withdrawal 
of the reward of association on this issue.641
It should be noted that response to Cairns’ article in the contingent forum 
was quite different. In particular, engagement with the material on the Internet has 
been extensive. In the contingent forum the article was taken up in support of 
numerous groups for whom the accusations had particular significance. For cancer 
sufferers and their families, Cairns’ framing of chemotherapy was of profound 
importance to their choice of care. In addition, he had sensationally attributed blame 
to national governments for the lack of success in the war against cancer. This 
evaluation was precisely the kind of evidence that practitioners of complementary 
cancer therapies required to recommend their alternative approaches. On the 
Internet, dozens of sites promoting complementary therapies for cancer reference 
Cairns’ article as precedent for the quest for alternative treatments. In many cases, 
Cairns’ commentary is translated into a kind of conspiracy theory; with 
chemotherapy framed as a tool of the medical profession for giving the appearance 
of care and cure, which in fact neither promotes quality or quantity of life. The 
complementary therapists’ alliance with Cairns’ dissent has a boundary work 
function in their contest for authority. Despite his dissent on this issue, Cairns 
carried with him the authority of those ‘inside’ science. For the complementary 
therapists, who for the most part are marginalized by the scientific community and 
denied authority, alliance with Cairns offered potentially increased authority by 
association. If a new point of contest could be established between the orthodox and 
complementary therapists then a boundary contest for authority could begin in 
relation to it. So, in the contingent forum there was explicit attention to Cairns’
641 It should be noted that the implicit rejection that Cairns experienced in relation to this publication 
did not extend to any greater degree of rejection or discredit. Subsequent to this publication Cairns 
continued to hold prestigious posts, receive funding and achieve publication in the most prestigious 
journals. It seems that, on account of his previous standing, this episode of dissent was largely 
overlooked by the scientific community.
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publication based upon the interests, including boundary/authority interests, of 
various non-scientific groups.
Lemer goes on to make the observation that a cancer therapies debate, of the 
very nature that Cairns’ had sought to incite, did in fact begin in 1986. At this time 
the journals became the forum for the conflict; that is, the cancer therapies debate 
was given explicit attention in the constitutive forum. However, as Lemer points out, 
it was not Cairns’ article that precipitated this debate, but rather a very similar 
offering from two of his Harvard colleagues, entitled ‘progress against cancer?’.642
Cairns’ 1985 commentary on the war against cancer did not result in his 
discredit. Although he had made comments that were embarrassing to the medical 
profession, he had used statistical analysis to demonstrate that his was one valid 
reading of the situation. He had also made some rather strong political statements, 
but these were perhaps forgiven as frustration after a career working in what still 
seemed a desperate and under-funded fight against a poorly understood disease. On 
this issue Cairns was perhaps in an unarticulated position of disgrace. He had not 
been ‘punished’ as such in the Mertonian sense, but he had marginalized himself and 
the community had acknowledged that tacitly by ignoring his contribution. In 1985 
Cairns had not made any explicit new claims, he had simply offered an interpretation 
based on existing data. He had however, through his interpretation, challenged the 
legitimacy of the mainstream approach from within the ranks of its authority. Not 
until 1988 would Cairns offer dissent that coupled interpretation with new data and 
unorthodox knowledge claims.
2. Directed mutation: Resurrecting Lamarck?
Cairns’ first report of directed mutation appeared in 1988 (see Chapter 2).643 In that 
first paper Cairns, and his Harvard team, made three assertions:
i) That a directed mutational process appeared to act in populations of starved 
bacterial cells.
642 Bailer, J. & Smith, E. (1986) Progress against cancer? New England Journal of Medicine, 314: 
1226-1232.
643 Cairns, J., Overbaugh, J. & Miller, S. (1988)
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ii) That directed mutation in bacteria implied the activity of a Lamarckian type 
evolutionary process.
iii) That directed mutation in bacteria might imply the existence of non-Darwinian 
evolution in other organisms.
Of these three assertions the second and third are the most controversial. The team’s 
claim to have observed directed mutation in bacteria is not itself problematic. In 
isolation the observation represents an anomaly, and anomalies are neither rare nor 
necessarily controversial in science. The controversial element arises from the 
authors’ discussion of the implications of this anomaly. In framing those 
implications they committed two acts of unorthodoxy, and incited controversy at two 
levels. Firstly, the use of Lamarckian reference implied the teams’ engagement in 
the longer running conflict between Lamarckians and Darwinians, and appeared as 
an attempt to resurrect the contentious material of Lamarckian theory. Second, this 
team of molecular biologists were offering statements about possible macro- 
evolutionary processes; an act that fell outside the disciplinary authority that they 
possessed as molecular biologists. Whereas Cairns’ 1985 statements about cancer 
were unpopular with the mainstream, his 1988 proposal of a Lamarckian anomaly 
placed him firmly in association with unorthodoxy. The old map identities of 
Lamarckism and Darwinism (see Chapter 3) firmly recorded the delineation of 
‘inside’ from ‘outside’ in relation to the theories. Cairns’ Lamarckism placed this 
contribution in the area that the old map recorded as ‘outside’. He was reminded of 
this in the subtle threat implied by Lenski and Ayala in 1989 when they stated that 
the invocation of Lamarckism ‘may perpetuate mistaken beliefs that are still widely 
held outside scientific circles’644 (my emphasis).
In the wake of the 1988 Harvard paper645 critics answered Cairns’ 
heterodoxy, and for the most part sought to reduce the impact of his dissent either by 
offering an non-contentious explanation for directed mutation or by demonstrating 
that some element of the experiments rendered them invalid. Not only was the
644 Lenski, R., Slatkin, M. & Ayala, F. (1989) p.2778
645 Cairns, J., Overbaugh, J. & Miller, S. (1988)
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response to his publication explicit, but also it was conducted in the key journals, 
and was engaged with by key authors in the fields of evolutionary biology and 
molecular biology. In Collins’ and Pinch’s terms, attempted rejection of directed 
mutation was explicit in the constitutive forum.646 For example, the 1988 paper was 
accompanied by a review from Nobel Prize winner and fellow member of the ‘phage 
group’ Franklin Stahl.647 Also, it appeared in the journal Nature, indicating the 
intention to make the negotiation of directed mutation a constitutive rather than 
contingent project. It is perhaps a legacy of Cairns’ eminent status that the 
negotiation of this claim was made so explicit. Whereas unorthodoxy from a little 
known or regarded individual or group might be easily rejected implicitly, a 
contribution from a prestigious institute, and esteemed academic is more difficult to 
overlook. An analogous case is offered by Jacques Benveniste’s reports of water 
memory in the 1980s. Those reports also appeared in Nature and were also dealt 
with explicitly by the scientific community. Jacques Benveniste was a regarded 
scientist and his research was conducted at the prestigious INSERM 200 laboratory 
of the University of Paris.
Cairns’ advocacy of these two contentious issues during the 1980s had some 
visible outcomes in terms of the kinds of ‘punishments’ that Merton predicts for 
those who offend against the scientific ‘norms’ or promote unorthodoxy.648 While 
both his chemotherapy article and his directed mutation research achieved 
publication, there are some aspects of their style of publication that betray the 
different treatment of these more contentious contributions. For example, Cairns’ 
1985 paper was published in the journal Scientific American. In their study of 
legitimation and rejection Collins and Pinch identify that journal as part of the 
‘contingent’ forum for debate.649 In their analysis, debate in the ‘contingent’ forum 
is peripheral to debate in the ‘constitutive’ forum. In the ‘constitutive’ forum, which 
is comprised of the major journals, professional conferences and reviewed books, 
the actual articulation and discourse of debate occurs. The debate in the ‘contingent’
646 Collins, H. M. & Pinch, T. J. (1979)
647 Stahl, F. (1988)
648 See Merton, R. (1942)
649 Collins, H. M. & Pinch, T. J. (1979)
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forum is supplementary to that discourse and includes personal communications, 
popular writing and publications in the less specialist or regarded journals. So in 
terms of Collins’ and Pinch’s framework, Cairns’ 1985 article, although achieving 
publication, does so only as part of the contingent discourse, despite Cairns’ usual 
acceptance as a contributor to the constitutive forum. In Merton’s terms, this 
apparent demotion to the contingent forum might be a kind of ‘punishment’ for 
unorthodoxy.650
To understand the circumstances of publication pertaining to Cairns 1988651 
it is useful to consider Collins’ and Pinch’s discussion of ‘the dilution of orthodox 
publication’.652 These authors suggest that unorthodox material sometimes achieves 
publication in the mainstream journals as part of the ‘tactics for rejection’. In those 
cases the material appears in a journal that is recognised as part of the constitutive 
forum, but is featured alongside an article that suggests caution or caveats to the 
reader. Thus, although legitimacy appears to have been achieved, it is diluted by a 
qualification that signposts the unorthodoxy. In some cases this combination of 
publication and caveats is formulated to the degree that the publication becomes a 
kind of tokenism.653 In other cases, the qualifying article suggests that the 
unorthodox material should be approached in the spirit of ‘discussion’ or 
‘hypothesis’ 654 The implication is that its content is invalid, but that if viewed as a 
debating exercise it might be made useful to the mainstream community. Nature 
editor John Maddox has explained journal publishers’ motivation for including these 
kinds of qualified publication, stating that: ‘ Journals are these days painfully aware 
of the accusation that their collective influence is to inhibit innovation.’655 So, 
journals include this kind of material to achieve an appearance of openness. Maddox 
hints at the boundaiy function of these publications, saying: ‘...even when there is
650 An alternate reading of this situation would be that Cairns perhaps chose Scientific American as 
the forum for this paper, seeking to reach its wider and more diverse readership. In that case, this 
would provide a further example of his self-conscious role as an advocate, and would contribute 
another element to his ‘loudness’ (see 4.2.5)
651 Cairns, J., Overbaugh, J. & Miller, S. (1988)
652 Collins, H. M. & Pinch, T. J. (1979)
653 Collins, H. M. & Pinch, T. J. (1979)
654 Gregory, J. (1998)
655 Maddox, J. (1988b) Waves caused by extreme dilution. Nature, 335: 760-763. p. 761
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little chance that the heterodox will become orthodox; people may find it instructive 
to know what is happening on the fringes of their interest’656 (my emphasis). These 
articles therefore are ostensibly published to promote openness, but in fact appear as 
a reminder of the boundary between science and non-science.
Cairns’ directed mutation paper appeared in the journal Nature, which seems 
to confer acceptance in the constitutive forum. However, the paper was featured 
alongside a review article that provided suggestions of how the research might be 
approached by readers. The review article was provided by respected molecular 
biologist Franklin Stahl and it stated that Cairns’ article should be read in the spirit 
of enquiry and for its novelty and potential interest. He suggested that readers 
might ‘find it a good exercise to try to build more specified schemes.’658 Essentially, 
the presentation of unorthodox material has a kind of training function for 
mainstream scientists; perhaps helping them build personal articulations of the 
boundaries of science. Stahl entitled the paper ‘A Unicom in the Garden’ and 
explained later659 that he had meant that if someone told you there was ‘a unicorn in 
the garden’ (i.e. something unbelievable and strange) that you would still go and 
have a look. Stahl is suggesting that the first report of directed mutation is like a 
report of a unicorn in the garden, and that as such it should at least be taken a look 
at. He signals the need for boundary work to resolve the challenge offered by 
directed mutation, saying that, a decision regarding the validity of the phenomenon 
awaits ‘...experimental support for some explanation that makes use of familiar 
processes...’660 By ‘familiar’ Stahl means orthodox, and is asking the community to 
seek an explanation that negates the challenge of the anomaly. He even says that: 
‘Top marks will go to those who can build their model solely from familiar 
elements.’661 Making reference to a forthcoming paper from Barry Hall, Stahl adds:
656 Maddox, J. (1988b) p.761
657 Stahl, F. (1988)
658 Stahl, F. (1988) p.112
659 Stahl, F. (1990); Stahl, F. (1992)
660 Stahl, F. (1988) p. 113
661 Stahl, F. (1988) p.112
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‘You should be warned, however, that more difficult challenges are just over the 
horizon.’662
An analogous example of this kind of qualified or ‘diluted’ publication 
appears in the journal Nature just two volumes prior to the publication of The Origin 
o f Mutants.663 In that issue Jacques Benveniste’s controversial article664 describing 
‘water’s memory’ appeared alongside a qualifying/caveat article from the journal 
editor John Maddox.665 Maddox suggested that Benveniste’s work be read for 
interest rather than information, stating that: ‘There are good and particular reasons 
why prudent people should, for the time being, suspend judgement.’666 Maddox then 
proceeded to engage personally in the conflict that the initial publication generated 
(See Chapter 5.6 for a fuller account of this episode). He led a delegation to 
Benveniste’s lab to observe their assays and then reported in the next volume of 
Nature that the results they had obtained appeared flawed.667 When Cairns’ first 
paper on directed mutation appeared Maddox was still addressing the water memory 
debate in the commentary sections of the publication.668 The caveat article provided 
alongside The Origin o f Mutants came from Franklin Stahl, perhaps because 
Maddox was too busy dealing with the aftermath of the previous ‘publication with 
qualification’ that he admitted to the journal just two volumes earlier. It is worth 
considering that Maddox was perhaps a particular enthusiast of the ‘diluted 
publication’ tactic that Collins and Pinch669 identify as a form of implicit rejection in 
the constitutive forum.
662 Stahl, F. (1988) p. 113
663 Cairns, J., Overbaugh, J & Miller, S. (1988)
664 Davenas, E., Benveniste, J. et al (1988)
665 Maddox, J. (1988a)
666 Maddox, J. (1988a) p. 787
667 Maddox, J., Randi, J. & Stewart, W. (1988) ‘High dilution’ experiments a delusion. Nature, 334: 
287 With reply from Benveniste.
668 Maddox, J. (1988b)
669 Collins, H. & Pinch, T. (1979) p.258
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4.2.4 Boundary work in the directed mutation debate: advocates and adversaries
The critics’ tactics
It is useful to consider the critics’ response to directed mutation in terms of 
the categories that Collins and Pinch identify in their discussion of the rejection of 
rival knowledge claims.670 To make sense of conflict activity, Collins and Pinch 
think about individual actions as ‘tactics’ purposed to achieve the defence of 
orthodoxy.
Collins and Pinch suggest that one key tactic adopted by the critics of a new 
knowledge claim is to formulate an a priori argument, or a negating precedent, 
against that new claim. Collins and Pinch call this ‘using the symbolic and technical 
hardware of philosophy’.671 This tactic is based on the implication that nothing can 
be true that is in direct conflict with what has already been established. That tactic is 
clearly illustrated in the directed mutation conflict. For example, in the very first 
critiques of directed mutation, and persistently thereafter, Luria and Delbruck’s 
fluctuation test672 is invoked as precedent against the directed mutation 
observations.673 That experiment is cited as pre-existing proof that bacterial mutation 
is random with respect to selective advantage. The citation is used to imply that 
dissent on the issue of directed mutation has previously been arrested, that the new 
publication is in effect ‘behind the times’ in its assault on orthodoxy. For the critics, 
invocation of this precedent is purposed to end negotiation before it has started.
Cairns foresaw this tactic (see below) and so dedicated space even in the first 
Harvard directed mutation publication to asserting the difference between their 
assays and the fluctuation test. In spite of that pre-emptive defence, and many
670 Collins, H. & Pinch, T. (1979) Only those tactics that are evident in the directed mutation case 
study are discussed here. Collins and Pinch identify several other categories of tactics, ranging from 
the most explicit such as the ‘denial of orthodox publication’ to the more subtle such as ‘accusations 
of triviality’ and ‘ad hominem arguments’.
671 Collins, H. & Pinch, T. (1979) p.242
672 Luria, S. & Delbruck, M. (1943)
673 Franklin Stahl begins his introduction to the first Harvard publication on directed mutation with a 
summary of Luria and Delbruck’s conclusions and says that ‘...John Caims, Julie Overbaugh and 
Stephan Miller challenge these credentials.’ [Stahl, F. (1988) p.l 12] See also [ Stewart, F. Gordon, D. 
& Levin, B. (1990); Lenski, R. & Mittler, J. (1993a)]
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subsequent explanations of the key differences between the experimental systems, 
the precedent of Luria and Delbruck was still being invoked many years later.674
Collins and Pinch suggest that another key tactic of critics is to attack the 
methodological precepts upon which new knowledge claims are founded. Again in 
the case of directed mutation we see this approach in action. In the first responses to 
the Harvard report the methodology of the directed mutation assays is scrutinised 
and numerous potential oversights are highlighted and implied.675 Answering these, 
and the later methodological queries and complaints became one of the major tasks 
of the directed mutation advocates. Cairns, and the other advocates, focussed 
significant attention on these issues in the early years of the debate, often directly 
addressing the methodological ‘problems’ that the critics had highlighted.676
A further tactic employed in the directed mutation debate, which I suggest 
might be added to the classification that Collins and Pinch677 offer, is the ‘invocation 
of unfavourable historical precedent’ for the contested knowledge claim. This is 
accomplished by highlighting previous unsuccessful attempts to establish the same 
(or a similar) contested knowledge claim. This amounts to the assertion that a new 
claim cannot be legitimate because it (or something similar to it) has been rejected in 
the past. In the case of directed mutation, some critics seized upon other examples of 
‘Lamarckian’ work to show that Lamarckian claims in general are not legitimate. 
This tactic was used in the contingent forum, where appeals to this kind of self- 
fulfilling historical evidence are not uncommon. For example, in 1995 Daniel 
Dennett wrote about ‘three losers: Lamarck, Theilard and directed mutation’.678 In 
his construction directed mutation effectively follows in the footsteps of these other 
rejected claims.
The advocates’ tactics
674 For example see Rosenberg, S. et al (1994); Foster, P. (1994)
675 See for examples: Charlesworth, D & Charlesworth, B. & Bull, J.(1988) ; Holliday, R. & 
Rosenberger, R. (1988); Van Valen, L. (1988); Danchin, A. (1988).
676 See for examples Cairns, J., Overbaugh, J. & Miller, S. (1988); Cairns, J. (1988); Cairns, J. & 
Foster, P. (1991); Foster, P. (1992); Foster, P & Caims, J (1992).
677 Collins, H. & Pinch, T. (1979)
678 Dennett, D. (1995)
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The 1988 Harvard paper had framed a challenge to the authority and 
monopoly of evolutionary biologists. Cairns’ team had asserted a bid for the 
expansion of the authority of molecular biology into territory usually delineated as 
the domain of evolutionary biologists. The advocates of directed mutation, John 
Cairns in particular, carried out numerous activities in service to that bid for 
expansion. Those activities constitute the advocates’ boundary work for expansion. 
The journal articles that appear early on in the debate illustrate that the advocates of 
directed mutation were self-aware of the need to strengthen their position in relation 
to the authority of the evolutionary biologists. Likewise, their adversaries were 
aware that the directed mutation publications represented an attempt by an adjacent 
disciplinary group/territory to increase authority into the territory they had claimed 
for themselves in previous contests.
Cairns carried out several acts of boundary work to promote the advocates’ 
success in this contest. He used certain tactics to assert the new knowledge claim, to 
sustain its assault and to strengthen its impact. There are three key examples of that 
activity:
i) I describe above the critics’ tactic of invoking negative precedent against the 
directed mutation research in the form of references to Luria and Delbruck’s 
fluctuation test. Cairns’ response to that critique was pre-emptive. He anticipated 
that Luria and Delbruck (1943) would be invoked, and dedicated significant space in 
‘ The Origin o f Mutants ’ to describing the important distinction between the Harvard 
research and the assay that Luria and Delbruck had carried out. His asserts that Luria 
and Delbruck’s experiments bear no relation to the directed mutation assays due to 
important methodological differences (see Chapter 2). From the outset Cairns and 
his team considered potential criticisms, and tailored their presentation to increase 
the vigour of their challenge. This pre-emption of, and attention to, forthcoming 
criticisms of directed mutation constitutes one of the principal tasks that Cairns’ 
undertook as an advocate.
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ii) Although it may seem counter intuitive, Cairns’ adoption of Lamarckian 
rhetoric (see details in Chapter 2) might be viewed in part as another tactic of 
boundary work for expansion. Collins and Pinch argue that a key tactic of critics is 
to defame new dissenting knowledge claims by equating them with existing 
‘unscientific’ beliefs or unorthodoxy.679 The nature of directed mutation predisposes 
it to association with Lamarckianism. The theory supposes interaction between the 
environment and DNA and, in its strong version, even an element of cell ‘choice’. 
Critics and commentators immediately addressed these links.680 However, Cairns 
and his team did not attempt to avoid that association, but rather made reference to it 
themselves in the 1988 paper. In that light, the group’s Lamarckism is another pre­
emptive act designed to strengthen their challenge by making it immune to 
‘unexpected’ criticism.
iii) I describe above the critics’ tactic of ‘attacking the methodological precepts’ 
of unorthodox knowledge claims. Collins and Pinch identify this as a key form of 
explicit rejection in the constitutive forum.681 This kind of critical attack, and the 
defence mounted in relation to it, form a familiar part of the discourse generally 
associated with controversy. Again, Cairns’ approach to this criticism begins pre­
emptively. Much of the discussion in the initial 1988 paper is dedicated to 
explanation and clarification of methodology. I have mentioned above that Cairns’ 
team devoted attention to distinguishing their methodology from Luria and 
Delbruck’s fluctuation test as a means by which to deflect that comparison. 
Although methodological criticisms of the Harvard research still formed a major part 
of the negative response to the initial publication, many points had been clarified and 
pre-empted prior to the first publication.
Cairns, and the other directed mutation advocates, demonstrated an 
awareness of approaches that might strengthen their challenge. Their early journal
679 Collins, H. & Pinch, T. (1979)
680 For example, Lenski, R., Slatkin, M. & Ayala, F. (1989) said that Cairns’ Lamarckism was
‘.. .potentially harmful in that it may seem to give credence to prescientific claims that have been 
thoroughly disproved.’ p.2777
681 Collins, H. & Pinch, T. (1979)
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articles demonstrate defences against the key tactics of their critics; they assert their 
claim, answer queries, and defend their research methodology. These are standard 
activities for a dissenting group attempting to gain credibility for a controversial 
knowledge claim. What is interesting in this case is that Cairns’ defence began pre­
emptively in each case. His pre-emption of criticisms implies that he had dedicated 
significant care to his role as an advocate, and considered his agency in the contest. 
Cairns did not wait for a defence of orthodoxy to be mounted against directed 
mutation, but rather guessed what its quality and content would be and defended the 
theory in advance. Thus, the 1988 paper that initiated the debate might be viewed as 
a crafted tool of the molecular biologists’ boundary assault, the majority of the text 
being given over to pre-emptive defence against ‘a priori argument’, ‘association 
with unscientific belief and ‘attacks on methodological precepts’.
Why be a Lamarckian?
The defences of directed mutation that Cairns and the other advocates 
present are tools for the perpetuation of their knowledge claim. That perpetuation 
increases the likelihood of their success. Some of these activities are overt, and are 
clearly directed to prolong debate. In addition to these acts, Cairns’ advocacy 
includes what might be considered as more cryptic boundary work activities for 
authority expansion. A key example is the invocation of Lamarckism that marks 
Cairns’ advocacy from the outset.682
To evaluate the possible boundary work function of Cairns’ Lamarckism, we 
must consider the value of Lamarckian association as a rhetorical device. In this 
section I argue that Lamarckian association can be seen as i) a rhetorical device 
signifying dissent, ii) a device for cohering a group of dissenters on the margins of 
orthodoxy and iii) a tool of advocacy relying upon sensationalism.
Chapter 3 describes the old map identity of Lamarckism that emerged during 
the twentieth century. In that chapter I show that the old map summarises failure and
682 See discussion in Chapter 2 of the Lamarckian rhetoric in Cairns, J., Overbaugh, J. & Miller, S. 
(1988)
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records the stigmatisation of Lamarckian association. I suggest that, by the late 
twentieth century, the map had gained a degree of persistence and cultural 
acknowledgement that meant it was consulted during almost any episode of dissent 
in evolutionary biology. That is to say, by the late twentieth century the presence of 
the old map meant that Lamarckism was irreversibly stigmatised and not a valid 
contestant for authority in science. To be a Lamarckian became inevitably 
controversial owing to that legacy. To acknowledge Lamarckian content in one’s 
work, as Cairns’ original team did, was to brand oneself controversial or dissenting. 
Historian Peter Bowler has considered the role of what he calls the ‘label’ 
Lamarckism,683 suggesting that historically the label or brand has been used to 
signify dissent.
So, we might consider Cairns’ early acknowledgement of the Lamarckian 
links of directed mutation as a tactic for branding his work as dissent. Rather than 
proposing a microbial genetics anomaly, Cairns launched a more profound 
challenge, the impact of which reached other disciplines. To be visible to the broad 
community, the material of the dissent had to first attract attention. What better way 
to attract the necessary attention for that challenge than to invoke the old map of 
Lamarckism? By encouraging the community to consult the old map Cairns was 
encouraging a resurrection of the Lamarckism versus Darwinism debate, and in so 
doing he immediately increased the life expectancy and scale of his dissent. The 
effect of Cairns’ use of the ‘Lamarckian’ label was acknowledged by biologist 
Bernard Davis in 1989, saying that: ‘...even if Cairns’ tilt towards Lamarckism 
should have to be rejected, it has served a very useful purpose, stimulating us to 
reconsider a long series of stubborn facts that have suffered neglect because they 
seemed hard to reconcile with Neo-Darwinian doctrine.’684 Davis acknowledged that 
Cairns’ Lamarckism extended the challenge of directed mutation beyond the field of
683 Bowler argues that the late nineteenth century advocates of what they termed Neo-Lamarckism 
had not re-invented Lamarckism as such, but rather had revived accounts of Lamarckism from 
Haeckel and Spencer. Bowler suggests that they used the ‘label’ Lamarckism to highlight their
dissent against Darwinism. [Bowler, P. (2003) Wellcome Trust symposium on transformism, 
evolutionism and creationism. The Wellcome Trust, London 06/12/03; Bowler, P. (2003) Personal 
communication.]
684 Davis, B. (1989)
240
molecular biology, attracting the attention of other specialists and provoking a 
broader debate than the directed mutation anomaly alone would precipitate.
Invoking the legacy of Lamarckian resurrections also served to locate the 
directed mutation anomaly as part of a larger and more ongoing conflict. This meant 
that rather than the directed mutation researchers launching a contest in isolation, 
they had instead framed their dissent as the most recent incarnation of an ongoing 
challenge to orthodoxy. While the critics of directed mutation raised precedent 
against the observations, the invocation of Lamarckism allowed the advocates to 
highlight precedent for similar dissent. Even though that precedent raised the spectre 
of defamation by association (discussed above), it rendered this new challenge part 
of a bigger and longer-term challenge to the orthodoxy of evolutionary biology. By 
making the Lamarckian association the advocates affected a kind of passive 
recruitment of those authors that had previously made similar challenges.
Finally, the stigma attached to Lamarckism (recorded on the old map) also 
meant that any reference to the theory would be bound to provoke response; in the 
late twentieth century Lamarckian claims were sensational. Although Cairns’ 
Lamarckism attracted negative attention in the constitutive forum, it still increased 
the visibility of the debate. This tactic operates on the premise that ‘there is no such 
thing as bad publicity’.
4.2.5 John Cairns versus Barry Hall: ‘loud’ versus ‘quiet’ advocacy.
The Origin o f  Mutants certainly attracted attention, and commentaries on the work 
emerged immediately and abundantly from a wide variety of sources, both 
professional and popular (see Chapter 2). That outcome might appear inevitable; the 
publication was certainly controversial on several levels. The response that followed 
implied that directed mutation was intrinsically controversial, and that debate was 
the unavoidable outcome of the announcement of that bacterial anomaly.
However, an interesting alternative interpretation becomes apparent when the 
work of molecular biologist Barry Hall is considered. Hall had worked on bacterial 
nutrition and mutation since the early 1980s, and had published his findings in the
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journal Evolutionary Biology.685 Hall had in fact studied the exact same phenomenon
686that would later be labelled ‘directed mutation’ when The Origin o f Mutants was 
published. However, he had not invoked Lamarckism in his treatment, nor had he 
suggested that the mutational process occurred elsewhere than in the specific system 
he had studied (conversely, Cairns suggested it might occur in ‘cells’687). Hall’s 
report was very much restricted to the statement of a bacterial anomaly. He avoided 
sensationalism in his presentation. Even after the publication of The Origin o f  
Mutants, and the commencement of the flurry of debate that John Cairns calls the 
‘brouhaha’688, still Hall avoided sensationalism in relation to his observations. In his 
1990 paper on the bacterial mutational phenomenon he termed the process 
‘spontaneous point mutations that occur more often when advantageous than when 
neutral’689; a much less catchy and inflammatory tag than ‘directed mutation’. In that 
same paper Hall also used the term ‘Caimsian mutation’ to describe the adaptive 
mutational process, distancing himself as an advocate, and shifting attention back 
towards Cairns.
Hall’s work did not precipitate a controversy of the kind that the ‘The Origin 
o f Mutants' stimulated. Hall reported the phenomenon as a bacterial anomaly, and as 
such it seemed almost unproblematic. It certainly did not seem to represent an 
authority challenge to evolutionary biology of the kind that the Harvard team later 
asserted. Although Hall’s findings were very similar to those that the Harvard team 
later published, he had constructed his report without making any explicit or 
articulated boundary assault; his work differed from Cairns’ in terms of tone and 
presentation. So, directed mutation in bacteria is not necessarily controversial per se. 
Neither are the echoes of Lamarckism that the Harvard team emphasised necessarily 
intrinsic to the discussion of this anomaly. Directed mutation is not necessarily an 
issue that need bear implications for evolutionary biology, provided that those 
implications are not asserted hand in hand with observations of the system. Hall 
referenced his more moderate approach himself saying: ‘I accepted Cairns’
685 Hall, B. (1982b)
686 Cairns, J., Overbaugh, J. & Miller, S. (1988)
687 Cairns’, J. Overbaugh, J. & Miller, S. (1988)
688 Personal communication 10/2003
689 Hall, B. (1990a)
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argument about the limits of the Luria-Delbruck work, but I was firmly rooted in 
conventional dogma’.690 Although Hall brought the issue of directed mutation to the 
evolutionary biological community by publishing in the journal of evolutionary 
biology, he did not demand the communities’ explicit engagement with the anomaly 
by vocalising the challenge that it might present. Hall presented the material of the 
directed mutation anomaly to the community of evolutionary biologists, but he did 
not frame his report as a challenge to the authority of that disciplinary group.
Cairns’ and Hall’s publications also rarely shared the same publication arena. 
Barry Hall chiefly presented his research in the journal Genetics, while Cairns’ 
contributions most often appeared in Nature and Science. Interestingly, despite the 
fact that Barry Hall was one of the most prolific authors of the debate he did not ever 
co-author with John Cairns. In fact, Hall’s contributions on directed mutation are 
almost exclusively single author pieces. Whereas Cairns was interested in 
recruitment and the formation of a network of directed mutation advocates, Hall 
appeared to remain abstracted and isolated from the community of those researchers. 
This reflects the motivations underlying each of their engagements. Hall was 
apparently interested only in reporting the details of the bacterial anomaly as a 
comparatively uncontentious phenomenon relevant to a small community. Cairns 
meanwhile had framed the anomaly as the foundation of an authority dispute, and as 
such was obliged to adopt another approach as part of the boundary work for 
expansion that he had set in motion.
Hall’s different quality of approach from Cairns’ has vastly influenced the 
way that these authors’ roles in the debate are evaluated. The majority of 
commentators cite Cairns as the ‘discoverer’ of directed mutation, and almost all 
popular and even professional commentaries refer back to ‘ The Origin o f Mutants' 
as the primary publication on the phenomenon. Accounts in print and online record 
the beginning of the directed mutation debate with that publication in 1988. This 
appraisal is perhaps a fair reflection of the history of the debate. Hall did not in fact 
instigate the second, and most vigorous, element of the conflict (that concerned with 
Lamarckism versus Darwinism). Neither did he instigate the element of the debate
690 Reported from personal communication in Goodman, B. (1992) p.29
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attached to the relative authorities of the molecular biological and evolutionary 
biological communities. Barry Hall may have ‘discovered’ directed mutation, and 
have earned priority in that respect, but John Cairns and his Harvard team instigated 
the directed mutation debate.
When the Harvard directed mutation observations were reported in 1988, 
Hall made no complaint concerning his priority in this field. However, interestingly, 
a priority claim was received by Nature (and the president of Harvard University) 
from Australian immunologist Edward Steele. In fact, Steele went as far as to accuse 
Cairns’ team of plagiarism and a separate dispute ensued in the pages of Nature691 
That conflict angered Nature editor John Maddox, who said: ‘A dispute over the 
attribution of priority for a neo-Lamarckian mechanism is premature and unseemly, 
to say the least, and may help make science seem ridiculous.’692 Steele had 
published his theory of acquired immunity in the early 1980s693, and had invoked 
reverse transcriptase in the process by which parental acquired immunity could be 
passed to offspring. Steele’s theory of acquired immunity bore scrutiny, and John 
Maddox admitted that it implied that ‘Lamarckian inheritance is alive and well, if 
only in exceptional circumstances’.694 Steele’s plagiarism accusations stemmed from 
Cairns’ invocation of reverse transcriptase as an agent of directed mutation.695 
Cairns had not referenced Steele in relation to that hypothesis.
Maddox takes up the accusations in an editorial address, stressing that they 
are inappropriate, and reprimanding Steele for poor conduct. He concludes directed 
evolution is too far from proof to even consider who might take credit for it. He 
says: ‘...in a field (if it is one) that has not yet ever got a Copernicus, Steele is 
already talking like a Galileo.’696 Maddox reassures the readership, and presumably 
Steele, that had the Harvard data been received as anything more than a point of 
interest and debate, then reviewers would have insisted that Steele receive a citation.
691 Maddox, J. (1989a) Lamarck, Dr Steele and plagiarism. Nature, 337: 101-102.
692 Maddox, J. (1989a) p. 101
693 Gorczynski, R. & Steele, E. (1980) Inheritance of acquired immunological tolerance to foreign 
histocompatibility antigens in mice. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, 77(5): 
2871-2875; Gorczynski, R. & Steele, E. (1981)
694 Maddox, J. (1989a) p. 101
695 Cairns, J., Overbaugh, J. & Miller, S. (1988)
696 Maddox, J. (1989a) p. 101
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The dispute was resolved eight months later when Steele and Cairns presented a 
joint letter to Nature.691 In that the authors cited Steele’s acquired immunity 
publications, as well as Cairns’ Harvard publication, and attributed both as an 
application of Howard Temin’s elucidation of the enzyme reverse transcriptase. The 
short letter concludes with the statement that: ‘One of us (E. J. S), in a letter he 
distributed to many people, has claimed that the other (J.C.) was guilty of 
plagiarism. He now acknowledges that the allegation was unfounded and he 
withdraws it.’698
Hall and Steele’s different approaches to priority in the field of directed 
evolution relate to their motivations for engagement in the debate. Steele has been an 
ardent Neo-Lamarckian, keenly framing his observations of acquired immunity as 
evidence in favour of Lamarckism. Most recently he set about suing the University 
of Wollongong, which he claimed dismissed him unfairly because they did not want 
to be associated with his Lamarckian sympathies. So Steele was interested in the 
broader aspect of the directed mutation debate, the Darwinian versus Lamarckian 
conflict. He was also interested in the authority contest with evolutionary biologists 
that the Harvard team had launched. In that light it made sense for him to engage 
with the community that were involved in that contest, and to desire priority in that 
debate. By contrast Hall was not engaged with that level of the dissent, and so for 
him the notion of priority was more in line with Maddox’s interpretation -  
‘premature’ and ‘unseemly’
I suggest that a useful way to characterise the different styles of Cairns and 
Hall is to characterise them as ‘loud’ and ‘quiet’ advocates respectively. This 
language effectively illustrates their different styles. I would like to suggest these 
might make useful general categories for considering advocates’ styles. In general, 
‘loud’ advocates are prone to sensationalism, dedicated to the acceptance of their 
claims, keen to extrapolate from observation to theory and eager to answer critics. 
They are unapologetic and willing to attach their reputations to the success of their 
claims. They are not averse to framing their claims as authority challenges. Loud
697 Steele, E. & Cairns, J. (1989) Dispute resolved. Nature, 340: 336.
698 Steele, E. & Cairns, J. (1989) p.336
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advocates are recorded historically as the principal advocates in contests. 
Conversely, ‘quiet’ advocates are modest in the presentations, focussing on 
observations without extrapolation to implications. They avoid framing authority 
contests and history records their advocacy as secondary to that of the loud 
advocates.
In section 4.2.6 I demonstrate the potential broad applicability of the 
categories ‘loud’ and ‘quiet’ by exploring the analogous styles of advocacy in the 
Cold Fusion debate.
4.2.6 An analogous case: Jones. Pons and Fleischmann’s styles of advocacy in the 
Cold Fusion debate.
The Cold Fusion controversy provides an analogous example of different 
styles of advocacy. That debate featured two loud advocates, Stanley Pons and 
Martin Fleischmann, and one quiet advocate, Steven Jones. Pons and Fleischmann’s 
advocacy shares many qualities with Cairns’, while Jones’ is similar to Hall’s. The 
interaction of loud and quiet advocacy in the Cold Fusion debate had very similar 
outcomes to those I have identified in the directed mutation debate (see 4.2.5).
In accounts of the Cold Fusion debate Pons and Fleischmann are generally 
recorded as the originators of the anomalous findings, and as the principal advocates 
during the months of the contest. They revealed their findings in a sensational and 
unorthodox press conference, made huge claims about the implications of their 
research for energy production, and devoted their time to trying to ensure the success 
of their claims. While Cairns did not behave in such an unorthodox manner, his 
advocacy does share its character with Pons and Fleischmann’s. All three used 
sensationalism as a tool for drawing attention to their initial claims; while Pons and 
Fleischmann called a press conference, Cairns did something equally dramatic. He 
claimed in print that observations in molecular biology had revealed a deficit in 
Neo-Darwinian theory, and even went as far as to invoke the spectre of Lamarck. 
The three advocates shared the approach of making unapologetic claims, with an 
emphasis on the possible huge implications of their findings. Pons and Fleischmann
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stressed the potential for amazing energy producing technologies, Cairns stressed the 
fact that directed mutation might occur in all ‘cells’ and might completely change 
our view of organic evolution; they all extrapolated wildly from laboratory 
observations to speculative theories and implications. After the initial claims, Cairns 
dedicated efforts to repeating and reinforcing the observation of directed mutation. 
He answered critics in journals and through personal communication. He was 
engaged in the work of advocacy, striving for the acceptance of his team’s claims. 
Similarly, Pons and Fleischmann took action to further their claim. They attended 
meetings, made bids for funding and acted as ambassadors for Cold Fusion.699 All 
three also shared a willingness to frame their dissent as an interdisciplinary contest. 
Pons and Fleischmann made an unapologetic transgression into the territory of 
physics, Cairns made a similar assault on the authority of evolutionary biologists. 
They presented their research not just as a problem for one specialist group, but as a 
challenge to the structure of the specialisms and the authority they confer.
These three qualify as loud advocates on account of their shared dedication 
to their claims; in the face of severe criticism, and with reputation pitched on their 
success in the contest. As a result history records them as the principal figures in the 
debates, and marks their first contributions as the instigation of the contests. All 
three are responsible not just for a theoretical debate, but also for an interdisciplinary 
contest, and for a challenge to fundamental tenets of existing theory.
In the case of directed mutation I have demonstrated that this was not the 
only possible approach to the directed mutation observations, and not the only style 
of advocacy that could be selected. I have described how Barry Hall made the same 
observations, but chose to present his findings in a completely different style. Where 
Cairns’ presentation was marked by sensationalism, Hall’s was marked by modesty 
and temperance and was free from speculation on implications. Hall did not frame a 
disciplinary contest. I have characterised him above as a ‘quiet’ advocate in that 
contest.
In the case of Cold Fusion, Jones is the quite advocate. Although Pons and 
Fleischmann are recalled as the progenitors of the theory, Jones had in fact been
699 See Collins and Pinch (1993) for details of their advocacy activities between April and July 1989
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working on the phenomenon for longer than their team. Just as Hall had worked 
from the early 1980s to reveal directed mutation, so Jones had been investigating 
Cold Fusion through dozens of experiments long before Pons and Fleischmann 
exploded onto the scene.700 Collins and Pinch have characterised Jones’ approach as 
‘modest’, and pointed out that his claims ‘did not pose the same theoretical 
challenge.701 He did not frame a disciplinary contest, and he did not mention the 
energy producing technologies that Pons and Fleischmann were so keen to highlight. 
Jones presented his work as ‘an interesting piece of physics’702, playing down its 
significance just as Hall had done with directed mutation. The result of this ‘quiet’ 
approach has been noted by Colins and Pinch, who have stated that:
‘...had it not been for Pons and Fleischmann, Steven Jones would probably 
have quietly established an interesting fact about the natural world...’
It seems almost certain that Hall might have ‘quietly’ done the same thing without 
Cairns.
In the case of directed mutation the loud and quiet advocates combined their 
efforts very effectively and peacefully. Hall may not have contributed the forceful 
kind of advocacy that Caims championed, but he did carry out dozens of the 
experimental replications and modifications that the critics demanded. He was 
contributing to the project of advocacy, and patiently answering critics through 
experiment. In the case of Cold Fusion the loud and quiet advocates did not form 
such a happy union. They became involved in a bitter fight for priority, and 
communication broke down between the two groups. The situation in the directed 
mutation debate was perhaps facilitated by the fact that Hall showed no interest in 
claiming priority for the observations, and was happy to call his phenomenon ‘point
700 Collins & Pinch (1993)
701 Collins & Pinch (1993) p.65
702 McAllister, J. (1992) p.7
703 Collins & Pinch (1993) p.65
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mutations that occur more often when advantageous than when not’704 and let Cairns 
have ‘directed mutation’.
The results of loud and quiet advocacy in each of these debates has been the 
same. The loud advocates are recognised as the key advocates, and their quiet 
counterparts contributions are less visible. Ironically, while the loud advocates have 
fought for their claims so ardently, it is clear that the quiet advocates might have 
achieved a degree of acceptance for the same claims had their modest approach not 
been interrupted. That fact demonstrates that loud advocacy itself can perpetuate 
conflict, which supports my identification of Cairns’ advocacy as one of the active 
forces of protraction in the directed mutation debate.
704 Hall, B. (1990)
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Chapter 5 -  A new forum for perpetuation: Scientific controversy on the 
Internet.
In this chapter I examine the role of the Internet in the directed mutation debate. I 
argue that the structure and dynamics of the debate were influenced by the Internet 
from the mid-1990s onwards. Using empirical data, I describe how the debate was 
extended both in scale of participation and meaning as it was taken up in this forum. 
I show how new communities engaged the debate and translated the dissent to suit 
their own agendas, making negotiation more complex and closure more elusive. I 
suggest that negotiation in the Internet forum has been a key force determining the 
perpetuation of the conflict.
With reference to the directed mutation case study, I argue that the Internet 
represents a new, important, and poorly understood forum for scientific debate. I 
suggest that a better understanding of engagement and dynamics in this forum will 
be key to successful analysis of late twentieth century scientific conflicts. I describe 
the difficulties that existing methodologies for controversy analysis face when they 
are applied to Internet hosted debates. In particular, I consider how boundary theory 
is impaired in contexts where the analogies of cartography beak down. I ask can you 
have discredit, or even closure in the Internet forum? I consider what elements of 
existing methodologies might be salvaged to create an analytical approach suited to 
the study of scientific controversy on the Internet.
Finally, I compare the Internet phase of the directed mutation debate with the 
Internet debate on Jacques Benveniste’s water memory, suggesting that change of 
scale and meaning, perpetuation of negotiation, and lack of resolution are perhaps 
more general outcomes of debates being taken up online.
5.1 How the Internet changed the scale of the directed mutation debate:
‘following the object’.
This section illustrates the increase of scale of the directed mutation debate on the 
Internet between 2000 and 2005. Chapter 2 has described the nature and extent of
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the directed mutation debate in paper publication. The aim in this section is to follow 
the debate into the Internet forum and consider its identity in that new context. 
Bruno Latour has encouraged sociologists to make analyses that ‘follow the 
object’.705 That is, as Bart Simon has interpreted the methodology, to trace ‘...the 
movement and deployment of the signifier...by accounting for its appearance, 
nonappearance and transformation in specific contexts.’706 The approach involves 
viewing the directed mutation debate as a ‘quasi-object whose ontological status is 
in a state of flux’.707 The meaning or identity of directed mutation at any point is 
then the ‘product of the network of human and non-human agents that are associated 
with it’.708 The material in 5.1 and 5.2 is purposed to provide a characterisation of 
directed mutation as it is transformed in the Internet forum, the aim being to ‘follow 
the quasi- object’ of the debate into that phase of its history.
‘Directed mutation’ on the Internet in 2000
In October 2000 a Web search, using the search engine Google.co.uk, and the search 
term ‘directed mutation’, yielded 233 hits. Analysis of these materials allows them 
to be categorised as several distinct ‘types’ of contribution to the directed mutation 
debate. I have identified 13 categories, and the proportion of the hits represented in 
each of these is depicted in fig.7. These include:
Weird science: This category includes commentaries on directed mutation, or 
reproductions of paper publications on directed mutation, that have been placed 
online to serve the explicit agenda of enthusiasts of the ‘the unusual and 
unexplained’ and ‘weird science’. Groups or individuals have created these pages for 
purposes of entertainment, or to promote what they describe as ‘scepticism in 
science’. In Chapter 2.3 I describe the rise of a culture of enthusiasm for science
705 Latour, B. (1993) We have never been modern. Harvard University Press, Massachusetts; Latour,
B. (1996) Do scientific objects have a history? Pasteur and Whitehead in a bath of lactic acid. 
Common Knowledge, 5: 76-91.
706 Simon, B. (2002) p. 19-20
707 Simon, B. (2002) p. 19
708 Simon, B. (2002) p. 19
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controversies and anomalies. These pages are produced in service to that culture. 
The materials in this category range from the reproduction of published articles, to 
lists of links, to commentaries written by interested amateurs. The most prolific and 
detailed site in this category is ‘science-frontiers’709, which offers reproduced 
articles, discussion, commentaries, links and references to print publications. It 
prioritises ‘those observations and facts that challenge prevailing scientific 
paradigms’. The site is produced by an amateur enthusiast and includes several 
references to directed mutation dating back to the late 1980s. This site is important 
in that many other online amateur authors reference it as their source of information 
on directed mutation.
Discussion: This category includes references to directed mutation in chat rooms, 
message boards, and news groups etc, including contributions from professionals 
and amateurs. The sites included in this categoiy host discussion that is not linked to 
any particular agenda, for example weird science, teaching or religion. Rather these 
sites include online debate between amateurs and professionals, and the host site 
does not display or promote any particular interpretation of the material. These are 
general science chat rooms, evolution debate forums, or news discussion groups.
Teaching: This category includes references to directed mutation in online teaching 
materials - the majority in online undergraduate lecture notes. The material often 
appears as PowerPoint presentations, slides or syllabi posted on departmental 
websites. This is an important category, since it indicates the degree to which 
students are being taught about this controversy, and also reveals the identity of 
directed mutation being presented in teaching materials. Interestingly, in the 
majority of these materials directed mutation is described to students to assert the 
importance of random mutation as a fundament of Neo-Darwinian theoiy. Directed 
mutation is often equated with Lamarckism, and the theory is generally characterised 
as either problematic or rejected. Several online student quizzes or exams as why
709 wvyw.science-frontiers.com Described in more detail in Chapter 2.3
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directed mutation is controversial, or ask for the proofs from molecular biology that 
contradict Cairns’ findings (i.e. Luria and Delbruck).
Science and Religion: The materials in this category appear on sites dedicated either 
to the promotion of a religion, or explicitly pitched as anti-religious, and are 
produced by individuals, organisations and associations. The majority deal with 
issues relating to either the broad science versus religion debate, or the more 
specific, creation versus evolution debate. Interestingly, for some, directed mutation 
appears to support the theory of ‘design’ and shows intelligence and progress in 
evolutionary change. For others directed mutation shows that orthodox evolutionary 
theory is flawed and so open to challenge from creationists. Some of these sites offer 
reference lists or article reprints. This category also includes material linking the 
ascetic starvation practices of some religious groups to directed mutation. In their 
interpretation, the theory of directed mutation appears to offer a scientific 
endorsement of their practice of withholding nutrition in an attempt to achieve an 
altered spirituality.
Amateur online: This category includes online publications from amateur 
enthusiasts. The sites do not betray any overall religious agenda, and the bizarre and 
unexplained are not prioritised over other science news. These sites are often 
produced by a single individual posting their views on contemporary science issues 
online, or by groups that publish online magazines promoting amateur comment on 
science. The materials range from reproduced print publications, to commentaries, to 
annotated reading lists, to links lists.
Academic online: This category includes contributions from any author with 
affiliation to an academic institution. These are professional commentaries on 
directed mutation. The materials in this category do not serve a particular agenda, 
and are not explicitly purposed as teaching materials.
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Journal articles online: This category includes any articles that have been reproduced 
online from original print publications. The article reproductions in this category 
appear on sites with no specific agenda, and offer no interpretation of the articles, or 
commentaries on them. In many cases these are publishing companies’ websites 
offering articles or abstracts free of charge as part of ‘open access’ schemes. Many 
of the journal publications on directed mutation from the period 1988 -  1995 are 
available in this form. This category also includes the reproduced full text papers 
that are available through subscription, or for one off download fees.
Core-set online: This category includes online materials, concerning directed 
mutation, produced by members of the original core-set (identified in Chapter 2). It 
does not include reprints of their paper publications, only new material. The 
principal member of the core-set whose contributions appear in this category is 
Richard Lenski, who has several pages describing his work and providing full 
bibliographic information. Patricia Foster also presents directed mutation work on a 
personal website.
Interested academics: This category includes hits recording an individual academic 
simply citing directed mutation as a research interest.
Bibliographies: This category includes the references to directed mutation that 
appear in bibliographies or lists. The materials in this category do not display any 
interpretation of directed mutation, or discussion of the content of the citations. They 
are often library databases, general science databases, or journal content archives.
Citations in other materials: This category includes references to directed mutation 
which appear as asides in other projects For example, Cairns’ biographical material 
that cites directed mutation as one of his research areas, and some online 
encyclopaedias or science dictionaries that offer a definition of directed or adaptive 
mutation.
254
Genetic Algorithms: Genetic algorithms are a tool of computer programme 
engineering. Along with evolutionary algorithms they form a class of strategies 
called ‘stochastic optimisation principles’. Essentially, these algorithms function by 
applying rules from biological change processes to the development of programmes 
in artificial intelligence and computer network design. They are intended to allow 
programmes to ‘adapt’ to their function in the same way as organisms adapt to 
environments. The methodology was first introduced during the 1970s710, and the 
key principles that the strategy mimicked were crossover, mutation and selection. 
More recently the notion of directed mutation has been used as an algorithm. This is 
interesting in that it shows the uptake of the concept of directed mutation into 
another disciplinary area. The computer scientists that employ the directed mutation 
algorithm are not interested in the legitimacy of the scientific claims surrounding 
directed mutation, nor are they engaged in the negotiation of the phenomenon, they 
just use the notion as a conceptual tool.
Site-directed mutation: 70 of the 233 hits referred to site-directed mutation. These 
references are not relevant to the directed mutation debate, since they relate to an 
experimental procedure, called site-directed mutation, which allows manipulation of 
specific DNA loci for research purposes. Therefore, these references have been 
excluded from this sample.
710 Holland, J. (1975)
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Types of material available online concerning 'directed mutation'
in October 2000
□  Weird science
□  Religion
■  Journals online
■  Bibliographies
□  D iscussion □  T eaching
■ A m ateur □  A cadem ics online
■  C ore-set online 01 In terested academ ics
□  Citation in other contexts □  Algorithms
Figure 7
Directed mutation on the Internet in 2005
In January 2005 a Web search, using the search engine Google.co.uk, and the search 
term ‘directed mutation’, yielded 747 hits. This is more than three times the number 
of hits in 2000. Figure 8 illustrates the proportion o f the 2005 hits in each o f the 
categories identified above. Figure 9 provides a comparison o f the volume of  
materials available across the categories between 2000 and 2005. Again, references 
to site-directed mutation are excluded in each case.
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Types of material available online relating to 'directed mutation'
in January 2005
□  Weird science
□  Religious
■  Journals online
■  Bibliographies
□  Discussion
■  Amateur
■  Core-set online
□  Cited in other contexts
Figure 8
□  Teaching
□  Academic online
□  Interested Academics
□  Algorithms
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Online materials on 'directed mutation' available in 2000 a s  compared
to 2005
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Figure 9
Figs. 7, 8 & 9 reveal the changing structure o f the directed mutation debate in the 
Internet forum between 2000 and 2005. First, the data reveals a considerable 
extension of scale. With the ‘site-directed mutation’ hits and any dead links 
excluded from the 2000 sample the number of relevant, accessible hits was 140. In 
2005 the same search, with ‘site-directed mutation’ and dead links excluded yielded 
332 hits. So the presence o f directed mutation online had more than doubled in 5 
years. This is not to suggest that this scale increase was unique to the case o f  
directed mutation online. During the period 2000-2005 the overall scale o f the 
Internet increased dramatically. In December 2000 there were 163,000,000 Internet 
users worldwide.711 In December 2004 that figure had grown to 934,480,000 users
711 NUA Internet survey. View online at: www.nua.ie
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worldwide.712 During 2005 the figure reached 1 billion worldwide.713 During that 
period there was also a huge increase in computer literacy, as a result of which, 
many more users were able to construct their own websites and join discussion 
forums. It is likely that, the overall growth of the Internet forum contributed to the 
overall increased participation in the directed mutation debate.
A comparison of the scale changes within the specific categories of material 
reveals the changing structure of the debate. Aside from the category ‘algorithms’, 
the two areas in which there was the most dramatic increase were ‘discussion’ and 
‘citations in other materials’, both of which experienced about eight times growth 
between 2000 and 2005. The increase in this type of material illustrates the increased 
number of interested onlookers that grew up around the debate in the Internet forum.
The next greatest increase was in the category ‘journal articles online’. 
Growth in this category brought the primary materials of the debate into a public 
forum, making it available to amateur audiences. A major cause of increase in this 
category has been the pressure exerted on publishing companies to make their 
journals available for free access online. As a result most publishers offer at least 
online contents or indexing, usually supported by open access to abstracts, if not full 
text. The key papers from this debate are all available online in full text; whether on 
publishers’ websites, in teaching materials, or with commentary on amateur 
websites. The result of this increased access to the scientific discourse on directed 
mutation means that an interested audience could also become an informed 
audience.
Teaching materials and academic contributions online both experienced 
around 100% increase. This perhaps reflects increasing computer literacy in this 
period. Many academics have received training enabling them to produce web 
resources for their students, and online tuition has become a familiar part of most 
undergraduate programmes. The increase in ‘academics online’ perhaps illustrates 
that staff trained to produce student web resources have also gone on to use those 
skills to pursue their own interests.
712 Computer Industry Almanac. View online at: www.c-i-a.com
713 Computer Industry Almanac.
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The categories ‘weird science’ and ‘amateur’ have undergone slight decline. 
This is perhaps to be expected, since both these categories prize novelty and 
anomaly. After several years of debate the novelty of directed mutation has faded. 
The sensationalism of the first Harvard publication, and the immediate storm of 
dissent that it occasioned, have been replaced by the negotiation of the fine points of 
the molecular problem, in very technical papers, appropriate only to a narrow 
community of experts. The authors of these sites were interested in the Lamarckism 
versus Darwinism element of the debate, and since that aspect has largely been 
eclipsed in journal publications since the early 2000s there is not a great deal of new 
material for these dissent enthusiasts to engage. A constant stream of anomalies and 
unexplained phenomena arise, providing these organisations and individuals with 
new material. In that sense directed mutation has become old news.
The presence of the core-set online has also not increased. There are two 
possible explanations for this. Perhaps those authors consider that their journal 
publications speak for themselves, and feel no need to publish outside the 
parameters of peer review. Alternatively, those few authors might personally be ill- 
disposed to engaging in the Internet based debate. For example, John Cairns has 
said:
‘I know nothing about any Internet forum on directed mutation (the idea fills me 
with horror).’714
Finally, religious or anti-religious attention has slightly decreased. The 
materials online in 2000 illustrate that there was no real consensus amongst these 
communities as to whether directed mutation was commensurate with or antithetical 
to religious approaches to science. For some it was evidence of design, for others it 
was another example of the inadequacy of evolutionary theory. With the relevance 
of directed mutation somewhat unclear to this community it has not been given 
further attention.
714 John Caims (personal communication, 10/03)
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Overall, there has been a general increase in the scale of the directed mutation 
debate online, with the greatest increase of materials in the categories linked to 
professional science, and academia. Many of the journal articles online originally 
appeared in print within the constitutive forum, and many online authors, for 
example those in the category ‘academics online’, occupy positions of authority in 
the cultural cartography of science outside the Internet forum. Although the 
signifiers of authority have a low visibility online (see section 5.3) nevertheless, 
many contributions to the online debate emerge from contexts that do confer 
authority in the standard cartography.
Supplementing those materials are the amateur contributions, which emerge 
from contexts that do not share the authority of ‘science’ outside the Internet forum. 
In the standard cultural cartography those individuals and contexts would exist 
outside the territory ‘science’, and they would not be part of negotiation during 
scientific dissent. However, in the Internet forum professional and amateur 
contributions appear side by side, and are often difficult to discern from one another. 
The implications of this blending of materials are discussed below.
5.2 New audiences generate new conflicts: is closure possible in diversified 
debates?
In the period immediately after the publication of The Origin o f  Mutants the directed 
mutation debate was comprised of two sub-debates. This structure is described in 
Chapter 2. In that chapter I argue that the two-aspect structure perpetuated the 
conflict. The Lamarckism versus Darwinism aspect of the debate has been highly 
contentious, less openly negotiated in journals, and has made little progress towards 
closure. Meanwhile, the aspect of the debate that deals with the molecular biological 
phenomenon has been more explicitly addressed in the constitutive forum. However, 
without resolution of the Darwinism versus Lamarckism issue the molecular debate 
cannot achieve full resolution. In the late 1980s there were three major foci of 
dissent in this debate:
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> Do bacteria have the capacity to control their mutational process and thus 
undergo adaptive change directed by environmental pressures?
> Would the existence of a mechanism of that kind represent a challenge to 
Neo-Darwinian theory?
> Would a mechanism of that kind provide an example of the action of 
Lamarckian evolution?
The first of these is open to negotiation and closure by common processes; for 
example, appeal to new evidence could potentially provide the route to consensus. 
Through experiment and negotiation this issue could potentially be resolved. The 
second and third issues are more difficult to resolve. The achievement of consensus 
on these questions requires more than the emergence of further experimental data. 
Allegiance either to a Darwinian interpretation or a Lamarckian interpretation of 
directed mutation is rooted in individual beliefs about evolution and evolutionary 
theory. Therefore, even prolonged negotiation is unlikely to achieve consensus on 
these issues because they are underpinned by a more fundamental disagreement. 
Many conflicts also reach a form of resolution through the process of abandonment. 
Again, in the case of these last two issues that is unlikely since the dissent is of such 
epistemological significance.
The uptake of the debate in the Internet forum enhanced these problems and 
added several more. Because most of the treatments online were secondary materials 
(i.e. commentaries) they did not offer the kind of new evidence that might lead to the 
resolution of molecular biological element of the debate. So, they did not contribute 
to the most likely route to resolution. Furthermore, most of the amateur treatments 
online focussed on the dissent between Lamarckism and Darwinism, inflaming this 
most contentious element. By framing the debate as a Lamarckian resurrection, 
amateur authors focussed attention on the aspect of the debate that was least likely to 
be resolved by appeal to evidence, abandonment or negotiation.
In addition to aggravating the existing impediments to closure, authors on the 
Internet also contributed further problems in the form of additional foci of dissent. 
Authors in the category ‘weird science’ encouraged that the directed mutation debate
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also became about conspiracy and the repression of anomalies in science. They 
asked:
> Has the work on directed mutation been unfairly evaluated or rejected just 
because it is unorthodox?
> Is Neo-Darwinian theory defended in science beyond the degree warranted 
by the evidence?
> Are all findings that conflict with Neo-Darwinism marginalized?
> Does science protect its authority by rejecting anomaly?
For example, the author of science-ffontiers, William Corliss, discusses ‘the 
seemingly unassailable dogma of evolutionary biology’, and asks regarding directed 
mutation: ‘can anything be more heretical?’ Corliss comments that:
‘This discovery [directed mutation] seems at least as “impossible” as the “infinite 
dilution” experiments discussed elsewhere. Will Nature now dispatch a “hit squad” 
to Harvard.’715
When Corliss revisits the directed mutation debate in a 1994 issue of science- 
ffontiers he recalls that after the Harvard results were published ‘one of science’s 
foundation stones was at risk’ and adds ‘this claim was too awful to accept’.716
In addition, authors who contributed materials with an explicit religious or 
anti-religious agenda encouraged that directed mutation become involved in the 
evolution versus creation debate. They asked:
> Does directed mutation provide evidence of intelligent design?
715 Corliss is making reference here to the reception of Benveniste’s work on water memory, which 
was published in Nature (Davenas, Benveniste et al., 1988) just before The origin of mutants (Cairns, 
Overbaugh & Miller, 1988). The ‘hit squad’ that he mentions is a reference to the deputation that 
Nature editor John Maddox led to Beneveniste’s laboratory to examine his experimental procedures 
(see 5.6). See Science Frontiers #60, Nov-Dee, 1988. View online at: www.science-frontiers.com
716 Science Frontiers #96, Nov-Dee, 1994. View online at: www.science-frontiers.com
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> Does directed mutation provide evidence that orthodox evolutionary theory 
is flawed at a fundamental level?
Again, these issues are not open to resolution by means of appeal to new data, re­
negotiation of existing evidence or abandonment.
In the Internet forum directed mutation developed various identities in 
relation to new agendas. Consensus was made even more unlikely because authors 
in each category were not necessarily interested in the others’ commentaries. For 
example, academic authors online were not necessarily moved to engage in the 
religion versus science debate. The religious authors were similarly disinterested in 
the possible conspiratorial marginalisation of Lamarckians. Negotiation was not 
being achieved because the numerous authors did not share an interpretation of the 
dissent.
Ultimately, closure depends on the achievement of a significant degree of 
consensus amongst those engaged in a conflict. In the case of directed mutation on 
the Internet, consensus could not even be reached concerning the identity of the 
dissent implied by the directed mutation phenomenon. The debate had diversified in 
this forum to become several related, yet quite different, sub-debates; each requiring 
its own form of closure. Different communities have different approaches to and 
identities of dissent and resolution, making negotiation between groups difficult. 
Chapter 4 identifies the clash of the sub-disciplinary groups ‘evolutionary biology’ 
and ‘molecular biology’ as a force of perpetuation in the directed mutation debate. In 
that chapter I argue that perpetuation resulted from these two groups pursuing 
different negotiation strategies, and having different understandings of closure. In 
the Internet forum, these two clashing communities were joined by several others, 
and the clash of styles of approach was magnified and multiplied.
5,3 Is there boundary work in the virtual world? What becomes of the 
cartographic metaphor online?
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Chapters 1-4 highlight the broad utility of boundary work theory as a 
methodological tool for the study of the directed mutation debate. Chapter 3 
describes how boundary theory reveals the debate as one episode within a larger 
conflict. The theory allows that we frame the identities of Lamarckism and 
Darwinism as ‘old maps’, and understand their histories accordingly. Chapter 4 
describes how boundary work and cultural cartography illuminate the circumstances 
of the interdisciplinary contest between molecular biologists and evolutionary 
biologists at the heart of the directed mutation debate. However, when we follow the 
debate into the Internet forum the success of boundary theory as an analytical tool is 
reduced.
Boundary theory relies heavily on the cartographic metaphor, with the 
concept of adjacency underpinning the notion of ‘boundary’. Representations of 
boundaries, and their associated authority signification, exist as part of a two- 
dimensional geographic metaphor. Gieryn calls these ‘culturescapes’.717 The 2-D 
cartography that records the episodic delineations of territories illustrates a transient 
consensus between the adjacent territories regarding the location of a boundary. 
Some visual representations of these 2-D cultural cartographies have been prepared. 
They record the proximity of certain cultural territories, illustrating adjacency and 
depicting their transient boundary delineations. ‘The Map of a Great Country’ is one 
example. This 1834 map produced by an American artist was intended as an allegory 
on alcoholism; depicting intemperate behaviours in the lands of ‘poor prospect’ and 
‘direness’ beside the seas of ‘anguish’ and ‘perdition’. In the south of the map, 
across the sea of temperance we see the states of ‘knowledge’ and ‘fine prospect’ 
where ‘Mount Science’ can be found.718
Although adjacencies and associated authority are open to constant debate, 
nevertheless, the geographic metaphor can be used to illustrate the state of cultural 
delineations at any one time. The boundaries on these maps depict the sites at which 
conflict occurs, and the scale of the territories demonstrates the authority of each 
cultural domain in relation to its ‘neighbours’. In boundary work theory these
717 Gieryn, T. (1999) p.7
718 This map has been reproduced in Gieryn, T. (1999)
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cartographies, the boundaries they depict, and the authority that they record, are 
assumed to reflect the tacit assumptions of the members of the cultural territories. 
Those tacit assumptions are used to navigate culture. In these geographic 
cartographies there are certain ‘signposts’ or signifiers that enforce assumptions of 
authority and delineation. For example, in the case of science, the territory is 
signposted by symbols such as universities, professional journal publications, 
professional conferences, citations, and even white lab-coats. The signifiers are vital 
parts of the cartography, and they guide activity both in culture and in new boundary 
disputes.
However, when we come to consider the representations on the Internet 
things are dramatically different. It is unclear how the cultural cartography can be 
pasted onto this new space; how the geographic metaphor might be applied to 
cyberspace. Also, it is unclear how the cultural cartography’s boundaries, adjacency 
and authority are replicated in this environment. There are two principal features of 
the Internet that make it so incommensurable with the cartographic metaphor and 
boundary theory: first, the physical organisation of the loci (i.e. websites or web 
pages) within the overall space, and, second, the manner in which navigation 
through the space and its constitutive loci is achieved.
In cyberspace there is no reality of adjacency between the various sites. The 
user creates a fresh adjacency with each navigation. There is no pre-determined 
route between loci and no linearity linking them. The start and end points of any 
users navigation are unfixed, except in as much as they might explore loci using the 
navigation order generated by the listing processes of a web search tool. The 
navigation or ‘surf of any user will be absolutely episodic and transient, and the 
navigational route followed by any one user does not influence the path that 
subsequent users will take.
Furthermore, the transient loci relations in this space are not supplemented 
by the kinds of signifiers used in the cultural cartography; in the Internet forum, 
association, authority and credibility are not signposted by the artefacts or indicators 
that are visible in the constitutive or contingent forums. For example, away from 
cyberspace, peer review marks journal articles as professional, and university
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affiliation marks authors as experts. In the Internet forum it is not necessary to 
demonstrate authority in order to present material, and the usual boundaries and 
associated signifiers are no longer functional or even relevant.
However, the Internet forum is not totally without a system of navigational 
guidance between loci. In that environment hyperlinks provide pointers for 
individuals’ navigation, and search engines provide a kind of recommended route 
through materials. However, even where links are used, navigations remain highly 
variable, and searches still rely on the user to choose which loci to visit from the 
filtered selection. Links and searches provide a guide to subject, but not to authority. 
Journal publications citations are the analogue of links. However, in journals 
citations imply a navigational aid related to the pursuit not only of subject but also of 
authority. Citations are used to assert community, and highlight the shared authority 
within a certain cultural territory. Citations can be a tool of boundary work and can 
imply inclusion or exclusion. Links between web loci do not generally fulfil such a 
sophisticated role, rather they offer a very basic navigational guide, prioritising 
subject over affiliation or authority. As business economist Detlef Schoder points 
out: ‘In the physical world two-dimensional maps and various other symbolic 
representations of our environment are the preferred means of orientation.’ But that 
by contrast, on the Internet: ‘...the navigational support provided by links, or a 
collection of links, is rather limited...[they] resemble street signs, and as such, are 
not that helpful for high-dimensional cyberspace navigation’.719
In some cases the use of hyperlinks fulfils a similar function to citation in 
paper publication. Academics online tend to link to other academics and to online 
journal material, rather than linking to the online contributions of amateurs. Those 
authors are using links to replicate the authority structures in the cultural 
cartography. Amateur authors on the other hand include links to professional and 
amateur materials, choosing to prioritise subject over authority. Furthermore, paper 
publications rarely cite online materials, whereas online materials very frequently
719 Schoder, D. (1999) Navigation in cyberspace -  using multi-dimensional scaling to create three- 
dimensional navigational maps. In: W. Gaul & H. Locarek-Junge (Eds.) Classification of the 
information age. Proceedings of the 22nd Annual GfKl. Conference, Dresden. Available online: 
www.iig.uni-freiburg.de/telematik/forschung/publikationen/pubfiles/Scl999a.pdf
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refer to paper publication. It is possible that a detailed analogy could be drawn 
between the use of citations and online links. That analogy might allow the choice of 
links to be viewed as a kind of boundary work online, and this would certainly be an 
interesting area for further research.
In spite of the apparent lack of adjacencies on the Internet, attempts have 
been made to provide a cartography of cyberspace and the navigations made within 
it. Much of this attention has been inspired by business interests, with companies 
keen to locate and link their sites in a way that makes visiting them both more 
simple and more likely. There are also ‘cyberspace geographers’ whose interest in 
creating a cartography is inspired by the spirit of exploration. They are attempting to 
map the new world that cyberspace represents. Examination of some of the maps 
generated through these efforts highlights the difficulty of assigning concepts such 
as adjacency or the geographic metaphor in this environment. Some representations 
use the principles of existing cartography, while others rely upon new metrics, grids 
and abstractions.
Computer scientists Martin Dodge and Rob Kitchin have made perhaps the 
most comprehensive study of the new cartographies of cyberspace. They have 
categorised the cyberspace cartographies and collected images in an ‘Atlas of 
Cyberspace’.720 The visual representations of cyberspace take several basic forms. 
Firstly, there are those representations that attempt to salvage the usefulness of the 
geographic metaphor. These use standard cartographies as their foundation and 
attempt to paste a representation of cyberspace over those familiar images.
720 Kitchin, R. & Dodge, M. (2002) Atlas of cyberspace. Addison-Wesley, London.
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Figure 10: Visualization study of the NSFNET721
There are also conceptual maps of cyberspace. These attempt to salvage the concepts 
of adjacency and scale and preserve these by depicting the web as if  it were 
physically arranged in space. Perhaps the best known o f these is the Internet Industry 
Map, which charts cyberspace by depicting the relationships between the major 
enterprises that are hosted in cyberspace.
Figure 11: The Internet Industry Map
721 Visualization produced by D. Cox and R. Patterson 1992
722 Visualization of cyberspace in terms of the commerce that it hosts. Prepared by Valdis Krebs in 
2000. The most recent version of the Internet Industry Map is available online: 
www.orgnet.com/netindustrv.html
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Other representations of cyberspace tend towards the abstract, and actively attempt 
to escape the restraints of standard cartographies with their implicit categories of 
adjacency and scale. At their most abstract these ‘cartographies’ become artistic 
representations of the abstraction of cyberspace.
Figure 12: 3-D Internet topography visualizations, created using Walrus visualisation software.723
Some of the most abstract visualisations exist in film, where cyberspace is given a 
physical manifestation as another ‘world’; often a world with enough constructed 
physical reality that people can ‘go there’.
Figure 13: Still from the film ‘The Matrix’ 
in which the Internet is depicted as a 
physical environment manifest from 
streaming data.
Figure 14: Still from the film ‘Johnny 
Mnemonic’ in which the Internet is depicted 
as a physical environment manifest from the 
data stored in cyberspace.
723 Walrus visualizations of cyberspace presented in Kitchin, R & Dodge, M. (2002)
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In addition to these cartographies, or visualizations, of the overall structure of 
cyberspace, there are also cartographic representations and visualizations of the 
individual navigations of any one user, at any one time, through the environment. 
These cartographies record the transient adjacencies that are created by each user’s 
personal navigation.
724 725
Figure 15: Basic surf-map Figure 16: A Natto view 3-D
showing a simple navigtion. visualization surf-map.
Figure 17: This surf map is a WebPath visualisation, created by a mapping tool that visualizes and 
records a user’s trail as they browse the Web.726
724 Surf map created using WebMap, a graphical navigation visualization tool. Produced by Peter 
Domel, 1994.
725 Natto View visualization has been developed by H. Shiozawa and Y. Matsushita.
726 WebPath visualization software has been developed by E. Frecon and G. Smith.
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However, while these ‘surf maps’ might record transient adjacencies, they cannot be 
used in the same way as the adjacencies in the cultural cartographies i.e. to illustrate 
boundaries or associated authorities. Without the signifiers of the standard cultural 
cartographies authority and association become less visible. As you navigate 
between sites the signifiers of authority are discreet. Also, search engines do not 
discriminate in terms of authority, and so provide no instructive guide as to the 
validity of sources.
In the case of the materials related to directed mutation there is a mixture of 
professional and amateur material. There are tacit and explicit agendas being served 
on many of the sites. In some cases the material presented is even factually incorrect. 
There are some ways of identifying remnants of the authority structures of the 
standard cultural cartography. For example the ‘.ac’ or ‘/edu’ in a web address 
signifies university affiliation and implies the authority association that attends that 
status in the cultural cartography. Also, the user might benefit from having existing 
knowledge of the authority relations within a certain topic, for example they might 
recognise the names of individuals or authors that have authority in the context of 
the cultural cartography.
It is difficult to imagine how boundary work might be visualised, or even 
manifest, in this environment. It seems that the cartographic metaphor cannot be 
applied, and thus adjacency and the delineations that boundary theory relies upon are 
lost. Science communications researcher, Adam Nieman, has considered the 
possibility of reinterpreting boundary work without the cartographic metaphor.727 
Nieman rejects the cartographic metaphor in favour of a ‘network model’, in which 
boundaries are determined by the ‘intermediate dependencies’ of the various 
territories. It is possible that this kind of network model might be applied to 
illuminate the transient adjacencies between loci that are created by the navigation of 
web users. The relationship of the loci one to another during that navigation would 
be an example of an intermediate dependency. However, this still cannot reveal
727 Nieman, A. (2002) Boundary negotiations in popular culture: ‘intermediate dependent entities’ and 
the ideological context of science policy [Preprint].
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boundary work activity because those brief interdependencies of adjacencies are 
transient, and specific to one user. The consensus required for boundary work to 
function is lost in the temporary nature of the adjacencies. It seems that the authority 
relationships online will require an alternative to the cartographic metaphor for their 
description.
5.4 Is the Internet forum ‘contingent’ or ‘constitutive’? A new arena for 
acceptance and rejection?
Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch have identified the constitutive and contingent 
forums as the contexts in which scientific controversy is conducted (see Chapter 
l).728 They characterise the constitutive forum as ‘scientific theorising and 
experiment and corresponding publication and criticism in the learned journals and, 
perhaps, in the formal conference setting.’729 The contingent forum on the other 
hand is comprised of ‘those actions which -  according to old-fashioned 
philosophical orthodoxy -  are not supposed to affect the constitution of ‘objective’ 
knowledge.’ In particular ‘...popular and semi-popular journals, discussion and 
gossip, fundraising and publicity seeking, the setting up and joining of professional 
organisations, the corralling of student followers, and everything that scientists do in 
connection with their work, but which is not in the constitutive forum.’730
It is difficult to assign the online directed mutation materials to these 
categories. They include contributions from both amateurs and professionals. Some 
of the materials are reproduced from the constitutive forum, for example, the many 
journal articles that have been made available. Other materials are more like those in 
the contingent forum, for example, non-reviewed online academic publications and 
personal communications in online discussion groups. The Internet provides the 
arena for professionals and amateurs to discuss science issues without the 
restrictions of highly visible authority signifiers. Furthermore, it allows amateurs to
728 Collins, H. & Pinch, T. (1979)
729 Collins, H. & Pinch, T. (1979) p.239-240
730 Collins, H. & Pinch, T. (1979) p.240
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comment on the reproduced constitutive materials and make their commentary 
visible to authors from the constitutive forum. The mixing together of these 
materials, alongside the blurring of the authority signifiers, makes it difficult to 
discern the contingent and constitutive categories. Part of what coheres the 
constitutive and contingent is the boundaries and associated authority that delineate 
them one from the other. As described in 5.3 these boundaries, adjacencies and 
authority structures breakdown on the Internet. As boundary work looses some of its 
descriptive power in the online environment, so to do the categories contingent and 
constitutive.
I suggest that it is not useful to assign the online materials to these forums. If 
we view the Internet simply as an assemblage of the contingent and constitutive then 
the particular character of this unique space for scientific debate is eclipsed. The 
Internet provides the opportunity for amateurs and professionals to engage together, 
even if not with one another, in the negotiation of scientific controversy. It promotes 
openness, not only in the author’s ability to make their opinions visible, but also in 
the availability of sources. In this environment the restraints of peer review are 
bypassed, and negotiation becomes a more lively and immediate process. In place of 
the long pauses between assertion and response that are occasioned as authors 
submit papers, wait to have them accepted and for journals to come into print, the 
Internet offers a context for more spontaneous discourse. For these reasons, I argue 
that it is useful to think of the Internet forum as a third arena for scientific 
controversy; existing alongside the contingent and constitutive forums, sharing some 
of each of their characteristics, but having an identity particular to it.
However, since the usual boundaries and signifiers are not visible in the 
context of the Internet, we must ask whether it is valid to acknowledge the Internet 
forum as a site of scientific debate. If the rules that the cultural cartography enforces 
concerning authority are not applied in this context, then can any negotiation that 
happens there be fed back into a system that makes choices about boundaries and 
authority? That is to say: is debate on the Internet part of a scientific controversy, 
and should it have an impact on negotiation in the contingent and constitutive 
forums?
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The data in fig.9 indicates the validity of Internet materials as part of the 
directed mutation debate. Two of the fastest growing categories of online material 
between 2000 and 2005 were ‘academics online’ and ‘journal articles online’. By 
contrast the categories ‘amateur online’ and ‘weird science’ experienced slight 
negative growth. So, the increased scale of directed mutation online in 2005 mainly 
resulted from an increase of materials in the more professional of the categories. The 
amateur materials, which often provoke concerns about the validity of online debate, 
represented less of the online materials overall than the professional in 2005. In the 
case of directed mutation at least, the notion that online materials are invalid because 
they are unprofessional seems inappropriate.
We learn from boundary theory that authority is negotiated between the 
cultural territories. A boundary is delineated at an agreed location between adjacent 
groups. A group cannot get authority by just saying that they have it, or demanding 
it -  it must be agreed. This highlights an interesting role for the Internet, and 
emphasises its importance as a site for debate; as long as the Internet community is 
engaged in debate the boundaries and authority are not set since consensus across 
the cartography has not been achieved. Although authors in journals might conclude 
on the authority contest, while others from adjacent territories remain undecided this 
cannot be finalised. Although there is concern about what the Internet discourse 
‘adds’ to debate in terms of intellectual material, that concern really misses the 
point. Material on the Internet might not be sufficiently intellectual or professional 
to occupy the constitutive forum, but it does show that individuals from other 
cultural domains don’t accept the constitutive decrees on closure. And without their 
agreement boundaries cannot really be set.
Interestingly, the Internet reveals boundary activity between communities. If 
we just look at journal articles all we see is the boundary work of authors as they 
push for increased authority. The Internet allows us see their opponents, and watch 
the boundary negotiation as a crowd of non-scientists or non-professionals ask 
questions about validity and fairness before agreeing on boundary and authority 
outcomes. The traditional problem of what the Internet ‘adds’ to scientific debate 
can be changed to a question about what the Internet ‘does’ to scientific debates.
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In terms of the protraction of debate, with which this thesis is concerned, 
activity in the Internet forum has had an undeniable influence. In the case of directed 
mutation, the Internet has not only increased the scale of debate, but it has also 
encouraged its diversification of identity. As mentioned above, the debate would 
now require several different closures, pertaining to the different interests and 
agendas that are involved, to be considered closed by consensus. The Internet forum, 
with its absence of controls such as peer review, has allowed the Lamarckism versus 
Darwinism debate to come to the fore. I have identified that element of the debate as 
a principal force of perpetuation, even in the paper debate where reference to that 
conflict is necessarily less explicit. With the Internet providing a site for negotiation 
of that aspect of the debate, perpetuation is enhanced. Although authors in the 
constitutive forum are less willing to engage that aspect, nevertheless, debate is 
perpetuated by having its most controversial element catered for in a new space. 
Therefore, it is not only interesting to consider the distinct nature of the Internet 
forum, but in this case it is a pragmatic necessity for achieving an understanding of 
the debates dynamics. I will not seek to further characterise the nature of the Internet 
here (that must be a larger project for attention elsewhere), but suffice to say, that I 
will assume it as a third distinct context for debate alongside the constitutive and 
contingent forums.
5.5 What becomes of ‘safe discredit’ in the twenty-first century? The 
implications for closure of contemporary conflicts.
In 1995 evolutionary biologist Daniel Dennett pronounced directed mutation dead. 
He stated that the theory had been ‘safely discredited’ and rejected by the scientific
•  731community. The dozens of journal articles published relating to directed mutation
subsequent to 1995 indicate that Dennett’s evaluation was premature. Furthermore, 
the huge growth of the debate in the Internet forum between 2000 and 2005 
illustrates that negotiation is far from concluded. Even if Dennett’s commentary had 
been true of the constitutive debate, it still would not have reflected the
731 Dennett, D. (1995)
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circumstances of uptake in the Internet forum. In this section, I argue, that notions of 
discredit and unorthodoxy loose meaning in debates taken up in the Internet forum. 
These debates achieve a virtual immortality, and closure becomes a remote 
possibility. Without the consensus that underpins closure, debates are potentially 
protracted indefinitely.
Sociologist Bart Simon has described what he calls the ‘afterlife’ of scientific 
controversies in relation to the cold fusion debate.732 He defines the afterlife as the 
existence of a debate in what appears as a ‘post-closure’ incarnation, and has 
developed a methodology for examining controversies that endure, despite apparent 
closure in the constitutive forum. He calls this the ‘hauntology’ of undead science. 
Simon has observed that after the scientific community rejected cold fusion there 
was in fact little change in the number of people working on the phenomenon, or 
interested in it. What changed was the way that those individuals had to conduct 
their research. After 1990 supporters of cold fusion worked more discretely, often in 
privately funded research institutes created for the purpose, and often publishing in 
specialist journals created by and for this community of researchers. Despite the fact 
that their structures of funding and publication changed, the material of the debate 
remained unchanged. Although many scientists had declared the end of the 
controversy, even branding cold fusion ‘pathological’ or fraudulent, if we follow the 
object of cold fusion into other contexts (as Latour and Simon have encouraged) we 
discover that the debate survived and continued unperturbed by the pronouncement 
of its closure.
In this section, I argue that the Internet is an ideal and common place for 
‘undead’ scientific controversies to be conducted. I have suggested in 5.3 that 
boundaries and authority do not translate well in the context of this forum. Here I 
argue that the concept of closure also is less relevant in the Internet forum, allowing 
many controversies to exist in a post-closure afterlife of the kind that Simon has 
identified. If there are undead controversies, as Simon suggests, then the Internet is 
an ideal realm for the dead; a hinterland between rejection and abandonment.
732 Simon, B. (2002)
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In the case of cold fusion, the Internet has allowed the debate to undergo full 
resurrection. Although the orthodox community have abandoned the debate, it is 
able to continue aside from that rejection in the Internet forum. A similar situation is 
illustrated in the case of the water memory debate (see section 5.6). That debate was 
declared closed in the autumn of 1988733, yet this did not prevent further research 
and negotiation continuing in other contexts. The water memory debate, like the 
directed mutation debate, has taken on numerous meanings in relation to the agendas 
of various interested groups. The diverse negotiations between and among those 
groups can be described as the afterlife of the water memory controversy. It seems 
that in the case of both cold fusion and water memory the process of ‘discredit’ has 
not had the impact expected. Although one community has rejected the claims, and 
asserted that it has the authority to do so, nevertheless others who contest that 
authority continue to negotiate and hold that rejection in little regard. And since 
cultural authority is negotiated between groups, and cannot just be declared by the 
interested party, ongoing debate is enough to leave boundaries undecided.
The situation as regards directed mutation is slightly different. Consensus 
concerning the status of directed mutation has not been reached in any forum. While 
Dennett has pronounced the theory dead, many other scientists continue to research 
the area and engage in the paper debate. Although many scientists encourage a 
Darwinian (or at legist non-Lamarckian) interpretation, still research also continues 
that supports the ‘stronger’ versions of directed mutation theory. The uptake of 
directed mutation in the Internet forum has not necessarily meant its reincarnation; 
directed mutation has essentially not been declared dead and so is not quite ‘undead’ 
in Simon’s terms. However, the increase of scale in the Internet forum has certainly 
breathed new life into the debate. The numerous new identities of directed mutation 
in that context mean that the debate is enjoying a kind of afterlife analogous to the 
cases of water memory and cold fusion online, but is simultaneously alive in the 
constitutive and contingent forums.
I have argued that the directed mutation controversy is comprised of two sub­
debates: the first being the negotiation of the anomalous molecular biological
733 Maddox, J. (1988b)
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findings, the second being the negotiation of the implications of that anomaly for 
Lamarckian and Darwinian theories. By the late 1990s it was the negotiation of the 
molecular biological elements of the debate that took precedence in the journal 
treatments. That was largely due to an awareness that the Lamarckism versus 
Darwinism element of the conflict could not be resolved by debate, and would be 
best addressed by finding further data related to the directed mutation phenomenon. 
In the late 1990s, the journal articles increasingly began to address specific technical 
issues relating to directed mutation, rather than the general implications of the 
phenomenon. Speculative or antagonistic commentary concerning the Lamarckian 
implications of directed mutation became far less common in print. Although the 
Lamarckian element of the debate had not been resolved it was being excluded to a 
degree from the constitutive materials based upon it apparent irresolvability. 
However, the uptake of the debate in the Internet forum allowed a resurrection of the 
active negotiation of that element of the debate, and in fact, that level of the debate 
took precedence on the many amateur sites. So although one level of the debate 
remained very much open in the constitutive forum, the more controversial elements 
of the debate began to enjoy an afterlife and resurrection away from the restrictions 
of the paper debate.
The existence of the Internet forum, as a context for certain debates to 
conduct their ‘afterlife’, or at least enjoy some enlivenment if they are not yet dead, 
means that the very notions of discredit and rejection in science are changed in 
meaning. Discredit in science is only influential if there is a degree of widespread 
consensus concerning the legitimacy of the discredit. The Internet provides a forum 
in which individuals or groups that do not accept the evaluation of orthodox 
scientists can continue to negotiate scientific issues. The great scale of engagement 
on the Internet allows discredit to lose its influence in the online environment. 
Closure relies upon the achievement of consensus regarding a contentious issue. The 
consensus does not have to be unanimous, but must be of a degree that means 
negotiation comes to an end. On the Internet, the degree of participation, and the 
different interests and agendas that underlie participation, make the achievement of 
consensus a practical impossibility. The issues of contention diversify such that there
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is not even consensus regarding the nature of the controversy. The different groups 
or individuals do not all share values concerning authority structures, or what counts 
as orthodox versus unorthodox. So, notions such as ‘discredit’ do not carry weight in 
the new forum. Their relationship to the quasi-object that the debate represents is 
altered by the change of context, and we must take that into account as we follow the 
debate into different contexts.
5.6 An analogous case: Jacques Benveniste and the Homeopaths.
Jacques Benveniste and water’s memory.
In June 1988, an article appeared in Nature from the French laboratory of 
eminent immunologist Jacques Benveniste.734 The authors of that paper reported that 
a water-based solution containing an antibody retained its capacity to evoke an a 
cellular response even once it has been so extremely diluted that there was unlikely 
to be even one molecule of the antibody remaining in a sample. They claimed that 
the water in the solution was somehow altered in an enduring way by that 
relationship with the antibody, even after dilution meant that no molecules of the 
antibody remained. The water behaved as if the antibody was still present, 
essentially the water seemed to ‘remember’ its presence.
Publication in the journal Nature of findings with such an apparent lack of 
physical basis was unusual. The journals editor John Maddox had approached the 
material with great caution. The paper had been sent in several versions to a number 
of referees over a period of months. When the paper finally appeared in June 1988 it 
was accompanied not only by an editorial introduction735, but also by a highly 
unusual ‘editorial reservation’.736 In the editorial Maddox described the ‘good and 
particular reasons why prudent people should, for the time being, suspend 
judgement.’737 He stressed that: ‘...when an unexpected observation requires that a
734 Davenas, E., Benveniste, J. et al. (1988)
735 Maddox, J. (1988a)
736 Maddox, J. (1988c) Editorial reservation. Nature, 333: 818.
737 Maddox, J. (1988a) p.787
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substantial part of our intellectual heritage should be thrown away, it is prudent to 
ask more carefully than usual whether the observation may be incorrect.’738 In the 
appended editorial reservation Maddox revealed that one of the agreed conditions 
for publication was that Benveniste allow a delegation to visit his laboratory to 
examine experimental procedure. The report of that investigation was scheduled to 
appear in the next issue of Nature.
The publication of Benveniste’s work alongside these editorial contributions 
provides an excellent example of what Collins and Pinch have called ‘diluting 
orthodox publication’.739 In this style of publication a paper is qualified by 
accompanying material, such that ‘the seeming stamp of legitimacy [is] emasculated 
by making it a case of special treatment’.740 The result is that the publication 
becomes ‘at best a kind of tokenism’.741 Collins and Pinch have described this type 
of publication in relation to an article on psychical research in the journal Nature in 
1974.742 In that instance, a paper reporting tests carried out on several alleged 
psychics, including Uri Geller, at California’s Stanford Research Institute, was 
published alongside an editorial explaining the publisher’s sceptical approach to the 
report.743 The leader was written by a well-known sceptic of parapsychology, and 
included extracts from unfavourable peer-reviews. The editorial stated that Nature 
had published against the recommendations of the reviewers for several reasons. 
These included: i) because the research emerged from a reputable institution, ii) 
because the method used was scientific, iii) because there was a lot of media 
attention and rumour surrounding what had been achieved in the research and the 
editors felt they should provide actual data and iv) because the readers of Nature 
expect the journal to occasionally handle high risk or contentious material.
Benveniste’s paper was treated in a similar way. It was also introduced by 
editorial material that referred to unfavourable reviews, and the editor justified 
publication on the grounds of settling rumours that had begun. In Chapter 4, I
738 Maddox, J. (1988a)
739 Collins, H. & Pinch, T. (1979) p.258
740 Collins, H. & Pinch, T. (1979)
741 Collins, H. & Pinch, T. (1979)
742 Targ, R. & Puthoff, H. (1974) Information transmission under conditions of sensory shielding. 
Nature, 251: 602-607.
743 Davies, D. (1974) Editorial: Investigating the paranormal. Nature, 251:559.
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describe how Cairns’ On the Origin o f Mutants was similarly published alongside 
qualifying material, in that case a leader article from molecular biologist Franklin 
Stahl744, as a form of dilution of orthodox publication.
The qualification of Benveniste’s research went further. The agreed 
laboratory visit went ahead, and John Maddox led a team to France. The 
composition of the team was remarkable, and further highlighted the publisher’s 
scepticism. Maddox took with him James Randi, a famous magician and fierce 
antagonist of the paranormal, and Walter Stewart, a well-known investigator of 
fraud in science. They spent a week at the laboratory analysing experimental 
methods and data interpretations, and Randi and Walters searched for every kind of 
trickery or fraud.745
Their report appeared in the next issue of Nature, calling the high dilution 
experiments ‘a delusion’.746 The authors stated that Benveniste’s experiments were 
ill-controlled, full of systematic error, fraught with observer bias and not 
reproducible. They did not accuse Benveniste of fraud, but rather stated that the 
researchers had seemed convinced of the reality of their reports. They concluded 
that: ‘...the claims made by Davenas et al. are not to be believed.’747 The team of 
investigators suggested that Benveniste withdraw his published paper, or at least 
write to Nature to qualify his data and interpretations himself.748 Benveniste refused 
to take that action. He did however write to Nature, but did so to offer a damning 
condemnation of the team that had visited his lab.749 He likened the experience to 
‘Salem witchhunts or McCarthy-like prosecutions’. He enjoined scientists as his 
peers to ‘never, but never let anything like this happen -  never let these people get in 
your lab.’750 Three months later Nature published Benveniste’s reflections on his
751treatment. He accused Nature of setting him up, and constructing his work as
744 Stahl, F. (1988)
745 Maddox, J., Randi, J. & Stewart, W. (1988)
746 Maddox, J., Randi, J. & Stewart, W. (1988)
747 Maddox, J., Randi, J. & Stewart, W. (1988) p.289
748 Maddox, J., Randi, J. & Stewart, W. (1988)
749 Benveniste, J. (1988a) Dr Jacques Benveniste replies... Nature, 334: 291.
750 Benveniste, J. (1988a)
751 Benveniste, J. (1988b) Benveniste on the Benveniste affair. Nature, 335: 759.
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fraud without supporting evidence. He stated: ‘fact twisting, errors, omissions,
752misquotations and mistruths are symptoms of a crusade’.
The result of the water memory affair was that Benveniste, a formerly highly
753regarded scientist ‘was pilloried, losing his government funding and laboratory’.
As far as authors in the constitutive forum were concerned the affair was ended, and 
the conclusions drawn by the Nature team led the consensus of the scientific 
mainstream. In October 1988, Maddox presented a final editorial on the water 
memory saga, in which he stated that ‘from this issue of Nature, the past several 
weeks’ correspondence on the Benveniste affair will be closed.’754
Benveniste, and a depleted group of supporters continued the research 
undeterred, eventually under the auspices of the company Digibiol that Benveniste 
set up to investigate the potential applications of water memory. The persistence of 
that group of advocates meant that a degree of attention in the contingent forum was 
retained into the 1990s. And even in the constitutive forum water memory was not 
as ‘closed’ as Maddox had stated. In 1993 repetitions were attempted at University 
College London, showing negative results. However, in the early 2000s a pan- 
European project began to retest the basophil system with faultless controls, and 
researchers were ‘surprised’ to find significant positive results.755
However, the greatest forum for water memory debate from 1990-present has 
been online. A thriving community has made original sources and new publications 
available on various websites. Negotiation of the implications of water memory are 
carried out in dozens of online discussion forums. Like the directed mutation debate, 
the water memory debate online has achieved a huge scale and has been translated to 
suit many new agendas. In the case of water memory the Internet has extended the 
life expectancy of the debate. The transfer of the debate to that forum has allowed it 
to survive closure, and in fact become perpetuated in many new incarnations. The 
water memory debate is now in the online ‘afterlife’, and has a chance for
752 Benveniste, J. (1988b)
753 Milgrom, L. (1999) The memory of molecules. The Independent, 19.03.99.
754 Maddox, J. (1988b)
755 Milgrom, L. (2001) Thanks for the memory. The Guardian, 15.03.01. In this article Milgrom 
reminds us how controversial water memory remains, stating that as a result of the positive findings 
in 2001 ‘Either Benveniste will now be brought in from the cold, or.. .the scientists involved in the 
pan-European experiment could be joining him there.’
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immortality. An analysis of the nature of its afterlife gives an impression of just how 
successful Internet resurrections can be.
Water memory online
In February 2005 a basic Web search, using the search engine Google.co.uk, and the 
search term ‘water memory’ yielded 4,140 hits. These hits can be categorised as 
several discrete types of contribution to the debate surrounding ‘water memory’. I 
have identified 12 categories of material, and the graph below depicts the proportion 
of the first hundred hits that fall into each of those categories.
Core-set online: This category includes any materials produced online by individuals 
that have been active in the constitutive and contingent forums. In the case of water 
memory, the two ‘core-set’ hits in this sample of 100 are new online material from 
Benveniste.
Alternative science: This category includes those discussions of, or references to, 
water memory hosted on sites purposed to promote various unorthodox ‘sciences’. 
These include sites focussed on astrology, the spirit of the Earth, electromagnetism 
and several sites dedicated to the theory of living water. These sites promote a 
‘scientific’ interpretation of the world, without the restraints of the ‘laws’ that 
govern standard physics and chemistry. This category includes sites produced by 
individual enthusiasts and also sites that represent the work of various alternative 
science institutes, foundations and associations. In this context ‘water memory’ is 
cited either as an accepted foundational principle of the alternative approach being 
promoted, or is described as an example of how the main stream systematically 
rejects unorthodox scientific findings.
Discussion: This category includes those references to water memory that exist in 
online mail groups and discussion forums. In the case of water memory the majority 
of these forums are also dedicated to the development of alternative science. Others
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are for discussion of alternative medicine, unusual or unexplained science, or 
general interest amateur science.
Amateur online: This category includes online publications from amateur 
enthusiasts. The sites do not betray any overall agenda of alternative science or 
medicine, and the bizarre and unexplained are not prioritised over other science 
news. These sites are often produced by a single individual who has posted their 
views on contemporary science issues online, or by groups that publish online 
magazines promoting amateur comment on science. The majority of treatments of 
water memory in this category simply describe the 1988 publication and offer 
amateur commentary on the perceived viability of the theory.
Homeopathy: The materials in this category appear on sites specifically dedicated to 
the promotion of homeopathy. These sites are produced by individuals and 
organisations, and are purposed to offer information and advice on the practice of 
homeopathy for healing. Some of these sites reference Benveniste’s work as a point 
of interest in the subject area, while others cite the theory of water memory as 
demonstration, or proof that homeopathy functions on a scientific basis.
Mention in other contexts: This category includes materials that reference water 
memory, but without its being part of any agenda specific to the site, or its content 
being relevant to the nature of the site itself. For example this category includes two 
references to Benveniste’s 1988 paper in sites offering science bibliographies. The 
remaining hits in this category exist as a result of Benveniste’s formation of the 
company DigiBio. In these examples DigiBio is listed, or briefly described on 
several online companies registers.
Educational materials: This category includes references to water memory in online 
undergraduate teaching materials. In the case of water memory all the examples in 
this sample reference Benveniste’s work as an example of rejected science.
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Alternative Medicine: The references in this category appear on sites dedicated to 
the promotion of alternative approaches to health, healing and medicine. These are 
more general sites than those in the homeopathy section and include crystal healing, 
acupuncture, herbalism and the consumption of electromagnetically modified water. 
These sites either reference water memory as evidence for the use of modified 
waters, or as evidence for the benefits of homeopathic and herbal therapies.
Journal articles online: This category includes paper published journal articles 
reproduced online. The materials in this category do not appear in service to any 
particular agenda, or on a site promoting any particular interpretation of the material. 
The articles reproduced in this case include some of the follow up investigations by 
other authors after 1988.
Academics online: This category includes online materials produced by any 
academic author, who has not been part of the original core-set, and who has not 
published the material in a paper format elsewhere.
Weird science: This category includes those materials that appear on sites dedicated 
to the discussion of and accumulation of examples of strange and unexplained 
phenomena in science. These sites collect examples of scientific anomalies, 
sometimes describing and analysing them, sometimes making available the 
published articles online.
Water sales: This category includes sites that have been constructed to manage the 
online sale of ‘modified water’. These sites reference water memory as scientific 
evidence for the healing or health benefits of the modified waters that they sell.
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Types of material available online relating to 'water memory' in 
February 2005
□  Weird science □  Discussion □  Teaching
□ A m ateur ■  Articles online □  C ore-set online
■  Cited in other contexts □  Academic online ■  Alternative medicine
□  Alternative science □  W ater sa les □  Homeopathy
Figure 18
In the case o f water memory, the online afterlife is marked by a diverse 
community with abundant agendas. Some groups had interests in water memory i.e. 
the homeopaths, and the retailers o f modified waters. Others are engaged by the very 
notion of controversy or unorthodoxy -  just like some o f the online contributors to 
the directed mutation debate. Although constitutive forum members (i.e. Maddox at 
Nature) are happy to declare the case closed, their boundary decision remains un­
agreed by the members of adjacent communities that remain vocal online.
5.7 Conclusion -  areas for further study
Looking at the cases of directed mutation and water memory online we see 
some commonalities that might indicate areas for further research. In these two cases 
uptake o f debate in the Internet forum increased the scale o f participation and 
extended the variety of participants. With these new participants came new interests 
and agendas, and the meanings o f both debates diversified. This diversification and 
increased scale complicated negotiation, and closure became increasingly unlikely. I 
have shown that negotiation o f these debates in the Internet forum has been 
ineffective, since interested parties have not necessarily agreed on appropriate
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closure, or even explicitly engaged with each other in the online debate. Closure has 
been impeded further by the breakdown of the authority structures that govern the 
cultural cartography away from the Internet. The familiar tactics and outcomes of 
boundary work are less visible, and less relevant. The cartographic metaphor, on 
which boundary theory relies, has lost its meaning.
Further empirical studies are required to confirm the generality of the issues I 
have highlighted in relation to these two debates. The increase of scale and 
diversification seem likely to be common outcomes of the uptake of scientific debate 
online, but the degree of scale increase and the extent of protraction of negotiation 
will be case specific. Detailed studies are needed to reveal the structure of debates 
online; in particular, the degree to which interest groups communicate with each 
other, or even acknowledge each other will be important to understanding this 
diffuse community of participants. Certain key issues will need to be considered, for 
example:
• Do Internet debates tend to become diffuse enough to count as multiple 
contests?
• Are all online participants one community, or do their interests and agendas 
require that they be defined as related yet discrete communities?
• Are some debates more likely than others to be taken up in the Internet 
forum?
To make analyses of scientific debate online we must create a new 
methodology; I have shown that familiar tools such as core-set analysis or boundary 
theory cannot be applied to the Internet forum. This is a daunting task, and the result 
has been a tendency to ignore Internet based scientific debate and characterise it as 
unimportant or unscientific. I have shown that, particularly in the case of directed 
mutation, to ignore the Internet as a forum for negotiation means we loose a vital 
part of the history of this protracted debate. The most economical approach to 
creating a new methodology for the analysis of online scientific debate will be to 
attempt to salvage tools from existing methodology. I have illustrated that the loss of
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the cartographic metaphor online makes some existing treatments unsuitable, 
however it is likely that tactics analogous to boundary work might be sought in the 
Internet forum. For example, the use of links online is likely to have an analogy to 
the constitutive and contingent forum use of references and bibliographies in the 
making and breaking of associations in service to authority.
Key to a new methodological approach must be an abandonment of end- 
directedness in our interpretations. Closure itself loses meaning on the Internet, and 
debates seem to acquire an immortality of the kind that Bart Simon has touched 
upon in his discussion of ‘undead’ science. The structure and dynamics of scientific 
debate online seem likely to require analysis that prioritises action over outcomes. In 
the two cases I have described here, debate has become too diffuse for closure to be 
a useful focus of historical or sociological analyses. In the Internet forum, perhaps 
even more than in other contexts for scientific debate, the notion of perpetuating 
forces might help us make the transition from passive accounts of controversies en 
route to closure towards richer reconstructions of the active factors influencing 
negotiation. Although there is a vast amount of empirical and methodological work 
required before we can make analyses of Internet based scientific controversy it 
seems that the unique combination of contingent and constitutive debate, rich 
communities, specialist and non specialist interaction and glimpses of the ‘afterlife’ 
of science will make the Internet very much worth the attention of historians and 
sociologists of science.
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Conclusion
Negotiation in the directed mutation debate has been protracted, and the 
controversy has not been resolved. The traditional approach to scientific 
controversy is end-directed and would see this episode as pending closure. 
Treatments of conflict in science have a teleological tendency, and suffer from 
problems of asymmetry akin to present-centredness. The circumstances that have 
perpetuated negotiation would not receive particular attention.
I have argued that protracted controversies have their own character, and 
that it is their perpetuation that makes them interesting. I suggest that identifying 
the active principles of perpetuation reveals the structure and dynamics of these 
complex conflicts. In this thesis I have identified six categories of perpetuating 
force that have been active in the directed mutation debate. These factors 
contributed impediments to negotiation and closure; they shaped the very nature 
of the debate. I argue that the language of perpetuating forces allows a more 
thorough analysis of long running controversies in science. I suggest that the 
categories I have identified, alongside possible others, might provide a tool for 
revealing the anatomy of protracted controveries more generally.
To enable this analysis of perpetuating forces in the directed mutation 
debate I have suggested some modifications to existing methodology. 
Sociological tools prove the most profitable for this analysis, but I have also 
argued that tools from the older essentialist tradition can be salvaged to bolster 
analyses. Gieryn’s boundary work has been applied throughout to reveal the 
directed mutation debate as (i) an instance of the ongoing struggle for authority 
between Darwinians and Lamarckians and (ii) an inter-disciplinary struggle for 
authority between molecular biologists and evolutionary biologists. To improve 
the analytical power of boundary theory in this project I have pursued two of 
Gieryn’s suggestions for extensions to his theory: I have examined the role of old 
maps in the negotiation of directed mutation, and I have refined the cartographic 
gaze to examine boundaries within science as well as those between science and 
the other terrritories.
I have provided a detailed case study of the directed mutation debate and 
have illustrated that this debate has two aspects -  one being the immediate 
dissent related to the bacterial anomaly of directed mutation, the other being a
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broader conflict between Lamarckian and Darwinian interpretations of evolution. 
I have demonstrated that the second aspect complicated negotiation and made 
resolution a remote possibility. I have shown that the directed mutation debate 
was first conducted by a core-set in the constitutive forum, but that later it was 
taken up by a much larger community as negotiation began on the Internet.
I have argued that the historical legacies of the directed mutation debate, 
and the invocation of old maps associated with those legacies, have acted as 
forces of perpetuation. I have demonstrated that a strongly pro-Darwinian and 
anti-Lamarckian context existed in the late twentieth century, and that directed 
mutation was necessarily negotiated in relation to that context. I have argued that 
late twentieth century Darwinian theory is subject to defence that is best 
described with Kuhn’s familiar language of parardigms. That defence asserted 
additional requirements of proof and refutation on the advocates of directed 
mutation. Meanwhile, the Lamarckian implications of directed mutation forced a 
negative legacy of defamation on the new claims. I have shown that while 
twentieth century records assert the triumph of Darwinism, they also insist that 
Lamarckism is defeated. These identities of Lamarckism and Darwinism are 
recorded on old maps, that have been unfurled and deployed during the directed 
mutation debate. I show that the record on the old maps is not historically 
accurate, but rather is the sum of twentieth century boundary work to assert these 
identities of the two theories in service to certain groups interests. In particular, I 
have shown that a range of dogmas have arisen in evolutionary biology to 
support the old map details, and that meanwhile the actual histoiy of Lamarckian 
support in the twentieth century has been obfuscated and manipulated to support 
the notion of Darwinian triumph. I have shown that old maps are created by 
boundary work and then are used for boundary.
I have demonstrated that the clash of molecular biologists and 
evolutionary biologists in the directed mutation debate added an additional layer 
to the conflict, complicating negotiation. I have described this feature of the 
debate as an authority struggle between these disciplinary groups, and argued 
that their activites can be seen as boundary work for expansion versus boundaiy 
work for protection respectively. I have argued that the different epistemologies, 
methodologies and practice between the disciplines made them ill-suited to 
conduct negotiation between them. I have shown that the groups did not agree on
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methods of negotiation, or even on what might constitute closure. I have 
demonstrated a similar situation in the cold fusion debate.
I have argued that advocacy can be one of the most important 
perpetuating forces in controversy. I have shown that in the case of directed 
mutation John Cairn’s advocacy has been a key force in prolonging the debate. I 
have provided a detailed biography for Cairns and a full bibliography. I have 
assesed his input and shown that he was a highly respected scientist, who tended 
towards involvement with controversy late in his career. I have characterised his 
advocacy as ‘loud’ and contrasted his style with Barry Hall’s advocacy which I 
characterise as ‘quiet’. I have demonstrated the broader applicability of these 
terms by illustrating an analogous case of loud and quiet advocacy in the cold 
fusion debate.
Finally I have shown that a key factor in the perpetuation of the directed 
mutation debate has been its huge change in scale and meaning as a result of 
uptake in what I call the ‘Internet forum’. I have argued that the Internet forum 
should be added to the classification that identifies the constitutive and 
contingent forums, being recognised as a third discrete arena for the negotiation 
of scientific controversy. I contend that understanding the role of the Internet will 
be increasingly essential to understanding the structure and dynamics of late- 
twentieth and twenty-first century scientific debates. I have shown how the scale 
of Internet negotiation and the invasion of new interests that it permits, 
influenced the directed mutation debate, and contributed to its protraction. I 
suggest that neither the familiar categories of closure that science studies has 
relied upon, nor notions of discredit, are valid in this arena, and that we must 
assume a new attitude towards the ends of conflicts to understand these new 
circumstances. I have also demonstrated that boundary theory is not suited to the 
analysis o f Internet based phases of debate. In the Internet forum adjacency 
breaks down and the cartographic metaphor is lost. I suggest that new tools will 
be needed for Internet analysis. I have illustrated the commonality of scale 
change and diversification of debates in the Internet forum through a discussion 
of the analogous case of the water memory controversy.
Overall, this project has aimed to contribute a novel analysis of 
negotiation in service to what might emerge as a specific anatomy of protracted 
scientific controversies. I have suggested that shifting focus from modes of
292
closure to forces of perpetuation might enble this richer analsyis of negotiation. I 
have a shown that exisiting methodology can be salvaged and put to use in that 
project, but that in general we must change some attitudes and assumptions 
regarding the nature of scientific conflict.
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Appendix 1: Project Design & Method
I first heard about directed mutation during an undergraduate lecture. I was studying 
for a BSc in Biological Sciences at Exeter University. My final year specialist 
subject, evolutionary genetics, was being taught by Head of Department Professor 
Mark Macnair. This particular lecture focussed on the two tenets of Neo-Darwinian 
theory: the one being phyletic gradualism - which expresses that evolution has 
occurred in tiny, imperceptible, steps throughout time, rather than by sudden 
changes or saltations; the other being that the mutations that fuel selection arise at 
random, and do not have any relation to utility in respect of the demands of the 
environment at a given time. Professor Macnair mentioned challenges that had been 
made to each of these tenets. In relation to phyletic gradualism he referred to 
Eldredge and Gould’s controversial theory o f ‘punctuated equilibria’, and in relation 
to the randomness of mutation he referred to John Cairns hypothesis of environment 
directed mutation in bacteria. Recommended reading for that session was Cairns’ 
1988 ‘The origin of mutants’ and Eldredge and Gould’s 1972 ‘Punctuated equilibria: 
an alternative to phyletic gradualism’. In the context of this lecture these two cases 
were being raised as object lessons against challenging the tenets of Neo-Darwinian 
theory. The three authors were presented as mavericks, whose work had been 
refuted. This was in 1998.
Following the lecture I searched for Cairns 1988 paper in the journal Nature 
and was also directed by the indexing search tool to Patricia Foster and Franklin 
Stahl’s early 1990s contributions to the debate that Cairns paper had instigated. I 
read a handful of these papers out of curiosity. A contradiction was immediately 
obvious: Cairn’s directed mutation theory, which had been presented as an 
unsuccessful challenge to a tenet of Darwinian theory, in fact, appeared to have 
sparked a long running debate and presented a substantial challenge to existing 
theory. Having spent two years as a science student learning about the value of proof 
and refutation to the scientific endeavour I was surprised to find that Cairns’ 
research was repeatable and yet not accepted.
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Around this time my peers and I were designing final year projects which 
would form the basis for our dissertations. I had written a proposal for a study of 
trends in the British badger population since 1985, but, having been intrigued by 
Cairns’ directed mutation experiments, I decided to change my project. I asked 
professor Macnair to act as my supervisor, and suggested that I might make a project 
of replicating Cairn’s original Harvard experiments, with a view to judging their 
repeatability. The experiments would have been relatively inexpensive, using only 
cheap materials and taking up limited laboratory space. Professor Macnair suggested 
that this plan might be a precarious one, since if the experiments failed there would 
be little material for a write up. Instead he suggested that I take a theoretical 
approach, creating a literature review on the topic and discussing how directed 
mutation related to Neo-Darwinian theory. Therefore, over the next few months I 
wrote: ‘The Darwinian paradigm: does modem adherence to Darwinism damage the 
objective aspirations of science.’
I had read the journal articles that had informed ten years of debate. Cairns’ 
experiments had been repeated, and extended to other genetic systems and even 
other unicellular organisms. The molecular biological phenomenon that had been 
described by the Harvard team seemed to exist. However, the Lamarckian language 
that Cairns had used, and the assault that his research had made to Darwinian theory 
had created substantial dissent. While bacterial directed mutation could be 
demonstrated, a non-Darwinian theory for mechanism meant that it remained 
controversial. It was my feeling that I had uncovered an instance of science not 
working.
In the months after graduating from my degree programme I continued to 
think about the directed mutation debate, and kept up to date about developments in 
the debate online. Within months I had begun to design a PhD project that would 
allow me to study this debate further. With my training as a biological scientist the 
obvious choice was laboratory based research, focussing on repetition and extension 
of the work that had been done on directed mutation. As such my project offered to 
allow me not only to study the debate, but also to actually engage in it. I made 
contact with a number of molecular biologists and bacterial geneticists in the
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London area, where I was living by this time, and met with several potential 
supervisors. One of the academics I met with was Dr Armand Leroi, an evolutionary 
biologist at Imperial College London’s Berkshire-based biological sciences 
department at Silwood Park.. We spent an afternoon discussing possible research 
strategies and funding options. We discussed the non-Darwinian implications of 
directed mutation, and talked about the potential problems these might provoke in 
terms of funding. The Lamarckian associations of directed mutation were difficult to 
avoid. This led on to a discussion of the wider issue of the pervasive influence of 
Darwinism on contemporary research and the fate of Darwinian dissenters in 
evolutionary biology. We thought that, perhaps there might be a theoretical project 
that discussed these issues, and used directed mutation as a case study to examine 
the state of late twentieth century evolutionary biology. Before I left Silwood Park 
Dr Leroi made a phone call to a colleague on the South Kensington campus of 
Imperial College, and arranged a meeting for me to discuss a potential theoretical 
project on the Lamarckian versus Darwinian debate.
A few weeks later I met Dr David Edgerton in Imperial College London’s 
Centre for the History of Science, Technology and Medicine. He explained to me the 
kinds of perspective that the history, philosophy and sociology of science could offer 
to this kind of project. The aspect of the debate that had really interested me was the 
core dissent between the Darwinian mainstream and the advocates of directed 
mutation. I realised that theoretical work of the kind that Dr Edgerton was describing 
would allow me to explore the conflict from that perspective. I did not have to get 
involved in the debate in order to offer a commentary on its dynamics. On Dr 
Edgerton’s advice I enrolled in an MSc course in the History of Science, Technology 
and Medicine. From the autumn of 2000 I studied in the London Centre for Science, 
Technology and Medicine, which combined the resources of Imperial College 
London, University College London, The Wellcome Trust and the London Science 
Museum. During the Masters programme I gained the historiographic and 
methodological skills that I would need to design and carry out a project within this 
discipline.
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During the MSc I met many historians of science, and often discussed my 
case study and potential project with them. It seemed that there were many ways of 
conducting the kind of research that interested me. Amongst these academics was Dr 
Joe Cain from the Department of Science and Technology Studies at University 
College London (UCL). Dr Cain is a historian of biology, and has a special interest 
in evolutionary biology and twentieth century biology. Our interests overlapped 
significantly, and Dr Cain’s interests made him an ideal candidate to supervise my 
project with its focus on very recent history. Dr Cain agreed to be my PhD 
supervisor, and, whilst finishing the Masters programme, I set about designing my 
research methodology and completing a more in depth literature review of the 
directed mutation debate. The case study for the project came together very easily. It 
was intended as a non-analytical section of the thesis, which would function as a 
resource for analysis in subsequent chapters. It required updating periodically, since 
I was committed to keeping my account relevant by keeping track of the dynamics 
of the debate as it unfolded. The analytical challenge was to find a way to evaluate 
the structure and dynamics of this debate. I wanted to discuss the very nature of 
Darwinian dissent in the late twentieth century, and more specifically, to look at the 
fortunes of Lamarckism in this context. Dr Cain and I agreed that this could be best 
achieved by first building an account of the nature of twentieth century adherence to 
Darwinian evolutionary biology; that I should seek the origins of Darwinism and 
trace those to the modem day. Alongside this account would appear a counter 
history of the fortunes of Lamarckism during the same period. This strategy would 
serve to contextualise the different treatments of Darwinism and Lamarckism in 
modem biology. Problems arose in relation to this strategy. In relation to building an 
account of the rise of Darwinism Dr Cain and I shared the concern that this approach 
amounted to ‘reinventing the wheel’. The literature by no means lacked an account 
of the synthesis period, it only lacked a version of the history told for my specific 
purpose. On the contrary, it appeared that a history of Lamarckism was almost 
entirely missing from the literature. With Darwinism in its ascendancy during the 
mid-late twentieth century the concurrent history of Lamarckism seemed to have 
been obfuscated. Rebuilding this history and rediscovering Lamarckian advocates
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and their stories would be a larger project that could be attended to in one aspect of 
my thesis. Recovering that history would be a PhD project in itself. So, alongside a 
non-analytical account of the history of the directed mutation debate I was left with a 
derivative account of the synthetic period, and a subsequent speculative discussion 
of the paradigmatic nature of Darwinism in modem biology and the problems this 
caused for dissenters. In this format the originality criteria for the project were in 
jeopardy.
Dr Cain suggested that one possible solution to these methodological 
problems would be to include oral history in my project. The idea would be to 
interview evolutionary biologists and obtain their accounts of the status of 
Darwinism and Lamarckism in modem biology and to question them about their 
experiences. Perhaps, in this way, adherence to Darwinism in modem evolutionary 
biology might be traced as a function of teaching and training in science. The 
advocates of directed mutation could be asked about their experience as dissenters in 
evolutionary biology. I began to consider the content of such interviews and who the 
appropriate interviewees might be.
At the same time Dr Cain suggested that my largely historical approach 
might be bolstered by attention to the sociology of science, and I began to read about 
the methodological tools that sociology had contributed to science studies. The UCL 
PhD programme required me to have a secondary supervisor to support Dr Cain’s 
mentorship. Sociologist of science, Dr Jane Gregory was suggested. I meet with Dr 
Gregory over the coming weeks and she guided me towards some key readings in 
the sociology of science. In particular she recommended that I look into boundary 
work theory.
I read sociologist Thomas Gieryn’s ‘Cultural Boundaries of Science’, and at 
once saw an alternative strategy for telling the story I was trying to construct in the 
thesis. Using the cartographic metaphor, as Gieryn had done to assess the relative 
authority of the cultural domains, I could express the history of the rise of 
Darwinism as a progressive struggle for extended authority. I could also contrast 
Darwinism and Lamarckism in terms of their relative authority and explain the 
difference in terms of their advocates’ success or failure at having garnered cultural
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authority. In the language that Gieryn offered I could frame the directed mutation 
debate as a challenge to the established authority structures in evolutionary biology, 
with the advocates and adversaries in this debate in conflict regarding the 
appropriate boundaries and thus authority of Darwinian evolutionary biology. The 
sociology of science had provided a lens through which to better view my case study 
and the historical legacy which had informed its context.
Dr Gregory also encouraged me to pursue oral history, particularly in the 
case of John Caims, whose style of advocacy formed an important part of the case 
study story. In 2001 I managed to contact Professor Caims in Oxford, where he had 
retired. By this time he was in his eighties. Caims very kindly assisted me in 
building a thorough account of the directed mutation debate. Through emails and 
letters over a period of a year he directed me towards additional materials, patiently 
explained the details of methodological debates and guided me as I identified a key 
cast of characters in this debate. Caims also offered some valuable insights into 
aspects of the debate that had accompanied the journal publications. He told me that 
he had in engaged directly with a number of molecular biologists and evolutionary 
biologists in an exchange of letters, often dealing directly with others 
methodological queries or complaints without waiting for the lengthy process of 
journal publication to address each small point. All this provided a wonderful insight 
into Cairns’ role as an advocate. In particular, Caims referred me to a series of 
letters he had exchanged with evolutionary biologist Bruce Levin. Levin had been a 
harsh critic of Cairns’ interpretation of the Harvard bacterial experiments. Levin’s 
student Richard Lenski became a key critic in the journal debate, while Levin 
himself debated the issue directly with Caims through private letters. Caims had 
kept some record of their exchanges and was willing for me to see them with 
Levin’s permission, but when I approached him by email, Levin suggested that the 
letters wouldn’t be very revealing and that there was little point in my seeing them. 
Levin did, however, share with me some of his thoughts on methodology and the 
appropriate interpretation of the directed mutation phenomenon. He suggested I 
look at Lenski and Mittler’s publications as a source of ‘reason’ on the subject. 
Around this time both Caims and Levin encouraged me to contact Patricia Foster,
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since they both considered her to be an authority on directed mutation. I 
subsequently exchanged some emails with Foster and she again assisted by directing 
me towards materials and clarifying some aspects of the molecular biological debate 
which by 2001-2002 had become very complicated and specialist.
Although the contacts that I had made with the ‘core set’ were revealing at 
some levels, it soon became clear that this research approach would have limited 
usefulness to my overall project. While both advocates and adversaries could shed 
light on the dynamics of this debate and reveal further details of their views than 
might their papers’ alone, they were not able to provide material that would be 
helpful in the more analytical areas of the thesis. As each provided me with 
information they did so often with the expressed hope that I would be grinding an 
evaluative axe in my history of the events of the debate. At its extremes for some of 
the advocates this became almost an appeal for vindication, and for the adversaries 
an appeal for validation of their critique. Had the project just been the recreation of a 
rich narrative describing the events and characters in this debate, there would have 
been merit in pursuing oral history further. However, with the project designed to 
address the broader issue of Lamarckian and Darwinian histories, the notion of being 
taking hostage (See Chapter 1, p40) by the subjects of my study became a very real 
concern. So having pursued an oral history approach for just over a year I concluded 
that the approach had provided as much information as would be useful in this 
context.
Unfortunately ill health forced me to take time away from research between 
2003 and 2005. I eventually returned to the thesis, working part time and at that 
point turned my attention to the remaining analytical chapters. Chapter 5 was 
intended as an analysis of the role of the internet in the directed mutation debate. I 
hoped to offer some general statements from this analysis regarding the role of the 
online community in contemporary science. Dr Joe Cain had initially encouraged me 
to pursue this issue, and so back in 2000 I had made a review of the debate online 
and I had carried out a quantitative analysis, looking at every source that referred to 
the debate and making a short summary of its contribution. When I returned to my 
research in 2005 this seemed an ideal time to make a second review, enabling a
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comparison to be made between the debate online in 2000 and 2005 and thus 
shedding light on the dynamics of this aspect of the debate.
In 2007 I began to construct the thesis, compiling the analytical material that 
would stand alongside the case study chapter that I had written earlier. The case 
study needed some updating, but was otherwise complete. This was a chapter length 
narrative describing the structure and dynamics of the directed mutation debate. This 
had originally been intended as Chapter 1 of the thesis, with the analytical material 
proceeding from it. Having adopted a sociological approach, and having created a 
synthetic methodology from the sociology and philosophy of science, I decided to 
alter the thesis structure to some extent. The case study became Chapter 2, allowing 
Chapter 1 to be taken up with a literature review and description of my 
methodology, thereby providing me with the opportunity to begin by describing the 
merit of ‘boundary theory’ as a lens through which to view my case study. In the 
process of designing the thesis I had come to realise that boundary theory was the 
most broadly useful tool for analysing this debate, and that it allowed the activities 
of advocates and adversaries to be revealed in new lights. In Chapter 1 I described 
the philosophical and historical tools that could contribute to my methodology, I 
highlighted sociological approaches that could enhance my analysis, and worked 
towards the conclusion that boundary theory was overall the most practical tool for 
my analysis. Thus the structure of the argument throughout Chapter 1 effectively 
mirrored my own intellectual journey, as I had considered first historical and 
philosophical tools and then realised the merit of sociology and in particular 
boundary theory.
Making my methodology explicit at the beginning of the thesis in a detailed 
account allowed me to highlight the contribution that I wanted to make to boundary 
theory through this study. Thomas Gieryn, the architect of boundary theory, had 
suggested some areas for further research. In his view, attention to interdisciplinarity 
and to the potential stability of authority structures was required. My case study 
provided the perfect opportunity for exploring these themes, since it encompassed an 
interdisciplinary conflict, and dealt with the long term stable authority which had 
become attached to Darwinian theory. Thus, I also used Chapter 1 to express my
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intention to extend boundary theoiy, bringing to the fore one of the original 
contributions that I hoped to make.
Chapter 2, the case study, remained a largely non-analytical narrative as I 
had originally intended. The account that I had first begun to construct some years 
earlier from key journal articles was brought up to date, and had been bolstered by 
additional material from some oral history investigation. Locating the case study 
after a chapter on methodology perhaps helped to highlight key themes for the 
reader: the contest for authority, interdisciplinarity and advocacy. It was my 
intention that this narrative serve a dual function; being first a source for the 
forthcoming analysis in my subsequent chapters, but also providing a stand-alone 
resource for other researchers who might make use of a developed case study of a 
debate within evolutionary biology. In that sense, I hoped that even a largely non- 
analytical chapter might make a contribution to the wider discourse.
In its final form the thesis was designed to have three analytical chapters, 
each following from the case study and developing a specific theme in relation to the 
that narrative. Chapter 3 dealt with the historical legacies of Lamarckism and 
Darwinism. As described above, this chapter had proved difficult to construct. I had 
discovered relatively early on that a plainly historical approach was rather 
redundant. With the sociological focus, that the thesis had by this time developed, 
the historical account of the rise of Darwinism was replaced by a sociological 
account of this well studied period in biology. Rather than re-stating this history for 
my own purposes, as I had originally set out to do, rather I used boundary theory to 
describe the means by which the advocates of Darwinism had sought to acquire 
increasing authority for Darwinism. Thus, I was able to retell this well known 
history from the perspective of the boundary objectives of the Darwinian advocates 
of this period. Also, I was able to reframe the lost history of Lamarckism as a 
function of the progressive rise of Darwinism and of the interests of its advocates. In 
this way the redundant ‘reinventing’ of the synthetic period was avoided, and this 
chapter was able to contribute a new perspective on this history as well as putting 
boundary theory to work against a well known historical case of authority struggle.
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In this chapter I also tackled one of the extensions to boundary work that I 
had outlined in Chapter 1: I demonstrated that the authority of Darwinism has not 
been local and episodic, but rather has been stable over a long period and throughout 
a number of authority contests. I used the language of ‘old maps’ to describe the 
unquestioned, tacit assumptions that lead to the stability of some authority 
allocations. Thus I was able to provide a rich sense of the context for non-Darwinian 
work in the late twentieth century, as I had originally hoped to do in this chapter.
Having used history and sociology in Chapter 3 to demonstrate the 
difficulties with carrying out non-Darwinian work in the late twentieth century, I 
wanted to explore the possible motivations of researchers taking on this daunting 
task. In particular I wanted to ask: why be a Lamarckian in the late twentieth 
century? In Chapter 4, using the directed mutation case study as a starting point, I 
explored advocacy as a means by which to understand the interests of non- 
Darwinian researchers. My analysis was based on a close study of the advocacy 
undertaken by John Caims during the directed mutation debate. In order to achieve 
this I provided a complete biography and bibliography for Caims, seeking to 
contextualise his work on directed mutation within his long and prestigious career. It 
was in this task that the oral history I had undertaken proved perhaps most useful. 
My communication with Caims allowed me to piece together a very complete 
account of his multinational career, a task that would not have been possible from 
secondary sources alone. I argued that there are different styles of advocacy, and 
used a supporting case study to show the greater generality of the styles of advocacy 
that I had identified in the case of directed mutation. I argued that some styles of 
advocacy were more suited to non-Darwinian work than others.
In Chapter 4 I also addressed the issue of interdisciplinarity. The narrative 
case study had shown that an interdisciplinary contest for authority was at the heart 
of the directed mutation debate. I extended the language of boundary theoiy to 
describe this contest between specialist groups within biology. As suggested in 
Chapter 1, I extended the value of boundary theoiy to analyses of contests within 
science as well as between science and other areas of culture. To achieve this I 
offered a characterisation of molecular biology and evolutionary biology, and
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considered the stakes and interests related to conflict within each of these 
disciplines. I was able to show that boundary theory has the capacity to explore the 
circumstances of disputes within science.
Using the data that I had collected in 2000 and 2005 I constructed Chapter 5 
as a largely empirical study of the change of scale and content conferred on the 
directed mutation debate by its uptake in the Internet forum. I argued that scale 
change and diversification are likely to be outcomes of uptake of debates online, due 
to the nature of participation on the Internet. I included a study of water memory and 
homeopathy to demonstrate the generality of the themes that I had discussed. In this 
chapter, I also reviewed the attempts that have been made to visualize the Internet, 
and argued that the nature of this new environment for debate makes much of our 
existing methodology for conflict studies redundant, and its language obsolete. This 
had become apparent to me through the process of attempting to apply the terms of 
boundary theory to this new space. The scope of this thesis did not allow me to offer 
resolution of these methodological problems, but I did highlight some ways in which 
the Internet might be studied, and some appropriate questions that might be asked 
about scientific debate online.
Making this range of analyses in relation to directed mutation created an 
eclectic thesis. I had highlighted points of interest from my case study debate and 
explored a range of these in detail. The unifying feature of my analyses had occurred 
to me when designing the content of Chapters 3 and 4. What had originally 
interested me in this debate had been its protraction. It seemed unsolvable, since, 
while science was borne out through repetition, agreement concerning legitimacy 
could not be reached. It occurred to me that the points of interest that I had identified 
in the debate were in fact the very agents of the protraction. To create a unifying 
theme for the project I was thus able to frame the project as a search for the features 
that had perpetuated the directed mutation debate, and impeded its resolution. Thus, 
the chapters subsequent to the case study each reveal particular aspects of the debate 
that I term ‘perpetuating forces’. Overall, this has given me the opportunity to argue 
that long running debates in science have a particular character, and that that 
character is conferred by the active forces which prolong the debate. Throughout the
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thesis I hope to have made a contribution to the ongoing study of scientific conflict 
by showing that the perpetuating forces I have identified in this project are perhaps 
part of a common anatomy of long running debates.
In conclusion, what appears in the final thesis had been achieved by a 
number of methods. The case study had been constructed from literature review, and 
further details provided by oral history. An account of the history of Darwinism and 
Lamarckism had been reconstructed from secondary literature viewed through the 
lens of boundary work theory. An account of the role of advocacy in the debate had 
been constructed partly from a discourse analysis of primary journal materials, and 
had been bolstered by Cairns’ oral history account. Cairns’ biography, which 
supplemented the chapter dealing with advocacy, had been constructed from 
literature review and Caims’ own account of his contributions. Finally, the chapter 
dealing with the role of the Internet had been constructed from an empirical survey 
carried out between 2000 and 2005. I stress in Chapter 1 of this thesis that a 
combined methodology has been used to allow the analysis undertaken in this thesis. 
I suggest here that combined methods have also been key to the approach taken in 
this research.
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Appendix 2: The Directed Mutation Debate: Cast of Characters
David Baltimore - Molecular biologist. Discovered the enzyme reverse 
transcriptase simultaneously with Howard Temin in 1970. This enzyme allows the 
transfer of information between RNA and DNA, undermining the dogma of 
unidirectional information transfer from DNA via RNA to protein that Francis Crick 
had asserted. Crick’s dogma barred the route for environment communication with 
DNA and thus for environment control of mutation and ultimately evolution. 
Reverse transcriptase opened part of the route of communication, making 
environment directed mutation potentially possible. Thus, reverse transcriptase was 
often cited by advocates of directed mutation as a possible factor in the mechanism 
of the process they described.
John Cairns -  Molecular biologist. Esteemed virologist, public health scientist and 
cancer researcher. Caims was director of the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory of 
Quantitative Biology during its 1960s heyday. See Chapter 4 for a full biography 
and Appendix 3 for a full bibliography. Lead advocate in the directed mutation 
debate. He proposed and defended the ‘strong’ versions of directed mutation theory, 
advocating non-Darwinian, and possibly even Lamarckian, interpretations of the 
bacterial phenomenon that his team first identified in 1988. He took on many duties 
as an advocate; answering critics in journals and through private correspondence, 
recruiting supporters, proposing mechanistic theories and repeating and confirming 
others’ experiments. As advanced age distanced him form active research his mantle 
was taken on by Patricia Foster, his former graduate student.
Francis Crick -  Molecular biologist. Co-discoverer of the structure of the DNA 
molecule. In 1970 he asserted the unidirectional transfer of information from DNA 
via RNA to protein, calling this ‘the central dogma of molecular genetics’ [Crick, F. 
(1970)]. That dogma barred the route for environment communication with / and 
modification of the DNA, thus precluding environment directed mutation of the kind
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that Caims proposed in the late 1980s. Crick’s dogma was undermined within a year 
when Howard Temin and David Baltimore simultaneously discovered reverse 
transcriptase, an enzyme which allowed information transfer from RNA to DNA.
Max Delbruck -  Biophysicist / Microbiologist. Collaborated with Max Delbruck at 
Cold Spring Harbor during the 1940s to create the ‘fluctuation test’ [Luria, S. & 
Delbruck, M. (1943)]. This test was designed to demonstrate that bacterial mutation 
and evolution was random with respect to the specific demands of the environment. 
They wanted to prove that pressure from the environment to achieve a certain 
mutation, and thus adaptation, did not increase the likelihood that the mutation 
would occur. They wanted to demonstrate the Darwinian assertion that mutation is 
random and that adaptation is based upon chance mutational events coupled to 
selection; that evolution is not directed by the environment. Their test became the 
key proof for this tenet of Darwinism. In the 1980s the advocates of directed 
mutation had to overcome the refutation of their findings by the precedent of the 
Luria and Delbruck assay. Advocates of directed mutation identified problems in 
Luria and Delbruck’s design and argued that the fluctuation test did not refute the 
kind of environment directed mutation that Cairn’s team had identified. Invocation 
of the fluctuation test by critics of directed mutation, versus defence of directed 
mutation theory against the precedent of the fluctuation test, characterised the first 
years of the journal based debate that I describe in Chapter 2.
Patricia Foster -  Molecular biologist. Graduate student in Caim’s Harvard 
laboratory during the 1980s. Co-authored with Caims on several occasions, 
supporting his strong versions of directed mutation theory. Progressively took over 
from Caims as lead advocate of directed mutation during the 1990s. Working 
throughout the mid -  late 1990s to uncover details of mechanism for the bacterial 
system that Caim’s Harvard team had identified in 1988.
Barry Hall -  Molecular biologist. Worked on a process of adaptive mutation in 
bacteria that was essentially the same as the activity that Caim’s team would term
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‘directed mutation’ in 1988. Hall conducted his research on this phenomenon 
without inciting controversy. He did not emphasise non-Darwinian implications of 
the bacterial system, and made no mention of the Lamarckian echoes that Caim’s 
team would later highlight. Hall continued to work on directed mutation after 
Caim’s team made the subject controversial, but did so with a moderate approach, 
seeking to interpret the system within Neo-Darwinism. Hall’s advocacy of directed 
mutation complemented Caim’s. He offered a weak model alongside Caim’s strong 
model, and made directed mutation more palatable to Neo-Darwinians. Hall became 
the lead advocate of the hypermutation model of directed mutation. This model 
allowed that the mutations occurring be determined to a degree by the environment, 
but limited this kind of genetic behaviour to bacteria and some other unicells. Hall’s 
hypermutation model has been favoured by advocates of directed mutation since the 
mid 1990s, largely supplanting Caim’s more inflammatory strong model. Hall’s 
hypermutation theory for directed mutation has been largely accepted as a feature of 
bacterial genetics.
Richard Lenski -  Evolutionary biologist. Trained in Bruce Levin’s laboratory. 
Lenski co-authored several papers on directed mutation with his former PhD student 
John Mittler. From 1990 these two evolutionary biologists were the principal critics 
of Caim’s research and of the non-Darwinian interpretation of directed mutation. 
They persistently recalled the precedent of the Luria and Delbruck assay as evidence 
against directed mutation. They encouraged a reinterpretation of the data within the 
framework of Neo-Darwinism and argued strongly against any invocation of 
Lamarckism.
Bruce Levin -  Evolutionary biologist. Trained Richard Lenski, who in turn trained 
John Mittler. These three evolutionary biologists were the key critics of directed 
mutation during the 1980s and 1990s, arguing against any Lamarckian interpretation 
of the Harvard findings. While Lenski and Mittler co-authored many papers on the 
subject, Levin instead engaged directly with John Caims in a prolonged private 
exchange of letters concerning directed mutation.
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Salvador Luria -  Microbiologist. Collaborated with Max Delbruck at Cold Spring 
Harbor during the 1940s to create the ‘fluctuation test’ [Luria, S. & Delbruck, M. 
(1943)]. This test was designed to demonstrate that bacterial mutation and evolution 
was random with respect to the specific demands of the environment. They wanted 
to prove that pressure from the environment to achieve a certain mutation, and thus 
adaptation, did not increase the likelihood that the mutation would occur. They 
wanted to demonstrate the Darwinian assertion that mutation is random and that 
adaptation is based upon chance mutational events coupled to selection; that 
evolution is not directed by the environment. Their test became the key proof for this 
tenet of Darwinism. In the 1980s the advocates of directed mutation had to 
overcome the refutation of their findings by the precedent of the Luria and Delbruck 
assay. Advocates of directed mutation identified problems in Luria and Delbruck’s 
design and argued that the fluctuation test did not refute the kind of environment 
directed mutation that Caim’s team had identified. Invocation of the fluctuation test 
by critics of directed mutation, versus defence of directed mutation theory against 
the precedent of the fluctuation test, characterised the first years of the journal based 
debate that I describe in Chapter 2.
John Mittler -  Evolutionary biologist. A student of both Richard Lenski (PhD) and 
Bruce Levin (Postdoctoral research). Mittler co-authored several papers on directed 
mutation with Lenski. From 1990 these two evolutionary biologists were the 
principal critics of Caim’s research and of the non-Darwinian interpretation of 
directed mutation. They persistently recalled the precedent of the Luria and 
Delbruck assay as evidence against directed mutation. They encouraged a 
reinterpretation of the data within the framework of Neo-Darwinism and argued 
strongly against any invocation of Lamarckism.
Susan Rosenberg -  Molecular biologist. Joined the directed mutation debate in the 
mid-1990s working to provide much needed mechanistic data. Her prolific 
experiments generated a vast amount of new empirical data, giving the debate a
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much needed boost in this period. Alongside Patricia Foster, Rosenberg became a 
lead advocate of directed mutation theory after 1995.
Franklin Stahl -  Molecular biologist. During the 1950s Stahl discovered the mode 
of replication of DNA, alongside geneticist Matthew Meselson. During the directed 
mutation debate Stahl wrote three important review articles on directed mutation. 
[Stahl, F. (1988); Stahl, F. (1990); Stahl, F. (1992)] In these he encouraged that 
scientists be open minded in their appraisal of directed mutation, so as not to over 
look exciting innovations on account of adherence to dogma. He offered his own 
theoretical mechanism for directed mutation, bolstering the credibility of Caims 
findings.
Edward Steele -  Molecular biologist / Immunologist. During the 1970s and 1980s 
Steele developed the controversial theory of acquired immunity. This suggested that 
immunity acquired during an organism’s lifetime could alter its DNA and thus be 
passed on to offspring generations. This presupposed a route of communication 
between the environment and the DNA. Acquired immunity defies the rules of 
Darwinism, particularly Crick’s central dogma, which has barred the route for 
communication between the environment and DNA. More significantly, in Steele’s 
presentation acquired immunity represents a vindication of Lamarckian principles, 
and illustrates that an entirely different interpretation of evolution may be required. 
Steele invoked Temin & Baltimore’s reverse transcriptase enzyme as the agent of 
the environment to DNA communication. His theory has now been widely accepted, 
although his Lamarckian styling for the system has been rejected. Steele began a 
priority dispute with Caims in the late 1980s, after Caims invoked reverse 
transcriptase in his proposed mechanism for directed mutation. This dispute was 
amicably resolved shortly afterwards [Steele, E. & Caims, J. (1989)]
Howard Temin -  Molecular biologist. Discovered the enzyme reverse transcriptase 
simultaneously with David Baltimore in 1970. This enzyme allows the transfer of 
information between RNA and DNA, undermining the dogma of unidirectional
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information transfer from DNA via RNA to protein that Francis Crick had asserted. 
Crick’s dogma barred the route for environment communication with DNA and thus 
for environment control of mutation and thus evolution. Reverse transcriptase 
opened part of the route of communication, making possible environment directed 
mutation. Thus, reverse transcriptase was often cited by advocates of directed 
mutation as a possible factor in the mechanism of the process they described.
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